“Does the one also partake of time? And, in partaking of time, is it and does it come to be both younger and older than, and neither younger nor older than, itself and the others?”—“How so?”—“If in fact one is, being surely belongs to it.”—“Yes.”—“But is to be simply partaking of being [152] with time present, just as was is communion with being together with time past, and, in turn, will be is communion with being together with time future?”—“Yes, it is.”—“So the one partakes of time, if in fact it partakes of being.”—“Certainly.”
“Of time advancing?”—“Yes.”—“So the one always comes to be older than itself, if in fact it goes forward in step with time.”—“Necessarily.”—“Do we recall that the older comes to be older than something that comes to be younger?”—“We do.”—“So, since the one comes to be older than itself, wouldn’t it come to be older than a self that comes to be younger?”—[b] “Necessarily.”—“Thus it indeed comes to be both younger and older than itself.”—“Yes.”
“But it is older, isn’t it, whenever, in coming to be, it is at the now time, between was and will be? For as it proceeds from the past to the future, it certainly won’t jump over the now.”—“No, it won’t.”—“Doesn’t it stop [c] coming to be older when it encounters the now? It doesn’t come to be, but is then already older, isn’t it? For if it were going forward, it could never be grasped by the now. A thing going forward is able to lay hold of both the now and the later – releasing the now and reaching for the later, while coming to be between the two, the later and the now.”—“True.”—“But if nothing that comes to be can sidestep the now, whenever a thing is at this point, it always stops its coming-to-be and then is whatever [d] it may have come to be.”—“Apparently.”—“So, too, the one: whenever, in coming to be older, it encounters the now, it stops its coming-to-be and is then older.”—“Of course.”—“So it also is older than that very thing it was coming to be older than – and wasn’t it coming to be older than itself?”—“Yes.”—“And the older is older than a younger?”—“It is.”—“So the one is then also younger than itself, whenever, in its coming-to-be older, it encounters the now.”—“Necessarily.”—“Yet the now is always present to the one throughout its being; for the one always is now, whenever [e] it is.”—“No doubt.”—“Therefore the one always both is and comes to be older and younger than itself.”—“So it seems.”
“Is it or does it come to be for more time than itself or an equal time?”—“An equal.”—“But if it comes to be or is for an equal time, it is the same age.”—“Doubtless.”—“And that which is the same age is neither older nor younger.”—“No, it isn’t.”—“So the one, since it comes to be and is for a time equal to itself, neither is nor comes to be younger or older than itself.”—“I think not.”
“And again: what of the others?”—“I can’t say.”—“This much, surely, [153] you can say: things other than the one, if in fact they are different things and not a different thing, are more than one. A different thing would be one, but different things are more than one and would have multitude.”—“Yes, they would.”—“And, being a multitude, they would partake of a greater number than the one.”—“Doubtless.”—“Now, shall we say in connection with number that things that are more or things that are less come to be and have come to be earlier?”—“Things that are less.”—“So, the least thing first; and this is the one. Isn’t that so?”—“Yes.”—“So of all [b] the things that have number the one has come to be first. And the others, too, all have number, if in fact they are others and not an other.”—“Yes, they do.”—“But that which has come to be first, I take it, has come to be earlier, and the others later; and things that have come to be later are younger than what has come to be earlier. Thus the others would be younger than the one, and the one older than they.”—“Yes, it would.”
“What about the following? Could the one have come to be in a way contrary to its own nature, or is that impossible?”—“Impossible.”—“Yet [c] the one was shown to have parts, and if parts, a beginning, an end, and a middle.”—“Yes.”—“Well, in the case of all things – the one itself and each of the others – doesn’t a beginning come to be first, and after the beginning all the others up to the end?”—“To be sure.”—“Furthermore, we shall say that all these others are parts of some one whole, but that it itself has come to be one and whole at the same time as the end.”—“Yes, we shall.”—“An end, I take it, comes to be last, and the one naturally [d] comes to be at the same time as it. And so if in fact the one itself must not come to be contrary to nature, it would naturally come to be later than the others, since it has come to be at the same time as the end.”—“Apparently.”—“Therefore the one is younger than the others, and the others are older than it.”—“That, in turn, appears to me to be so.”
“But again: must not a beginning or any other part of the one or of anything else, if in fact it is a part and not parts, be one, since it is a part?”—“Necessarily.”—“Accordingly, the one would come to be at the [e] same time as the first part that comes to be, and at the same time as the second; and it is absent from none of the others that come to be – no matter what is added to what – until, upon arriving at the last part, it comes to be one whole, having been absent at the coming-to-be of neither the middle nor the first nor the last nor any other part.”—“True.”—“Therefore the one is the same age as all the others. And so, unless the one itself is naturally contrary to nature, it would have come to be neither earlier nor [154] later than the others, but at the same time. And according to this argument the one would be neither older nor younger than the others, nor the others older or younger than it. But according to our previous argument, it was both older and younger than they, and likewise they were both older and younger than it.”—“Of course.”
“That’s how it is and has come to be. But what about its coming-to-be both older and younger, and neither older nor younger, than the others and they than it? Is the case with coming-to-be just as it is with being, or [b] is it different?”—“I can’t say.”—“But I can say this much, at least: if something is indeed older than another thing, it could not come to be still older by an amount greater than the original difference in age. Nor, in turn, could the younger come to be still younger. For equals added to unequals, in time or anything else at all, always make them differ by an amount equal to that by which they differed at first.”—“No doubt.”—“So [c] what is older or younger could never come to be older or younger than what is older or younger, if in fact they always differ in age by an equal amount. On the contrary, something is and has come to be older, and something younger, but they do not come to be so.”—“True.”—“So also the one, since it is older or younger, never comes to be older or younger than the others that are older or younger than it.”—“Yes, you’re quite right.”
“But consider whether it comes to be older and younger in this way.”—“In what way?”—“In the way that the one was shown to be older than the others and they older than it.”—“What of that?”—“When the one is [d] older than the others, it has surely come to be for more time than they.”—“Yes.”—“Go back and consider: if we add an equal time to more and less time, will the more differ from the less by an equal or a smaller fraction?”16—“A smaller.”—“So the one’s difference in age in relation to the others will not be in the future just what it was at first. On the contrary, by getting an increment of time equal to the others, it will differ from them in age always less than it did before. Isn’t that so?”—“Yes.”—“Wouldn’t that [e] which differs from anything in age less than before come to be younger than before in relation to those things it was previously older than?”—“Younger.”—“And if the one comes to be younger, don’t those others, in turn, come to be older than before in relation to it?”—“Certainly.”—“So what is younger comes to be older in relation to what has come to be earlier and is older, but it never is older. On the contrary,
it always comes to be older than that thing. For the older advances toward the younger, while the younger advances toward the older. And, in the same way, the [155] older, in its turn, comes to be younger than the younger. For both, by going toward their opposites, come to be each other’s opposite, the younger coming to be older than the older, and the older younger than the younger. But they could not come to be so. For if they came to be, they would no longer come to be, but would be so. But as it is they come to be older and younger than each other. The one comes to be younger than the others, because it was shown to be older and to have come to be earlier, whereas the others come to be older than the one, because they have come to be later. [b]
“And by the same argument the others, too, come to be younger in relation to the one, since in fact they were shown to be older than it and to have come to be earlier.”—“Yes, it does appear so.”
“Well then, insofar as nothing comes to be older or younger than a different thing, owing to their always differing from each other by an equal number, the one would not come to be older or younger than the others, and they would not come to be older or younger than it. But insofar as things that came to be earlier must differ from things that come to be later by a fraction that is always different, and vice versa, in this way they [c] must come to be older and younger than each other – both the others than the one and the one than the others.”—“Of course.”—“To sum up all this, the one itself both is and comes to be older and younger than itself and the others, and it neither is nor comes to be older or younger than itself or the others.”—“Exactly.”
“And since the one partakes of time and of coming to be older and [d] younger, must it not also partake of time past, future, and present – if in fact it partakes of time?”—“Necessarily.”—“Therefore, the one was and is and will be, and was coming to be and comes to be and will come to be.”—“To be sure.”—“And something could belong to it and be of it, in the past, present, and future.”—“Certainly.”—“And indeed there would be knowledge and opinion and perception of it, if in fact even now we are engaging in all those activities concerning it.”—“You’re right.”—“And a name and an account belong to it, and it is named and spoken of. And [e] all such things as pertain to the others also pertain to the one.”—“That’s exactly so.”
“Let’s speak of it yet a third time. If the one is as we have described it – being both one and many and neither one nor many, and partaking of time – must it not, because it is one, sometimes partake of being, and in turn because it is not, sometimes not partake of being?”—“Necessarily.”—“When it partakes, can it at that time not partake, or partake when it doesn’t?”—“It cannot.”—“So it partakes at one time, and doesn’t partake at another; for only in this way could it both partake and not partake of [156] the same thing.”—“That’s right.”—“Isn’t there, then, a definite time when it gets a share of being and when it parts from it? Or how can it at one time have and at another time not have the same thing, if it never gets and releases it?”—“In no way.”
“Don’t you in fact call getting a share of being ‘coming-to-be’?”—“I do.”—“And parting from being ‘ceasing-to-be’?”—“Most certainly.”—“Indeed the one, as it seems, when it gets and releases being, comes to be [b] and ceases to be.”—“Necessarily.”—“And since it is one and many and comes to be and ceases to be, doesn’t its being many cease to be whenever it comes to be one, and doesn’t its being one cease to be whenever it comes to be many?”—“Certainly.”—“Whenever it comes to be one and many, must it not separate and combine?”—“It certainly must.”—“Furthermore, whenever it comes to be like and unlike, must it not be made like and unlike?”—“Yes.”—“And whenever it comes to be greater and less and equal, must it not increase and decrease and be made equal?”—“Just so.”
[c] “And whenever, being in motion, it comes to a rest, and whenever, being at rest, it changes to moving, it must itself, presumably, be in no time at all.”—“How is that?”—“It won’t be able to undergo being previously at rest and later in motion or being previously in motion and later at rest without changing.”—“Obviously not.”—“Yet there is no time in which something can, simultaneously, be neither in motion nor at rest.”—“Yes, you’re quite right.”—“Yet surely it also doesn’t change without changing.”—“Hardly.”—“So when does it change? For it does not change while it is at rest or in motion, or while it is in time.”—“Yes, you’re quite right.”
[d] “Is there, then, this queer thing in which it might be, just when it changes?”—“What queer thing?”—“The instant. The instant seems to signify something such that changing occurs from it to each of two states. For a thing doesn’t change from rest while rest continues, or from motion while motion continues. Rather, this queer creature, the instant, lurks [e] between motion and rest – being in no time at all – and to it and from it the moving thing changes to resting and the resting thing changes to moving.”—“It looks that way.”—“And the one, if in fact it both rests and moves, could change to each state – for only in this way could it do both. But in changing, it changes at an instant, and when it changes, it would be in no time at all, and just then it would be neither in motion nor at rest.”—“No, it wouldn’t.”
[157] “Is it so with the other changes too? Whenever the one changes from being to ceasing-to-be, or from not-being to coming-to-be, isn’t it then between certain states of motion and rest? And then it neither is nor is not, and neither comes to be nor ceases to be?”—“It seems so, at any rate.”—“Indeed, according to the same argument, when it goes from one to many and from many to one, it is neither one nor many, and neither separates nor combines. And when it goes from like to unlike and from unlike to like, it is neither like nor unlike, nor is it being made like or unlike. And when it goes from small to large and to equal and vice versa, [b] it is neither small nor large nor equal; nor would it be increasing or decreasing or being made equal.”—“It seems not.”—“The one, if it is, could undergo all that.”—“Doubtless.”
“Must we not examine what would be proper for the others to undergo, if one is?”—“We must.”—“Are we to say, then, what properties things other than the one must have, if one is?”—“Let’s do.”—“Well then, since in fact they are other than the one, the others are not the one. For if they were, they would not be other than the one.”—“That’s right.” [c]
“And yet the others are not absolutely deprived of the one, but somehow partake of it.”—“In what way?”—“In that things other than the one are surely other because they have parts; for if they didn’t have parts, they would be altogether one.”—“That’s right.”—“And parts, we say, are parts of that which is a whole.”—“Yes, we do.”—“Yet the whole of which the parts are to be parts must be one thing composed of many, because each of the parts must be part, not of many, but of a whole.”—“Why is that?”—“If something were to be part of many, in which it itself is, it will, of [d] course, be both part of itself, which is impossible, and of each one of the others, if in fact it is part of all of them. For if it is not part of one, it will be part of the others, that one excepted, and thus it will not be part of each one. And if it is not part of each, it will be part of none of the many. But if something is part of none, it cannot be a part, or anything else at all, of all those things of which it is no part of any.”—“It certainly appears so.”—“So the part would not be part of many things or all, but of some one character and of some one thing, which we call a ‘whole,’ since it has [e] come to be one complete thing composed of all. This is what the part would be part of.”—“Absolutely.”—“So if the others have parts, they would also partake of some one whole.”—“Certainly.”—“So things other than the one must be one complete whole with parts.”—“Necessarily.”
“Furthermore, the same account applies also to each part, since it too [158] must partake of the one. For if each of them is a part, �
��each,’ of course, signifies that it is one thing, detached from the others and being by itself, if in fact it is to be each.”—“That’s right.”—“But clearly it would partake of the one, while being something other than one. Otherwise, it wouldn’t partake, but would itself be one. But as it is, it is surely impossible for anything except the one itself to be one.”—“Impossible.”
“But both the whole and the part must partake of the one; for the whole will be one thing of which the parts are parts, and in turn each thing that is part of a whole will be one part of the whole.”—“Just so.”—“Well, then, [b] won’t things that partake of the one partake of it, while being different from it?”—“Doubtless.”—“And things different from the one would surely be many; for if things other than the one were neither one nor more than one, they would be nothing.”—“Yes, you’re quite right.”
“Since both things that partake of the oneness of a part and things that partake of the oneness of a whole are more than one, must not those things themselves that get a share of the one in fact be unlimited in multitude?”—“How so?”—“Let’s observe the following: isn’t it the case that, at the time when they get a share of the one, they get a share, while not being one and not partaking of the one?”—“Quite clearly.”—“While being multitudes, [c] then, in which oneness is not present?”—“Certainly, multitudes.”—“Now, if we should be willing to subtract, in thought, the very least we can from these multitudes, must not that which is subtracted, too, be a multitude and not one, if in fact it doesn’t partake of the one?”—“Necessarily.”—“So always, as we examine in this way its nature, itself by itself, different from the form, won’t as much of it as we ever see be unlimited in multitude?”—“Absolutely.”
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