POLUS: Ask your questions.
CHAEREPHON: I will. Suppose that Gorgias were knowledgeable in his brother Herodicus’ craft. What would be the right name for us to call him by then? Isn’t it the same one as his brother’s?
POLUS: Yes, it is.
CHAEREPHON: So we’d be right in saying that he’s a doctor?
POLUS: Yes.
CHAEREPHON: And if he were experienced in the craft of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon or his brother, what would be the correct thing to call him?
POLUS: A painter, obviously.
[c] CHAEREPHON: Now then, since he’s knowledgeable in a craft, what is it, and what would be the correct thing to call him?
POLUS: Many among men are the crafts experientially devised by experience, Chaerephon. Yes, it is experience that causes our times to march along the way of craft, whereas inexperience causes them to march along the way of chance. Of these various crafts various men partake in various ways, the best men partaking of the best of them. Our Gorgias is indeed in this group; he partakes of the most admirable of the crafts.
[d] SOCRATES: Polus certainly appears to have prepared himself admirably for giving speeches, Gorgias. But he’s not doing what he promised Chaerephon.
GORGIAS: How exactly isn’t he, Socrates?
SOCRATES: He hardly seems to me to be answering the question.
GORGIAS: Why don’t you question him then, if you like?
SOCRATES: No, I won’t, not as long as you yourself may want to answer. I’d much rather ask you. It’s clear to me, especially from what he has said, that Polus has devoted himself more to what is called oratory than to discussion.
[e] POLUS: Why do you say that, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asks you what craft Gorgias is knowledgeable in, you sing its praises as though someone were discrediting it. But you haven’t answered what it is.
POLUS: Didn’t I answer that it was the most admirable one?
SOCRATES: Very much so. No one, however, asked you what Gorgias’ craft is like, but what craft it is, and what one ought to call Gorgias. So, [449] just as when Chaerephon put his earlier questions to you and you answered him in such an admirably brief way, tell us now in that way, too, what his craft is, and what we’re supposed to call Gorgias. Or rather, Gorgias, why don’t you tell us yourself what the craft you’re knowledgeable in is, and hence what we’re supposed to call you?
GORGIAS: It’s oratory, Socrates.
SOCRATES: So we’re supposed to call you an orator?
GORGIAS: Yes, and a good one, Socrates, if you really want to call me “what I boast myself to be,” as Homer puts it.3
SOCRATES: Of course I do.
GORGIAS: Call me that then.
[b] SOCRATES: Aren’t we to say that you’re capable of making others orators too?
GORGIAS: That’s exactly the claim I make. Not only here, but elsewhere, too.
SOCRATES: Well now, Gorgias, would you be willing to complete the discussion in the way we’re having it right now, that of alternately asking questions and answering them, and to put aside for another time this long style of speechmaking like the one Polus began with? Please don’t go back on your promise, but be willing to give a brief answer to what you’re asked.
GORGIAS: There are some answers, Socrates, that must be given by way of long speeches. Even so, I’ll try to be as brief as possible. This, too, in [c] fact, is one of my claims. There’s no one who can say the same things more briefly than I.
SOCRATES: That’s what we need, Gorgias! Do give me a presentation of this very thing, the short style of speech, and leave the long style for some other time.
GORGIAS: Very well, I’ll do that. You’ll say you’ve never heard anyone make shorter speeches.
SOCRATES: Come then. You claim to be knowledgeable in the craft of oratory and to be able to make someone else an orator, too. With which [d] of the things there are is oratory concerned? Weaving, for example, is concerned with the production of clothes, isn’t it?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And so, too, music is concerned with the composition of tunes?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: By Hera, Gorgias, I do like your answers. They couldn’t be shorter!
GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I daresay I’m doing it quite nicely.
SOCRATES: And so you are. Come and answer me then that way about oratory, too. About which, of the things there are, is it knowledge?
GORGIAS: About speeches. [e]
SOCRATES: What sort of speeches, Gorgias? Those that explain how sick people should be treated to get well?
GORGIAS: No.
SOCRATES: So oratory isn’t concerned with all speeches.
GORGIAS: Oh, no.
SOCRATES: But it does make people capable of speaking.
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And also to be wise in what they’re speaking about?
GORGIAS: Of course.
SOCRATES: Now does the medical craft, the one we were talking about [450] just now, make people able both to have wisdom about and to speak about the sick?
GORGIAS: Necessarily.
SOCRATES: This craft, then, is evidently concerned with speeches too.
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Speeches about diseases, that is?
GORGIAS: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Isn’t physical training also concerned with speeches, speeches about good and bad physical condition?
GORGIAS: Yes, it is.
SOCRATES: In fact, Gorgias, the same is true of the other crafts, too. Each [b] of them is concerned with those speeches that are about the object of the particular craft.
GORGIAS: Apparently.
SOCRATES: Then why don’t you call the other crafts oratory, since you call any craft whatever that’s concerned with speeches oratory? They’re concerned with speeches, too!
GORGIAS: The reason, Socrates, is that in the case of the other crafts the knowledge consists almost completely in working with your hands and activities of that sort. In the case of oratory, on the other hand, there isn’t any such manual work. Its activity and influence depend entirely on [c] speeches. That’s the reason I consider the craft of oratory to be concerned with speeches. And I say that I’m right about this.
SOCRATES: I’m not sure I understand what sort of craft you want to call it. I’ll soon know more clearly. Tell me this. There are crafts for us to practice, aren’t there?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Of all the crafts there are, I take it that there are those that consist for the most part of making things and that call for little speech, and some that call for none at all, ones whose task could be done even silently. Take painting, for instance, or sculpture, or many others. When [d] you say that oratory has nothing to do with other crafts, it’s crafts of this sort I think you’re referring to. Or aren’t you?
GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates. You take my meaning very well.
SOCRATES: And then there are other crafts, the ones that perform their whole task by means of speeches and that call for practically no physical work besides, or very little of it. Take arithmetic or computation or geometry, even checkers and many other crafts. Some of these involve speeches to just about the same degree as they do activity, while many involve speeches more. All their activity and influence depend entirely on speeches. [e] I think you mean that oratory is a craft of this sort.
GORGIAS: True.
SOCRATES: But you certainly don’t want to call any of these crafts oratory, do you, even though, as you phrase it, oratory is the craft that exercises its influence through speech. Somebody might take you up, if he wanted to make a fuss in argument, and say, “So you’re saying that arithmetic is oratory, are you, Gorgias?” I’m sure, however, that you’re not saying that either arithmetic or geometry is oratory.
[451] GORGIAS: Yes, you’re quite correct, Socrates. You take my meaning rightly.
SOCRATES: Come on, then. Please complete your answer in the terms of my q
uestion. Since oratory is one of those crafts which mostly uses speech, and since there are also others of that sort, try to say what it is that oratory, which exercises its influence through speeches, is about. Imagine someone asking me about any of the crafts I mentioned just now, “Socrates, what [b] is the craft of arithmetic?” I’d tell him, just as you told me, that it’s one of those that exercise their influence by means of speech. And if he continued, “What are they crafts about?” I’d say that they’re about even and odd, however many of each there might be. If he then asked, “What is the craft you call computation?” I’d say that this one, too, is one of those that exercise their influence entirely by speech. And if he then continued, “What is it about?” I’d answer in the style of those who draw up motions in the Assembly that in other respects computation is like arithmetic—for it’s [c] about the same thing, even and odd—yet it differs from arithmetic insofar as computation examines the quantity of odd and even, both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other. And if someone asked about astronomy and I replied that it, too, exercises its influence by means of speech, then if he asked, “What are the speeches of astronomy about, Socrates?” I’d say that they’re about the motions of the stars, the sun and the moon, and their relative velocities.
GORGIAS: And you’d be quite right to say so, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Come, Gorgias, you take your turn. For oratory is in fact one [d] of those crafts that carry out and exercise their influence entirely by speech, isn’t it?
GORGIAS: That’s right.
SOCRATES: Tell us then: what are they crafts about? Of the things there are, which is the one that these speeches used by oratory are concerned with?
GORGIAS: The greatest of human concerns, Socrates, and the best.
SOCRATES: But that statement, too, is debatable, Gorgias. It isn’t at all clear yet, either. I’m sure that you’ve heard people at drinking parties [e] singing that song in which they count out as they sing that “to enjoy good health is the best thing; second is to have turned out good looking; and third”—so the writer of the song puts it—“is to be honestly rich.”
GORGIAS: Yes, I’ve heard it. Why do you mention it?
SOCRATES: Suppose that the producers of the things the songwriter [452] praised were here with you right now: a doctor, a physical trainer, and a financial expert. Suppose that first the doctor said, “Socrates, Gorgias is telling you a lie. It isn’t his craft that is concerned with the greatest good for humankind, but mine.” If I then asked him, “What are you, to say that?” I suppose he’d say that he’s a doctor. “What’s this you’re saying? Is the product of your craft really the greatest good?” “Of course, Socrates,” I suppose he’d say, “seeing that its product is health. What greater good for humankind is there than health?” And suppose that next in his turn [b] the trainer said, “I too would be amazed, Socrates, if Gorgias could present you with a greater good derived from his craft than the one I could provide from mine.” I’d ask this man, too, “What are you, sir, and what’s your product?” “I’m a physical trainer,” he’d say, “and my product is making people physically good-looking and strong.” And following the trainer the financial expert would say, I’m sure with an air of considerable scorn for all, “Do consider, Socrates, whether you know of any good, Gorgias’ [c] or anyone else’s, that’s a greater good than wealth.” We’d say to him, “Really? Is that what you produce?” He’d say yes. “As what?” “As a financial expert.” “Well,” we’ll say, “is wealth in your judgment the greatest good for humankind?” “Of course,” he’ll say. “Ah, but Gorgias here disputes that. He claims that his craft is the source of a good that’s greater than yours,” we’d say. And it’s obvious what question he’d ask next. “And [d] what is this good, please? Let Gorgias answer me that!” So come on, Gorgias. Consider yourself questioned by both these men and myself, and give us your answer. What is this thing that you claim is the greatest good for humankind, a thing you claim to be a producer of?
GORGIAS: The thing that is in actual fact the greatest good, Socrates. It is the source of freedom for humankind itself and at the same time it is for each person the source of rule over others in one’s own city.
SOCRATES: And what is this thing you’re referring to?
[e] GORGIAS: I’m referring to the ability to persuade by speeches judges in a law court, councillors in a council meeting, and assemblymen in an assembly or in any other political gathering that might take place. In point of fact, with this ability you’ll have the doctor for your slave, and the physical trainer, too. As for this financial expert of yours, he’ll turn out to be making more money for somebody else instead of himself; for you, in fact, if you’ve got the ability to speak and to persuade the crowds.
[453] SOCRATES: Now I think you’ve come closest to making clear what craft you take oratory to be, Gorgias. If I follow you at all, you’re saying that oratory is a producer of persuasion. Its whole business comes to that, and that’s the long and short of it. Or can you mention anything else oratory can do besides instilling persuasion in the souls of an audience?
GORGIAS: None at all, Socrates. I think you’re defining it quite adequately. That is indeed the long and short of it.
[b] SOCRATES: Listen then, Gorgias. You should know that I’m convinced I’m one of those people who in a discussion with someone else really want to have knowledge of the subject the discussion’s about. And I consider you one of them, too.
GORGIAS: Well, what’s the point, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Let me tell you now. You can know for sure that I don’t know what this persuasion derived from oratory that you’re talking about is, or what subjects it’s persuasion about. Even though I do have my suspicions about which persuasion I think you mean and what it’s about, I’ll still ask [c] you just the same what you say this persuasion produced by oratory is, and what it’s about. And why, when I have my suspicions, do I ask you and refrain from expressing them myself? It’s not you I’m after, it’s our discussion, to have it proceed in such a way as to make the thing we’re talking about most clear to us. Consider, then, whether you think I’m being fair in resuming my questions to you. Suppose I were to ask you which of the painters Zeuxis is. If you told me that he’s the one who paints pictures, wouldn’t it be fair for me to ask, “Of what sort of pictures is he the painter, and where?”
GORGIAS: Yes, it would.
[d] SOCRATES: And isn’t the reason for this the fact that there are other painters, too, who paint many other pictures?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: But if no one besides Zeuxis were a painter, your answer would have been a good one?
GORGIAS: Of course.
SOCRATES: Come then, and tell me about oratory. Do you think that oratory alone instills persuasion, or do other crafts do so too? This is the sort of thing I mean: Does a person who teaches some subject or other persuade people about what he’s teaching, or not?
GORGIAS: He certainly does, Socrates. He persuades most of all.
SOCRATES: Let’s talk once more about the same crafts we were talking [e] about just now. Doesn’t arithmetic or the arithmetician teach us everything that pertains to number?
GORGIAS: Yes, he does.
SOCRATES: And he also persuades?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: So arithmetic is also a producer of persuasion.
GORGIAS: Apparently.
SOCRATES: Now if someone asks us what sort of persuasion it produces and what it’s persuasion about, I suppose we’d answer him that it’s the persuasion through teaching about the extent of even and odd. And we’ll be able to show that all the other crafts we were just now talking about [454] are producers of persuasion, as well as what the persuasion is and what it’s about. Isn’t that right?
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: So oratory isn’t the only producer of persuasion.
GORGIAS: That’s true.
SOCRATES: In that case, since it’s not the only one to prod
uce this product but other crafts do it too, we’d do right to repeat to our speaker the question we put next in the case of the painter: “Of what sort of persuasion is oratory a craft, and what is its persuasion about?” Or don’t you think it’s right to repeat that question? [b]
GORGIAS: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: Well then, Gorgias, since you think so too, please answer.
GORGIAS: The persuasion I mean, Socrates, is the kind that takes place in law courts and in those other large gatherings, as I was saying a moment ago. And it’s concerned with those matters that are just and unjust.
SOCRATES: Yes, Gorgias, I suspected that this was the persuasion you meant, and that these are the matters it’s persuasion about. But so you won’t be surprised if in a moment I ask you again another question like this, about what seems to be clear, and yet I go on with my questioning—[c] as I say, I’m asking questions so that we can conduct an orderly discussion. It’s not you I’m after; it’s to prevent our getting in the habit of second-guessing and snatching each other’s statements away ahead of time. It’s to allow you to work out your assumption in any way you want to.
GORGIAS: Yes, I think that you’re quite right to do this, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Come then, and let’s examine this point. Is there something you call “to have learned”?
GORGIAS: There is.
SOCRATES: Very well. And also something you call “to be convinced”?
[d] GORGIAS: Yes, there is.
SOCRATES: Now, do you think that to have learned, and learning, are the same as to be convinced and conviction, or different?
GORGIAS: I certainly suppose that they’re different, Socrates.
SOCRATES: You suppose rightly. This is how you can tell: If someone asked you, “Is there such a thing as true and false conviction, Gorgias?” you’d say yes, I’m sure.
GORGIAS: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well now, is there such a thing as true and false knowledge?
GORGIAS: Not at all.
SOCRATES: So it’s clear that they’re not the same.
GORGIAS: That’s true.
[e] SOCRATES: But surely both those who have learned and those who are convinced have come to be persuaded?
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