It does seem that way.
So that what gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower is the form of the good. And though it is the cause of [e] knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge.11 Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they. In the visible realm, light and sight are rightly considered sunlike, but it is wrong to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to think of knowledge and truth as goodlike but wrong to think that either [509] of them is the good—for the good is yet more prized.
This is an inconceivably beautiful thing you’re talking about, if it provides both knowledge and truth and is superior to them in beauty. You surely don’t think that a thing like that could be pleasure.
Hush! Let’s examine its image in more detail as follows.
How? [b]
You’ll be willing to say, I think, that the sun not only provides visible things with the power to be seen but also with coming to be, growth, and nourishment, although it is not itself coming to be.
How could it be?
Therefore, you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge owe their being known to the good, but their being is also due to it, although the good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power.
[c] And Glaucon comically said: By Apollo, what a daemonic superiority!
It’s your own fault; you forced me to tell you my opinion about it.
And I don’t want you to stop either. So continue to explain its similarity to the sun, if you’ve omitted anything.
I’m certainly omitting a lot.
Well, don’t, not even the smallest thing.
I think I’ll have to omit a fair bit, but, as far as is possible at the moment, I won’t omit anything voluntarily.
Don’t.
[d] Understand, then, that, as we said, there are these two things, one sovereign of the intelligible kind and place, the other of the visible (I don’t say “of heaven” so as not to seem to you to be playing the sophist with the name).12 In any case, you have two kinds of thing, visible and intelligible.
Right.
It is like a line divided into two unequal sections.13 Then divide each section—namely, that of the visible and that of the intelligible—in the same ratio as the line. In terms now of relative clarity and opacity, one subsection of the visible consists of images. And by images I mean, first, shadows, then reflections in water and in all close-packed, smooth, and [e] shiny materials, and everything of that sort, if you understand. [510]
I do.
In the other subsection of the visible, put the originals of these images, namely, the animals around us, all the plants, and the whole class of manufactured things.
Consider them put.
Would you be willing to say that, as regards truth and untruth, the division is in this proportion: As the opinable is to the knowable, so the likeness is to the thing that it is like?
Certainly. [b]
Consider now how the section of the intelligible is to be divided.
How?
As follows: In one subsection, the soul, using as images the things that were imitated before, is forced to investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle but to a conclusion. In the other subsection, however, it makes its way to a first principle that is not a hypothesis, proceeding from a hypothesis but without the images used in the previous subsection, using forms themselves and making its investigation through them.
I don’t yet fully understand what you mean.
Let’s try again. You’ll understand it more easily after the following [c] preamble. I think you know that students of geometry, calculation, and the like hypothesize the odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles, and other things akin to these in each of their investigations, as if they knew them. They make these their hypotheses and don’t think it necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves or to others, as if they were clear to everyone. And going from these first principles through the remaining steps, they arrive in full agreement. [d]
I certainly know that much.
Then you also know that, although they use visible figures and make claims about them, their thought isn’t directed to them but to those other things that they are like. They make their claims for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal itself, not the diagonal they draw, and similarly with the others. These figures that they make and draw, of which shadows [e] and reflections in water are images, they now in turn use as images, in seeking to see those others themselves that one cannot see except by means of thought. [511]
That’s true.
This, then, is the kind of thing that, on the one hand, I said is intelligible, and, on the other, is such that the soul is forced to use hypotheses in the investigation of it, not travelling up to a first principle, since it cannot reach beyond its hypotheses, but using as images those very things of which images were made in the section below, and which, by comparison to their images, were thought to be clear and to be valued as such.
I understand that you mean what happens in geometry and related [b] sciences.
Then also understand that, by the other subsection of the intelligible, I mean that which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic. It does not consider these hypotheses as first principles but truly as hypotheses—but as stepping stones to take off from, enabling it to reach the unhypothetical first principle of everything. Having grasped this principle, it reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion without making use of anything visible at all, but only of forms themselves, [c] moving on from forms to forms, and ending in forms.
I understand, if not yet adequately (for in my opinion you’re speaking of an enormous task), that you want to distinguish the intelligible part of that which is, the part studied by the science of dialectic, as clearer than the part studied by the so-called sciences, for which their hypotheses are first principles. And although those who study the objects of these sciences are forced to do so by means of thought rather than sense perception, still, [d] because they do not go back to a genuine first principle, but proceed from hypotheses, you don’t think that they understand them, even though, given such a principle, they are intelligible. And you seem to me to call the state of the geometers thought but not understanding, thought being intermediate between opinion and understanding.
Your exposition is most adequate. Thus there are four such conditions in the soul, corresponding to the four subsections of our line: Understanding for the highest, thought for the second, belief for the third, and imaging [e] for the last. Arrange them in a ratio, and consider that each shares in clarity to the degree that the subsection it is set over shares in truth.
I understand, agree, and arrange them as you say.
1. See 474b–c.
2. See 474c–475c.
3. Momus is a personification of blame or censure.
4. See the Theages.
5. See Plato, Apology 31c–32a, where Socrates explains that his daimonion has kept him out of politics.
6. See 412a–b.
7. Aristotle (Meteorologica 355a14) reports Heraclitus as believing that “the sun is new every day”: the sun not only sets at night, it ceases to exist, being replaced by a totally new sun the next morning.
8. See, for example, Iliad i.131.
9. See 435d.
10. Throughout, Socrates is punning on the word tokos, which means either a child or the interest on capital.
11. Accepting the emendation of gignōskomenēs to gignōskomenēn.
12. The play may be on the similarity of sound between ouranou (“of heaven”) and horatou (“of the visible”). More likely, Socrates is referring to the fact that ouranou seems to contain the word nou, the genitive case of nous (“understanding”), and relative of noētou (“of the intelligible”). If he said that the sun was sovereign of heaven, he might be taken to suggest in sophistical fashion that it was
sovereign of the intelligible and that there was no real difference between the good and the sun.
13. The line is illustrated below:
Book VII
[514] Next, I said, compare the effect of education and of the lack of it on our nature to an experience like this: Imagine human beings living in an underground, cavelike dwelling, with an entrance a long way up, which is both open to the light and as wide as the cave itself. They’ve been there since childhood, fixed in the same place, with their necks and legs fettered, able to see only in front of them, because their bonds prevent them from turning their heads around. Light is provided by a fire burning far above [b] and behind them. Also behind them, but on higher ground, there is a path stretching between them and the fire. Imagine that along this path a low wall has been built, like the screen in front of puppeteers above which they show their puppets.
I’m imagining it.
Then also imagine that there are people along the wall, carrying all kinds of artifacts that project above it—statues of people and other animals, [c] made out of stone, wood, and every material. And, as you’d expect, some [515] of the carriers are talking, and some are silent.
It’s a strange image you’re describing, and strange prisoners.
They’re like us. Do you suppose, first of all, that these prisoners see anything of themselves and one another besides the shadows that the fire casts on the wall in front of them?
How could they, if they have to keep their heads motionless throughout life? [b]
What about the things being carried along the wall? Isn’t the same true of them?
Of course.
And if they could talk to one another, don’t you think they’d suppose that the names they used applied to the things they see passing before them?1
They’d have to.
And what if their prison also had an echo from the wall facing them? Don’t you think they’d believe that the shadows passing in front of them were talking whenever one of the carriers passing along the wall was doing so?
I certainly do.
Then the prisoners would in every way believe that the truth is nothing [c] other than the shadows of those artifacts.
They must surely believe that.
Consider, then, what being released from their bonds and cured of their ignorance would naturally be like, if something like this came to pass.2 When one of them was freed and suddenly compelled to stand up, turn his head, walk, and look up toward the light, he’d be pained and dazzled and unable to see the things whose shadows he’d seen before. What do you think he’d say, if we told him that what he’d seen before was inconsequential, [d] but that now—because he is a bit closer to the things that are and is turned towards things that are more—he sees more correctly? Or, to put it another way, if we pointed to each of the things passing by, asked him what each of them is, and compelled him to answer, don’t you think he’d be at a loss and that he’d believe that the things he saw earlier were truer than the ones he was now being shown?
Much truer.
And if someone compelled him to look at the light itself, wouldn’t his eyes hurt, and wouldn’t he turn around and flee towards the things he’s [e] able to see, believing that they’re really clearer than the ones he’s being shown?
He would.
And if someone dragged him away from there by force, up the rough, steep path, and didn’t let him go until he had dragged him into the sunlight, wouldn’t he be pained and irritated at being treated that way? And when he came into the light, with the sun filling his eyes, wouldn’t he be unable [516] to see a single one of the things now said to be true?
He would be unable to see them, at least at first.
I suppose, then, that he’d need time to get adjusted before he could see things in the world above. At first, he’d see shadows most easily, then images of men and other things in water, then the things themselves. Of these, he’d be able to study the things in the sky and the sky itself more easily at night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than during [b] the day, looking at the sun and the light of the sun.
Of course.
Finally, I suppose, he’d be able to see the sun, not images of it in water or some alien place, but the sun itself, in its own place, and be able to study it.
Necessarily so.
And at this point he would infer and conclude that the sun provides the seasons and the years, governs everything in the visible world, and is [c] in some way the cause of all the things that he used to see.
It’s clear that would be his next step.
What about when he reminds himself of his first dwelling place, his fellow prisoners, and what passed for wisdom there? Don’t you think that he’d count himself happy for the change and pity the others?
Certainly.
And if there had been any honors, praises, or prizes among them for the one who was sharpest at identifying the shadows as they passed by and who best remembered which usually came earlier, which later, and [d] which simultaneously, and who could thus best divine the future, do you think that our man would desire these rewards or envy those among the prisoners who were honored and held power? Instead, wouldn’t he feel, with Homer, that he’d much prefer to “work the earth as a serf to another, one without possessions,”3 and go through any sufferings, rather than share their opinions and live as they do?
[e] I suppose he would rather suffer anything than live like that.
Consider this too. If this man went down into the cave again and sat down in his same seat, wouldn’t his eyes—coming suddenly out of the sun like that—be filled with darkness?
They certainly would.
And before his eyes had recovered—and the adjustment would not be quick—while his vision was still dim, if he had to compete again with [517] the perpetual prisoners in recognizing the shadows, wouldn’t he invite ridicule? Wouldn’t it be said of him that he’d returned from his upward journey with his eyesight ruined and that it isn’t worthwhile even to try to travel upward? And, as for anyone who tried to free them and lead them upward, if they could somehow get their hands on him, wouldn’t they kill him?
They certainly would.
This whole image, Glaucon, must be fitted together with what we said [b] before. The visible realm should be likened to the prison dwelling, and the light of the fire inside it to the power of the sun. And if you interpret the upward journey and the study of things above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you’ll grasp what I hope to convey, since that is what you wanted to hear about. Whether it’s true or not, only the god knows. But this is how I see it: In the knowable realm, the form of the good is the last thing to be seen, and it is reached only with difficulty. Once one has seen it, however, one must conclude that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful in anything, that it produces both light [c] and its source in the visible realm, and that in the intelligible realm it controls and provides truth and understanding, so that anyone who is to act sensibly in private or public must see it.
I have the same thought, at least as far as I’m able.
Come, then, share with me this thought also: It isn’t surprising that the ones who get to this point are unwilling to occupy themselves with human affairs and that their souls are always pressing upwards, eager to spend their time above, for, after all, this is surely what we’d expect, if indeed things fit the image I described before. [d]
It is.
What about what happens when someone turns from divine study to the evils of human life? Do you think it’s surprising, since his sight is still dim, and he hasn’t yet become accustomed to the darkness around him, that he behaves awkwardly and appears completely ridiculous if he’s compelled, either in the courts or elsewhere, to contend about the shadows of justice or the statues of which they are the shadows and to dispute about the way these things are understood by people who have never seen justice itself? [e]
That’s not surprising at all.
No,
it isn’t. But anyone with any understanding would remember that [518] the eyes may be confused in two ways and from two causes, namely, when they’ve come from the light into the darkness and when they’ve come from the darkness into the light. Realizing that the same applies to the soul, when someone sees a soul disturbed and unable to see something, he won’t laugh mindlessly, but he’ll take into consideration whether it has come from a brighter life and is dimmed through not having yet become accustomed to the dark or whether it has come from greater ignorance into greater light and is dazzled by the increased brilliance. Then he’ll declare the first soul happy in its experience and life, and he’ll pity the latter—but even if he chose to make fun of it, at least he’d be less ridiculous [b] than if he laughed at a soul that has come from the light above.
What you say is very reasonable.
If that’s true, then here’s what we must think about these matters: Education isn’t what some people declare it to be, namely, putting knowledge into souls that lack it, like putting sight into blind eyes. [c]
They do say that.
But our present discussion, on the other hand, shows that the power to learn is present in everyone’s soul and that the instrument with which each learns is like an eye that cannot be turned around from darkness to light without turning the whole body. This instrument cannot be turned around from that which is coming into being without turning the whole soul until it is able to study that which is and the brightest thing that is, [d] namely, the one we call the good. Isn’t that right?
Yes.
Then education is the craft concerned with doing this very thing, this turning around, and with how the soul can most easily and effectively be made to do it. It isn’t the craft of putting sight into the soul. Education takes for granted that sight is there but that it isn’t turned the right way or looking where it ought to look, and it tries to redirect it appropriately.
Complete Works Page 172