U.S. and Israel: Memorandum of Understanding (November 30, 1981)
PREAMBLE
This Memorandum of Understanding reaffirms the common bonds of friendship between the United States and Israel and builds on the mutual security relationship that exists between the two nations. The Parties recognize the need to enhance strategic cooperation to deter all threats from the Soviet Union in the region. Noting the long-standing and fruitful cooperation for mutual security that has developed between the two countries, the Parties have decided to establish a framework for continued consultation and cooperation to enhance their national security by deterring such threats in the whole region.
The Parties have reached the following agreements in order to achieve the above aims:
ARTICLE I
United States-Israeli strategic cooperation, as set forth in this Memorandum, is designed against the threat to peace and security of the region caused by the Soviet Union or Soviet-controlled forces from outside the region introduced into the region. It has the following broad purposes: a. To enable the Parties to act cooperatively and in a timely manner to deal with the above mentioned threat;
b. To provide each other with military assistance for operations of their forces in the area that may be required to cope with this threat;
c. The strategic cooperation between the Parties is not directed at any State or group of States within the region. It is intended solely for defensive purposes against the above mentioned threat.
ARTICLE II 1. The fields in which strategic cooperation will be carried out to prevent the above mentioned threat from endangering the security of the region include: a. Military cooperation between the Parties, as may be agreed by the Parties;
b. Joint military exercises, including naval and air exercises in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, as agreed upon by the Parties;
c. Cooperation for the establishment and maintenance of joint readiness activities, as agreed upon by the Parties;
d. Other areas within the basic scope and purpose of this agreement, as may be jointly agreed.
Israeli Law on the Golan Heights (December 14, 1981)
1. The law, jurisdiction and administration of the State shall apply to the Golan Heights. . . .
2. This law shall become valid on the day of its passage in the Knesset.
3. The Minister of the Interior shall be charged with the implementation of this law, and he is entitled, in consultation with the Minister of Justice, to enact regulations for its implementation and to formulate in regulations transitional provisions and provisions concerning the continued application of regulations, orders, administrative orders, rights and duties which were in force on the Golan Heights prior to the application of this law.
Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Security (December 15, 1981)23
As I see them, our main security problems during the 1980’s will stem from external threats to Israel, her integrity and her sovereign rights. . . .
One—The Arab confrontation.
Second—The Soviet expansion which both builds on the Arab confrontation and at the same time provides it with its main political and military tools.
Later on, I will comment on the implications in terms of political and military requirements in order to cope with the threat and to ensure Israel’s national security in the 1980’s.
Starting with the Arab challenge, I must touch upon the three major factors which, in my mind, contribute the most to sustain Arab enmity and confrontation at a level that presents an actual danger to our security and which, I believe, will continue to sustain it in the foreseeable future—at a level which might confront us with a potential threat to the existence and integrity of Israel.
Those factors are:
A. First, the national ideology of radical Arab regimes (such as in Syria, Libya, Iraq and South Yemen) and their political and strategic ambitions which motivate them to invest, on a first-priority basis, in the creation of a political-military setting designed to serve a strategy of political and military stages for the liquidation of the State of Israel.
The main elements of this strategy of stages can be summed up as follows: 1. A combined effort of sustained political pressure and, when needed, limited military action aimed at the harassment and weakening of Israel.
2. The build-up of a military power, conventional and eventually non-conventional, to be used in appropriate conditions in the future, for a decisive onslaught against Israel.
3. The third element of the strategy is the political and military reliance on the Soviet Union, to ensure the Arab capability to initiate and carry out the confrontation.
4. The fourth element is to maximize the political strategic impact of the oil weapon.
5. And the fifth is the political and military backing to the PLO as an instrument to carry out terrorist activities. This constitutes a central element in the strategy of stages, so long as Israel’s deterrent posture and other political considerations prevent the formation of an Arab coalition, ready to wage war.
That brings me to the second major factor, which is the PLO. On the challenge presented by the PLO, I will say only this: The PLO poses a political threat to the very existence of the State of Israel and remains one of the main obstacles to the resolution of the Palestinian problem on the basis of the Camp David accords.
It constitutes a framework for terrorist organizations operating against Israel, in its territory or in the world at large, with the following purposes: • To undermine the domestic stability in Israel and its security.
• To generate international pressure on Israel.
• To drag the confrontation states to war against Israel.
• To deter Arab countries and moderate Palestinian elements from negotiations with Israel on the basis of Camp David.
The third factor is one of growing concern to us and to the Western world, and might well develop as the main challenge of the 1980’s. It has to do with the Soviet strategy of expansion in the Middle East and Africa. The Soviet strategy is under no pressure of time, but its achievements since the middle of the 1950’s are really impressive. . . . It is a strategy of expansion which, if not checked, could eventually enable the Soviet Union: • To ensure a sea-control capability in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
• To establish the military infrastructure for direct or indirect operations.
• To expand and penetrate other key countries in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, from the direction of Afghanistan, Iraq, South Yemen and Syria.
• To outflank NATO’s eastern tier (Turkey) through Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
• To outflank NATO’s southern tier in the Mediterranean, through Libya, Syria and Algeria.
• To gain control over other key countries in Africa, from the direction of Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola and Congo-Brazzaville. . . .
Today, as in the past two decades, the Soviet strategy of expansion in the area continues to build on: • Arab regimes which Soviet political and military support enables to survive, to carry out their own ambitions and to maintain military confrontations—including the confrontation with Israel.
• Radical elements and terrorist organizations, which Soviet political and military support enables to create upheavals threatening to shift the region towards Soviet political-strategic patronage.
The shadow of Soviet presence in the Middle East and Africa endangers the stability of the region and vital interests of the free world. I want to stress this point with all possible emphasis. The greatest danger to the free world in the 1980’s would be to continue to indulge in the wishful thinking and the inaction which have characterized Western attitudes to Soviet gradual expansion during the last two decades. . . .
Obviously, in order to be able to protect our national security interests, we will have to ensure our ability to maintain a balance of forces and a qualitative and technological edge over any combination of Arab wa
r coalition; in other words: • To prevent war by maintaining a deterrent posture against the threats to the existence of Israel.
• Should deterrence break down and war erupt, to ensure a military capability to preserve the integrity of Israel’s territory, in any war-opening situation including a sudden Arab attack, and to disrupt the war coalition by damaging the core of its offensive capability.
To achieve these goals, we will have to structure our military strength on new approaches, taking into account: • The lack of territorial depth and therefore the necessity to establish a strong territorial defense system, based on populous and high quality settlement of key border areas in Judaea, Samaria, the Gaza district, the Golan Heights, the Galilee and the Negev.
• The need to provide maximum protection to human life.
• The need to develop and produce weapon systems and equipment which should enable us to maintain a permanent qualitative advantage over Arab confrontation states—including with regard to advanced and sophisticated equipment they might get from Eastern and Western sources.
As a rule, while striving to establish ties of strategic cooperation with the United States to enhance stability and security in the region as a whole, we will continue to ensure our own independent ability to cope with the Arab military threats to our existence and security.
In order to cope with the threat, Israel cannot build on a balance of power based on a simple quantitative ratio of military forces. We cannot hope to match Arab numbers. Therefore, Israel’s defense policy will have to ensure our ability to maintain a military balance based, beyond the quantitative ratio, on a clear qualitative and technological superiority. Israel is confronted by the challenge of maintaining a balance in peace of countries which have practically no limitations in funds to finance their military effort and furthermore in the . . . military technology and sophisticated weaponry they receive from all three sources—the Soviet, the American and the Western European supply sources, which are all competing by the same means for influence and economic advantages. Among the three sources of supply the United States remains sensitive to the need of maintaining a balance in the Arab-Israeli confrontation. But there is no control on the influx of armament from Soviet and European sources. Therefore, Israel has to build on her independent capability to develop and produce systems which are vital to ensure our qualitative advantage and our security. This puts a tremendous burden on our defense budget and on Israel’s national economy. . . . The second “safety valve,” if I can use that concept, in our defense policy, is our resolve and our ability to prevent the disruption of the territorial military status in neighboring countries. That includes our resolve.
One—To prevent the violation of security arrangements laid down in political agreements such as in the Sinai with Egypt, and the Golan with Syria. It must be crystal clear: We did sign the peace treaty with Egypt and we faithfully carry out its provisions of withdrawal to the international border, but we have no intention to accept any violation of the status and of the security arrangements in the Sinai as agreed between us.
Two—We will prevent any violation of the status quo ante in south Lebanon.
Three—We will prevent any change in the geographical-military status of the confrontation area which might present unacceptable threat such as the massive introduction of Iraqi forces into Jordan or southern Syria or Syrian forces into Jordan. Such an accumulation of forces in the confrontation area would endanger our very existence and is therefore unacceptable to Israel. . . .
The third element in our defense policy for the 1980’s is our determination to prevent confrontation states or potentially confrontation states from gaining access to nuclear weapons. Israel cannot afford the introduction of the nuclear weapon. For us it is not a question of a balance of terror but a question of survival. We shall therefore have to prevent such a threat at its inception.
There are three major elements in our defense policy for the 1980’s. We shall, of course, also maintain our freedom of action and our ability to act in order to overcome the terrorist threat. To sum up—in order to strengthen the foundation of its national security, in face of the direct Arab threat as well as in face of the challenge from outside the region, Israel will make special efforts:
One—To ensure our qualitative advantage and maintain the required balance of forces.
Two—To expand and consolidate our economic, industrial, scientific, demographic and physical infrastructure, so as to carry the burden of our national security.
Three—To hold political negotiations from a position of security for the purpose of continuing the peace process between Israel and her neighbors.
Four—To consolidate and nurture national unity in Israel, as well as the ties between Israel and the Jewish people in the Diaspora.
Five—To enhance strategic cooperation with the United States and to develop security relationships with Middle-Eastern and African countries and with other countries in the world. In that respect, I want to stress that Israel is not a liability but an asset, as the United States has gradually come to realize. For the common defense of the Free World, beyond our military capabilities, Israel has to offer an example of true democracy and stability in the midst of regional uncertainties and upheavals, and moreover the capability to contribute to the well-being of developed and less-developed nations, in many important fields such as science, medicine, food production and sophisticated agricultural technology in general.
Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir: Israel’s Role in a Changing Middle East (Spring 1982)24
Traditionally, the twin goals of Israel’s foreign policy have always been peace and security—two concepts that are closely interrelated: Where there is strength, there is peace—at least, shall we say, peace has a chance. Peace will be unattainable if Israel is weak or perceived to be so. This, indeed, is one of the most crucial lessons to be learned from the history of the Middle East since the end of the Second World War—in terms not only of the Arab-Israel conflict, but of the area as a whole.
The Middle East is a mosaic of peoples, religions, languages and cultures. Although the Muslim-Arab culture is predominant, it has not produced any homogeneity. A vast number of currents—religious and political—are vying with each other, cutting across political borders. The region is permanently in ferment, and frequently unrest flares up in violence, terror, insurrection, civil strife and open and sometimes prolonged warfare. . . .
The most remarkable feature, in our context, of these chronic manifestations of unrest and belligerence is the fact that the great majority of them have nothing to do with Israel or with the Arab-Israel conflict. There were some outsiders, 20 and 30 years ago, who sincerely, but out of ignorance, believed that a solution of the Arab-Israel conflict would lead to regional stability and open a new era of progress. Nothing could be further from the truth. There have, it is true, been four major wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors. However, a full count of the instances of trouble and strife, both domestic and international, in North Africa and Western Asia, would show that the overwhelming majority have no connection whatsoever with the Arab relationship to Israel. . . .
Reduced to its true proportions, the problem is clearly not that of a homeland for the Palestinian Arabs. That homeland is Trans-Jordan, or eastern Palestine. There are, however, 1.2 million Palestinian Arabs living in the territories which have been administered by Israel since 1967 in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Their status and problems were discussed at great length at Camp David. The granting of sovereignty to those areas was ruled out by Israel. A second Palestinian Arab state to the west of the River Jordan is a prescription for anarchy, a threat to both Israel and Jordan, and a likely base for terrorist and Soviet penetration. Hence, it was finally resolved at Camp David to implement an Autonomy Plan for the inhabitants of those areas, on a five-year interim basis. The proposal was made by Israel and accepted by the other partners of the Camp David accords, Egypt and the United States. It is not intended as t
he ultimate solution of the problem represented by these areas and their inhabitants, but as an interim arrangement designed to achieve two objectives: (a) to allow the Arab inhabitants of these areas the fullest feasible freedom in running their own lives, and (b) to create optimal conditions of peaceful coexistence between Arab and Jew.
Israel has made it clear, at Camp David and since, that it has a claim to sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza. In order, however, to keep the door open to a solution that will be acceptable to the parties, as envisaged at Camp David, Israel has deliberately refrained from exercising its rights under this claim. The claim will undoubtedly be presented at the end of the five-year interim period, and, while it is realized that there will be a similar claim on the Arab side, by that time one would hope that the kind of atmosphere will have been created that will make it possible to reach an agreement involving a solution acceptable to both sides. It should be clearly understood, therefore, that just as Israel is refraining from pushing its own solution at this time, by the same token the Arab side must refrain from pushing now for measures or the adoption of principles (such as self-determination, an embryo parliament in the autonomous territories, and the like) that would clearly fall beyond the parameters of Camp David and that would tend to prejudge the ultimate outcome of the negotiations on the final status of these areas. Autonomy, in other words, must be allowed to perform the function it was intended to perform—namely, to serve as an interim arrangement, pending the ultimate solution that is to be addressed at a later stage.
Meanwhile, Israelis and Arabs are learning to coexist in Judea, Samaria and Gaza—ultimately the best way to reconciliation and peace. Israelis will continue to reside in those areas. As in the past, this will not be done, of course, at the expense of the Arab inhabitants and their property. But, as Judea and Samaria constitute the heartland of the Jewish people’s birth and development as a nation, Israel will not be party to a design that would deny Jews residence in those areas.
The Israel-Arab Reader Page 35