As for us in Jordan, we are directly affected by the results of the continued occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through the accelerating colonization program and through the economic pressures systematically being brought on the Palestinian people to force them out of their land.
In the light of these facts, and in the no-war and no-peace situation that prevails, we find ourselves more concerned than anybody else to confront the de facto annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which forces us to take all steps necessary to safeguard our national security in all its dimensions. Both Jordanians and Palestinians shall remain one family that cares for its national unity to the same extent that it cares to stay on this beloved Arab land.
May God assist us in our aspirations.
Lebanon and Israel: Truce Agreement (May 17, 1983)33
The government of the Republic of Lebanon and the government of the State of Israel, . . .
Having agreed to declare the termination of the state of war between them,
Desiring to ensure lasting security for both their states and to avoid threats and the use of force between them,
Desiring to establish their mutual relations in the manner provided for in this agreement, . . .
Have agreed to the following provisions:
ARTICLE 1 1. The parties agree and undertake to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of each other. They consider the existing international boundary between Lebanon and Israel inviolable.
2. The parties confirm that the state of war between Lebanon and Israel has been terminated and no longer exists.
3. Taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, Israel undertakes to withdraw all its armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with the annex of the present agreement.
ARTICLE 2
The parties, being guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, undertake to settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner as to promote international peace and security and justice.
ARTICLE 3
In order to provide maximum security for Lebanon and Israel, the parties agree to establish and implement security arrangements, including the creation of a security region, as provided for in the annex of the present agreement.
ARTICLE 4 1. The territory of each party will not be used as a base for hostile or terrorist activity against the other party, its territory, or its people.
2. Each party will prevent the existence or organization of irregular forces, armed bands, organizations, bases, offices or infrastructure, the aims and purposes of which include incursions or any act of terrorism into the territory of the other party, or any other activity aimed at threatening or endangering the security of the other party and safety of its people. To this end, all agreements and arrangements enabling the presence and functioning on the territory of either party of elements hostile to the other party are null and void.
3. Without prejudice to the inherent right of self-defense in accordance with international law, each party will refrain: a. From organizing, instigating, assisting, or participating in threats or acts of belligerency, subversion, or incitement or any aggression directed against the other party, its population or property, both within its territory and originating therefrom, or in the territory of the other party.
b. From using the territory of the other party for conducting a military attack against the territory of a third state.
c. From intervening in the internal or external affairs of the other party.
4. Each party undertakes to ensure that preventive action and due proceedings will be taken against persons or organizations perpetrating acts in violation of this article.
ARTICLE 5
Consistent with the termination of the state of war and within the framework of their constitutional provisions, the parties will abstain from any form of hostile propaganda against each other.
ARTICLE 6
Each party will prevent entry into, deployment in, or passage through its territory, its air space and, subject to the right of innocent passage in accordance with international law, its territorial sea, by military forces, armament, or military equipment of any state hostile to the other party.
ARTICLE 7
Except as provided in the present agreement, nothing will preclude the deployment on Lebanese territory of international forces requested and accepted by the government of Lebanon to assist in maintaining its authority. New contributors to such forces shall be selected from among states having diplomatic relations with both parties to the present agreement.
ARTICLE 8 1. A. Upon entry into force of the present agreement, a Joint Liaison Committee will be established by the parties, in which the United States of America will be a participant, and will commence its functions. . . . a. The Joint Liaison Committee will address itself on a continuing basis to the development of mutual relations between Lebanon and Israel, interalia the regulation of the movement of goods, products and persons, communications, etc. . . .
2. During the six-month period after the withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with Article 1 of the present agreement and the simultaneous restoration of Lebanese government authority along the international boundary between Lebanon and Israel, and in the light of the termination of the state of war, the parties shall initiate, within the Joint Liaison Committee, bona fide negotiations in order to conclude agreements on the movement of goods, products and persons and their implementation on a nondiscriminatory basis. . . .
ANNEX SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS a. A security region [in southern Lebanon] in which the government of Lebanon undertakes to implement the security arrangements agreed upon in this annex is hereby established. . . . The Lebanese authorities will enforce special security measures aimed at detecting and preventing hostile activities as well as the introduction into or movement through the security region of unauthorized armed men or military equipment. . . .
b. Lebanese Police . . . may be stationed in the security region without restrictions as to their numbers. These forces and elements will be equipped only with personal and light automatic weapons. . . .
c. Two Lebanese Army brigades may be stationed in the security region. One will be the Lebanese Army territorial brigade. . . . The other will be a regular Lebanese Army brigade. . . .
d. The existing local units will be integrated as such into the Lebanese Army, in conformity with Lebanese Army regulations. . . .
Said Musa: Interview on Internal Dissent (May 26, 1983)34
. . . Fatah’s leadership knows that the Palestinian cause is not an issue of an officer or a group of officers, or an issue of a military group of elements in the arena of conflict in Al-Biqa’ rebelling against military orders. Ours is a cry for correcting a mistaken political action that had begun to develop and emerge more clearly following our departure from Beirut. Frankly, there is a political conflict within Fatah that has been going on for years. This conflict has developed into a broad current that believes in political concepts that are committed to Fatah’s statutes and political program. . . .
Following our freeze in Beirut, several positive questions evolved. And these should have given us the incentive to stiffen our political stands in order to confront the U.S. imperialist plan and in order for this steadfastness not to become a catalyst for implementing the U.S. plot and program. Following the battle of Beirut, we should have also submitted a struggle plan that commits the Palestinian revolution to confront the U.S. plan on Lebanon’s territory by virtue of the fact of the existing occupation and as a field of struggle through alliance with the nationalist movement and the honorable forces who are determined to continue the fight. However, this leadership went to Fez, and we consider that the Fez plan is actually Fahd’s plan which stems from Camp David and from UN Resolution 242 despite the inclusion of certain points which at first glance appear positive, such as demanding the establishment of a Palestinian state, the return of refugees, regain
ing Jerusalem, and eliminating the settlements. But we wonder who is capable of translating this program or that plan. Are Arab summits capable of doing such a thing?
And I answer: No, because from our experience in Lebanon no one moved to provide Beirut’s children with a single drink of water. We realize that the establishment of the Palestinian state and the return of the refugees is an issue that requires several wars. When the United States and Israel feel that their interests in the region are threatened, it is only at that moment that our voice as a Palestinian revolution will be heard. Then, the Arab countries can impose their plans, although they are supposed to be on the line of confrontation and in the middle of the conflict and not in a position to make deficient plans. Had these plans been offered by friends or allies or other parties, they could have been accepted, but not from the Arab countries because this is not what is expected of them. However, despite all this we say that whatever the matters may be, there is supposed to be a Palestinian option when there is a state of inability to implement these plans. Our Palestinian option since 1965 has been the option of armed struggle. However, the Palestinian leadership accepted the Arab option and dropped the option of armed struggle. . . .
And as for the Reagan plan, it was proposed on the day on which the last batch left Beirut. We heard the clauses of the plan when we were at sea. Its discussion in the Fatah movement began; we discussed its positive and negative sides. Through a simple political reading of the plan we find that it denies the existence of the Palestinian people and not only the Palestinian question. It also says no to the Palestinian state, no to the PLO, no to Jerusalem and its return, and yes to the settlements and to changing the borders. Despite all this, some voices within Fatah said there were positive points in the plan—that it recognized for the first time that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were under occupation. Is there anything new in this? Is there any justice in this? . . .
After the Reagan plan we plunged into a new whirlpool, the plan for a confederation with Jordan. We began to discuss the details before the state had been established—instead of first establishing the state and then discussing the confederation, which would be a direct result of establishing the state. Without going into all the details of this matter, I say that so far no clear decision has been made on this matter. We have not closed the door on it; it remains unresolved. There should be clear agreement that talks on a confederation are to be held after the establishment of an independent state. . . .
It is not a question of numbers. If it had been so I would have addressed an appeal to all our fedayeen and they would all have joined us. We are an indivisible part of Fatah. We are the conscience of Fatah who have raised their voice and thought aloud, and express the broad faithful base. . . . Therefore, it is necessary to stop and examine what we have achieved. What has this revolution achieved? Is it capable of shouldering the responsibility in confronting these big plans in light of its current reality or should it rearrange itself in a proper manner so that it can confront the coming stage? We say that the . . . National Council when it said yes to many of the political issues is neither a revolutionary nor a clear act. Political clarity is the major base. We understand that in the stages of retreat revolutionary movements adhere more closely to principles and bases.
What should I say to my father who fought in 1936 before the occupation of Palestine and the establishment of the Israeli state? What should I say to those who fought during these years to prevent the establishment of such a state? Are we fighting in order to recognize Israel? This is not reasonable, not reasonable and strange. These issues should be reexplained and corrected. Lastly, is it fair that the Central Committee issues decisions to put us under the command of the commander in chief together with Abu Hajim and Al-Haj Isma’il? Is it fair that it issues decisions to freeze our activity? . . .
Khalid al-Hasan: On the Dissident Rebellion (May 27, 1983)35
. . . Frankly and without exaggerating or underestimating what has been described as a rebellion, mutiny, or split within the Fatah movement, we ask: What did really happen, what were its causes, and what repercussions is it likely to have?
Answer: The group involved, including Abu Musa, Qadri, Abu Salih, and others, originally held political views characterized by rejection of the Fez resolutions and other policies. . . . This group, even before Fez, adopted certain political attitudes based on an idealistic rejection of everything or on conditional approval of many things. For example, Brother Abu Salih said that he would support the Fez summit [plan] if it included setting up a Palestinian state and would oppose it if it did not. So, fundamentally, this group has been adopting a certain political attitude for years. We could say that this attitude began to crystallize after the September events, and it has been applied to Jordan and to the recent Fez resolutions. The group included Naji ’Allush, Abu Nidal, and many others. Some of them left the movement and some continued to work within its framework. Even at the recent PNC meetings in Algiers, Abu Musa adopted certain attitudes which stemmed from a comprehensive theory which everyone wished it was possible to implement, even partially. The reason behind the declarations made in Al-Biqa’ was certain military organizational decisions made with the approval of the Military Council. They believe that some of these decisions should not have been made, especially the appointment of Abu Hajim as officer in charge of the Al-Biqa’ area and Al-Haj Isma’il as officer in charge of the north. Their position developed into a mutiny in the sense that they rejected the new military organizational steps. It was not made on political grounds, although the political aspect later came into it.
As far as discipline is concerned, this matter is serious. Democracy may be required on such matters, but at the level of the Central Committee, not the level of military officers. . . . That is the declared principle of the matter. The other fact is that, very regrettably, Brother Abu Salih overstepped the mark in Fatah’s democracy when he extended a hand for funds from a source outside Fatah and cooperated with two Arab states. . . . That money was paid before the PNC conference and it was agreed that five issues would be used to cause a split. They included rejection of the Fez summit, rejection of agreement with Jordan, and rejection of the Reagan initiative. There was no problem there, but to give the dissension a national character they were to use these points and, in the event of failure, they were to raise the issue of the dialogue with Israeli democratic forces. . . .
Another issue had also been raised to cause disunity. That issue was the differences with Syria. . . . I believe that national unity is not unity of the organizations but rather unity of the people behind the leadership and the goals. This does in fact exist because the Palestinian people are united regardless of whether there is a leadership or not. It was the Palestinian people, not an organization or a leadership, who foiled the settlement plots in the fifties. This matter is too great to be undermined. The people are much more united than the organizations. The organizational numbers do not broadly and accurately reflect the real attitudes of the people. One organization or another may have some support here or there, but Abu ’Ammar’s leadership is unquestionable and Fatah’s political line represents the mainstream. That is why I consider agreement among the organizations to be agreement among the instruments of work—and not national unity because unity is there. Our problem with the unity of the instruments is that some of them are not Palestinian, even though they are identified as such, because they do not take Palestinian orders. National unity or front relations under the National Charter, and in fact under any front regulations anywhere in the world, means agreement on a minimum plan of action with the minority accepting the views of the majority. It is very regrettable that the minority does not accept the opinion of the majority. . . .
King Hussein of Jordan: Speech to the Palestine National Council (November 22, 1984)
Brothers and sisters, the convocation of your council in Amman represents the unity of your will and the will of your people in the occupied homeland and elsewhere. It al
so represents the cohesion of the efforts and wills of two fraternal peoples, which have been demonstrated by their confrontation of the common challenge and danger. It is a natural return to what should and would continue to be. The Jordanian people have, more than and before anyone else, shared with the Palestinian people their sorrows, sufferings, and sacrifices and also carried with them their hope, determination, and resolution to regain their legitimate national rights on the land of Palestine. Jordan, and with it my family, have more than and before anyone else stood by the Palestinian people in confronting the Zionist danger in the early days just as we are confronting it today while it is at its peak. We are not saying this in order to outbid, maneuver, or seek praise, but to affirm an objective fact that has been made evident by actual participation in facing the common danger. . . .
I personally opened the first session of the PNC on May 28, 1964 in Jerusalem. I told your brother representatives of the Palestinian people in that meeting, among other things, that your convention represented a unique, historic event in the entire history of the disaster. I said that it was the first meeting of the heroic struggler Palestinian people despite all the designs to scatter them to all the four corners of the globe. So you can see from the historical facts that we—as a Hashemite family and a country— have never disavowed, God forbid, the Palestinian identity and aspirations or tried to dominate Palestine and its people.
Brothers and sisters: Following Israel’s occupation of the West Bank in 1967, we in Jordan and our brothers in Egypt devoted our efforts to achieving two objectives: first, rebuilding our Armed Forces which were destroyed by the war; and second, working politically for the sake of regaining the territory that was occupied by force. We cooperated with sister Egypt in issuing UN Security Council Resolution 242 which formed the basis of our political actions. The late leader President Jamal ’Abd al-Nasir urged me during our first meeting after the June war to do anything and exert every effort to regain the occupied territory. I did not need anyone to tell me to do that. By God, I have never showed cowardice and will not show cowardice when it comes to defending Jerusalem and Palestine. I have done all I could with God’s help. I have spared no effort and pursued every course.
The Israel-Arab Reader Page 42