Israel now is facing a clear question; that is, in light of its present situation time is not on its side. Tension in relations among the Arabs has begun to ease; the Arabs want to understand, resolve their problems, and cooperate among themselves. There is a real desire to know about the changes in the world and their effect on their situation; they want to know what they should do to become effective in the world. Arab scientific cadres are being formed and our intrinsic military capabilities are growing. The Israelis say that the news of Arab capabilities have surprised them.
Therefore, all this makes the Israelis realize that time is against them in terms of topography and politics, as well as other factors. Let us not rule out that some Israeli strategists will say that time is against us in this situation. If we can change this situation and change the military geography, time might be on our side.
Therefore, we should be alert over the next five years because when Israel wants to embark on military aggression it will take new land; it might launch a new attack to come out of its deadlock. Who will oppose them internationally?
The answer is no one, even if no one offered direct support to encourage it to launch aggression, no one will stand against Israeli aggression, as happened in the wars of 1967 and 1973 because the United States has remained alone in the arena of the big powers, and the U.S. policy is the policy we are now experiencing. Will the Soviet Union be capable of confronting the aggression if it takes place, or will it be Europe that confronts the aggression? All this makes us wonder what then is the situation?
The most influential stand vis-à-vis such a situation should come from within ourselves and our capabilities. There is no better way than this to remove the minefields that mar Arab relations. The second best way under these circumstances is also to push ahead joint action as expeditiously as possible. Faced with the quick developments, we should have a joint policy as Arabs on the regional level. It is not sufficient that Iraq has a policy, whether this policy is viewed as sound, or wrong in varying degrees, or that Egypt has such a policy, or Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and Algeria too. We are dutybound as Arabs to have a joint regional policy. The basic pillars of this joint regional policy are to reduce the number of the Arab nation’s enemies, or to reduce the frictions that will add further enemies. Our relations with Ethiopia should not be bad. We must try to solve our problems with Iran as Arabs and within boundaries that safeguard our rights and do not encroach on its rights.
All these elements limit the Israeli ability to make inroads during the mentioned five-year period not only in the Arab land but also in terms of influencing the Arabs in the technological, political and military fields with its own efforts or with the help of Jewish influence in the world. If the Arabs take all these elements into consideration, they will find themselves in an excellent position and will prevent the wave from destroying their barriers. The wave will merely move from one place to another because their barriers are high and impregnable. The wave will thus be forced to change direction and to destroy barriers in other places. . . . Moreover, when interest in the Palestine question diminishes, the Arabs will not act either. When a long time passes without effective action, interest in an issue fades away. There is another important issue, which is the situation in the occupied territories and the valiant popular resistance there.
It is not enough to show Arab solidarity with the intifada in a traditional manner that may become ineffective if it remains unchanged. It is necessary to overhaul the means and formulas of attention and support. At the top of the list is extending real financial support to the militant Palestinian people and enhancing organized and meaningful political action in the international arena. . . . the intifada and its actions represent an Arab army corps that is carrying out the task of weakening the Zionists in the occupied territories by using stones. We must provide the intifada with its needs out of pan-Arab principles and regional security considerations. Let us then provide it with what an army corps needs in supplies and ammunition. Then, and only then, will we ensure the strength of the intifada.
What weakens the enemy most is psychological exhaustion. Israel used to say that its soldier was invincible and some of us even believed it. Now, and due to the intifada, that soldier looks weak and undisciplined. He no longer wears his beret or helmet and does not rise to salute his officers when they pass by. This, and other things, show that he lacks discipline. It is well known that the soldier’s strength lies in his discipline.
The intifada of the young people and valiant women has shown us the true, pathetic state of the Israeli soldier. They have told us: Here you see the Israeli soldier—a man whom we can defeat if we exhaust him. If we, the little ones and women, have destroyed the Israeli soldiers’ morale, then Arabs, united and with greater power, are able to defeat the enemy and regain their rights.
Now we see certain new factors emerging on the ground that affect the residents of the West Bank and Gaza. Immigration to Israel has made some of them leave their lands and go to Jordan. Last year, Mr. President, 55,000 young Palestinians left the West Bank and Gaza and came to Jordan. This should make us think about maintaining, through resistance, what is left of Arab rights on the land until such time as we can use more effective methods to regain more than what we can regain now. We know that 80 percent of Israelis live on the Mediterranean coast and do not care about the intifada.As for us, we are affected by the intifada. The Israeli people have become used to the fact that there are children throwing stones, and the one who is really affected is the Israeli soldier who returns to his home town at the weekend. What I mean, Mr. President, is that without real, constant, and strong support for the intifada, it may become ineffective in the future. Immigration itself and the absorption of thousands of new immigrants into Palestinian territory—whether in Israel or in the occupied territories—aim to end the Arab presence in Palestinian territory.
Palestine was usurped through deliberate planning, and it can only be restored through deliberate planning backed by determination to achieve justice. The struggler sons of Palestine have proved to be an example of determination and readiness for sacrifice. The loss of Palestine was not essentially due to the Zionists’ faith in the Zionist cause, but due to the Arabs’ abandonment of the Arab cause. It was also not essentially due to Zionist strength, but to Arab weakness. Now that the Arabs have realized— through different factors and reasons, including their triumph over their enemies and the enemies of God on the eastern front and the heroic stand of the people of the deadly stones—that they are capable of taking action, then Palestine will return. Light will chase out darkness and the banners of justice shall fly over holy Jerusalem, God willing. . . .
Among the most important developments since the international conflict in World War II has been the fact that some countries which used to enjoy broad international influence, such as France and Britain, have declined, while the influence and impact of two countries expanded until they became the two superpowers among the countries of the world—I mean the United States and the Soviet Union. Of course, with these results, two axis have developed: the Western axis under the leadership of the United States, with its known capitalist approach and its imperialist policy; or the East bloc under the leadership of the Soviet Union and its communist philosophy.
Among the results of World War II: The Zionist state has become a reality, and the original owners of the land, the Palestinians, have become refugees. While the imperialist Western world helped the expansionist scheme and aggression of the Zionist entity in 1967, the communist bloc sided with the Arabs in the concept of balance of interests in the context of the global competition between the two blocs, and sought to secure footholds for the East bloc against the Western interests in the Arab homeland. The East bloc, led by the USSR, supported the Arabs’ basic rights, including their rights in the Arab-Zionist conflict. The global policy continued on the basis of the existence of two poles that were balanced in term of force. They are the two superpowers, the United States
and the USSR.
And suddenly, the situation changed in a dramatic way. The USSR turned to tackle its domestic problems after relinquishing the process of continuous conflict and its slogans. The USSR shifted from the balanced position with the United States in a practical manner, although it has not acknowledged this officially so far. The USSR went to nurse the wounds that were inflicted on it as a result of the principles and the mistaken policy it followed for such a long time, and as a result of the wave of change it embarked on, which began to depart from the charted course. It has become clear to everyone that the United States has emerged in a superior position in international politics. This superiority will be demonstrated in the U.S. readiness to play such a role more than in the predicted guarantees for its continuation.
We believe that the world can fill the vacuum resulting from the recent changes and find a new balance in the global arena by developing new perspectives and reducing or adding to this or that force. The forces that laid the ground for filling the vacuum and for the emergence of the two superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR, after World War II at the expense of France, Britain, and Germany can develop new forces, which we expect will be in Europe and Japan. America will lose its power just as quickly as it gained it by frightening Europe, Japan, and other countries through the continuous hinting at the danger of the USSR and communism. The United States will lose its power as the fierce competition for gaining the upper hand between the two superpowers and their allies recedes.
However, we believe that the U.S. will continue to depart from the restrictions that govern the rest of world throughout the next five years until new forces of balance are formed. Moreover, the undisciplined and irresponsible behavior will engender hostility and grudges if it embarks on rejected stupidities.
Given the relative erosion of the role of the Soviet Union as the key champion of the Arabs in the context of the Arab-Zionist conflict and globally, and given that the influence of the Zionist lobby on U.S. policies is as powerful as ever, the Arabs must take into account that there is a real possibility that Israel might embark on new stupidities within the five-year span I have mentioned. This might take place as a result of direct or tacit U.S. encouragement. On the other hand, the Arabs have a plus, and that is Arab solidarity that will be effective if the Arabs work out a well-defined plan of action and devise regional policies vis-à-vis neighboring foreign countries, and if they forge fruitful cooperation based on strong foundations oriented toward clear goals. The cooperation will have to encompass culture, politics, economics, and other areas. Recent American utterances and behavior as far as pan-Arab security and Palestinian Arab rights to their homeland are concerned inevitably cause alarm and warrant Arab vigilance, or are supposed to evoke such a reaction on our part. One may cite recurrent statements by U.S. officials about their intention to keep their fleets in the Gulf for an unlimited period of time, and their support for an unprecedented exodus of Soviet Jews to Palestinian territory, neither of which would have been possible solely under the cover of the human rights slogan had not the Americans put pressure on the Soviets, exploiting the latter’s special circumstances so as to incorporate the issue into their bilateral agreements with the Soviets. Add to that the increasing support for the Zionist entity’s strategic arms stockpiles and giving it license to deploy them when necessary, the judgment on when to use them being left up to Israel. This is above and beyond U.S. assistance to Israel in other areas.
We all remember, as does the whole world, the circumstances under which the United States deployed and bolstered its fleets in the Gulf. Most important of these circumstances: The war that was raging between Iraq and Iran; Iranian aggression had extended to other Arabian Gulf countries, most notably the sisterly state of Kuwait. At the time, beyond the conflicting views regarding the presence of foreign fleets in Arab territorial waters and foreign bases on their territory and their repercussions for pan-Arab security, that excessive deployment was somehow comprehensible. But now, and against the background of the recent world developments and the cessation of hostilities between Iraq and Iran, and with Kuwait no longer being the target of Iranian aggression, the Arabian Gulf states, including Iraq, and even the entire Arabs would have liked the Americans to state their intention to withdraw their fleets.
Had they said that under the same circumstances and causes they would have returned to the Gulf, it might have been understandable also. But U.S. officials are making such statements as if to show that their immediate and longer-term presence in Gulf waters and, maybe, on some of its territory, is not bound to a time frame. These suspect policies give Arabs reason to feel suspicious of U.S. policies and intentions as to whether it is officially and actually interested in a termination of the Iraq-Iran war and thus contribute to much needed regional stability.
The other side is the immigration of Soviet Jews to the occupied Palestinian land. How can we explain the Americans’ support and backing for Jewish immigration to the occupied Arab territories, except that the United States does not want peace as it claims and declares. If it really and actually wants peace, the United States would not have encouraged Israel and the aggressive trends in it to adopt such policies, which enhance Israel’s capability to commit aggression and carry out expansion.
We the Arabs, proceeding from a long-standing friendship with the Soviet Union, did not expect that the Soviets would give in to this U.S. pressure in such a way that it would lead to these grave consequences for the Arabs and their pan-Arab security. As we tackle these challenges, it would be just as compromising to the destiny and cause of the Arabs to feel fear as it would be to be lax in our evaluating and working out a reaction to them. Therefore, there is no place among the ranks of good Arabs for the fainthearted who would argue that as a superpower, the United States will be the decisive factor, and others have no choice but to submit. At the same time, there is no place in our midst for those who fail to take note of recent developments that have added to U.S. strength, thus prompting it to the possible commission of follies against the interests and national security of the Arabs—either directly or by fanning and encouraging conflicts detrimental to the Arabs, irrespective of their source. We are not thus out to antagonize or to incite public opinion against the United States on the strength of mere speculation over potential developments. We are only making the point that the Arabs seek peace and justice throughout the world and want to forge relations of friendship with those who show respect to what friendship is all about—be it the United States or any other nation. It is only natural that the Arabs take a realistic approach to the new posture and power of the United States that has led the Soviet Union to abandon its erstwhile position of influence. However, America must respect the Arabs and respect their rights, and should not interfere in their internal affairs under any cover. The United States must not forget that the Arab nation is a great nation that taught humanity things it had been ignorant of. Otherwise, there is no room for unilateral friendship or unilateral respect, and there will be no consideration for the interests and rights of any party unless it is capable of understanding and respecting the Arabs’ rights, interests, dignity, options, and pan-Arab security. Against the backdrop of the vital issues related to the substance of national Arab security, the question arises as to what we the Arabs have to do.
One of certain indisputable things, brothers, is that the correct description for a certain situation is not necessarily the correct solution to that situation, but an inevitable introduction leading to the correct solution. Therefore, in all cases, a solution does not merely consist of defining which issues are rejected, both concerning our behavior or the behavior and thinking of others who harm our pan-Arab security and national and pan-Arab interests. Another thing over which there is no room for dispute is that the policy of the age is not set by concerned foreign parties on any basis other than policies and strategies whose expected final result is to serve the interest of their countries.
Zionism realized these facts and
concentrated its international effort here and there in accordance with an accurate perception and longer-lasting knowledge than that of the Arabs. The Zionists were progressive initiators in fields where they would disrupt the calculations and influences of the Arabs. In accordance with this basis, and not only on the basis of developing public opinion, Zionism directed its special concentration on the United States of America to involve it in its strategy, after realizing that the future of its goals and joint action with the Europeans would come up against special obstacles. The United States accepted the concept of joining interests and action with Zionism out of its concept of its own interests, after the United States had taken over the role of the European colonialists following World War II.
Despite all the harm the United States inflicted upon the Arabs due to its alliance with Zionism, there remained the fear of communism, the Soviet Union, and the Arab friends and allies of the Soviet Union in the region, in addition to other factors. This continued to prevent the Arabs from taking influential stands towards U.S. policy, with minor exceptions. Their stands became restricted to a mere ineffective rejection or an ineffective silence and acceptance. The United States began not to take Arab stances seriously. The United States may have the famous red lines beyond which it does not tread concerning the interests of other nations that deal peacefully with it, but its policy so far has no red lines warning the concerned sides in the United States not to tread beyond them where Arab interests are concerned.
Realizing Arab solidarity on the basis of pan-Arab interests, correctly defining Arab interests, clearly and accurately defining everything that threatens their security and stability, and proceeding from this basis of capability, frankness, and solidarity with the United States, or other countries in general, prevents these countries from exceeding the proper bounds with the Arab nation and thus becoming a threat.
The Israel-Arab Reader Page 54