Your organization, the PLO, has acted on all fronts throughout the world to prevent the plot of the transfer—from the UN Security Council in New York to Europe, to Russia, to the Islamic and African summits at Dakar, to the Arab foreign ministers’ conference in Cairo, to the Non-aligned Movement in Indonesia, to China, and to Japan. The action continues. . . .
Sons of the great Palestinian revolution, proud struggling people of Palestine, let the 29th year of the Palestine revolution and the sixth year of our blessed intifada be the year of challenge and victorious confrontation. What year, brothers? The year of challenge and victorious confrontation under the shadow of our solid national unity and the confidence of the PLO, our national unity, for routing the forces of Israeli dictatorship and the liberation of our Palestinian land and our holy Jerusalem.
Let us all stand like one man with one heart and one goal against our enemy, who occupies our land and homeland and sanctities.
The greater the darkness the closer the dawn!
Mahmoud Darwish: Resigning from the PLO Executive Committee (August 1993)
I will shock you. This organization, complete with its hierarchy and structure and figures and perhaps its content—this organization is finished. Yes, it is finished, and you must admit this and act accordingly. [You must] put all your imaginative resources to work to see what comes next and to nurture the infant that it [the PLO] has given birth to, whether some of us weep for it [the PLO] or others rejoice at its demise.
This organization is finished whether you go with the settlement to the end or drop out of the settlement now. The organization’s remaining role is to sign the agreement with Israel. The moment it signs, it will be transformed into something else. What is this something else? Think about it as of now, and think of the fate of the cadres standing in the wind. . . .
We are approaching a grave decision relating to an imminent agreement with the Israeli government on Gaza and Jericho. When will this matter be discussed? When?
Some will say: Israel does not want to keep Gaza, and handing it over to the Palestinians solves an Israeli problem caused by the Gaza’s unsolvable problems and caused by the intifada and by Israel’s inability to annex because it wants to preserve Israel’s Jewish character. Some will say that the Israeli-Palestinian agreement will eliminate the obstacle standing in the way of the Arab-Israeli peace train, and that the agreement will cool down the Arab-Israeli conflict and divide the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian people, and, and. . . . All this is true, but we cannot say that Gaza and Jericho don’t concern us. Whether the proposal promises us full self-government or incomplete independence, we must take our time studying it in order to avoid leaping into thin air, in order not to take risks. We must carefully examine the details and the principles before we take this step, and the examination must involve all the groups and trends of the Palestinian people.
Have we obtained answers to the questions, including the following questions:
Is this deal part of a comprehensive peace settlement . . . ?
Is it clear that this is the first stage of the implementation of [Security Council] Resolution 242 in accordance with a clear timetable linked with a clear commitment and a clear recognition that this land is occupied land?
Who will run this experimental self-government in Gaza and Jericho? The PLO, whose role is going to end? Or an elected council?
Will the PLO go there, or will its chairman, in his capacity as its chairman or the president of something else?
What are the parameters of the experimental interim stage? Will it be self-government if the experiment and the test are a success? And what if it fails? Here, allow me to warn that our current conditions and present structure provide a negative answer to this question.
Is there a clear bridge linking the interim stage with the final stage, to reassure us that the interim stage will not be the final one?
Is the popular base ready to plunge into this experiment? Or is it charged with dangerous, explosive elements?
Can we ignore the fears, real or contrived, that our Arab ‘neighbors’ are expressing about the agreement with our Israeli ‘neighbors’?
What international economic guarantees are there that to make Gaza viable and build its infrastructure . . . ?
What forms of national self-expression will be allowed in resisting the occupation, which will remain there through general security, the settlements, the borders, the right of foreign representation, the crossings and the bridges and other forms of Israeli sovereignty?
Those questions make me think we are about to take an historic risk. I hope it works, but I have fears about its failure and its destructive national effects, which could lead to disaster.
My conscience will not tolerate participation in this adventurous decision as long as I cannot answer the questions posed. For that reason, I stand by my resignation from the decision-making body, placing myself at the disposal of the Palestinian people and their higher national interests.
Forgive me if I say that I am under no obligation to take part in this gamble. . . .
It is your right to ask me: Why [resign from the PLO Executive Committee] now? Why at this particular time?
Among the easy, ready-made charges: Isn’t this abandoning ship?
I will respond immediately. . . . I don’t see a ship now, if the ship is the PLO. Look around you carefully: its institutions, departments and bureaus are unoperational. They are up for auction.
It would be a crime to ignore the objective element in the crisis we are going through, but it is arrogant to ignore the subjective element. I am asking for no more than good management of the ending, in a manner that preserves people’s dignity and humanity. We have taken two generations to their death in the project of liberation and independence, and it now appears as if we are abandoning them completely, leaving them to the winds of the new wilderness. No, the martyrs were not stupid, as some angry people are saying. The martyrs were right. They believed their blood and their nation. We are the ones to blame, we who have no answer to any question relating to their children. . . .
We see a ship’s captain in a fluid image driven by a mysterious force towards an unknown fate at sea. On the shore, we see thousands of the martyrs’ children waving to him: wait for us, or take us with you. . . .
We are bidding a chaotic farewell to an historic stage and entering another stage for which we have not prepared ourselves. This is the question that haunts me. . . .
Israel and PLO: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements [“Oslo Agreement”](September 13, 1993)
The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the “Palestinian Delegation”), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:
ARTICLE I
Aim of the Negotiations
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the “Council”), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
ARTICLE II
Framework for the Interim Period
The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles
.
ARTICLE III
Elections 1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.
3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.
ARTICLE IV
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.
ARTICLE V
Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations 1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.
ARTICLE VI
Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities 1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.
ARTICLE VII
Interim Agreement 1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the “Interim Agreement”).
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council’s executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.
ARTICLE VIII
Public Order and Security
In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.
ARTICLE IX
Laws and Military Orders 1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.
ARTICLE X
Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee
In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.
ARTICLE XI
Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic Fields
Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.
ARTICLE XII
Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt
The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.
ARTICLE XIII
Redeployment of Israeli Forces 1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.
ARTICLE XIV
Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area
Israeli will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.
ARTICLE XV
Resolution of Disputes 1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
3. The par
ties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.
ARTICLE XVI
Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Programs
Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a “Marshall Plan,” the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.
ARTICLE XVII
Miscellaneous Provisions 1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.
ANNEX I
Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections 1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.
2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues: a. the system of elections;
b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and
c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.
3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.
ANNEX II
Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area 1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.
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