Between 1906 and 1910, the creation of an 'Expeditionary Force' became one of the prime functions of the Army Staff but, partly through Admiralty intransigence, but mainly for reasons of economy, little was done to give this force the transport, training or manpower it required. Even the establishment of a divisional system languished; the Home Army was organized on a command basis - Southern Command, Northern Command, and so on - and the battalions and regiments at home continued to pursue their original functions, the training of recruits and the dispatch of troops to battalions overseas, while at the War Office Haldane was mainly concerned with the creation of the Territorial Force and political arguments over conscription. The creation of an Expeditionary Force - or at least the notion of its prime role in support of France- might have been abandoned but for a succession of small but significant events overseas.
Following the Algeciras Conference of 1906, Germany's sense of grievance grew, notably in 1907 when Britain and Russia patched up their differences over Afghanistan and India and signed the Anglo-Russian Alliance. William Carr confirms that 'the agreement was not directed against Germany ... though no doubt alarm at the growth of the German navy and resentment of Germany's blustering and arrogant diplomatic methods played some part on the British side; but first and foremost, this remained a colonial agreement, designed to reduce British commitments overseas'. (33)
Even so, the agreement exacerbated German resentment; Carr notes that 'German newspapers complained in 1907 of the ring closing around Germany', (34) though the signing of the Anglo Russian Alliance did not commit Britain to membership of the current Franco-Russian Entente. Britain fully intended to keep continental affairs at a distance - a resolve that became increasingly difficult to sustain as the years passed and European tensions grew.
In Cabinet, defence debate was still concentrated on the Anglo German naval race. This race accelerated in 1909 when the First Lord of the Admiralty, Reginald McKenna, demanded the construction of six new dreadnought battleships to compete with the latest German increases under the German Naval Law of 1908.
This demand led to widespread comment in the press, alarm among the public and disputes in cabinet. As Winston Churchill remarked later: 'Genuine alarm was excited throughout the country at what was for the first time widely recognized as the German menace, In the end, a curious and characteristic solution was reached. The Admiralty had demanded six ships; the economists offered four; and we finally compromised on eight.' (35)
The British Government and the general public then became concerned by the attitude of the Kaiser. On 28 October 1908 the Kaiser compounded his other diplomatic errors with the United Kingdom by calling the British 'as mad as March hares' in an interview with the Daily Telegraph newspaper. In what was later described in the German newspapers as 'one of the great diplomatic blunders of the century', the Kaiser stated that the German people had little time for the British: 'What has come over you that you are so completely given over to suspicions unworthy of a great nation? I have said, time after time, that I am a friend of England and yet your Press, or a considerable section of it, bids the people of England refuse my proffered hand and insinuates that the other hand holds a dagger.
'The prevailing sentiment among large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. That is another reason why I resent your refusal to accept my pledged word. You retort that I am your arch-enemy and you make it hard for me. Why is this?'
The Kaiser also alleged that the French and Russians had tried to push Germany into conflict with Britain during the Boer War, and claimed that the rapidly expanding High Seas Fleet was aimed at Japan rather than Britain. These last comments proved particularly unwise. The Kaiser's remarks in this interview managed to alienate Britain, France, Russia and Japan, led to furious diplomatic exchanges, an acrimonious two-day debate in the Reichstag and the resignation of Prince von Bulow, the German foreign minister, who was blamed for failing to stop the Kaiser's outburst.
After this spectacular rant the Kaiser was obliged to endure a short period of silence, but his arrogance usually shielded him from the problems he created and from any sense of responsibility for the steps other nations felt obliged to take in response to such statements. 'We Hohenzollerns are the bailiffs of God,' he once declared, as if his words and actions enjoyed some form of divine sanction. The steps taken by other countries - forging defensive alliances, extending conscription, building dreadnoughts to match the expansion of the High Seas Fleet - only convinced the Kaiser that he was taking the prudent course in expanding his fleet and army to protect his people against aggression and encirclement.
In the autumn of 1908 trouble broke out in the Balkans with the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This action raised tension between Austria-Hungary and Britain's new ally, Imperial Russia. While making it clear that Britain would not be drawn into this dispute, Sir Edward Grey offered full support to Russia, and when Germany in turn supported Austria-Hungary political tension rose yet again. In the end Russia gave way but, said Churchill, 'This Teutonic triumph was a victory gained at a perilous cost ... Russia in 1910 made an enormous increase in her already vast army and both Russia and France closed their ranks.' (36)
The French were not satisfied with either the Russian alliance or the existing Entente with Britain. They were determined to turn the Entente Cordiale into a full-blown military alliance, and their original agreement with Sir Edward Grey, reserving the decision on any BEF deployment to 'the Government of the day', did not deter French ministers from pressing this point with their British colleagues on many occasions. In April 1908, for example, the French premier, Georges Clemenceau, met Richard Haldane at Downing Street. 'I had an hour's talk with him and found him very well informed,' wrote Haldane. 'He had been following our Army reforms closely but he wanted much more from us.’ (37)
Clemenceau wanted the British to introduce conscription and make a formal military alliance with France, but received no satisfaction on either point. Nor was the embryo BEF as yet either ready or equipped for such deployment. The plans for Anglo French military cooperation in the event of war had made little progress since there was no political commitment to such activity. Steps to alter that situation began only in August 1910 when Brigadier General Henry Wilson became Director of Military Operations at the War Office.
Wilson at the War Office 1910-1914
Dined with the King. Also Prince of Wales and Standfordham. Had little talk with the King but much with Standfordham who said that I was more responsible for England joining the war than any other man. I think this is true.
Diary of Major-General Henry Wilson,
4 December 1914 (1)
If the Kaiser can be regarded as the man mainly responsible for involving Europe in a disastrous war, Brigadier General Henry Wilson can be seen as the architect of Franco-British military cooperation in the years before the war. As he himself admits in the above diary extract, if any one man was responsible for sending the BEF to France in August 1914, that man was Henry Wilson. But to understand why this relatively junior officer should be so directly concerned with matters of high policy and Britain's continental strategy in the pre-war years, it is necessary to understand the man.
Henry Hughes Wilson was born in Ulster in 1864, a product of that province which, says Correlli Barnett, has provided Britain with its closest approximation to a Junker class. However, the most significant thing about Wilson was not his background but his Francophilia: a long succession of French governesses and childhood visits to France provided the young Henry Wilson with a love of all things French. As he grew up, the food, the wine, the history, the towns and countryside of France became his abiding love, aided by a sound grasp of the French language, a rare asset in the pre-war British Army- though Kitchener and Douglas Haig were also proficient French speakers.
It is impossible to stress Wilson's Francophilia too strongly. Writing a warning letter to Reginald McKenna, the First Lo
rd of the Admiralty, over the Agadir question in 1911, that astute observer, Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey, states:
It is of course notorious that the DMO [Director of Military Operations] General Wilson, who has brought this question to the front, has a perfect obsession for military operations on the Continent. He spends his holidays bicycling up and down the Franco-German frontier; he has preached this gospel at the Staff College for years and packed the War Office with staff officers who share his views. He holds the view not only that military action is indispensable in order to preserve the balance of power in Europe, but that we require a conscript army for this purpose. If he can get a decision in favour of military action at this juncture he will endeavour to commit us up to the hilt. (2)
All this was very true, but to trace the development of Wilson's involvement with the BEF we must go back to the beginning of his military career. Wilson always intended to join the Army but failed the entrance exam for Sandhurst and Woolwich no fewer than five times, and finally entered the army 'by the back door', with a commission in the Irish Militia. Once in the army, though, Wilson flourished. He was gazetted into the Rifle Brigade in 1884 and served in the Burma campaign of 1887, receiving a wound in the face that scarred him for life. Wilson was generally popular in the army; he had copious amounts of Irish charm, was cheerful in adversity and considered brave in an army that took courage for granted- and no mean soldier in the field. His problems arose from his character, for Henry Wilson was a compulsive intriguer; his peers liked him but his superiors did not trust him.
Wilson attended the Camberley Staff College from 1890 to 1892 and during his time there made several visits to the battlefields of the Franco-Prussian War and the eastern provinces of France, a practice he would continue in future years. After graduation he was posted to the Intelligence Department of the Army, which took him back to France from time to time for discussions with the French commanders - those post-1906 'conversations' had deep roots. On some of these visits he was accompanied by a close friend, Captain à Court Repington, a man who later became the military correspondent of The Times- and one of Wilson's most devoted enemies.
In the British Army service on the Staff alternates with periods of regimental duty. In 1899 Wilson became brigade major of a light infantry brigade and went to war in South Africa, where he fought at Colenso, the Modder river and at Spion Kop; all were disasters of various kinds and did little to instil a favourable view of his superiors' competence in Major Henry Wilson.
When Lord Roberts replaced General Redvers Buller as commander-in-chief in South Africa in 1900, Wilson became 'Bobs' military secretary, the man responsible for postings and appointments, a post that greatly widened his range of acquaintances and contacts. Wilson returned to the UK in 1901 as a brevet Lieutenant-Colonel with a DSO, a man clearly marked for advancement. His time in South Africa may also have convinced Wilson that when something needed doing, he was the man to do it. He had seen enough to persuade him that many senior officers were hidebound, inefficient dinosaurs with no understanding of the modern world; when time presented him with the opportunity to intervene in strategic or political affairs, he would not be deterred by any respect for rank.
Wilson was arrogant, opinionated and not short of conceit, but he was no fool. He fully supported the reforms introduced by successive war ministers and by 1907 he was a Brigadier General. From 1907 to 1910 he was the Commandant of the Staff College at Camberley; and in December 1909, while on a visit to Paris, he decided to pay a courtesy call on his opposite number at the Ecole Superieure de la Guerre, General Ferdinand Foch.
This proved a fateful meeting, one with far-reaching consequences. Wilson declined the usual rapid VIP tour of the facilities. He asked permission to sit in on the classes and at some point during the day he became smitten with Foch's intellect and grasp of military matters. That this was so is a cause for wonder, for Foch's reputation hardly stands up to close critical inspection.
Foch was one of the architects of the pre-1914 French tactical doctrine of 'offensive à outrance', the result of French deliberations on the disasters of 1870-71. Harking back to the successes of the great Emperor Napoleon, the doctrine meant abandoning any notion of defensive tactics or the husbanding of reserves in favour of an all-out attack on the enemy, regardless of loss. This doctrine was total tosh in the face of twentieth-century firepower, and should have been seen as such by the French general staff before it led to the slaughter of French infantry and much of their officer corps in the early weeks of 1914. To be fair, Foch also emphasized the need for commanders to understand the elements of defence and withdrawal, but these requirements were overwhelmed by the alleged benefits credited to the offensive. Critics might argue that this view is based on hindsight, but if senior officers creating a tactical doctrine for a coming war cannot see where that doctrine will lead, what use are they?
Foch is also on record as saying, after Bleriot had flown across the English Channel in 1909, that the aeroplane was 'good for sport but useless for war', another opinion that did not survive the first weeks of the Great War when aerial reconnaissance became vital and the growth of tactical air power began.
Lacking these reservations, Henry Wilson found Foch entrancing. Invited for a chat before lunch, Wilson stayed on throughout the afternoon and insisted on returning the next day for more discussions with his French colleague. He returned to Camberley declaring that his encounter with Foch was a meeting of minds, 'Foch's appreciation of German moves through Belgium are completely the same as mine,' he recorded, 'the important line being between Verdun and Namur.' (3)
A month after this visit Wilson was back in Paris for further talks. He was already exceeding his official brief, for his job at this time was training British officers in staff duties, not discussing military strategy with the French. In May 1911, Foch visited Wilson at Camberley, and in June Wilson accompanied Foch on an Ecole staff tour. Although they became dose friends- Wilson was even invited to the wedding of Foch's daughter- there is little doubt that Foch was the master and Wilson the disciple in this budding professional relationship - Foch's well-known ability to wind British generals round his finger was never more apparent than at this time.
Nor was Wilson reticent in declaring where this friendship was leading, for their talks dearly ranged far beyond the day-to-day routine of staff training duties. After a lunch at the War Office in 1911, Wilson took Foch to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and told the secretary, 'I've got a French general outside - General Foch, and mark my words - this fellow is going to command the Allied Armies when the big war comes.' (4)
Both men were vocal advocates of Britain's commitment of an Expeditionary Force to France immediately on the outbreak of war. There was one telling exchange during Wilson's second visit to Paris in 1910 when he asked Foch to define the smallest military force that the French would find useful. Foch's reply was illuminating: 'A single British soldier ...and we shall see to it that he gets killed.’ (5) During his time at Camberley Wilson nipped across the Channel at every opportunity to immerse himself in Anglo-French affairs, but his big chance to shape events came in August 1910 when he was appointed Director of Military Operations at the War Office -the very position from which his predecessor, General Sir James Grierson, had started the staff 'conversations' with the French four years previously.
On his first day in the post Wilson sent for the files on these 'conversations'- and was appalled by what he found. In four years nothing of any practical value had emerged. There were no plans, no draft orders, no estimates, no proposals or counter-proposals, no railway timetables or shipping schedules; nothing had been done of any practical nature to order or transport a British Expeditionary Force to France.
Wilson was still digesting these facts when the French military attache in London, Colonel Victor Huguet, was ushered in, hotfoot from the French Embassy, urging Wilson to take action and breathe fresh life into these moribund 'conversations'. This Wilson proceede
d to do, with considerable energy and no little success. He arrived at the War Office with one aim - to get the Expeditionary Force organized for rapid mobilization and deployment in the event of war, and to ensure that deployment was to France, in support of the French Army- and nowhere else.
By March 1911, seven months later, Wilson and his staff had worked out a plan for moving six infantry divisions and a cavalry division - the entire British Army in the United Kingdom - to France, with great speed, immediately on the outbreak of war; the infantry divisions on the fourth day after the mobilization order M4 - the cavalry on the seventh day - M7 - the artillery on the ninth day- M9.
Now Britain had an outline plan, but that plan still had to be worked out in detail- and obtain Cabinet approval. This last task would be difficult, for in 1908 a subcommittee of the CID had prepared a report (6) on The Military Needs of the Empire and reached the following conclusions:
A.The Committee in the first place desired to observe that in the event of an attack on France by Germany, the expediency of sending a military force abroad or relying on naval means alone is a matter of policy, which can only be decided by the Government of the day.
B.In view, however, of the possibility of a decision by the Cabinet to use military force, the Committee have examined the plans of the General Staff and are of the opinion that in the initial stages of a war between France and Germany, in which the Government decided to assist France, the plan to which pref erence is given by the General Staff is a valuable one and the General Staff should accordingly work out all the necessary details.
The Old Contemptibles Page 6