All was therefore ready when the mobilization order arrived and the four infantry divisions and one cavalry division of the BEF, with all their impedimenta, set out for France. The first four infan try divisions were formed into two corps; I Corps, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, would be commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig; II Corps, consisting of the 3rd and 5th Divisions, would be commanded by Lieutenant General Sir J. M. Grierson. The cavalry division would be commanded by MajorGeneral E. H. H. Allenby, and the entire force would be under the command of Field Marshal Sir John French, with Lieutenant General A. J. Murray as his chief of staff, Major-General Henry H. Wilson as sub-chief and Major-General Sir William Robertson as quartermaster general.
The BEF were extremely fortunate to have Sir William Robertson as QMG. Robertson had joined the army as a cavalry trooper and is still one of the few private soldiers to have risen through the ranks to field marshal. Commissioned in 1888, he had gained promotion through sheer ability, attended the staff college and later been the college commandant. A soldier to his fingertips, Robertson knew how to tackle a complicated logistical task and, rather more to the point in August 1914, how to cope when matters went awry. As he wrote in his memoirs:
It was necessary that the Quartermaster-General's staff should examine the situation from every point of view, and introduce such elasticity into the supply arrangements as would promptly afford the Commander-in-Chief the greatest possible choice of action. In short, it should be prepared to meet any and every reasonable contingency, for no matter how skilful the plans of the Commander-in-Chief might be, they would almost certainly fail in execution if the troops were not properly fed, quartered and kept supplied with ammunition. (22)
It is noticeable- and curious- that Robertson's memoirs make no mention whatsoever of his colleague Henry Wilson, the subchief of staff.
The total force under Field Marshal French's command amounted to around 150,000 men, a puny force perhaps when compared to the vast armies of France and Germany, but a well-trained, efficient and completely professional one. Haldane and Wilson had done wonders in creating the BEF and preparing it to move, but the problems facing it had only just begun in August 1914. As related-and in view of what follows the point is worth stressing- Wilson had spent years getting the BEF ready to move, but he still had to work with the ration strengths and equipment scales drawn up and funded by his military and political superiors. Had the Govern ment been willing to admit in Parliament the progress of the 'conversations' and Wilson's close links with the French General Staff, it is at least possible that the Government and staff, working together, would have devoted more thought to the kind of fighting a European war would involve and created a BEF equipped to con tinental standards in both size and equipment.
As it was, they had got a colonial army, small, mobile and lightly equipped- the sort of army Britain had needed to fight the South African War back in 1899. What was needed in 1914 was a continental army, massive, largely conscripted, armed with heavy artillery, howitzers and machine guns, equipped with motor transport and backed by ammunition scales suitable for heavy usage and a long war. In the event, since the British Army was small, the munitions and armaments industry that supported it was equally small and proved itself unable to meet the demands that would shortly come from the divisions in the field and the new divisions training at home.
Nevertheless, on 4 August, the BEF reservists began to muster at their regimental depots and proceed from there to their battalions and the docks. The troops in Britain went to Southampton, those in Ireland to Cork, Dublin and Belfast. The motor transport went to Avonmouth, military stores and supplies to Newhaven, food to Liverpool. In the first five days of mobilization 1,800 trains ran to these ports. At the ports the men and stores were embarked on four classes of ships: Class I, Personnel; Class 2, Horses and Vehicles; Class 3, Motor Transport; Class 4, Stores. Each day an average of thirteen fully loaded ships sailed from the UK.
These ships sailed to Boulogne, Le Havre and Rouen, escorted across the Channel by the Royal Navy; not a ship, man or gun was lost on the voyage. (23) Henry Wilson's plan had worked to perfec tion. The WF scheme finally came to fruition on 23 August 1914 when the infantry of the British Expeditionary Force opened fire on the German First Army to begin the Battle of Mons.
The BEF Advances 9-22 AUGUST 1914
To the north, outlined against the sky, countless fires were burning. It was as if hordes of fiends had suddenly been released, and dropping on the distant plain, were burning every town and village.
Edward Spears, Liaison, 1914, p. 103
While the British Army was mustering troops and sending them to France, the German armies were pouring into Luxembourg and Belgium and French forces were surging across the eastern frontiers of France into the Ardennes and the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. The French deployed their First Army in the South and their Fifth Army in the North; the German armies mustered in reverse order, with the Seventh Army in the South and the First, Second and Third, set to move in a great scythe-like thrust into Luxembourg, Belgium and northern France, in the North. All these forces were working to a pre-war plan; the French armies were following the dictates of Plan XVII and pushing east, and the Germans were enacting the strategy drawn up years before by the late Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1906.
The famous Schlieffen Plan had the aim of avoiding the ultimate peril for any nation, a war on two fronts. When faced with an array of enemies, the wise general will try to defeat the strongest force first, and the strongest enemy facing Germany, post-1871, was France. Von Schlieffen calculated that the vast, slow-moving Russian armies would take six weeks to muster, and this period provided his 'window of opportunity' - the German armies must defeat those of France in no more than forty-two days, before the Russians could take the field. That done, the German armies would be rushed eastward on Germany's well-developed railway system and inflict a similar blow on the armies of the Tsar.
The Germans had to move quickly, avoiding any delay caused by the mighty French forts along the Franco-German frontier by attacking France through Belgium, overwhelming the French armies in just six weeks. Germany's entire strategy for victory in the First World War was based on this long-prepared plan and these tight timings- and it is therefore at least arguable that when the French, far from being defeated, struck back on the Marne on 6 September 1914, thirty-seven days after the invasion of Belgium, Germany had already lost the war.
Von Schlieffen worked on his plan for years, but most of his work was refinement; the essence of the plan did not change. By the time he retired in 1906, his plan called for just one German army- the Eighth- to contain the Russians in the East. The Sixth and Seventh under Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, totalling 345,000 men, were to hold the French assault by the First and Second Armies in Alsace and Lorraine, even giving ground if need be. At the same time the First and Second German Armies, 320,000 and 260,000 strong respectively, under the overall command of General von Bulow of the Second Army, were to advance into northern France via Belgium, scooping up the Belgian Army, most of the French Army and - should they be so foolish as to intervene- any British force in their path.
This sweep should go as far west as possible; ideally, von Schlieffen had decreed, 'when you march into France the left-hand soldier should brush the Channel with his sleeve'. Meanwhile the German Fourth (180,000 men) and Fifth Armies (200,000 men) were to advance through the Ardennes, conforming with the movements of the armies on either flank and holding the German line together. It will be noticed that the German armies grew pro gressively stronger from south to north; von Kluck's First Army on the right wing, mustering 320,000 men, was the strongest of all.
Having overrun Belgium and reached France, these armies would press south to envelop Paris. Von Kluck's First Army would move south of the city before all three armies turned east to press the French armies attacking Germany against th
eir own eastern fortifications. Von Schlieffen based his confidence in this part of the plan on prior knowledge of the French strategic plan, Plan XVII.
As with the Schlieffen Plan, Plan XVII had taken years to prepare. The plan adopted in May 1913 was actually the seventeenth draft of the original, much altered since the French staff sat down to discuss what they could do to recover the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine in the 1870s, and tinkered with most recently by General Joffre. Brooding over the losses and humiliations of 1870-71, the French looked back to their days of la gloire under the great Napoleon- and eventually decided that the answer to their problems was staring them in the face. It lay in resurrecting the first Emperor's principles; there they would find a method- a tactic, perhaps even a strategy - that would guarantee success when the struggle with Germany began again.
During the first Emperor's campaigns, a combination of artillery and infantry, the latter surging forward to the sound of drums, had given the French armies victory over a host of foes for more than a quarter of a century. Here, then, lay the solution to all military difficulties- the offensive; abandon all other possibilities and concentrate on attack, all-out attack, 'l'attaque à outrance', a constant, no-holds-barred assault on enemy forces wherever found. Forget defence, forget withdrawal, above all forget reserves; only attack and victory would be yours. This doctrine was expounded in the years up to 1914 by Colonel de Grandmaison, chief of the Troisieme Bureau (Operations Branch) in the French general staff, aided by the chief of the Ecole Superieur de Guerre, Henry Wilson's confederate and boon companion, General Ferdinand Foch.
With the advent of modern weaponry, the French doctrine of l'attaque à outrance was, to put it bluntly, insane. Times had changed since Austerlitz and Wagram. In the face of new technology, such as magazine rifles, automatic weapons, shrapnel and heavy guns, plus the use of entrenchments- all of which had made their appearance in the US Civil War fifty years previously and had been greatly refined since - the thought that troops could storm enemy positions and carry all before them, relying on courage and the sudden force of their attack- l'attaque brusque- was stark lunacy.
The French general staff did not see it that way. They based their strategy on the ancient furia frances, the power and élan of the French infantry soldier, the cran - guts - of the officer corps, backed up by the new 75mm quick-firing gun. Let those soldiers see the enemy, let the Soixante-Quinze do its work, and all would be well.
It might therefore be argued that if the BEF of 1914 was a Victorian army, the French Army that entered the First World War was a Napoleonic army- at least in matters of training and doctrine. In appearance it dated from 1870, from the red pantaloons worn by the infantry and the helmets, breastplates and plumes adorning the cavalry troopers, to the white gloves worn into battle by the officers. Attempts to introduce the less visible 'horizon bleu' uniform to the infantry was resisted by all ranks until the fields of France were carpeted with gloriously clad heaps of dead in the late summer of 1914. Nor were the French over-blessed with modern weaponry. The cavalry had a carbine as well as sword and lance, but with the exception of the excellent 75mm field gun, the famous Soixante-Quinze, most of the French guns were obsolete; as with the BEF, there was a shortage of heavy guns and high explosive shells. In 1914 the German Army had 3,500 heavy guns, the French 300 heavy guns and several hundred Soixante-Quinze, the BEF just 480 guns of every calibre.
The 'offensive à outrance' was the doctrine driving Plan XVII. Essentially, the French armies would all push east for the Rhine, driving the enemy before them. Five armies would be deployed in the East, running north from Belfort in Alsace to Hirson on the Franco-Belgian border. The area to the west, from Hirson to the North Sea, would be left wide open- unless covered by the British Expeditionary Force or the Belgians.
If, as was rumoured in Berlin and reported by French spies, the Germans really intended to attack through Belgium, west of Hirson, and surge south across the Meuse into France, so much the better. They could not possibly have enough men to carry out the Schlieffen Plan and defeat Plan XVII ...or so it was thought. Moreover, brooded the Troisième Bureau, if they were strong on the two flanks they must be weak in the centre and therefore vulnerable to an attack through the Ardennes by the French Third and Fourth Armies. In brief, says the British Official History, before the war: 'Joffre's first object was to break the enemy's centre and then fall on the right, or western wing of the German Armies'. (1) Deep down, however, Joffre did not really believe that the Germans would come into France via Belgium.
The Germans were equally content with their enemy's tactics. The farther the French armies pushed east, the easier it would be for the German right wing to get in behind them. To aid this process, the commander of the German left wing, Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, a very competent soldier, was ordered not to put up too much resistance to the main French thrust. When the French advanced he was to fall back steadily, causing heavy casualties but doing nothing to hinder the French advance until the encirclement of French forces was complete. Nor were the Germans worried by any lack of numbers; they fully intended to employ their Reserve Corps in their field armies - a decision that would provide the German staff with more than enough troops to carry out their entire strategic plan.
By August 1914, seven German armies, seventy divisions containing over 1,500,000 soldiers, had been mustered along Germany's western frontier. These armies were divided into three wings. The left wing, defending Alsace and Lorraine, was comprised of the Seventh and Sixth Armies - smaller than the other two wings with a total of sixteen divisions. Then came the centre - the Fifth and Fourth Armies - totalling twenty divisions, and finally the right wing, made up of three armies, the Third, Second and First. This wing contained thirty-four infantry divisions and a mounted corps of three cavalry divisions. The first part of the BEF story is largely concerned with the actions of the German First Army (von Kluck), the Second Army (von Bulow) and the Third Army (von Hausen), the three armies on the German right wing- though other German armies will become involved later.
Von Schlieffen never ceased to press the merits of his strategy. Unfortunately, his successor as Chief of the General Staff, General Helmuth von Moltke, was much less certain that he should denude the Rhine and Russian frontiers to provide the maximum possible strength for Schlieffen's push into Belgium and France. To von Moltke, the Schlieffen Plan seemed just a touch too risky; it flew in the face of that old English proverb about not putting all the eggs in one basket. Von Moltke therefore proceeded to tinker with the plan, first by allocating newly raised divisions to the Rhine, then by actually transferring divisions from west to east.
It is possible that von Moltke's action fatally undermined the plan. The slow-moving Great War armies had weight rather than momentum; by reducing the weight of the main attack, von Moltke reduced the chances of it succeeding. On the other hand, it is equally possible that the Schlieffen Plan simply demanded too much of the soldiers. The armies of 1914 relied on feet and hoofs - and it is doubtful that the German armies, especially the First and Second Armies on the western flank, which had the farthest distance to travel, could have marched the hundreds of miles from the Luxembourg frontier to the outskirts of Paris and still been fresh enough to fight a major engagement. It is also possible that von Schlieffen was well aware of this problem; since nothing could be done about it, it was simply ignored.
This is only a brief outline of the strategic plans with which the two continental enemies entered the war. The essence of both plans is simple, and that is sound strategy for, according to Clausewitz, in war only the simple succeeds. A broad understanding of these plans is essential, both in order to understand what was going on in France between August and December 1914 and to see where the BEF fits into the overall situation; the image to bear in mind is that of the revolving door, with two forces pushing in opposite directions about the pivot of Paris, and a timescale of just forty-two days. If anything delayed or disrupted that timescal
e the Schlieffen Plan would fail and Germany might lose the war.
Germany's belief in the prowess of her armies was not without foundation. With the possible exception of the fully professional British Expeditionary Force of 1914, the German Army outclassed every other army on the Western Front for much of the war. It was the powerful and efficient product of a society steeped in militarism and dedicated to the subjection of neighbouring states. In such a role it proved itself invincible against more numerous opponents- until those opponents also became powerful and efficient under pressure of necessity. Germany was, however, obliged to pay a: stiff price for such military efficiency- despotism at home and tyranny abroad.
Countries with a democratic system of government - such as Great Britain - go to war reluctantly and only when forced to do so; their armies consequently suffer both heavy losses and disasters in the early days. Such countries are more interested in the maintenance of civilised values - and less of a threat to their neighbours - but there is a price to pay, and when war comes the soldier pays that price. Britain's failure to prepare for a modern European war cost the British Army - and the British Empire - a great number of lives after August 1914.
In 1922 Rudyard Kipling, the Imperial poet, noted that the British Army's general unpreparedness for a continental war in 1914 'has been extolled as proof of the purity of this country's ideals, which must be a great consolation to all concerned'. Kipling's only son, Jack, was killed at the Battle of Loos in September 1915, so the bitterness in that comment is understandable. Even so, professionalism is not everything in military affairs. The German Army was highly professional but its conduct in the first weeks of the war, during the advance into Belgium, was disgraceful. As they advanced, the German generals implemented a deliberate policy of terror to quell any spirit of resistance in the towns and villages the army overran.
The Old Contemptibles Page 11