The British withdrawal from Mons was not a sudden, coordinated movement across the entire front - poor communications prevented that. It was a piecemeal process as companies and platoons and sections found themselves able to briefly beat down the enemy fire to their front and fall back, or noted men falling back on their flanks and elected to follow, or were ordered back by their officers. Withdrawing from a position when under direct attack is among the most difficult of military manoeuvres, but these soldiers were skilled and disciplined troops who quickly grasped what was happening and knew what to do when their chance came to move - many had withdrawn under fire before when closely pressed by Pathan tribesmen on the North- West Frontier of India. Fortunately they found plenty of cover among the gardens and houses in the suburbs of Mons, so the withdrawal was effected without undue difficulty and was in no sense a rout. The blowing of the canal bridges was the signal for a general withdrawal, and by 1700 hours most of the British line had disengaged and was moving back to Smith-Dorrien's previously prepared positions south of the canal.
Only in the Mons salient, where some battalions of the 8th Infantry Brigade were surrounded by German forces, was there any significant loss. Here some platoons of the 4th Middlesex - pinned down by shellfire, their rifles jammed by sand and running out of ammunition for their machine guns- were overrun, though the soldiers continued to engage the enemy until their positions fell. The rest of Smith-Dorrien's corps withdrew from Mons and the canal line, turning to face the enemy again a mile or so farther south. Pinned down by British shellfire in their first attempt to carry this second position, the Germans put in another attack about 1730 hours and were hurled back by rifle fire from the 2nd Royal Scots, the rst Gordon Highlanders and the 2nd Royal Irish Regiment. The Germans then broke off the attack; in the early evening their bugles sounded the ceasefire, ending any further advances that day. The German Army had discovered what professional British infantry could do in a defensive battle and had not enjoyed the experience.
This was the famous Battle of Mons. It lasted twelve hours, and apart from a few tactical decisions during the day and the order to pull back later that night, none of the senior officers had a lot to do. From the moment the first shot was fired, the outcome at Mons depended on the shooting and fieldcraft of the soldiers and the tactical skills of the battalion commanders; both were well up to the task.
Total casualties in II Corps were just over 1,600 men, killed, wounded and missing; the Corps also lost two guns along the canal. The largest battalion casualties were in the 4th Middlesex, which lost 400 men, and in the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, which lost over 300; both of these units were in the 8th Infantry Brigade in the salient. Haig's I Corps, which was barely engaged at all, lost just forty men and Allen by's Cavalry Division even fewer. German losses, largely from rifle fire, exceeded 5,000 men.
The Battle of Mons was largely fought by the two divisions of Smith-Dorrien's II Corps, and they should get the credit for it. The Official History comments that: 'Altogether the British commanders were not dissatisfied with this day's work. The unsatisfactory position on the canal had been imposed on them fortuitously; but it had been held for a sufficient time and had been evacuated, without great disaster or difficulty, in favour of a second position only a mile or so in rear. The men too were in high spirits, for they had met superior numbers of the ost highly renowned army in the world and given a good account of themselves.' (11)
There was, of course, a hidden error here, a failure in the senior command. But for the skill of those riflemen a heavy price would have been paid for committing the BEF against so many German divisions. The finger of blame here must point at General Lanrezac and to a certain extent at Field Marshal French. French had failed to keep a grip on the campaign so far, had declined to consult his allies and insist on an obviously essential conference with Lanrezac. As a result, he had let the BEF march on unsupported towards the advancing Germans. Good generals have to be lucky but Field Marshal French was pushing his luck too hard and it soon began to run out.
At nightfall on 23 August, II Corps were pulling back from direct contact with the enemy and taking up defensive positions three kilometres (two miles) south of the canal. They had been in action all day, had withdrawn by platoon and company under shell and rifle fire and were naturally in some disorder. The men needed to sort themselves out and receive fresh supplies of ammunition, a hot meal and, if possible, some rest. The brigades of the 3rd and 5th Divisions had to reform while General Smith-Dorrien received reports and casualty and ammunition returns from his commanders. That done, he would have to contact Field Marshal French, report on the situation and obtain fresh orders.
While Smith-Dorrien was doing all this, he pulled his men back to the hastily prepared defensive position three kilometres (two miles) south of the canal and ordered them to dig in there for a renewal of the battle on the following day. The weary soldiers of II Corps were carrying out this order at 2300 hours on 23 August when a message arrived from Field Marshal French, ordering Smith-Dorrien to send a staff officer at once to GHQ and receive fresh orders. The essence of these orders was that there would be no stand south of Mons. With a strong German force to his front and the French on his right falling back, Field Marshal French had decided to retreat.
This decision had not been reached without some furious debate at GHQ. Wilson's diary entry for August 23 states: 'During the afternoon, I made a careful calculation and I came to the conclusion that we only had one corps and one cavalry division (possibly two corps) opposite us. I persuaded Murray and Sir John that this was so, with the result that I was allowed to draft orders for an attack tomorrow by the Cavalry Division, 19th Brigade and II Corps, to the North East, pivoting on Mons.' (12)
Given the fact that II Corps and the 19th Infantry Brigade had been in close action all day with large forces of the enemy, one can only wonder where Wilson was getting his information from or what might have happened had this order to attack been implemented. Fortunately, this was not the case. Wilson's account continues: 'Just as these [orders] were complete, a wire came from Joffre to say we had two and a half corps opposite us. This stopped our attack and at 11 pm came the news that Fifth Army were falling back still further. Between 11 pm and 3 am we drafted orders and made arrangements for a retirement to the line Maubeuge-Valenciennes. It had been a day of sharp fighting and severe disappointment.' (13)
The withdrawal of the BEF from Mons to the Marne duly began in the small hours of 23/24 August, only to stop again two days later when Smith-Dorrien's now battle-hardened II Corps turned on its pursuers at Le Cateau.
The Battle of Le Cateau 26 AUGUST 1914
Very well, gentlemen, we will stand and fight.
Lt.-Gen. Horace Smith-Dorrien
The order to withdraw the BEF from Mons came not a moment too soon. Not only were the French on their right continuing to withdraw from the engagement around Charleroi, but von Kluck's forces were still moving round the British left, continuing their march towards the west of Paris while hoping to drive their opponents, French and British, into the elusive safety of Maubeuge.
According to the Official History, after the fight at Mons von Kluck 'resolved to continue the attack next day, enveloping the [British] left flank with the intention of cutting off the enemy's retreat to the west'. It adds, 'the attack will be so directed as to force the enemy into Maubeuge'. (1) If the Anglo-French forces in the north could be penned in Maubeuge the general German advance on Paris could continue unimpeded.
These twin aims produced a certain ambivalence in von Kluck's actions. Convinced that the British would fall back south and west, down their line of communications towards the Channel ports, he sent the entire II Cavalry Corps, three divisions under General von der Marwitz, to cut them off while a further four infantry corps - eight divisions - were tasked to push south and drive the BEF and at least part of the Fifth Army into Maubeuge.
These actions thwarted Field Marshal French's first firm intention of aba
ndoning any further attempt to liaise with the detested Lanrezac and withdraw towards the Channel ports down the route of the BEF's advance.
Up to a point, this was a sensible intention. By retreating down his established lines of communication, French would enjoy the advantage of organized rail links for the movement of supplies and reinforcements to the front and the evacuation of the wounded, as well as the availability of supply dumps. However, with the enemy trying to edge round his left flank, this withdrawal to the south and west was no longer an option - and would anyway have created a gap between the BEF and the French Fifth Army that the Germans would surely exploit.
French therefore elected to pull back towards the south, and Joffre asked the Field Marshal whether he might care to consider withdrawing in the direction of Cambrai.
This decision to retreat was providential for intelligence errors continued, and, as noted, on the evening of 23 August Wilson had persuaded French to order a fresh advance. Fortunately new information then arrived from GQG and the BEF attack was shelved. French then received news that the Fifth Army were still falling back, so the BEF were ordered to retreat towards a line between Maubeuge and Valenciennes. This order had to be relayed to the BEF's corps and divisional commanders; this took time and caused further confusion.
It is essential to bear in mind the problems of telephonic communication in northern France in 1914 Haig's HQ was in telephone contact with GHQ but Smith-Dorrien's was not, so a II Corps staff officer, Brigadier General Forrester-Walker, was sent back 35 miles to GHQ at Le Cateau to receive the new orders. The time taken for this 115-kilometre (70-mile) round trip caused further delay. It is hard to see why these orders were not sent directly to Smith-Dorrien for execution.
When Forrester-Walker arrived back at Smith-Dorrien's HQ, it was discovered that the orders contained no coherent plan for the BEF retirement. Instead, French stated that the arrangements for withdrawal were to be 'worked out between the two Corps commanders', but seemed to suggest that Haig's I Corps should cover the retreat of II Corps. It was now 0300 hours on 24 August, the day after the engagement at Mons. Dawn would come at 0500 hours, the men had not slept for two nights, and the German attack was sure to be renewed as soon as it was light enough for their artillery commanders to spot the fall of shot. There was no time for the two Corps commanders to work things out, and they were not, in fact, able to meet until noon on 24 August, when German artillery had been firing on II Corps positions for several hours and an infantry attack was clearly pending. By that time Haig's Corps was already on the move- the 1st Division's retreat had started at 0400 hours and the 2nd Division moved out shortly afterwards - and if Smith-Dorrien's corps were to manage another successful disengagement they must move quickly.
French had not indicated a destination for the withdrawal, as he had not yet made up his mind where to go. He had already assured Joffre that he would withdraw the BEF towards Valenciennes and had abandoned the idea of a retreat south-west towards Amiens, but he was also toying with the notion of pulling back inside the fortress of Maubeuge, a second-class French fortress with defensive bastions stretching for 32 kilometres (20 miles), a position that was close to his right rear, well provisioned and, perhaps, defensible.
The idea of a retreat into Maubeuge was, French admitted, 'a terrible temptation'. (2) Fortunately, recalling the example of Marshal Bazaine, who had been penned in Metz in 1870 and forced to surrender by the Prussians, French resisted this alluring prospect. Had the BEF withdrawn into Maubeuge German siege artillery deployed at Liège would have arrived within days to enforce surrender; in the face of modern heavy artillery, these fortress cities had lost their value in the first weeks of the war. The only remaining option was retreat, so the BEF got wearily to its feet and began to pull back to the south, the first leg of their retirement taking them towards Le Cateau.
As noted - and in spite of French's previous intention - it was Haig's corps which moved first while II Corps stayed back to cover their move. Smith-Dorrien's men were therefore still in position when the German attack was renewed at 0700 hours, and they greeted it with a storm of rifle and machine-gun fire. This briefly checked the German advance and Hamilton's 3rd Division got clear, the 2nd South Lancashires and the rst Lincolns, backed by the field guns of the 109th Battery, RFA, punishing the German troops pushing into the village of Cipley and the small town of Frameries, though suffering heavy losses in return.
An officer of the 24th Brandenburg Regiment, Captain von Brandis, who served later at Verdun and was no stranger to hard fighting, wrote in his post-war memoirs that: 'A continuous stream of gun and howitzer shell hurtling and howling overhead falls on Frameries. No human being could possibly live there. If we thought the English had been shelled enough to be "storm ripe" we were fairly mistaken. They met us with well-aimed fire and as we went forward only dead and wounded were to be seen in our firing line. Tommy seems to have studied our tactics and waited for the moment of assault, and only when we were fully in the open did he fire with his machine-guns.' (3)
The British infantry were actually making very little use of machine guns- currently only issued on a scale of two to a battalion - and most of this drenching fire came from the 'ten rounds rapid' opened on the enemy by the soldiers of the 1st Lincolns. The German assault failed and was resumed only after another half-hour of artillery fire, but when the Germans finally entered Frameries the British had slipped away; 'from their experience in small wars', wrote von Brandis, 'the English veterans knew how to slide off at the last moment'. (4)
The British battalions had not disengaged before causing the enemy considerable casualties. Von Brandis records that his battalion alone had lost one third of its men, three company commanders and half the other officers; the British tactic of identifying and picking off the officers was clearly taking effect. The losses, however, were not all on one side; the 2nd South Lancashires, waiting too long before slipping away, were caught in enfilade by machine guns and lost over 200 men.
At dawn, three German divisions, one from III Corps and all of IV Corps, engaged Fergusson's 5th Division, attempting to outflank the left of the British line. The tactics employed here replicated those used against the 3rd Division. Fergusson's brigades were first pinned in position by artillery fire and then hit with a massive infantry attack. In response, riflemen of the 1st Dorsets and guns of the 37th Battery, RFA, scorched the advancing German line with fire and, having checked the first German attack, began to retire. The withdrawal was not made without loss; the 2nd Duke of Wellington's Regiment, not having received the order to retire, was surrounded by the enemy and lost some 400 men before it could disengage.
Problems then arose on Fergusson's right flank. This should have been covered by the 19th Infantry Brigade and Allenby's cavalry division, but the cavalry had ridden out on reconnaissance before dawn and the 19th Brigade, which was still taking its orders from GHQ and not from II Corps HQ, had been ordered back long before dawn, leaving the left flank of the 5th Division completely 'in the air'. The Germans discovered this fact before noon, and IV Corps promptly came in from the west to roll up the British front.
Fortunately, the cavalry division came back from its foray just in time to re-enter the fray. Fergusson, realizing the danger to his left flank, had already formed a small rearguard consisting of the 1st Norfolks and the 1st Cheshires, supported by the 119th Battery, RFA. He gave command of this force to Colonel Ballard of the Norfolks and ordered him to hold the ground around Quievrain that offered a good field of fire to the north-west. When the German infantry tried to cross this ground soon after noon they received the usual violent pummelling from BEF rifle and artillery fire.
This action was under way when the 2nd Cavalry Brigade under Brigadier de Lisle appeared on the scene, assessed the situation and elected to participate with a charge. Charging the enemy in the open was tantamount to suicide, but the cavalry could rarely resist the opportunity and the 9th Lancers, backed by two squadrons of the 4th Dragoon
Guards, swept into the fray, catching and spearing a few German soldiers in the open before sweeping across the front of the British infantry.
The horsemen were now under fire from no fewer than nine German batteries and every German soldier in the area, fire that emptied saddles and brought horses crashing down in mid-stride. When they reformed behind the British infantry, cavalry losses in those few hectic minutes were found to be high; around 250 cavalrymen and many horses had been shot down. The only solid gain from this charge by the 9th Lancers and the 4th Dragoon Guards- one of the last such exploits in modern war- was that it enabled the cavalry to extricate some guns of the 119th Battery, RFA, which were in danger of capture - a feat for which Captain Francis Grenfell of the 9th Lancers was later awarded the Victoria Cross.
Although this action and the presence of Ballard's force foiled von Kluck's first attempt at envelopment, this did little to improve a steadily deteriorating situation. A fresh German division, the 8th, was now deploying and moving in on the two infantry battalions, and fire from the horse artillery and RFA batteries could do little to stop them; once again it was time to go, and at 14.30 hours Colonel Ballard ordered his units to withdraw.
The cavalry duly fell back and the 1st Norfolks also managed to slip away; not so the rst Cheshires. Three separate orders to break off the action failed to reach the battalion commander, by now wounded, and the Germans gradually closed in on the Cheshires until the battalion was completely surrounded. The Cheshires kept up the fight for three hours before the handful of survivors ran out of ammunition and were forced to surrender.
In this action the 19th Battery lost thirty officers and men, the 1st Norfolks lost over 250 officers and men, and the 1st Cheshires, which had started the day with almost 1,000 men, were reduced to just two officers and 200 men when the battalion remustered the following day.
The Old Contemptibles Page 16