In retrospect, the dismissal of General Lanrezac just before this decisive attack seems somewhat unfair; Lanrezac should have been part of this victory. From the first days of the war - amazingly just four weeks previously- he had been warning GQG that the major German effort would come with a massive attack on the Northern Front, and his warnings had been ignored. He had also been ignored by Field Marshal French and had been denied British support for his highly successful counter-attack at Guise.
It can be fairly claimed that Lanrezac had done as well as any other commander and better than most, but by 1 September his Fifth Army was on the point of collapse and Lanrezac's nerves were in shreds. The Fifth Army crossed the Aisne in some disorder and a dangerous 40-kilometre (25-mile) wide gap had developed between the Fifth Army and the BEE Reports had also reached GQG that Lanrezac had been heard crying 'Nous sommes foutus' (politely, 'we are ruined') in moments of crisis. Joffre did not tolerate pessimistic officers so Lanrezac had to go and General Louis Franchet d'Esperey took command of the Fifth Army.
One of Franchet d'Esperey's first tasks was to make contact with Field Marshal French. As we have seen, French had promised to keep the BEF in the line- but would he go farther and support this counter-stroke against the enemy, which d'Esperey was preparing to make on 6 September? This question was also exercising General Joffre, and with reason, for on 4 September Joffre had been advised that French was dithering yet again.
French had now received a drubbing on Anglo-French cooperation from Kitchener and a written appeal for help from General Joffre and two of his aides, Murray, his Chief of Staff, and Henry Wilson, the Sub-Chief of Staff, were now at odds over strategy and giving him conflicting advice. French and Murray had had a meeting with Generals Gallieni and Maunoury at GHQ, during which French insistence on the importance of BEF participation on the Marne had clearly fallen on deaf ears; no sooner had the French generals departed than Murray issued an order for a further BEF retreat that night.
However, while Gallieni and Maunoury were with French and Murray, Wilson had held a separate meeting with Franchet d'Esperey. At that meeting he had agreed that, provided he could convince the Field Marshal, the BEF would support the Fifth Army attack. Then came a difficulty; according to Wilson's diary:
'When I got back I found that Sir John had already ordered a retirement, having this morning specifically stated to the Governor of Paris [Gallieni] that he would remain on the Marne unless turned out and also that he would co-operate with the Fifth or Sixth Army, or both. It is simply heartbreaking.' (17)
There is an Army expression for this sort of problem: 'order, counter-order, disorder'. Deluged with conflicting advice, even from his own staff, the Field Marshal elected to do nothing, telling Colonel Victor Huguet that he 'needed to re-study the situation before deciding on action'. (18) When news of this further prevarication reached Joffre's ears it drove him close to despair. In an attempt to change the Field Marshal's mind he sent French another copy of his Order No.6, detailing the counter-attack, but by the time the order arrived at GHQ later that night the BEF were again retreating.
Joffre needed every available asset for his Marne attack, including the BEF, and now Joffre wondered whether the Field Marshal would indeed, as promised, commit the BEF to this assault on the Marne when the time came. He therefore decided to visit French at GHQ, which had now- worryingly- moved even farther south, from Compiegne to Melun, a town on the Seine, south-east of Paris. On 5 September, less than twenty-four hours before the Marne attack was due to begin, Joffre was obliged to leave his headquarters and motor the 160 kilometres (100 miles) to Melun to explain yet again the details of his plan to the Field Marshal. That done, Joffre then made a personal and very emotional appeal to French on behalf of France, adding that the honour of England was at stake. This appeal reduced French to tears but proved effective. Turning to Henry Wilson, he said, 'Damn it, I can't explain. Tell him all that men can do, our fellows will do.' (19)
The Battle of the Marne was largely a French affair. The onslaught involved the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Foch's Ninth Army, plus the BEF, pushing north and east on a 200-kilometre (150-mile) wide front with the Third Army standing firm in the east, all pivoting on the fortress of Verdun. Over a million men were committed to the Marne offensive and the BEF, positioned between the Fifth and Sixth Armies, therefore played only a minor, if vital, role.
The events of the battle can be briefly described. Maunoury's Sixth Army opened the offensive on 5 September with an attack on von Kluck's army along the River Ourcq, between Senlis and Reims. The first attack fell on the rear of von Kluck's army but, as the battle continued, corps after corps of the German First Army became involved - and were duly ground down as the advancing French tide swept over them. Von Kluck was then obliged to break off his march east in order to repulse the Sixth Army, and so the gap between the German First and Second Armies reopened - to provide a path north for the BEF.
Joffre sent the Fifth Army and the BEF into this gap, both tasked to prise the German armies apart. The Battle of the Marne went on for the next week and the outcome depended on whether Foch's Ninth Army and Maunoury's Sixth Army- holding the gap open- would be crushed before the Fifth Army and the BEF broke through. This was in doubt for some days, and at one point General Gallieni was obliged to send out 6,000 men of IV Corps from the Paris garrison, transporting the soldiers in taxi cabs, the famous 'taxis of the Marne', to shore up Maunoury's line against a German counter-attack. However, once the German retreat began it kept going, closely pressed by the advancing French and British- but not pressed closely enough.
By 8 September, French pressure was also having its effect on von Bulow's army, which was being slowly levered back towards the Aisne; on that day von Bulow admitted to a staff officer from von Moltke's headquarters that a retreat was now inevitable. Nor was the news much better at von Kluck's headquarters, and later that day a general order was given for the German armies in the west to withdraw to the line of the River Aisne, astride Soissons, and take up defensive positions; the Schlieffen Plan had been abandoned.
During the Battle of the Marne it gradually became apparent that the high-water mark of the German advance had been reached; now the feldgrau tide would ebb steadily back to the north, at least until the German generals found a place to dig in, make a stand and defy eviction. This ebbing of the Germanic tide was a withdrawal, not a rout; the German armies fell back without panic or confusion. One by one, starting on their right wing, one German army after another attempted to disengage, gain a little distance from the advancing Allied armies and the time necessary to find a defensible position and develop a defence line. That they were allowed the time to do this was an Allied defeat.
Otherwise the Battle of the Marne was a great French victory. By the end of the battle on the evening of 10 September, (20) the French armies, with some useful assistance from the BEF, had driven the German armies back some roo kilometres (60 miles), to the steep-sided valley of the River Aisne. The BEF's contribution to this massive offensive could only be small but it was useful.
On 5 September the BEF was mustered south of the Grand Morin river, just east of Paris, 24 kilometres (15 miles) or a day's march- to the rear of the flanking Fifth and Sixth French Armies. That day marked the official end of the retreat from Mons - at least according to the British Official History. (21) The previous day the first four divisions of the BEF had received their first reinforce ments, some men arriving from the UK, others supplied by units hitherto kept in reserve but now deployed to top up those battalions or brigades seriously reduced in the recent fighting. The men were very welcome, but the BEF urgently needed supplies of food, clothing and artillery ammunition. Replenishment was difficult at this time for the northern supply bases had been closed and all stores and shipment of stores from the UK transferred to the port of St Nazaire at the mouth of the Loire in Brittany. Boulogne had been closed on 27 August, Rouen on 3 September. Le Havre, currently being emptied, would close
on 5 September.
This was a staff failure; any transfer of essential supplies to the Loire should have been stopped on 1 September when French was obliged to keep the BEF in the line. The Official History records that on 29 August 60,000 tons of stores, 15,000 men and 1,500 horses were at Le Havre. (22) lt does not explain why these men and supplies were sent south-west to Brittany instead of being dispatched north to the BEF, commenting instead that the movement of supplies from Le Havre to St Nazaire was 'a very considerable feat of organization'.
The very next paragraph (23) states that 'the arrival of the first reinforcements was only secured by the extraordinary exertions; and it was obvious that the III Corps must enter the new operations with its ranks still much depleted and lacking one third of its artillery'. Perhaps there is some logical explanation for the dichotomy between the statements in these adjoining paragraphs, but if so it is not supplied.
Field Marshal French had kept his promise to remain between the Fifth and Sixth Armies but the BEF was not in line with them; when the Marne offensive opened, the BEF was still south of its allies. Henry Wilson's diary entry for 1 September describes this as 'A ridiculous position, as it is neither one thing nor the other, and it makes the two French flanks ragged and insecure.’ (24) The BEF were echeloned behind these flanking armies, but when news of the coming counter-attack filtered down to the rank and file, morale soared. A copy of General Joffre's order for the Marne counter-offensive begin ing on 6 September reached French's HQ at 0300 hours on 5 September and his Operation Order No.7 was issued at 1715 hours. All was quickly made ready for a general advance the following day; the men cleaned their weapons, loaded up with ammunition and tobacco and put on clean socks. Long before daylight on 6 September the men began to fall in, by platoon and company, by battalion and brigade.
Operation Order No.17 stated:
1. The enemy has apparently abandoned the idea of advancing on Paris and is contracting his front and moving southeastward.
2. The Army will advance eastwards with a view to attacking. Its left will be covered by the 6th French Army also marching east and its right will be linked to the 5th French Army marching north.
The BEF, now three corps and a cavalry division, were to march in the general direction of Montmirail, forcing a passage across the high plateau west of Champagne, driving the enemy before it. Sir John's orders required the BEF to wheel to the east, pivoting on its right flank, and then push on towards the north-east, east of the River Ourcq, towards Soissons and the River Aisne, which lay 100 kilometres (60 miles) to the north.
This terrain is not good campaigning country; the ground is rolling and dotted with extensive belts of woodland and the Allied advance had to cross several deep river valleys, those of the Grand Morin, the Petit Morin, the Ourcq and the Marne, before reach ing the steep-sided valley of the River Aisne and moving across that river into Picardy. These are all wide, deep, unfordable rivers which could only be crossed at bridges, and each river provided the retreating enemy with a viable defence line - if he was given time to occupy it. This became the crux of the Battle of the Marne; defeating the enemy in the field and driving him back was one thing, but it was equally important to stay close on his heels and prevent him digging in.
The march began at around 1000 hours on 6 September, led by Allenby's cavalry division and two independent cavalry brigades under Brigadier General Hubert Gough which would eventually form part of the 2nd Cavalry Division. As the advance continued throughout 6 and 7 September the men realized, with considerable gratification, that the Germans were retreating before them. This fact was confirmed by patrols of the Royal Flying Corps, which reported by 1800 hours on 6 September that there were no major German units south of the Petit Morin. During the day, the advance was contested only by a few enemy cavalry patrols and occasional bursts of artillery fire.
The BEF advance therefore continued, but slowly - somewhat too slowly. On 7 September, the BEF marched up to the Grand Morin, two battalions of the 3rd Division, the 1st Wiltshire and the 2nd South Lancashire Regiment, getting across the river before being counter-attacked by the enemy; the Wiltshires beat off the attack without difficulty but the South Lancashires had a stiff fight with German cavalry before their crossing was secured. General Joffre's General Order No. 7, issued at 1720 hours, directed the armies on the Allied left to continue pushing the enemy north and east but to bear in mind the possibility of enveloping the enemy right wing if the chance arose; this order directed the BEF to 'get a footing in succession across the Petit Morin, the Grand Morin and the Marne'. (25)
Frank Richards was marching north with his battalion of the Royal Welch Fusiliers:
We had finished with our retirement and were facing in the right direction. We marched up some rising ground. Down in the valley in front of us was the river Marne. On each side of the river was a village. A fine bridge spanned the river but it was now in half, the enemy having blown it up. We advanced down the hill in extended order. The enemy were supposed to be holding the two villages and we had to take them. We were met by a hail of fire. The men on the right and left of me fell with bullet wounds in the legs and a sergeant just behind me fell with one through the belly. We were having heavy casualties, but couldn't see one of the enemy. (26)
The BEF advance continued along the road from Sablonnieres to Château-Thierry, now the boundary between the British and the Fifth Army, the BEF heading north-east now, in the direction of Rebais. As they advanced, the BEF discovered signs that seemed to indicate that the enemy- to quote the Official History (27) - were 'demoralized': empty wine bottles littering the verges, looted houses and, here and there, drunken Germans asleep in haystacks and barns. A better word would be 'undisciplined', but even that applied to only a few; the great mass of German soldiers were neither demoralized nor defeated.
The Germans fell back slowly and the Allied advance was neither as swift nor as close as it might have been. Douglas Haig certainly thought that the BEF should have pushed harder. 'I thought our movements were very slow today,' he recorded in his diary on 7 September,' in view of the fact that the enemy were on the run.' Fortunately, the enemy did not make a determined stand on the Petit Morin, which runs through a narrow, steep-sided valley, with only six bridges across the stream at the bottom, but strong parties of German infantry remained behind to contest the BEF's crossing.
The two bridges at Sablonnieres were found to be defended and an attempt to rush across by the 4th Dragoon Guards was beaten off with rifle and machine-gun fire, as was an attempt to outflank the enemy with a push via Bellot. At Gibraltar, three kilometres (two miles) south-west of Orly, the cavalry detected a jager battalion and a cavalry brigade at breakfast and brought up a battery of the RHA to drench their unsuspecting foes with shellfire, but in general the enemy had the best of it. By 0830 hours the British cavalry had been brought to a halt and were waiting for the infantry to come up.
The infantry were still moving slowly, mainly because the lanes were narrow and movement across wooded country difficult; on the extreme left the infantry of the 4th Division reached a ridge overlooking the Marne - a much wider valley than that of the Petit Morin - where the enemy greeted their appearance with a hail of shells. The 19th Infantry Brigade soon discovered that the enemy were holding the north bank of the Marne in considerable strength and maintaining a bridgehead on the south bank at La Ferté sous Jouarre. Meanwhile, over on the right, the BEF advance, covered now by artillery fire, had reached the Petit Morin, which was crossed near Bellot by the recently arrived rst Battalion, The Cameron Highlanders; this success proved decisive and Sablonnieres was in British hands by the early afternoon.
By that evening the Petit Morin had been crossed and the troops of I Corps had advanced as far as Basseville, midway between the Petit Morin and the Marne, though General Haig, the corps commander, still felt that the advance might have been made more quickly or taken more ground.
Forcing the Petit Morin line cost the BEF fewer than
600 men killed and wounded. More than 500 German prisoners were taken, along with at least a dozen machine-guns; the number of German killed and wounded is not known precisely but units of the German Guards, 2nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions, recorded heavy losses, some companies of the Guards' jager battalions coming out of the action with only forty-five men. (28) The German positions along the Petit Morin having been reduced, the BEF moved up to the heights overlooking the Marne.
It had been expected that the enemy would make a stubborn defence on the Marne, which seemed to offer the ideal terrain for a rearguard action, but by the evening of 8 September RFC patrols reported that, on the contrary, while the enemy might still fight a delaying action, his retreat to the north appeared to be continu ing. This being so, Sir John French elected to press on, but the pace of the BEF advance remained slow. On 9 September Haig was again urging his troops forward. 'A little effort now might mean the conclusion of the war! The enemy was running back. It was the duty of each of us to strain every effort to keep him on the run.'
This is true, so one might wonder why the advance of Haig's I Corps beyond the Marne stopped at 0830 hours and did not resume until 1500 hours - and stopped again before 1700 hours. II Corps were greeted with heavy shellfire and broken ground, so the advance of the 5th Division was 'consequently slow'. (29) The artillery problem was tackled by two companies of the 1st Lincolnshires in the 3rd Division, which made their way through the woods to the enemy gun line and shot down the German gunners, 'almost to a man', as they served the guns. Unfortunately, while taking the enemy guns, the Lincolns were hit by counter-battery fire brought down on the enemy guns by the 65th Howitzer Battery, RFA. Four infantry officers and around thirty men were killed or wounded; 'friendly fire' was not unknown to the soldiers of the BEF The fighting beyond the Marne that day followed a similar pattern for every BEF corps, infantry advances supported by artillery being held for a while by German infantry and artillery; even so, the Official History claims that the pressure exerted by the BEF that day was the prime factor in forcing back von Bulow's Second Army. (30)
The Old Contemptibles Page 23