While the French and German forces angled off to the northwest, the BEF remained on the Aisne. The Official History's verdict on the BEF's advance from the Marne to the Aisne and its performance in the subsequent Aisne fighting seems accurate - and points the finger of blame at Sir John French: 'The race [from the Marne] was lost mainly owing to a failure to make a resolute effort to reconnoitre the enemy's dispositions on the river ...and to push forward parties to seize the bridges on September 12/13. When the divisions made a rather cautious and leisurely advance they should have been reminded of the old adage that "Sweat saves Blood". In GHQ orders there was no hint whatever of the importance of time.' The account goes on to add that, after the Germans were known to have dug in, 'There was no plan, no objective, no arrangements for cooperation, and the divisions blundered into battle. (14)
The Official History describes the situation on the Aisne front after 15 September as 'The Deadlock' (15) and notes that, at a meeting at Fère-en-Tardenois on 14 September, French had ordered all three corps commanders to entrench their troops and concentrate the heavy guns of all five BEF divisions in an attempt to subdue the powerful German batteries. French's gloomy view of the situation was confirmed by a communication from General Joffre at or 5 hours that day: 'It seems as if the enemy is once more going to accept battle in prepared positions north of the Aisne. In consequence it is no longer a question of pursuit but of a methodical attack, using every means at our disposal and consolidating each position in turn as it is gained.'
This note tacitly confirms a change in strategy and the introduction of another expensive Great War tactic, 'bite and hold', an attempt to seize part of the enemy line and hold it while prepar ing for another bite. The usual result of any 'bite and hold' attack was to create a small salient, which the enemy promptly brought under fire from three sides. The war of movement had given way to a 'war of offensives', in which the power of the offence would be pitted against the depth and tenacity of the defence.
Joffre's assessment of the immediate future was correct, but the day of the fully planned and prepared offensive - the set-piece battle - had yet to dawn; there was still a little time for a better solution, one that avoided the risks and losses inherent in frontal assaults on well-prepared positions. With their flanks still open to the north and west, flanking attacks by either side were still possible. If only one side could get ahead of the other, the chances of success, of rolling up the opposing line from the flank, could be considered high.
Joffre certainly thought so, but in his Special Instruction No. 29, dated 17 September, (16) he notes that where the enemy had already entrenched, 'it is essential to maintain an offensive atti tude in order to keep the enemy under threat of attack and prevent him from disengaging and transferring portions of his forces from one point to another'. In other words, the chances of win ning this 'Race to the Sea' depended on speed and resources. It would be necessary to maintain the pressure on the Aisne and all other parts of the expanding Western Front, while still finding sufficient forces to hook round the end of the enemy line.
This steady shift of the French armies north and west towards the Channel coast soon led Field Marshal French to review the position of the BEF. This force was now in the centre of the Aisne front with French armies on either flank - and at some distance from those comforting ports on the Channel coast. This position pleased General Joffre since it prevented any radical actions by his British allies, but it was less than satisfactory to the Field Marshal, who wanted to shorten his supply lines and move the BEF closer to the sea and the Royal Navy. Therefore, at the end of September, French suggested to Joffre that the BEF should resume its desig nated pre-war position, on the extreme left flank of the French armies.
This dictated a move to the north of Arras, beyond the current French line, which ended effectively at La Bassée. The area north of this was lightly held by cavalry units, but once up there, aided by the Belgian Army, the BEF could fill the gap between La Bassée and the Channel, a distance of some 60 kilometres (40 miles), beat off any German movements to the west and- perhaps- mount an offensive towards the east and outflank the German line, creating a situation the French armies to the south-east could exploit.
French urged this action on the generalissimo but Joffre was unenthusiastic. Joffre preferred to keep the BEF between the French Fifth and Sixth Armies because he would then be in a position to dictate what the BEF would do. French's hesitation before the Marne had left a deep scar in Joffre's mind - and it appears that the Field Marshal was worrying yet again about his flanks.
On the evening of 16 September, French had been visited by Colonel C. B. Thompson, the British liaison officer with Maunoury's Sixth Army. Thompson informed the Field Marshal that the French XIII Corps had been checked that day west of Noyon by the sudden appearance of the German IX Corps, brought down from Belgium. 'Here', said French, 'was another incident in that continual flanking and outflanking manoeuvre which would only cease at the sea ... Again the IV French Corps arriving east had been arrested on finding the German force entrenched on its left [or northern] flank ... It was from this particular evening of 16th September that I date the origin of a grave anxiety which then began to possess me.’ (17)
As if he did not have enough current worries, French had now began to brood on some pre-war discussions at the Committee for Imperial Defence, concerning 'the importance that the Channel ports should be held by a power in absolute friendship with us'. (18) With the start of the Race to the Sea, 'what was to prevent the enemy launching a powerful movement for the purpose of securing the Channel ports whilst the main forces were engaged in practically neutralising one another?' (19) - the recent stalling of the French IV and XIII Corps attacks being a particular example.
The Field Marshal's solution was to shift the BEF north, mainly to defend the Channel ports and to be 'in a better position to concert combined action and cooperation with the Navy'. The Official History endorses the Field Marshal's opinion, stressing that the British were indeed very anxious to retain Antwerp and protect the Channel ports.
Inevitably, General Joffre did not like it; he thought that French was anxious to position the BEF close to the Channel ports, the better to arrange an evacuation should the war again turn sour. In his reply to French's suggestion he stated that 'the Commander in-Chief cannot share the view of Marshal French as to the time at which this movement should be carried out (20) and would prefer that any such move be delayed.
Anglo-French cooperation was clearly fragile at this time, and on 28 September Wilson's diary records: 'The fact is, and I think there are some grounds for it, that the French are dissatisfied with us. It is very unfortunate.' (21) So it was but, unfortunately for General Joffre, Field Marshal French had in reserve that part of his orders which stated that the BEF was an independent command. Therefore, on 1 October, the Field Marshal told Joffre that he had now decided to exercise this prerogative and intended to remove his force from the Aisne to a new position north of La Bassée- whether Joffre liked it or not.
In the event this blunt statement met with very little actual opposition from Joffre. The Allied front north-west of La Bassée was held only by French cavalry and Territorial troops; they needed bolstering as the trench lines crept towards them and the strategic dangers inherent in this open flank became ever more obvious. Therefore, if French wanted to go north, why not? There would be plenty for the BEF to do up there, in preparing defensive positions, supporting the French and Belgians, fending off any major German attack to the west or securing a line from La Bassée via Ypres to Dixmude, covering the Channel ports and establishing a 'start line' for any Allied attack to the east.
Joffre therefore did not oppose French's ultimatum, and on the night of 1/2 October 1914 the BEF began to move north. The units left their line on the Aisne in great secrecy, with the enemy unaware that they had gone. First to move was Gough's 2nd Cavalry Division, by road. This was followed by Smith-Dorrien's II Corps, which began to
move by rail from Compiegne to Flanders on 5 October. Next to depart was Pulteney's III Corps, followed by Haig's I Corps, which concentrated at Hazebrouck on 19 October and was in position near Ypres two days later. GHQ moved to Abbeville on 8 October and was established at St Orner five days later. As these British units came into line in the north, so German units arrived in line to the east, just in time to oppose them. The stage was now set for the first engagements of what came to be the First Battle of Ypres.
The War in the North 2-18 October 1914
It was therefore judged necessary to halt and arrange a general, combined attack on a five-mile front ... the first formal British attack of the war.
The capture of Meteren, 13 October 1914, British Official History, 1914, Vol. II, p. 96
Shortly after Field Marshal French set up his headquarters at St Orner, he received a visit from Colonel à Court Repington, the military correspondent of The Times. In his memoirs (1) the normally shrewd Repington wrote an eulogistic account of the Field Marshal during this visit, one in which Repington's opinions seem somewhat at variance with the facts.
Writing of the advance from the Marne, Repington declares that 'Sir John's decision to cross the Aisne in pursuit was one of the boldest moves ever taken by a commander'. (2) Writing of the Race to the Sea, he continues: 'Our Army then moved to the west and began that series of wonderful actions which culminated in the defeat of the second great German effort to overwhelm us in the west and eventually ended in the establishment of rival lines of defence, and in the crystallisation of the fighting lines into the trench warfare which endured throughout the years 1915, 1916 and 1917.'
That most of these moves and 'wonderful actions' were a result of force majeure by the enemy rather than any sagacity on the part of Field Marshal French has clearly escaped Repington's notice, but the eulogy continues:
‘Most days when Iwas at GHQ I had at least two long talks with the Field Marshal alone, and was impressed with his complete grasp of the whole military situation and by his intimate knowledge of all the details of his troops and their services. He possessed the sacred fire of leadership in a rare degree. Inever knew him to be depressed. He was the incarnation of confidence and he inspired confidence in all. Nothing escaped him and the rapidity of his decisions was remarkable.’ (3)
A veritable Alexander, it seems - and how fortunate for the BEF were any of this true! Unfortunately, these views of the Field Marshal's character and competence are at variance with the facts, and since Repington was neither a fool nor under the pressure of events when he wrote these words- in 1920, when Sir John French's failings had long since been obvious to all- one can only wonder what inspired them. Whatever it was, these glowing opinions were not borne out by subsequent events.
One of the reasons advanced by Field Marshal French for the BEF's rapid move to the north was to help the defence of Antwerp, which was now on the brink of collapse. Antwerp was important for various reasons; not only was it a major port, but any troops there were in a position to threaten the German lines of communication across Belgium, while the Royal Navy was most anxious that Antwerp should not fall into German hands for use as a submarine base.
The Belgian Army and the Belgian king and government had been holding out in Antwerp since mid-August, receiving periodic assistance from the British but coming under steady and increasing pressure from the German Army. During his first advance into Belgium, von Kluck had sent four divisions and some infantry brigades plus a great deal of artillery to maintain the siege of Antwerp in spite of the pressures elsewhere. The Germans had now decided to reduce the Antwerp bastion completely, and on 28 September they began a heavy bombardment of the outer forts. By 1 October, this defensive ring had fallen and French was informed that the defences of Antwerp were on the point of collapse.
In an effort to stave off this disaster, the British government offered to send the 7th Division, the 3rd Cavalry Division and a small number of heavy guns under Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Rawlinson to the relief of Antwerp; the hope was that this force, together with the Belgian Army, could hold Antwerp until the BEF came up from the Aisne and drove off the besiegers. Given the urgency of the situation the first British troops dispatched to Antwerp on 3 October were a small brigade of Royal Marines, some 2,000 men with twelve machine-guns, with the 7th Division and the cavalry to follow the next day. This force would land at Zeebrugge and Ostend and march to Antwerp, being joined on the way by a French contingent of similar size; their joint strength would increase the garrison of Antwerp by some 53,000 men. (4)
However, on 3 October the Field Marshal was further informed that the Belgian government had already left Antwerp for Ostend and that King Albert, with the six-division-strong Belgian field army, intended to withdraw from the Scheidt and head in the direction of Ghent, partly to protect the coast, partly in the hope of linking up with the Allied armies close to the Franco-Belgian frontier. With this message came the dire news that the remaining defenders of Antwerp .were unlikely to hold out for longer than another week.
From then on the collapse of Antwerp was rapid. The intervention of Rawlinson's force was both too little and too late, and the Royal Marine Brigade, which arrived on 6 October, was withdrawn on 8 October. Major-General T. Capper's 7th Division arrived at Zeebrugge on 7 October and was followed into Ostend by Major-General Sir Julian Byng's 3rd Cavalry Division. Their commander, Sir Henry Rawlinson, then arrived from the Aisne, where he had been in temporary command of the 4th Division after General Snow had been accidentally injured. The promised French contingent failed to arrive at all, but these British units were in position at Ostend or Bruges on 8 October, when the Belgian government decided to evacuate Antwerp.
This evacuation was not accomplished without loss. The Royal Naval Division, three light brigades composed of sailors and marines, lost a total of 2,558 men; many of these were interned in Holland for the duration of the war when they withdrew across the Dutch border and 1,000 men were taken prisoner by the Germans. The British effort to save Antwerp had failed and Rawlinson was now concerned with getting his corps out of Ghent and joining forces with the BEF at or around the town of Ypres. This move began on 11 October, and by the night of 13/14 October Rawlinson's force- Capper's 7th Division and Byng's 2nd Cavalry Division, now called IV Corps- were taking up an outpost position around Ypres in trenches currently held by the French 87th Territorial Division.
Field Marshal French was now nursing a new grievance, once again with Lord Kitchener, but largely over General Rawlinson. 'Lord Kitchener did not make things easy for me,' French complains in his memoirs. (5) 'Keenly desirous to influence the course of operations, his telegrams followed one after another, each containing directions regarding the local situation of which, in London, he knew little.' It does not seem to have occurred to French that telegrams can be sent in either direction and his original orders contained a specific requirement to keep Kitchener informed of events: 'You will kindly keep up constant communication with the War Office and you will be good enough to inform me as to all movements of the enemy reported to you as well as to those of the French Army.' (6) If Kitchener did not know what was going on at the front during this time, part of the fault lay with the BEF commander.
French also complains that Kitchener is dealing directly with Joffre and failing to tell him what they are talking about. He therefore 'repudiates any responsibility for what happened in the north in the first ten days of October', for, he adds, 'I explicitly told the Secretary of State for War that the British troops operating there were not under my command.' To underline this point he quotes a telegram from Kitchener that states: 'Have already given Rawlinson temporary rank. I am sending him instructions regarding his action Antwerp. The troops employed there will not for the present be considered part of your force.' (7)
It appears that French was telling Kitchener what Kitchener had just told him. On the other hand, French also quotes a telegram that he sent to Rawlinson on 11 October- two days afte
r the date on which, according to the Official History, French took IV Corps under command: 'Your message 119, addressed to Lord Kitchener and repeated to me received. I really do not understand whether you regard yourself as under my orders or not; but if you do, please be good enough to explain your situation without delay ... Be good enough to answer me by some means at once as my own and General Joffre's plans are much put out and perhaps compromised by all this misunderstanding.' (8)
Here is another example of that common military situation: order, counter-order, disorder. One cannot help but feel sorry for Sir Henry Rawlinson, caught up in this telegraphic feud between the two field marshals while attempting to confront the enemy and extricate his command from a crumbling situation north of Ypres.
To avoid increasing this confusion here it is necessary to describe the situation of the BEF and the French armies in the north- basically astride the Franco-Belgian border- after the II Corps move from the Aisne had been completed and Rawlinson's IV Corps came under French's command; both these events took place on 9 October.
The German Sixth Army was on a line facing west between Menin and Arras. Between Arras and La Bassée the Sixth Army was opposed by two French corps, the XXXIII and XXI of General Maud’huy's Tenth Army. North of La Bassée, the Tenth Army had the 1st Cavalry Corps under Conneau and the 2nd Cavalry Corps under de Mitry, a total of six cavalry divisions, with General Conneau in overall command; these cavalry corps were positioned between the British II and III Corps when they came into the line. Apart from cavalry patrols, this part of the front was wide open up to Ypres until the arrival of the BEF in early October.
By the time Field Marshal French took his troops north the BEF had grown somewhat. The 6th Division (under Major-General J. L. Keir) had arrived on 12 September and joined III Corps and, as related, IV Corps under Rawlinson was about to arrive from Ghent. This increase in manpower would be useful for any attack to the east, for the Allied line north of the River Somme was cur rently very thin. The front of some 40 miles between the Somme and La Bassée was held by more units of the French Tenth Army, whose positions were 'scattered over a wide front', (9) and opposed by divisions of the German First and Second Armies.
The Old Contemptibles Page 26