The Old Contemptibles

by Robin Neillands

  Wilson's problems in convincing the Field Marshal seem to have been exaggerated. As we have seen, orders to implement Foch's plan for the coming attack between Ypres and Nieuport - to advance and 'attack the enemy where met' (7) - were issued to the BEF on the afternoon of 15 October, so the BEF's part in the First Battle of Ypres began with the movements described in the previous chapter. The only significant change in recent days was the arrival of Haig's I Corps from the Aisne; the 2nd Division moved into the line north of Langemarck and the 1st Division into positions west from Langemarck to the Yser Canal.

  Thus were the forces poised when the battle of First Ypres began on 19 October. French was convinced that 'the whole enemy force north of the Lys probably does not exceed three and a half army corps'. (8) In fact it consisted of five and a half army corps, and these forces were bearing down on the BEF line like a battering ram. On 19 October this line was not a carefully prepared 'defensive position' but the 'start line' for an advance to the east, and although their forces were much larger the German plan was roughly similar. The Sixth and Fourth Armies were to crush the Allied flank at Ypres and then wheel west and south to pin the British against the Channel coast, taking the ports of Dunkirk and Calais before pressing on to the south and rolling up the Allied line.

  On 19 October, General de Mitry's cavalry, advancing to the north-east, met elements of the German Fourth Army outside Roulers, 24 kilometres (15 miles) from Ypres. On that day the German III Reserve Corps, positioned on the coast, mounted an attack against the Belgians to begin what became known as the Battle of the Yser - a battle that the Belgians won only by opening the dyke sluices and letting the sea in. This flooded Belgium from the coast to Dixmude but secured the north flank of the Allied line for the rest of the war.

  On the same day Rawlinson sent the 7th Division of IV Corps down the road from Ypres towards Menin. The 7th Division got as far as the village of Gheluvelt, ten kilometres (six miles) from Menin, where it was halted by heavy artillery fire from the guns of the German Fourth Army. On the left of the 7th Division, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade reached Ledeghem and the 6th Brigade reached Passchendaele on the rim of the salient. The cavalry brigades were meeting very little opposition, for von Falkenhayn was biding his time; the more the BEF moved east, the deeper its divisions would move into his trap. Therefore, as IV Corps advanced towards Menin it created a sharp salient, or bulge, in the German defences- a bulge that von Falkenhayn intended to cut off in due course.

  Up to this point neither French nor Joffre had known of the creation, let alone the presence, of the German Fourth Army. Fortunately, General de Mitry, the French cavalry commander, quickly realized that he had a new and totally unexpected German army on his front. He therefore withdrew his forces from in front of Roulers- an action that had the unfortunate effect of exposing the left flank of the British 3rd Cavalry Division to attack - and informed French's GHQ that strong German forces were moving across their front. This was when French realized that the BEF was facing not just the Sixth Army - which would have been bad enough- but the strong, fresh Fourth Army as well.

  Getting accurate information was difficult. The weather on the first day of the German offensive was misty and cloudy, restricting RFC patrols. It improved the following day when intelligence was received that large enemy forces - very large enemy forces -were on the northern front and about to smash into the Allied line. RFC reports were proving exceptionally useful as the Western Front trench line began to form and cavalry patrolling gradually became impossible. The Germans were starting to move their divisions at night to avoid RFC reconnaissance, but such large troop movements could not be entirely concealed and the build-up of German forces east of Ypres was soon obvious.

  Even so, Field Marshal French was still clinging stubbornly to his post-Armentières conviction that enemy opposition on his front was negligible. Haig's corps had now come into the line east of Ypres, and on 19 October French sent for the I Corps commander and gave him his orders. The enemy, said French 'cannot have more than the III Reserve Corps between Menin and Ostend so I Corps were to advance via Thourout with the object of cap­ turing Bruges' (9) - the objective French declared to Wilson on 20 October. In fact, the enemy had five corps between Ostend and Menin. However, French continued, having taken Bruges, 'if this is proved to be feasible and successful, every endeavour must be made to turn the enemy's flank and capture Ghent'. (10)

  I Corps was to pass through Ypres and move out on the line Ypres-Roulers. On reaching the top of the salient ridge, Haig could assess the situation and decide whether to attack the enemy in the north, moving towards Ostend, or north-east towards Roulers- an attempt just abandoned by the French cavalry. Haig, said French, would be supported by de Mitry's cavalry to the north and by Byng's 3rd Cavalry Division from IV Corps in the south, wbile the rest of the BEF - III and II Corps - were to continue pushing east if possible but always 'leaning' against the enemy line to prevent the Germans moving forces across Haig's front.

  Although these orders were based on a complete failure to 'read the battle', it is possible to see that French was trying to adhere to Foch's strategic plan. The BEF's II, III, IV and Cavalry Corps would soak up the enemy opposition and hold it in place while Haig's corps, advancing at dawn on 20 October, broke through the German line in the north and rolled it up from the flank. The fact that military circumstances on the BEF front had changed com­ pletely with the sudden appearance of the Fourth Army seems to have escaped the field marshal's notice. As related, the enemy force on this line actually consisted of some five and a half corps - eleven full divisions- of the German Fourth Army. On 20 October this army and the German Sixth Army to the south flung all their strength against the Allied line.

  Commenting on this point, the Official History remarks that: 'The Commander-in-Chief apparently either placed no reliance on the details of the strength of the enemy gathered by his Intelligence or else he considered the new German Reserve Corps [of Fourth Army] of small account.' (11) If so the Field Marshal was gravely mistaken.

  It also appears that French took far too much advice from Henry Wilson. Wilson was now little more than a GHQ mouth­ piece for Foch, constantly urging the Field Marshal to comply with Foch's strategy and press on to the east, however much the growing evidence of German strength and intentions indicated the need for a defensive posture at this time. Another commander may have considered the mounting evidence of German strength on 18/19 October, calculated the enemy's probable intentions and taken a difFèrent course. Instead, Field Marshal French pressed on blindly with his plan until disaster was confronting him and about to overwhelm him.

  French's Operation Order No. 39 of 20 October begins: 'The enemy today made determined attacks on the II, III and IV Corps which have been successfully repulsed. The Commander-in-Chief intends to contain the enemy with the II, III and Cavalry Corps and the 7th Division of IV Corps and to attack vigorously with the I Corps.'

  In fact, the German attacks were still mounting in strength and had not been repulsed; the Field Marshal's subordinates - his corps and divisional commanders - were actually worried that these enemy attacks could not even be contained. Fortunately for the BEF the various corps commanders were already using their initiative, adopting defensive measures more suited to the situation and digging in to resist further attacks.

  Early on 20 October, Pulteney realized that the III Corps advance at Armentières had been checked. Anticipating a violent counter-attack, he ordered his men to dig in and prepare to hold on. This counter-attack duly came in later that day when the German XIII Reserve Corps pounded the 6th Division positions with artillery and then sent in their infantry covered by heavy machine-gun fire. It was noticeable that the Germans had now become wary of British rifle fire and were advancing in short rushes, some troops moving forward while riflemen, supported by machine guns, fired on the British positions to keep the soldiers' heads down- the basic 'fire and movement' tactic of trained infantry in the advance. These German
attacks continued after dark, and by dawn on 21 October Pulteney realized that his single corps was opposed by no fewer than two full corps, the XIX and XIII, of the Sixth Army attacking on a front of 19 kilometres (12 miles). After the losses of recent weeks III Corps no longer had sufficient men to hold such a front against heavy attacks.

  Nor was this all; a new hazard now appeared. In addition to the chronic shortage of artillery ammunition the infantry now discovered that the cartridges they were being issued with were a fraction too large for the breeches of their rifles. While the rifles were cool this was not a problem, but as the breeches heated up the cartridge cases began to jam.

  Frank Richards writes: 'One by one our rifles began to jam. In a short time mine and Smith's rifles were the only two that were firing in the whole of our platoon. Then ours were done up too: the fact was that continual rain had made the parapet very muddy and the mud had got into the rifle mechanism, which needed oiling in any case, and continual firing had heated the metal so that between one thing and another it was impossible to open and close the bolts. The same thing happened all along the battalion front. (12)

  The soldiers could not flick open the bolt to eject the spent cart­ ridge and reload; it was necessary to kick the bolt open and feed in rounds by hand, all this compounded by a lack of rifle oil to clean and lubricate the action. With large enemy concentrations moving against their positions, this was no small snag, but somehow the infantry fire was maintained and the enemy attacks halted.

  It spite of everything, the BEF soldiers put up a stout fight; the much-reduced 2nd Sherwood Foresters in the 18th Infantry Brigade, though surrounded at La Vallée on 20 October, held out all night against three enemy battalions. Only the remnant of this battalion- two officers and some sixty men- were taken prisoner at dawn, after what the Official History calls 'forty-eight hours of continuous fighting'. (13) The same story is told in other accounts; the British infantry battalions were being pushed back or pinned down but they were fighting hard for every metre of ground.

  Allenby's Cavalry Corps was also driven back on 20 October. This was simply a matter of numbers. Allenby's two-division corps contained only around 9,000 rifles while six German cavalry divisions, plus four jager battalions, a total of some 24,000 men, were sent in against the BEF position; Allenby's corps fell back before this onslaught and dug in that night around Ploegsteert and Messines, from where Allenby sent appeals to III Corps for assistance. III Corps and the Cavalry Corps held their positions that night under heavy German artillery fire and a succession of infantry assaults. These attacks were driven off with casualties but a number of BEF positions were lost on the 6th Division front, and although the cavalry managed to hold the village of Messines, the Château at Hollebeke, just to the north-east, was captured.

  Rawlinson's IV Corps was effectively acting as the right-flank guard of Haig's I Corps in Ypres, the 7th Division holding positions on the Menin road while Haig's corps came up on their left flank. Major-General Capper's 7th Division then pushed strong infantry patrols up to Gheluvelt and towards Menin, followed by elements of two infantry brigades supported by armoured cars - the latter introducing a new element into this war. Strong German forces were then encountered and the left flank of the 7th Division was obliged to withdraw to positions behind those it had occupied the previous day. None of this frantic activity along the line seems to accord with French's assessment of the situation, but on 20 October Haig was still intent on obeying the instructions contained in French's Army Operation Order No. 39 of 20 October: 'to march in the direction of Thourout using the road Ypres-Passchendaele and roads to the north. This Corps will attack the enemy wherever met.'

  Given that the enemy were now advancing towards Ypres, this meeting was not long delayed. By the evening of 20 October no real progress had been made by the BEF units, and although German attacks so far had been driven off, pressure was mounting all along the line. So begins the first day of the 'Battles' of Messines and Langemarck, which the Official History (14) dates to 21 October.

  At the northern end of the BEF line the 2nd Division of Haig's corps crossed the Zonnebeke-Langemarck road, six kilometres (four miles) east of Ypres, and promptly ran into plunging artillery fire followed by an infantry attack from no fewer than five German divisions. The 2nd Division observed a large body of German infantry from the 52nd Reserve Division moving on their front; for once the British were able to stop the German infantry with artillery rather than rifle fire. One Royal Field Artillery battery of six guns fired no fewer than 1,400 shells on 21 October, but this abundance of shells would not last.

  Those German soldiers who survived the shelling were stopped in their tracks by more rapid BEF rifle fire, which quickly carpeted the ground with German dead, but the pressure of enemy numbers then brought the 2nd Division advance to a halt. That evening the 2nd Division was forced to entrench around Zonnebeke, having made little or no progress during the day. The 1st Division also met stiff resistance from the outset but pressed on, and had managed to advance about a kilometre (half a mile) before it too was halted between Poelcappelle and Koekuit.

  Farther south, at Armentières, III Corps, tasked to hold its positions as a pivot for I Corps, was heavily shelled, and the 12th Infantry Brigade was forced out of its forward positions at La Gheer when the enemy renewed the attacks of the previous day. The La Gheer position was retaken by the evening, but not with­ out cost; the 12th Brigade lost 468 officers and men in the fight for La Gheer on 21 October - and the battle was just starting. Meanwhile, at Messines, the Cavalry Corps had spent a day on the defensive, unable to reoccupy the ground lost the previous day in the face of strong attacks by superior enemy forces

  Overall, the results of this first day were mixed; the German Fourth Army had sufFèred severe losses and had been halted but the position of Haig's corps between Zonnebeke and Langemarck was not secure- and became even less secure when de Mitry's cavalry on their left was observed withdrawing towards the Belgian positions along the Yser.

  General de Mitry's action that day was yet another example of the chronic problems caused on the Western Front by a divided Allied command. If a French - or Belgian or British - general wanted to withdraw or was ordered to do so by his superior officer, the situation thus created for formations on their flanks was considered of no importance. Fortunately for General Haig, the commander of the French cavalry division to the left of I Corps realized that if he moved his troops a great gap would appear in the Allied line; he therefore elected to stay in position until again ordered to withdraw at dusk. This brief delay gave Haig time assess the situation and issue fresh orders and, like the IV and III Corps commanders to the south, he ordered both his divisions to stop attacking and dig in. I Corps had lost 932 men that day, and the German attacks showed no sign of diminishing.

  The BEF -seven and a half infantry divisions - and five French and British cavalry divisions, all fighting as infantry and much reduced in numbers, were now holding a front of some 56 kilometres (35 miles) against eleven German infantry divisions and eight German cavalry divisions backed by a quantity of heavy artillery and well supplied with machine guns. Rather more to the point, the Foch-French plan had stalled and the British and French advance had been halted. In the face of strong enemy attacks, the corps commanders were now digging in, though Field Marshal French was still convinced that the enemy 'is vigorously playing his last card and I am convinced that he will fail'. (15)

  Fortunately, in spite of these misconceptions, reason was at last beginning to prevail, even at GHQ. The heavy fighting and losses of 20/21 October had at last persuaded French that his troops should halt at least until the German reaction had been 'contained'. An order was issued at 2030 hours on 21 October, placing the BEF on the defensive; the troops now had to dig trenches and prepare to hold on to them against whatever force the Germans could bring up. Joffre visited French that day and assured him that the French IX Corps would be sent up to Ypres in support, an essential step since the
BEF had no reserves of any kind. Until IX Corps arrived, the only help available to the hard-pressed BEF would come from the Lahore Division of the Indian Corps, which was now detraining near Hazebrouck.

  Joffre's offer of help was encouraging, but there was now another problem: artillery support. On the evening of 21 October the BEF had only ninety-three heavy guns (60-pounders, 4.7-inch and 6-inch guns and 9.2-inch howitzers) in France, of which fifty­four were deployed along that 56-kilometre (35-mile) front at Ypres. This in itself was not nearly enough for adequate support, but the real problem was a shortage of ammunition.

  As these battles at Ypres progressed, limits were placed on ammunition expenditure until the batteries still in action were restricted to firing one shell every half-hour or eight shells per gun per day; some batteries were withdrawn from the line as there was no ammunition for the guns at all. Urgent requests for more ammunition sent to the UK by GHQ were regarded as unrealistic or simply ridiculous; one artillery general was bluntly informed that 'no army or nation could maintain supply at the rate asked for.' (16) It was becoming ever more obvious that the defence of Ypres would depend almost entirely on the infantry.

  At 2030 hours on 21 October, a somewhat ambivalent order was issued from GHQ: 'Action against the enemy will be continued on general line now held, which will be strongly entrenched.' Quite apart from the contradictory nature of this order, exactly how the line could be 'strongly entrenched' without the necessary tools or equipment was not explained. The British defences at Ypres were now 'at best short, disconnected lengths of trenches, three feet deep; there was no wire, no dugouts, no communication trenches and no time to construct anything in the nature of a second defence line'. (17) The British and French soldiers were excavating their shallow trenches with bayonets, sharpened stakes, spades looted from farmhouses, and their bare hands.