The British defence therefore depended on the guns of the field artillery and the rifles of the infantry when the German attacks began again soon after dawn on 22 October. These attacks were concentrated on a north-south line between Messines and Bixschoote, just east of Ypres, though the Sixth Army kept battering north of La Bassée in the south and the Fourth Army pounded the Belgians and French along the Yser Canal.
The German tactic was simple: keep pushing forward, keep probing the Allied line for a weak spot, keep battering until something gave way. The fighting at Ypres went on for a full month, the longest battle yet in this expanding war. Attack and counterattack succeeded each other and losses mounted steadily, but the fighting neither stopped nor diminished in ferocity. The Germans were always probing for that weak spot; the Allies continued doggedly keeping them out.
Among all this general action there were certain significant events. The Germans launched attacks at Langemarck on 22 October because this was the junction of the 2nd Division and the 1st Division, but any hope that the line would crack wide open here soon ended. Heavy fire from both divisions was brought down on the German infantry floundering across the muddy fields until their dead were piled up two and three deep before the British trenches.
If the German infantry sufFèred from British bullets, the British endured a hurricane of German shells. The Germans were also using up artillery ammunition at a furious rate, raining shells down continuously on the British outposts, taking a heavy toll of the infantrymen crouching in their shallow trenches – trenches that could not be made deeper because they then filled with water. Under this steel deluge the trench line, such as it was, began to disintegrate. 'The troops must be imagined as fighting in small groups scattered along the front in shallow trenches, often separ ated by gaps amounting to two, three or even four hundred yards. (18) The trench line at Ypres was not continuous. During daylight the gaps between these trench positions could be covered by fire, but at night they could be penetrated by enemy patrols.
The German attacks on 22 October did not seriously damage the British line - somehow the ragged men in these muddy rifle pits contrived to hang on- but German attacks on theYser just to the north forced the Belgians to withdraw to the west side of the Yser Canal. The divisions of IX Corps promised by Joffre were now coming into the salient, but the 17th Division, the first unit of IX Corps, did not take over the front of Haig's 2nd Division until the evening of 23 October.
Nor was Foch willing to accept that the Allied advance had been stopped or that Ypres was seriously threatened. With IX Corps up in the line, he now ordered that the attack to the east should be resumed. His resolve clearly had a tonic effect on Field Marshal French, who, on 23 October, had told Kitchener that 'the enemy are vigorously playing their last card' and the following day assured the Secretary of State that the current battle was 'practically won'. There is no evidence to support either claim; though enemy losses were high and mounting, their divisions were continuing to press forward.
German attacks on 22 October again concentrated on the Langemarck position, a small salient in the BEF line. On that misty morning the German infantry, advancing in solid clumps and silhouetted against the eastern sky, provided a wonderful target for professional riflemen. Some British soldiers later claimed that they fired 500 rounds that day, firing until their rifles were too hot to handle. October 22 was the day that German histories have come to call the Kindermorde - the Slaughter of the Innocents- of Langemarck. These German units were composed largely of volunteers, many of them students with little military training and no experience, who advanced on the British line with arms linked, singing. The British Official History account (19) of what happened to the German infantry before the rifles of the 2nd Green Howards, 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers and 2nd Wiltshires makes grim reading:
Struck by gun and machine-gun fire as soon as they came well into sight, the German masses staggered ...their dead and wounded were literally piled up in heaps ...
Led by their officers, however, some still struggled on; a few got within two hundred yards of the Wiltshires and others actually penetrated a gap between the Green Howards and the Scots Fusiliers, only to meet their fate at the hands of a reserve company.
The 54th Reserve Division, for to this the attackers appear to have belonged, recoiled; but after a pause, made one last effort against the flanks of the Wiltshires, again to be driven back by shrapnel and rifle fire.
These attacks on the BEF line continued all day until the fields before the British line were carpeted with dead or wounded men, some crawling to the rear, those unable to move crying out for help or for their mothers. The vast German cemetery at Langemarck, where most of these dead now lie, is still a place of pilgrimage for Germany.
The German attacks were not simply concentrated on I Corps at Langemarck. The 7th Division was heavily engaged farther south and kept under artillery fire throughout the night of 23h4 October, followed up by an even heavier bombardment at dawn and an infantry attack. This came from units of the German XXVII Reserve Corps, which was making a desperate effort to breach the BEF line at Polygon Wood, a position north-west of Hooge and just inside the British line.
This attack was at first successful. Three battalions of the German 244 Infantry Regiment overran the 2nd Wiltshires, killing or capturing 450 men; only 174 of the 2nd Wiltshires answered the battalion roll-call on 25 October. The German advance through Polygon Wood was then checked by the divisional reserve, the Northumberland Hussars- a Territorial unit and the first to be seriously engaged- and the 2nd Warwickshires. The latter battalion lost almost 300 men, including their CO, in this engagement, but Polygon Wood was eventually cleared and the enemy hunted back to their own lines at the point of the bayonet.
The critical point of this battle was now coming. The British were fully determined to hang on to Ypres and would not be driven out; as at Polygon Wood, attack was met with counter-attack. Even Field Marshal French's ever-volatile nature was in one of its up-swings; on 23 October he issued an Order of the Day, congratulating his troops on their endurance, 'and reminding the troops that the enemy must before long withdraw troops to the east and relieve the tension on our front'.
Some relief or reinforcement was urgently required, but where was it to come from? The 8th Division, composed of regulars brought back from far-flung garrisons, would not disembark in France for another two weeks, and the trickle of men reaching the front-line units was not sufficient to make up for the steady flow of losses. The 7th Division of IV Corps, which was not one of the most heavily engaged formations - the most losses in 1914 were incurred by the 3rd Division of II Corps- had already lost 45 per cent of its officers and 37 per cent of its men. A large number of rifle battalions had already been gravely reduced; the 2nd Scots Guards, the 1st Royal Welch Fusiliers and the 1st South Staffs, three battalions from 7th Division brigades, had already lost over 500 men apiece, more than 50 per cent of their strength. These losses are worse than they appear for they were concentrated among the rifle companies, among the 'fighting men' of the battalions; as the 'fighting men' were killed off, so the BEF line began to weaken.
This shortage of manpower was now acute and could not yet be eased; the Territorial units had to volunteer for overseas service, and though many did so, Territorial battalions were only now arriving in the field. The infantry brigadiers in the BEF were having to fight with battalions mustering a couple of companies, the divisional generals with brigades at half-strength - while the supporting artillery faced a shortage of ammunition and no signs of an increase in supply.
On the other hand, the German armies had also lost a great number of men and the British and their allies at Ypres were now fighting a largely defensive battle; this gave them a useful tactical advantage in what was rapidly becoming a battle of attrition. As with the Allied attack on 18 October, the German offensive had been held- just- and on 25 October French telegraphed Kitchener that the situation was 'growing more favourable by the hour'
, concluding on 27 October that it was 'only necessary to press the enemy hard in order to achieve complete success and victory'.
This belief was all French needed to order his offensive to continue. Unfortunately, the enemy was still present in great strength across his front and there was still that shortage of artillery ammunition. On the day he ordered a renewal of his attack, French warned Kitchener that unless fresh supplies of shells were soon available 'the troops will be compelled to fight without the support of artillery'.
This was the situation when Field Marshal French decided to renew the offensive. On the night of 24/25 October, the BEF held the southern half of the Ypres salient with the 17th, 18th and 87th Divisions of the French IX Corps holding the northern half and the Belgian Army continuing the French line to the North Sea. The dividing point between the French and British units was at the villages of Broodseinde and Zonnebeke, on the eastern edge of the salient.
French's Operation Order No. 40, issued on 24 October, required the 1st, IVth and Cavalry Corps to advance east in support of the French while II, III and the Indian Corps contained the enemy to their front from Messines to Neuve Chapelle. In this order, French directed that the three corps should 'dress by the left' or stay in line with the forces to the north - a repeat of his action on the Marne. This order naturally produced a similar result. Haig's advance was constrained by the progress made by the French IX Corps, while the IV Corps to his right had to wait for Haig's battalions to get for ward ... and so it continued to the Lys.
The assumption was that the French on the left flank would set the pace. Whatever happened elsewhere, no matter which units got forward or were checked, the BEF units must conform to the pace of the French on their left flank. In making this decision the Field Marshal threw away the potential to take advantage of any opportunities, should they occur- unless the left flank did indeed forge ahead. No one could tell what would actually happen before the battle started, but if any of the advancing corps could force a breach in the German line, such a breach should be exploited. As it was, the troops were compromised before their attack even began.
This being so, the situation of the BEF on this northern part of the front on 27/28 October can be described in one word: stalemate. Although orders for the French IX Corps advance remained in place and were repeated on both days, this corps, now reinforced by the 31st Division, failed to get forward at all, and this situation did not change over the next six days. Defence still dominated the battlefield and, as the Official History points out, (20) if the Germans with all their superiority in guns and numbers were unable to sweep I Corps out of the way, it was hardly surprising that these Allied divisions, three French, three British, three cavalry, without heavy artillery, were unable to make any progress either.
This was not for want of trying. At dawn on 27 October, IX Corps tried hard to advance but were met with a hail of enfilade machine-gun fire from the high ground around Passchendaele and were quickly brought to a halt. This in turn inhibited the action of the British 2nd Division on the French right; this formation pressed on to the bottom of the slope leading to Passchendaele before being halted, having lost almost 300 officers and men for no significant gain. On the 1st Division front, no progress was made either, but forward patrols and RFC contact patrols reported large German formations - the first of a new German striking force, Army Group Fabeck - massing across the Menin road east of Gheluvelt.
The Germans were about to renew their attack here in the north because with the battle south of the Lys petering out they now had troops to spare. The Indian Corps had taken over from the bat tered II Corps around Neuve Chapelle on the night of 29/30 October; the battered village had been captured by the Germans on 27 October and the BEF line redrawn on the western outskirts. By the time it ended the three-week Battle of La Bassée had cost Smith-Dorrien's much-reduced corps another 14,000 casualties; for a while Smith-Dorrien found himself without a command, but the line was still being held.
Pulteney's Ill Corps, battling around Armentières, were outnumbered and under unceasing attack, but here again the line held and the Battle of Armentières ended - at least officially - on 2 November. Allenby's Cavalry Corps also managed to hang on at Messines, on the southern side of the Ypres salient, so Field Marshal French had some reason to believe that this new attack from the salient would be successful.
Unfortunately for the Field Marshal, with the pressure off their line south of the Lys, the enemy were also preparing to mount a major effort farther north, a surge down the Menin road to Gheluvelt and so into Ypres. French remained ignorant of this pending assault, believing, as he said in a cable to Kitchener on 27 October, that the enemy had sufFèred such losses in recent weeks that they were now 'quite incapable of making any strong or sustained attack'. Three days later the enemy put in just such an attack, down the Menin road to Gheluvelt, a thrust that quickly endangered the entire British line in front of Ypres.
Von Falkenhayn was handling his two armies at Ypres with considerable skill, defending with part of his force while attacking with the other, transferring his efforts up and down the Allied line, always probing for that weak spot. It has been argued that the German armies should have attacked all along the Allied line, all the time, until something gave way, but artillery - and artillery ammunition - was the key to success on the Western Front, now and later, and like their opponents the Germans were now very short of artillery ammunition. However, by alternating their attacks the German commanders could use the artillery of both armies to support whichever army was attacking, hence those crushing bombardments that battered the Allied defences and caused such casualties to the defenders of Ypres.
This alternating strategy did not mean that the front before the holding force became quiet; attack and counter-attack continued all along the line. It was necessary for von Falkenhayn to keep up the pressure everywhere to prevent any transfer of Allied forces to the point of attack, a sound strategy that made the best use of existing resources but rapidly led to exhaustion among the troops at the front.
Unfortunately for General von Falkenhayn, there was a snag with this sensible strategy, and a simple one: it did not work. The attacks and counter-attacks of recent days had caused great losses to both sides, but after several days of hard fighting and constant pressure the Fourth and Sixth Armies had not achieved a breakthrough. The opposing lines held - with small advances to and fro- while the fighting continued and the losses mounted. Clearly, a breakthrough would require more men, more guns and units not yet shattered by weeks of battle.
Therefore, on 27 October, Von Falkenhayn decided to form a third army or army group before renewing the offensive. This would consist of three corps, six divisions in all, under General von Fabeck, who was currently commanding the German XIII Corps. Fabeck was also given a cavalry corps and a further six unbrigaded battalions of infantry, plus a quantity of artillery, over 250 heavy guns in all. (21)
This force, 'Army Group Fabeck', was deployed between the inner flanks of the Fourth and Sixth Armies. All three armies were tasked with pushing a way through the vital Messines-Wytschaete ridge and so on to the Gheluvelt plateau, cracking the front before Ypres. This attack was set for 30 October. The striking force would consist of the right and centre of Sixth Army, the whole of Fourth Army, and Army Group Fabeck. To keep the British on their toes while Fabeck's men were mustering, two German army corps and a Bavarian reserve division would launch a fresh attack on Gheluvelt on 29 October.
While the Germans seemed ever able to form more armies and find more men, Field Marshal French had no more units available-indeed, some BEF units now had to be temporarily disbanded. On 27 October French decided to place the 7th Division under Haig, so raising his corps to three much-depleted divisions, while Lieutenant-General Rawlinson returned to England to take command of the 8th Division; the 8th would eventually join the 7th Division to form a new IV Corps. In the meantime, the 7th Division went to reinforce I Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Division went
to the much-depleted Cavalry Corps. Haig placed the 7th Division astride the Menin road, and it was moving in there when GHQ telephoned Haig with the news that they had intercepted a German wireless message ordering the XXVII Reserve Corps of Fourth Army to attack down the Menin road towards Gheluvelt on 29 October. The final phase of First Ypres was about to begin.
Gheluvelt 29-31 October 1914
The general situation in Flanders on the night of the 30th/31st October was disquieting. The BEF had been continuously fighting for ten days; it had sufFèred heavy losses; its reserves were exhausted ...
British Official History, 1914, Vol. II, p. 299
In the long and glorious history of the British Army, few engagements have displayed the qualities of that army so clearly as the Battle of First Ypres. The BEF were not unsupported and due credit must be given to the French and Belgian units involved in this battle, but the ragged, hungry, professional soldiers of the BEF were the keystone of the arch defending Ypres; had they given in, had those scanty battalions failed to hold ground in the face of repeated attacks, the Ypres position could not have been held.
To follow the battles around Ypres in the last months of 1914, the various stages need to be kept under constant review. The Race to the Sea became a race only towards the end, as the opposing armies drew nearer and nearer to the finishing tape on the North Sea coast. Then, instead of a series of flanking attacks - with those on the Allied side 'always twenty-four hours and an army corps behind the enemy' - the race became an attempt by both sides to muster sufficient forces at the northern end of the line to achieve a breakthrough.
The Old Contemptibles Page 31