By now, like all the BEF battalions, these reinforcement units were much reduced. The 2nd Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (2nd KOYLI), the 2nd Battalion, The King's Own Scottish Borderers (2nd KOSB) and the 2nd Battalion, The Inniskilling Fusiliers were down to 300 men each; only the London Scottish was anywhere near full strength with 750 men.
Led forward by their CO, Lieutenant Colonel G. A. Malcolm, the London Scottish went forward to take up a position at l'Enfer Wood, just west of the Messines ridge. However, owing to a misunderstanding, they came into the line believing that the cavalry units holding the ridge were in the process of attacking, and the colonel therefore deployed his battalion in support and led it out of cover. They were immediately spotted by the enemy and subjected to heavy shelling and forced to go to ground in the open, taking shelter in shell holes or abandoned trenches. The London Scottish remained forward, engaging the enemy to their front for most of the day, beating off at least one German attack at the point of the bayonet. Losses were inevitably high; by nightfall this fine battalion had had lost 321 men. (9)
With this assistance the cavalry were able to hold most of Messines village and even mount local counter-attacks, but German pressure was building up all along the line. More attacks were being mounted against the 2nd Cavalry Division at Wytschaete but these attacks petered out by dusk; a further German attack at 2230 hours lasted only half an hour before the enemy were again beaten back. Field Marshal French records that 'for close on 48 hours these troops [the cavalry] held the Wytschaete-Messines ridge against the utmost efforts of two and a half German Army Corps to dislodge them. Here was the centre of our line of battle and had it given way, disaster would have resulted to the entire left wing of the Allied line.' (10)
German pressure was not confined to the BEF front. So great was the pressure on the northern end of the Allied line on 30 October that the Belgians opened the sluices in their dykes and let the sea flood their country north of Dixmude, and the French units north and south of the BEF were also being pounded by the Fourth and Sixth Armies; the BEF fought hard and well at Ypres but it did not fight alone.
The basic problem for the British commanders was manpower. The BEF had now been fighting continuously for over two months, and although several new divisions - the 6th, 7th and the 3rd Cavalry Division- had come out, these had been quickly absorbed in this expanding war. Very few replacements had reached the battalions in the four original BEF infantry divisions, where the battalions were often down to company strength. The BEF was simply running out of troops, and the line it held around Ypres was too long. As a result, the BEF was now in serious trouble, and the critical point in this battle had not yet been reached.
Closer inspection of the situation reveals more problems. Not only were there too few men but those in the line were dog tired. They had been fighting continuously for ten days, and when they were not fighting they were digging trenches to improve their positions. Any assistance in holding the Ypres position must come from the French, but the French units on the BEF's left flank, though cooperating wonderfully with their British allies on a local level, currently had no more troops to commit. Little more than defensive fighting could be expected on the front north of I Corps where the 1st Division had been heavily engaged at Gheluvelt.
The Official History goes into some detail when describing the importance of the Gheluvelt position. This village astride the Menin road blocked the best route into Ypres and, standing on the high point of the encircling ridge, offered great artillery observation to whoever held it. On the morning of 31 October the British, who occupied a line on the forward, eastern, slope of the ridge, still held Gheluvelt. The troops holding this line came from the 3rd Infantry Brigade, supported by two battalions from the 2nd Brigade; as elsewhere, these units were very weary and under strength.
The 3rd Brigade, which should have had over 4,000 men- from the 1st Queen's, 2nd Welch, 1st South Wales Borderers and 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC), this last from the 2nd Brigade mustered barely 1,000 men, most of these in the 2nd KRRC. Elements of other battalions were close by, including two companies of the 1st Loyals (North Lancashire Regiment) and a detachment from the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers.
Fully determined to crack the BEF front and force a breakthrough, General von Fabeck sent in thirteen battalions to overwhelm the British troops defending Gheluvelt. Six of these German infantry battalions were fresh, and they struck the BEF's forward positions at Gheluvelt like a hammer.
Astride the Menin road, the wd Welch held the forward position, with the 1st Queen's on their right and the 1st South Wales Borderers on their left. To the north of the Borderers the line was held by the 1st (Guards) Brigade- the 1st Scots Guards, the 1st Cameron Highlanders and the 1st Black Watch. In reserve west of Gheluvelt were two companies each from the Loyals and the 2nd KRRC. Artillery support was provided by the 34th Brigade, RFA, positioned some 460 metres (500 yards) west of Gheluvelt, where the fourth battalion of the 3rd Brigade, the 1st Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment, guarded the guns. On the face of it, the BEF line seems strongly held but, again, the units composing the defence were but shadows of their peacetime selves. The British front line was just 180 metres (200 yards) -within easy rifle range - of the German front line, so there had been no chance to rest or relax. Pinching and slapping their faces to keep awake, the BEF infantry stood to their line and watched to their front.
When the enemy attempted to rush across the narrow gap of no man's land at 0615 hours on 31 October, the result was another slaughter. The young German soldiers from the 102nd Infantry Regiment were singing as they advanced; some were seen strolling arm in arm towards the British line- insanity indeed. As they came, the weary, muddy, khaki-dad soldiers defending Gheluvelt adjusted their rifle sights, waited until the bulk of these enemy soldiers were out in the open, and greeted them with a terrible fire.
The hail of shot produced by the British infantry's 'fifteen rounds rapid' cut the enemy down in droves. Later German accounts, from observers unable to believe that bolt-action rifles could produce such a volume of fire, reported that the BEF were equipped with a great number of machine guns. The first infantry attacks were quickly repulsed with great loss but, as so often before, German artillery then began to pound the British line. This process, alternating infantry attacks with artillery concentrations, went on all day and, under this pressure the British line began to collapse.
By 0930 hours the 2nd Welch had been blown out of their shallow trenches and the survivors withdrew to the even shallower support line, closer to Gheluvelt. Unfortunately, news of this Welch withdrawal failed to reach the 1st Queen's on their right and these men were taken in enfilade when the Germans occupied the former Welch trenches. Even so, the Queen's held on, assisted by a company of the 2nd KRRC, but some idea of the situation east of Gheluvelt may be gained from the fate of a company sent from the 1st Gloucesters to fill the gap left by the Welch. Eighty strong when it went forward, this company was down to just thirteen men when it came up to contest the next German attack. Moreover, since communications had broken down and no runner survived the shellfire long enough to reach Brigade Headquarters, the fate of this company and the Queen's in those forward trenches remained unknown to higher authority.
At 1000 hours the enemy launched another strong attack, seven battalions pushing forward north and south of the Menin road, cheering as they came on, buoyed by the news that the Kaiser himself had come up to watch them take Gheluvelt. Again they ran into terrible rifle fire; again those grey-dead bodies littered the ground before the British line. This attack was pressed home with great courage but it was more than an hour before the Germans could prevail against the BEF rifles - and then only after their attack had been aided by field artillery, which came up to pound the British trenches at point-blank range. By 1115 hours, German artillery fire and numbers finally began to tell; the forward BEF units, the Queen's and the KRRC- or what was left of them- were forced back and out of the rui
ns of Gheluvelt. Only two officers and twelve men of the Queen's survived this fight and the 2nd KRRC, the strongest unit in the line, was reduced torso (all ranks) by the end of the day.
The loss of Gheluvelt was a major disaster. Gheluvelt was a bastion in the BEF line. From here the Menin road ran east, directly into Ypres, providing the enemy with the perfect axis of advance for a final thrust through the Allied line. Moreover, with the fall of this position the front of the 1st Division had been broken and many of the men were now retreating towards Ypres. This was not a rout - they were retreating in good order- but their losses had been severe and they were doing the sensible thing in falling back. Field Marshal French records that on his way up to I Corps HQ that morning:
I had not gone more than a mile when the traffic on the road began to assume a most anxious and threatening appearance. It looked as if the whole of I Corps was about to fall back in confusion on Ypres. Heavy howitzers were moving west at a trot - always a most significant feature of a retreat- and ammunition and other wagons blocked the road almost as far as the eye could see. In the midst of the press of traffic and along both sides of the road, crowds of wounded men came limping along as fast as they could go, all heading for Ypres. Shells were screaming overhead and bursting with reverberating explosions in the adjacent fields. This spectacle filled me with misgiving and alarm. (11)
Such sentiments are hardly surprising. With no reserves on hand, how was the position to be retrieved, and if it was not retrieved, what could prevent a breakthrough? Fortunately, the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Divisions had previously agreed on a scheme of mutual support for just such an emergency. At 1015 hours General Monro of the 2nd Division met General Lomax at the Hooge Château and placed one of his reserve battalions, the 2nd Worcesters, at the disposal of the 1st Division. Lomax sent the battalion to Brigadier General FitzClarence of the 1st (Guards) Brigade, who ordered Major E. B. Hankey, the commanding officer of the 2nd Worcesters, to 'counter-attack with the utmost vigour against the enemy in Gheluvelt and re-establish our line there'.
Then I Corps sufFèred another setback. The staff of the 1st and 2nd Divisions were conferring at the Hooge Château at 1315 hours, when four heavy shells struck the house and exploded in the conference room. Major-General Lomax was mortally wounded, Major General Monro was severely concussed, several members of the divisional staffs were killed, and other staff officers were wounded. In the space of a shell-burst the command echelon of two divisions was literally blown apart.
This disaster added to Haig's existing problems. Gheluvelt had been lost, the Germans were within five kilometres (three miles) of Ypres and were pushing hard all along the line ... and now two of his division commanders were either dead or hors de combat. News of this fresh disaster reached Haig at the White Château at about 1400 hours, but Douglas Haig not easily ruffled. Major General Bulfin was sent to command the 1st Division and more men, any that could be found - sappers, cooks, clerks, grooms, lightly wounded men, anyone who could hold a rifle- was sent up the Menin road.
As a rule a commanding general is well advised to keep out of the battle and direct his command from some safe central position. Personal heroics have to be abandoned above brigade level, but this was a time for personal leadership. Summoning his mounted escort, ignoring the steady rain of shells, Douglas Haig went forward to join his men. Accompanied by a mounted lancer, he rode up the road towards Menin, halting and turning back any formed group of soldiers heading towards Ypres, stopping to encourage the men he met along the way. The sight of their commanding general moving towards the front line did a great deal to encourage the troops. They turned back, more men joining in as the scattered units went back to the fight.
With that much achieved, Haig returned to the White Château. His first order was for the rapid construction of a final defence line in front of Ypres to which I Corps could retire if the line was broken again. When Field Marshal French arrived at the Château later that afternoon he found 'Haig and John Gough, his Chief of Staff, in one of the ground floor rooms, poring over maps and evidently much disconcerted. But though much perturbed in mind and very tired in body and brain, Haig was as cool and alert as ever.' (12)
French had no help to offer, no men to spare. Any reinforcements must come from the French, so while Haig prepared to pull his troops back to the outskirts of Ypres, the Field Marshal departed for Foch's HQ in search of aid. Then, just as the field marshal was leaving, a staff officer, Brigadier General Rice, came galloping up to the door with wonderful news. At 1530 hours the 2nd Worcesters, another much-depleted battalion, mustering just seven officers and 350 men, had stormed across the fields from the Polderhoek wood and retaken Gheluvelt at the point of the bayonet.
The Worcesters had lost three officers and over 180 men retaking Gheluvelt, but this crucial position astride the Menin road was now back in British hands. Not only that; the left of the 7th Division had also advanced and the broken link between the 1st and 7th Divisions had been reforged. For the moment at least Ypres was secure.
The charge of the 2nd Worcesters at Gheluvelt, if rightly famous, was but one gallant deed among many in the BEF that day. The 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers had hung on outside Gheluvelt and beaten off all attacks though reduced to just 151 men. The 1st Loyals did equally well, down to just eighty men before they were overwhelmed, while the 2nd Welch had hung on to the Gheluvelt Château and counter-attacked the enemy when he came up.
All the other units in the line did well that day: the 1st Queen's, the 1st (Guards) Brigade, the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, the 60th Rifles- every BEF unit in the line. The German attack was pressed home with courage and persistence but it was opposed by British Regular soldiers - tired and ragged men who somehow found the strength, and the sheer guts, to hang on to their positions and fight back. They needed no urging, no cheering on; that natural bloody mindedness of the British soldier in defence was enough. They had been tasked with hanging on to Ypres and if they could not hold their line living they would hold it dead.
While his troops were gritting their teeth and hanging on, Field Marshal French was moving close to despair. After leaving Hooge he had gone to meet General Foch to ask for help. Foch promised a counter-attack by French troops at dawn the following day but, clearly, this might be too late to save the BEF line in front of Ypres. This being so, Field Marshal French told Foch that unless support was sent soon, 'There is nothing left for me to do but go back up and die with I Corps.'
Foch had no patience with this remark. 'You must not talk of dying but of winning,' he said, and promised to send up six battalions of the 32nd Division by the following day. French and Foch then sent messages to Douglas Haig, urging him to hold on at all costs until the French attack relieved the pressure. These exhortations were unnecessary; Haig's corps was hanging on, though later that night Haig decided that Gheluvelt should be abandoned and the line moved back to the reverse, western, slope of the ridge, slightly closer to Ypres. This was the only step back. 'For the next ten days,' says Liddell Hart, 'Haig's line remained without change and unshaken, save for a minor withdrawal on the right on the 5th to conform to a recoil of the French troops on his right.' (13)
The fighting that day had been equally severe in other parts of the line. The right wing of III Corps had been heavily shelled and Pulteney's corps was ordered to pull back to the defence line between the hamlet of Klein Zillebeke and the Frezenberg ridge. Before moving, Major-General E. S. Bulfin, still commanding his composite unit - Bulfin's Force - ordered his men to give the Germans a 'mad minute' of rifle fire, then charge with the bayonet on the enemy masses closing on their front. This last move proved decisive; the Germans fled and the British soldiers suddenly found themselves on an open battlefield, heaped with German dead and wounded; they therefore advanced another half-mile before pull ing back and digging in for the night.
October 31 was a day of triumph and disaster for the BEF They had held their lines but at a terrible cost, a further reduction of
the shrinking ranks of the rifle battalions. Of the battalions engaged at Gheluvelt that day, the 1st Queen's were down to fifty men, the 2nd Welch had seventy, the 1st Scots Guards 105, the 1st South Wales Borderers 204, the 2nd KRRC 150. Other battalions were in a similar state- the 1st Loyals (North Lancashire Regiment) was 'practically non-existent'. (14) The BEF as a whole was now down to between a half and a quarter of its original strength.
On the other hand, the BEF had held the line everywhere until the commanders chose to withdraw; they were not defeated. The Kaiser sent a laudatory message to von Fabeck's army group on the evening of 31 October, but a later, official account of that day's fighting admitted that very little had been achieved; no ground had been taken except part of the burning village of Messines, until the British pulled back from Gheluvelt. Von Fabeck now decided to concentrate his army group's efforts south of the salient, on the line between Wytschaete and Messines; to avoid the losses inflicted by British rifle fire, his units would, where possible, attack at night.
Writing to his wife of this battle on 31 October, Wilson relates that: 'All yesterday we were heavily attacked on our left hand and had to fall back. This morning the attack recommenced with increased violence and as I write the fire is very heavy. All last night I was at work collecting reserves for today's fight, and Foch, who came to see me at I am this morning, only left me at 2.30 am and then lent Sir John 8 battalions and 6 batteries.' (15)
In his diary for I November Wilson writes:
At 5 am message from Allen by to say cavalry heavily attacked all night and being driven in. By 11 am Allen by retiring on Kemmel. Lord K called me up on telephone from British Consulate in Dunkirk and asked for situation. I told him. He was upset and asked if he could do anything. I replied, 'For the moment- no- but send more troops.' He telephoned the War Office to send five more battalions of Terriers. Foch has now taken over the cavalry line with the 32nd Division and he has the equivalent of another division coming up tonight and if the 1st and 7th Division can hold on I believe Foch will save the situation. He is a fine fellow. The German Emperor was down opposite us today, no doubt thinking to see Ypres taken. But he won 't. (16)
The Old Contemptibles Page 33