Having already sent one third of his field artillery batteries out of the line owing to a shortage of ammunition, on 5 November General Haig was obliged to ration the supply of shells to the remaining guns, Until further notice they would receive no more that twenty rounds per day of 18-pounder ammunition and only ten rounds per day of 4.5-inch ammunition. If the Germans came forward now the defence must rely on their rifles and bayonets.
Accounts of the action around Ypres in the first days of November give an impression of heavy and continuous fighting but without much movement in the positions of either side- 'very little change in the situation at the front ... no crisis and calm reigned at the Allied Headquarters', according to the Official History. (5)
The belief was gradually gaining ground at GHQ that the fight ing in 1914, if not exactly over, was at least dying down. Indeed, at the Corps Commanders' conference on 5 November, General Haig was surprised that the main topic put forward for discussion by the staff was arrangements for winter leave, some of it to the UK. At this time Haig was pressing hard for the relief of the 1st and 7th Divisions and reported a steady increase- were that possible- in the enemy shelling of his positions in front of Ypres; his units had no men to spare for leave or any other leisure activity. The I Corps advance HQ near the Menin Gate had been hit three times in as many days, several members of Haig's staff being killed; according to Haig's appreciation of the situation, the enemy was both active and aggressive.
In his life of Henry Wilson, Callwell comments: 'the situation had become fairly satisfactory and the enemy attacks were dying away'. (6) There were, in fact, no grounds whatsoever for complacency, still less for the bland assumption that the battles of 1914 were over and the winter lull at hand- there would be few lulls in the killing in this new kind of war.
To be fair to Field Marshal French, there was little he could do to help the troops in the line, and he did attempt to rest some of the more reduced formations. On 5 November, two brigades from II Corps came up to relieve the 7th Division, which withdrew to billets behind the line. More II Corps units were put into the line here and there around Ypres to bolster existing units or afford some relief to tired formations until, for a while, Horace Smith Dorrien was a corps commander without a corps. The Indian Corps now held the former II Corps positions at Neuve Chapelle with four II Corps battalions in close support.
One indication of the mood of the time comes from the visit to the BEF of the elderly Field Marshal Lord Roberts, who arrived at St Orner on 11 November and contracted a chill which swiftly turned into pneumonia; on 14 November, the much-loved 'Bobs' died in France, in the midst of his beloved soldiers, with the gunfire of the Battle of First Ypres raging again outside his windows.
The first stages of this final battle around Ypres - an engagement generally referred to as the Battle of Nonne Boschen- began on 5 November. On 6 November, Wilson records: 'Our news today is that the French are being violently attacked and are giving ground. I was out this afternoon, and have to go and see Foch again. The Germans have got up another corps and in spite of 230 guns they are pushing the gallant little Frenchman back. We are being attacked everywhere also, but not with any ferocity so we are holding our ground all right.' (7)
In fact, pressure against the BEF sector of the front was mounting steadily and the basic BEF problem, a lack of numbers - reserves - continued to haunt Field Marshal French as this pressure continued to grow. All he had out of the line was the wreck of the 7th Division and two or three newly arrived Territorial battalions, brought to France to work on the lines of communication. However, French's memoirs record that 'our Intelligence Departments and the French became very optimistic on the subject of a great withdrawal of the Germans from the Western Front'. (8)
This optimism proved infectious, in spite of the evidence. Three days later, on 9 November, French cabled Kitchener that Joffre 'now believed the Germans were in the process of withdrawing troops from the Western Front and sending them east to Poland where General Hindenburg was currently in full retreat before the Russian Army'. In reality the three German commanders in the west - Crown Prince Rupprecht, von Fabeck and the Duke of Wiirttemberg, urged on by von Falkenhayn - had been steadily building up their forces in Belgium for yet another massive thrust at Ypres. This followed von Falkenhayn's dictum on 3 November that 'only perseverance in the offensive [is needed] to obtain a complete success'. This massive thrust came in on 11 November 1914, four years to the day before the eventual armistice.
The enemy spent the intervening days reorganizing their forces around Ypres after the flooding of the coastal area by the Belgians. This flooding was not entirely detrimental to the German armies, for they were now sheltered from attacks on the northern part of their line; it therefore enabled them to thin out their units in the northern sector and send some south to thicken up the troops around Ypres. Crown Prince Rupprecht of the Sixth Army also elected to send any units and guns he could spare to von Fabeck, and between 5 and 11 November another six divisions, including a division of the Prussian Guard Corps, were added to von Fabeck's strength astride the Menin road.
The German High Command- von Falkenhayn- then decided to create yet another new 'Army Group' under General von Linsingen. Formed on the night of 9/10 November, this consisted of XV Corps and Baron von Plattenberg's Guards Corps supported by no fewer than 230 guns - the guns noted by Wilson in his diary. This powerful unit- not an army group, as the term is usually understood, but still a massive force - moved into position astride the Menin road, opposite Haig's much-depleted I Corps and awaited the order to push into Ypres.
This was not to be an isolated attack. Von Linsingen's group would merely form the centre of the attack on the BEF position. His orders were 'to drive back and crush the enemy lying north of the Comines canal [i.e. north of the line Comines-Warneton], delivering the main weight of the attack with the left wing'. Meanwhile, Army Group Fabeck would push forward south of the canal and all the other divisions of the Sixth and the Fourth Armies north and south of Ypres were to push west to the sea.
As will be seen, this was no small-scale, localized push, this was it, an all-out, hard-driving thrust, right into the centre of the Allied line - and the point of that thrust would come against I Corps of the BEF astride the Menin road. It would begin, as usual, with an artillery bombardment of the Allied line and more exploratory attacks, the Germans seeking weak points among the Allied positions.
This last battle of First Ypres - known later as the Battle of Nonne Boschen- the 'Nun's Wood'- began on 10 November with an attack on the French positions north-east of Ypres, a strike that gained the Germans a small bridgehead across theYser at Dixmude. This attack convinced the French generals - incorrectly - that the weight of this new German attack would come north of Ypres and fall on their lines between Bixschoote and Zonnebeke. In fact, it fell on the BEF between Gheluvelt and Hooge on 11 November, and the heart of this final battle took place just north of the Menin road, at Nonne Boschen and Polygon Wood, positions held by the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the BEF.
The morning of 11 November was chilly and misty and dawn arrived with a heavy downpour and the start of what the Official History describes as 'the most terrific fire the British had yet experienced'. (9) This fire concentrated on I Corps and on Wing's 'division' of II Corps- which could muster only some 4,000 men - just south of the Menin road. The bombardment went on for several hours, the Germans marking the BEF line to establish the position of the British guns and the infantry defences prior to the infantry attack, which came in at 0900 hours.
Later on, 11 November became better known 'Remembrance Day' or 'Armistice Day', but that was after the war ended. Until then 11 November 1914 was noted by the soldiers of the British Army as one of the hardest days of battle in the entire war. On that day twelve and a half German infantry divisions, surging forward on a 14-kilometre (9-mile) front from Messines to Polygon Wood, smashed into the British line astride the Menin road, pos itions manned by McCracke
n's, Gliechen's and Shaw's brigades in Wing's division south of the road and Brigadier FitzClarence's 1st (Guards) Brigade in I Corps in the woods just to the north of it.
These scratch brigades contained some of the great fighting battalions of the war, the cream of the county regiments. McCracken's brigade mustered 1,764 men from the 2nd KOSBs, 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, 1st Gordon Highlanders, 1st South Lancashires and 1st Wiltshires. Gleichen's brigade numbered fifty officers and 1,550 men from the 1st Cheshires and the 2nd Bedfords. Shaw's brigade contained seventy-six officers and 2,638 men from the 1st Lincolns, 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, 4th Royal Fusiliers, 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers and 2nd Duke of Wellington's.
All three of Wing's brigades were well under strength; at full strength an infantry brigade in 1914 should have mustered 124 officers and 4,100 other ranks. To the north of the Menin road lay the 1st (Guards) Brigade under FitzClarence; this was a Guards brigade in name only since it contained the 1st Black Watch, the 1st Cameron Highlanders and only one Guards battalion, the 1st Scots Guards; this 'brigade' mustered around 800 men -less than that of a pre-war battalion.
The German bombardment, which felled trees, levelled trenches and collapsed dugouts, went on for over two hours before the German infantry attack came in. This was a thrust by twenty-five battalions of infantry; a force totalling 17,500 men against some 7,500 British infantry entrenched in the Nonne Boschen on a short line running north-east to Polygon Wood.
The advancing Germans - Pomeranians and East Prussians from the 4th Division - suffered terrible casualties as they came on, both from shelling and the rapid rifle fire of the British regular infantry; the Official History, while recording that the enemy had twelve battalions here against the British eight and a half, states that these attacks were 'broken by the steady fire of II Corps and were never dangerous'. (10)
Even so, the attacks against McCracken's and Gleichen's battalions kept coming and were pressed home with great resolution; the German battalions attacked again and again, but were always driven back with losses. They tried again at 1600 hours and were again cut down, pressing their attacks until the shell-pocked fields before the British line were carpeted with field-grey dead, piled two and three deep in places- and still the attacks continued. The German attacks were not broken off until 2roo hours that evening, when the battlefield was dark except for flares.
Astride the Menin road the Prussian Guard division was attempting to break through the centre of the British line at the point held by Shaw's brigade and FitzClarence's Guards. The Official History estimates that three German divisions, the 30th, 39th and 4th - thirty-seven battalions in all- moved against Cavan and McCracken and Moussy - odds of five to one. These German units included their 4th Guards Brigade, which engaged Shaw's weak battalions, and the German rst Guards Brigade, which engaged Brigadier FitzClarence's 1st (Guards) Brigade. These were the crack troops of the German Army, the Kaiser's pride and joy, men determined to live up to their reputation as an elite force, unstoppable in attack. Their attack was duly delivered, and with considerable force.
Alas for the Prussian Guard! Regimental pride and élan were no use against the raking rifle fire of two stubborn county battalions, the 1st Lincolns and the 2nd Duke of Wellington's. The 1st Guards Grenadier Regiment of the 4th Brigade suffered such heavy losses before the British trenches that it carne to a halt and went to ground. Farther north, the 2nd Guards Grenadier Regiment succeeded in breaking through the British line, its enfilade fire forcing the 1st Royal Fusiliers to fall back, but Brigadier General Shaw then counter-attacked with two companies of the 2nd Royal Sussex and the rst Royal Scots Fusiliers and drove them out again. Brigadier Shaw was well forward and was wounded in this counter-attack, the command of his scratch brigade passing to Lieutenant Colonel W. D. Smith of the 2nd Royal Sussex.
This counter-attack did not prevent other German units breaking through the BEF line in places. Haig therefore committed the rest of the 2nd Royal Sussex to the front line; other units were also sent forward and the belief spread that the Royal Fusiliers' positions had been retaken. This turned out to be mistaken, and further attempts to evict the enemy during the afternoon met with no success. In this action the 1st Battalion, The Royal Fusiliers was reduced to 100 men led by two second lieutenants - the only officers left. German losses had also been high, and all they had to show in return was a brief success -and one short section of battered trench. All in all, the right and centre sections of the I Corps line had held up well against the German onslaught.
The encounter between Prussian Guard units and the BEF took place at Nonne Boschen around 0900 hours when the German 1st Guard Brigade - six full battalions - met the 800 men of the British 1st (Guards) Brigade just south of Polygon Wood- though it should be noted that the 1st Guards Brigade had the 1st Battalion, The King's Regiment of the 6th Infantry Brigade (in all 456 men) in close support on its left.
The attack at Nonne Boschen was undertaken with typical courage and disregard for casualties. The German Guards advanced across the shell-torn ground at the trot and crossed the first line of trenches in the face of heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, shedding men with every metre. This was a last flash of pride and élan; these German Guards came into the attack with bayonets fixed and rifles at the high port, the officers with drawn swords. Without stopping to return fire, they breasted the British line and attacked the defenders with the bayonet.
British soldiers - and especially Highland soldiers - are not afraid of cold steel. The Scots soldiers quickly scrambled from their trenches and came out to fight the enemy in the open, bay onet to bayonet, but numbers soon began to tell. The chaplain of the German 4th Guards Division wrote later that the British were 'cold-blooded and tough and defend themselves even when their trenches are taken', (11) but the Scots could not hold back the German Guards for long.
Accounts of this violent action are not surprisingly confused. The British line was broken but in the process the German attack apparently fell apart, the forward units split by the stout resistance from FitzClarence's men. The Cameron Highlanders and the Black Watch were overwhelmed but the Scots Guards hung on to their last strongpoint in a farm and defied eviction as the German tide flooded past. The British artillery now began to flay the German advance, expending all available supplies of ammunition and putting a wall of shellfire between the German forward units and those coming up in support.
The 2nd Duke of Wellington's, north of the Menin road, had taken over some of the Guards Brigade trenches and was attacked by the fusilier battalion of the 2nd Guards Grenadier Regiment, which broke through and advanced 800 metres (500 yards) into the BEF position before they were checked; the Official History records that 'in the course of a long struggle the Fusilier Battalion gradually became a disorganized crowd and finally was practically annihilated' (12) - the remnants being driven from the woods by a bayonet charge from the Duke of Wellington's reserve company. In this engagement the German Guards lost seven out of twenty officers and 380 out of 826 men ...and still the battle continued.
By midday, three hours after opening their attack, the Prussian Guard had fought its way into Nonne Boschen, its battalions much reduced and confused by the relentless British rifle and machine-gun fire that assailed them from every quarter, but still fighting hard. The battle in this close country- for as yet shelling had not obliterated the vegetation - was fought at very close range, often hand to hand. The heavy German artillery fire of previous days, which had felled trees and pitted the ground with shell holes, had provided the British infantry with an adequate amount of cover.
Moreover, being ordered to advance and penetrate the British line quickly, the German units failed to 'mop up' -to kill or capture any survivors of their first attack- before moving on. These survivors therefore went to ground, took up all-round defensive positions wherever they happened to be, and shot at any Germans that came before their rifle-sights. The result was a sprawling battle in the woods, with no one on either side having a cle
ar idea as to what was going on. This fight for the Nonne Boschen and Polygon Woods was another 'soldier's battle', in which everything depended on the individual soldier's ability to 'stick it' ... and keep fighting.
Therefore, although the German units were pressing forward relentlessly, most of the British line was still holding firm. In front of Polygon Wood the 1st Battalion, The King's Regiment beat off all attacks by the German 3rd Foot Guards Regiment and raised a wall of dead in front of their position; no Germans entered the wood, though at one time the King's battalion reported to Brigade that it was 'supported on the right by the Prussian Guard'. The Scots Guards position at Northampton Farm, north of the Menin road, also held out and was never taken. At Verbeek Farm, 100 men of the Black Watch plus the staffs of several battalion HQs clerks and grooms and batmen- not only beat off any attacks on their position but were also able to open fire on German units moving west across their front.
In short, the British line was ragged in parts but it did not break; the Prussians were either kept out or rapidly evicted from the BEF line by the fire of the dogged infantry battalions backed up by men from the Headquarters companies, who snatched up their rifles and came running forward to join in the fighting and shore up the line. Even so, when the 'tail' of a battalion, those troops whose prime task is to support the fighting men, gets involved in the action, matters are getting desperate, and so it was here.
The Old Contemptibles Page 35