Kitchener then occupied a number of high military positions and consolidated his considerable reputation in India and Egypt. In August 1914 he was hastening back to Egypt when he was hauled off the Dover-Calais ferry and offered the appointment of Secretary of State for War, a post he accepted with considerable reluctance.
One of the most unusual aspects of Kitchener's performance is that it improved as he rose in rank; most commanders are eventually promoted to their level of incompetence, that point where their rank exceeds their ability and - as with Sir John French - their limitations are suddenly and starkly revealed. Not so Kitchener; as he was promoted, his performance improved. He was no better than adequate as a field commander in the Sudan but he performed good service thereafter as a soldier and a diplomat, not least in defusing the potentially disastrous confrontation with a French officer, Captain Marchand, at Fashoda in 1898; their encounter might have precipitated a Franco-British war but in fact paved the way for the Entente Cordiale.
In 1914 Kitchener was among the first to realize that this war on which his nation had now embarked would not be short. He also realized what that conclusion must mean - the creation of large armies and a large munitions industry. He was also able to exploit his considerable reputation with the public when calling hundreds of thousands of volunteers to the colours; that famous poster, showing the field marshal over the slogan 'Your King and Country Need You', brought in the men who were mustered into several armies, the New or Kitchener Armies, which took the field in 1916.
This eighteen-month delay in committing these troops to the battle, from the autumn of 1914 to the summer of 1916, was largely due to Kitchener's insistence that these armies should not take the field until they were trained, equipped and fully ready for the field. French demands that the new armies should be committed to the fight, division by division, as they were formed and equipped in 1915 were largely resisted and no pressure from Paris changed Kitchener's mind - to send untrained troops into battle, he said, 'was little short of murder', a fact most clearly demonstrated by the fate of two New Army divisions at Loos.
One man who shared Kitchener's conviction that this would be a long war was the First Army commander, General Sir Douglas Haig. Douglas Haig has long been the vector for all the accusations and myths that have surrounded the Great War generals, and those myths are still current among the general public. More informed authorities, following the lead set by the late John Terraine, have long concluded that Haig, while by no means a military genius, was a perfectly competent officer, whose actions, in the main, were both sensible and understandable in the context of the time. Haig, though not without faults, was certainly no donkey.
Douglas Haig was born in Edinburgh on 19 June 1861 and was just fifty-three and one of the youngest generals in the army when he went to France in August 1914. The Haig family came from ancient Border stock with a seat at Bemersyde near Kelso, though Haig's father came from Fife and was a distiller of whisky; Haig's whisky can still be consumed in British pubs. The Haig family were comfortably off but were not members of the aristocracy or the 'landed gentry'; they were 'in trade', barely a cut above the middle classes.
Like Sir John French, Haig was a cavalry officer. He was commissioned into the 7th Hussars in 1885 at the age of twenty-four. In December 1886 the 7th Hussars went to India, and by July 1888 Haig was a captain and adjutant of the regiment - a fairly rapid promotion. He spent four years as adjutant before becoming a squadron commander in 1892. He then returned to England to sit the Staff College entrance exam, in which, to his considerable surprise and disappointment, he failed to gain enough marks for a competitive vacancy.
He returned to India and devoted himself to his regimental duties until recalled to England for a one-year stint as ADC to the Inspector-General of Cavalry. Haig then joined the staff of Colonel John French, a rising star in the cavalry world, who had recently been tasked with writing a new cavalry drill book. When French went to the Aldershot command, Haig took on the task and the new cavalry drill book, by Colonel French and Captain Haig, duly appeared in 1896.
Haig got most of the credit for this work, and in February 1896 he was nominated for a place on the next staff course, entering the junior division at Camberley. Haig clearly did well at Camberley; the chief instructor, Lieutenant Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, a man not known for tolerating fools, is alleged to have remarked that Haig would one day be the commander-in-chief of the British Army.
Douglas Haig then saw active service, joining Major General Kitchener's 1898 campaign against the dervishes in the Sudan which culminated in the battle of Omdurman. During this campaign Captain Haig served in the Egyptian cavalry as a major - a bimbashi - and as chief of staff to the commander of the cavalry at the battles of the Atbara and Omdurman, all useful experience.
Up to this time, Haig's career does not appear to be flourishing academically, although he had passed into the Staff College by nomination. On the other hand, when set an academic task, at Oxford University, the War Office or at Camberley, he appears to have done well - or well enough. At this stage in his career he was doing adequately, but not noted as a rising star.
After the Sudan, however, his career began to pick up. In 1898 Haig became a brevet major, a man marked for promotion, and returned to the UK in November to become brigade major of the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot, under Major General John French. This acquaintance must have deepened into friendship, for later that year Haig loaned French £2,000 to cover losses French had incurred either from speculating in South African gold shares or from dallying with the ladies, two activities to which Sir John was somewhat prone. This loan enabled French to pay his debts and so remain in the service.
The next call to arms soon took both men to the South African War of 1899-1902, French as commander of the cavalry, Haig as his deputy acting adjutant general (DAAG). They arrived at Capetown on 10 October 1899, the day before the Boers declared war. The war in South Africa was a graveyard of British military reputations in the opening years of the twentieth century, but Haig emerged from the conflict as a substantive lieutenant colonel and French came home famous for the relief of Kimberley. Haig became an area commander for part of the Orange Free State, and was also appointed to command the 17th Lancers. Haig gained useful experience in that three-year debacle but he remained firmly convinced that the shock of the arme blanche cavalry charge was still a battle-winning tactic. Like General French, Haig was a stout opponent of the growing use of cavalry regiments as mounted infantry.
Haig returned to England in 1902 in conmand of the 17th Lancers, relinquishing that post in 1903 to go to India as a colonel, rising on arrival to the rank of local major general. In that rank he took up the post of Inspector General of Cavalry under the Commander-in-Chief India, Lord Kitchener - a man he would meet again in 1914.
In 1906, after three years in India, Haig returned to Britain, but the period had been marked by two significant events. In 1905, after a meeting at Windsor and a whirlwind courtship, he married Dorothy Vivian, a lady-in-waiting to Queen Alexandra and sister of a brother officer, Lord Vivian, who had served in the 17th Lancers during the South African War. Haig was already well connected or he would not have been invited to Windsor by Edward VII, but this marriage took him into a realm well beyond mere social duties. After his accession, King George V took a deep and personal interest in military affairs and expected to be consulted on all matters concerning appointments and promotion. The king's influence was profound, and before long King George was happy to indulge in long conversations with Major General Haig - a man with experience in many aspects of the military establishment - and listen to his comments and advice.
Haig also wrote a book, a worthy if misguided work entitled Cavalry Studies, Strategical and Tactical. This book draws on his experience as Inspector General of Cavalry in India and contains much good advice on the handling of cavalry regiments, but it also offers some intriguing insights into what Haig saw as the cavalry's decisive role in
a major war.
General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, otherwise a great supporter of Haig, states that on the basis of this book Haig 'could certainly not be considered among the prophets', and that his faith in the future role of cavalry was 'a pipe dream'. (4) This comment is certainly true. The invention of the magazine rifle and automatic weapons inevitably reduced the role of cavalry to that of mounted rifleman; while the horse continued to provide mobility up to the battlefield and in pursuit, the day of the arme blanche cavalry charge, with lance and sabre, was long over.
There were, however, a lot of cavalry diehards about in the opening decades of the twentieth century, and Haig's views were received with respect. On returning to England in 1906 he was appointed a military secretary by Richard Haldane, later Lord Haldane and Secretary of State for War in the pre-war government.
Military secretaries are charged with appointments and promotions and this post gave Haig a position of considerable influence with the king and the army at large.
Haig played a significant part in various developments, including the General Staff concept, the creation of the Territorial Force for home defence and the all-important reorganization of the British Army into an expeditionary force of six infantry divisions and a cavalry division - though not with matters concerning its deployment. Like most people in government or the army, he assumed that the BEF would be sent to some trouble spot in the empire; only a few people, most notably Henry Wilson, foresaw a British commitment in a major European war. His next appointment was as Director of Military Training (DMT) at the War Office, responsible for training areas, methods, schools of instruction and the writing and publication of training manuals.
In 1907 he was appointed Director, Staff Duties, in the General Staff Directorate, remaining there until 1909, when he went to India as Chief of the General Staff to the commander-in-chief. Before taking up this appointment Haig was knighted by King Edward VII at Balmoral. Haig's list of honours was growing - by 1914 they included KCB (Knight Commander of the Bath), KCVO (Knight Commander of the Victorian Order), KCIE (Knight Commander of the Indian Empire) and ADC General.
All but the first of these honours and awards were in the royal gift and had no particular connection with the military world. Haig had not been admitted to the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) or military rank in orders such as the Order of St Michael and St George, which leads one to suppose that his social position was due more to his royal connections than his military reputation or expertise.
Haldane did not forget his useful subordinate. In 1911 he wrote offering Lieutenant General Haig the prestigious Aldershot command, which Haig took over from Horace Smith-Dorrien in March 1912. The officer commanding at Aldershot would automatically take command of I Corps of the BEF should Britain go to war during his appointment, and so it proved. When the Great War broke out in August 1914 that post fell into General Haig's lap.
Haig reached two immediate conclusions about this war: first, that it would not be short; second, that Field Marshal French, the newly appointed commander-in-chief of the BEF, was not the man to command Britain's armies in the field during such a conflict. A far better choice, Haig averred, would be someone ... well, not unlike himself.
At this point the writer must declare an interest; he is no admirer of Field Marshal Sir John French. This author believes it would have been better for the reputation of the Great War generals and - more importantly - for the lives of the soldiers in 1914 and 1915 if French had been removed from his command in 1914, before the battle of the Marne, when the numerous deficiencies in his abilities were rapidly becoming clear. By comparison Douglas Haig must be regarded as an officer of some intellect and considerable efficiency, a much better choice for commander of the BEF than his shallow and indecisive commander.
Most of the tales told about Douglas Haig are simply not true. He was neither callous nor incompetent, nor stupid. He had studied the military art carefully, had gained wide experience in South Africa and India and was perfectly willing to employ new methods and kit - such as the aeroplane and the tank - as soon as they became available. As we shall see, he was also willing to learn from his mistakes and vary his plans accordingly. He had done very well at First Ypres and was highly regarded by his corps and by his colleagues. On the professional competence issue, Douglas Haig is hard to fault - within the limitations of the time.
There are, however, a number of problems with his character. Underneath his somewhat dour, Border Scots facade, Douglas Haig was an optimist. This aspect of his character is illustrated by his reply to Colonel Repington, the military correspondent of The Times, at the end of January, when Repington asked whether it was possible to advance on the British front. Haig's reply was that 'as soon as we are supplied with ample artillery ammunition of high explosive I thought we could walk through the German line at several places'. (5)
Optimism is generally no bad thing in a general, but with Haig it often went too far. Haig tended to believe that one more effort, one more push, one more sacrifice, would carry the day and bring victory in the field - when the evidence often suggested that the attacks should be discontinued. This was not always the case but, as we shall see, the law of diminishing returns applies as much on the battlefield as in the field of economics, and Haig sometimes failed to realize this.
Haig was also something of an intriguer, a flaw he detected and deplored in that arch-intriguer, Major General Henry Wilson, the current sub-chief of staff. Haig's intrigues were subtle, long-term, largely directed against his superior officer, Field Marshal French, and began as soon as war broke out. When King George V asked Haig for his opinion of the field marshal on 11 August, one week into the war, Haig replied that, while he was sure Sir John would do his utmost to carry out his orders, he had grave doubts whether his temper or his military knowledge was 'sufficient for him to discharge properly the difficult duties which would devolve upon him'.
In his diary entry Haig then added his private thoughts. 'In my own heart I know that French is quite unfit for this great Command at a time of crisis in our Nation's History. But I thought it sufficient to tell the King that I had "doubts" about the selection.' (6) Haig continued to express these doubts to anyone who would listen, and the fact that he was entirely right in such assessments does not make his actions more attractive.
One other problem, though one not entirely Haig's fault, was to cause problems later. Douglas Haig was notoriously inarticulate. He could issue clear orders and write detailed and unequivocal letters, but when it came to standing up and stating his plans verbally Haig tended to ramble. This problem was compounded when another gruff, inarticulate soldier, Sir William Robertson, became CIGS at the end of 1915 and the two men were later confronted with the silvertongued prime minister, David Lloyd George. All too frequently the prime minister could not make head or tail of what these officers were trying to tell him and therefore tended to assume they were being economical with the truth regarding the situation in the field.
Haig is not an easy man to understand. His competence and character are best explored though his actions and will be revealed as this story of 1915 develops. His colleague, Horace Smith-Dorrien, was a much less complex character but an equally competent general. Indeed, it might be that Smith-Dorrien was more competent than Haig, but his talents were unappreciated by Sir John French and his career as an army commander in the Great War was therefore regrettably short.
General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was an officer of wide experience, noted both for a ferocious temper and as one of the few British officers to survive the massacre of the 24th Foot at Isandlwana during the Zulu War of 1879. Born in 1858, Smith-Dorrien was now fiftysix and had commanded II Corps with skill and distinction in recent months, especially at Mons and Le Cateau, but also in the various engagements during the first battle of Ypres. Smith-Dorrien's abilities did nothing to endear him to Field Marshal French, who never ceased to denigrate him, not least to his brother officer and I Corps colleague, Douglas
Haig.
In a diary entry on 5 February, for example, Haig records French telling him that 'Sir H. Smith-Dorrien is a weak spot and that he ought not to be where he is in command of an Army, but that he could not pass him over at this stage in the campaign'. Haig records telling French that he could not give an opinion about S-D as he did not know enough of the facts, but thought S-D's staff were 'useless'.
Should anything happen to Sir John French, either Smith-Dorrien or Haig would be in line for command of the BEF armies - the only other possible contender was General Sir Ian Hamilton, and he was to lose his chance and much of his reputation at Gallipoli. This being so, it was not in Haig's interest to defend Smith-Dorrien against French's enmity, though there is no evidence that he added to it. The irony is that French was still quite unaware that his main enemy within the BEF in 1914/15 was his trusted confidant, Sir Douglas Haig.
On the day these two BEF armies were formed, the battlefront of the BEF stretched for some 32 kilometres, from St-Eloi on the southern tip of the Ypres salient to Cuinchy on the La Bassee canal. The Second Army would occupy the northern part of this line, with II Corps north of III Corps, while the First Army occupied the ground to the south, again with two corps, the third corps in reserve. The French Eighth Army occupied the Ypres salient, while south of Haig's force the French Tenth Army took up the line towards Arras.
The Old Contemptibles Page 42