by FDR
Roosevelt had one last meeting that evening—a personal tête-à-tête over beer and sandwiches with two outsiders: thirty-three-year-old Edward R. Murrow, back from London; and FDR’s Columbia classmate William Donovan, who since July had been heading the president’s clandestine intelligence operations as the innocuous “coordinator of information.” From Murrow he wanted to know how the British were bearing up. From Donovan, a current intelligence assessment. From both he wanted independent judgment on how the American people would react to a declaration of war. And he let his hair down. American planes had been destroyed “on the ground, by God, on the ground,” pounding his fist on the table.134
At noon Monday, Roosevelt motored down Pennsylvania Avenue to Capitol Hill, deliberately choosing an open car to demonstrate his confidence and resolve. In the second car rode Eleanor and Mrs. Woodrow Wilson, whom FDR had asked to join the presidential party. When he entered the House chamber, the Congress rose as one for a prolonged standing ovation. Twelve times in a speech of only twenty-five sentences the president was interrupted by thunderous applause. He catalogued Japan’s Pacific aggression—not only at Pearl Harbor but in Malaya, Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippines, Wake Island, and Midway:
The facts of yesterday speak for themselves. No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute victory.
I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.135
It was a powerful speech, powerfully delivered. Congress acted within thirty-three minutes: unanimously in the Senate, 388–1 in the House, the lone dissenter Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin of Montana—who had also voted against war in 1917.
The United States was at war.
* The “Gentlemen’s Agreement” of 1908 arose in response to action by the San Francisco Board of Education, which in 1906 decreed that Japanese students must attend a segregated Oriental school lest they overwhelm the city’s white students. Since there were only ninety-three Japanese students involved, overcrowding was scarcely the issue. As the San Francisco Examiner crowed, “Californians do not want their growing daughters to be intimate in daily school contact with Japanese young men.”
TR intervened, called the San Francisco action a “wicked absurdity,” and invited the school board to Washington, where a compromise was worked out. Tokyo agreed not to issue passports to Japanese citizens who wished to settle in the United States, thus choking off immigration, and the San Francisco school board agreed to allow properly prepared Japanese students to enroll in the same classes with whites. The arrangement was spelled out in a series of notes between the Japanese government and the State Department and is summarized in 2 Foreign Relations of the United States 1924 370–371 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939).
* By statute, Japanese ministers of war and Navy were chosen from the senior ranks of the services. By refusing to nominate a candidate or withdrawing its officer from the cabinet, either service could topple a government. The Army, moreover, reserved the right to appeal directly to the emperor, bypassing the civilian government altogether. The system was patterned on Germany before World War I, an infelicitous choice similar to General P. G. T. Beauregard’s decision to base the Confederate battle plan at Shiloh on Napoleon’s tactics at Waterloo. David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear 503–504 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
* Ambassador Grew was married to Alice de Vermandois Perry, the granddaughter of Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry, the victor of the Battle of Lake Erie and brother of Commodore Matthew Perry, who opened Japan to the West in 1853. Her father, Thomas Sergeant Perry, held the chair in English literature at Keio University. Alice had spent her youth in Japan and had developed a wide network of contacts who gave her husband remarkable access to the Japanese leadership. Joseph C. Grew, 1 Turbulent Era: The Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945 9 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952).
* Zhukov established his military reputation on the Khalkhin-Gol. Given command by Stalin in June, Zhukov revitalized a demoralized army, massed his tanks and artillery contrary to traditional military doctrine, and, in a tactic made famous in World War II, launched a tidal wave of a counterattack on August 20 that swept the Japanese from the field. Otto Preston Chaney, Jr., Zhukov 38–59 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971).
* After the fall of France and the establishment of the Vichy regime with Marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain as head of state, FDR appointed Admiral William D. Leahy as U.S. ambassador. Leahy had retired as chief of naval operations in 1939 and was then serving as governor of Puerto Rico. Roosevelt believed a military man would enjoy greater prestige in Vichy.
* Following his retirement as Army chief of staff in 1935, MacArthur went to Manila as commanding general (field marshal) of the Philippine Army. His headquarters were separate and distinct from the U.S. Army in the Philippines, which was commanded by Major General George Grunert. With MacArthur for a time were Lieutenant Colonel Dwight D. Eisenhower as his executive officer and Captain Lucius D. Clay as his engineer. For a snapshot of the organization of MacArthur’s headquarters and its relation to the U.S. Army in the Philippines, see Clay’s comments in Jean Edward Smith, Lucius D. Clay: An American Life 76–82 (New York: Henry Holt, 1990).
* Dean Acheson’s record for anticipating the likelihood of war in the Far East sets a standard for error that few statesmen would wish to emulate. Not only did he make the wrong call in July 1941, but his speech to the National Press Club as President Truman’s secretary of state on January 12, 1950, placing South Korea outside the American defensive perimeter in the Pacific, contributed significantly to the North Koreans’ decision to cross the 38th parallel in June 1950. For the text of Acheson’s speech, see 22 Department of State Bulletin 116 (January 23, 1950).
* At a separate audience with the heads of the Army and Navy on September 5, Emperor Hirohito pressed the chiefs as to the probable length of hostilities in case of war with the United States. According to the record kept by Prince Konoye, the Army chief of staff, General Sugiyama, said that operations in the South Pacific could be disposed of in about three months. “The Emperor recalled that the General had been Minister of War at the time of the outbreak of the China Incident, and that he had informed the Throne that the incident would be disposed of in about one month. He pointed out that despite the General’s assurance, the incident was not yet concluded after four long years of fighting. In trepidation the Chief of Staff went to great lengths to explain that the extensive hinterland of China prevented the consummation of operations according to the scheduled plan. At this the Emperor raised his voice and said if the Chinese hinterland was extensive, the Pacific was boundless. He asked how the General could be certain of his three months calculation. The Chief of Staff hung his head unable to reply.” “Konoye Memoirs,” quoted in Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor 266 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950). For a more critical assessment of Hirohito’s role, see Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan 387–437 (New York: HarperCollins, 2000).
* “Dear Frank,” wrote Grew on September 22. “As you know from my telegrams, I am in close touch with Prince Konoye who in the face of bitter antagonism from extremist and pro-Axis elements is courageously working for an improvement in Japan’s relations with the United States.… I am convinced that he now means business and will go as far as is possible, without incurring open rebellion in Japan, to reach a reasonable understanding with us. It seems to me highly unlikely that this chance will come again or that any Japanese statesman other than Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the military extremists in carrying through a policy which they, in their ignorance of international affairs and economic laws, resent and oppose.” 4 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941 468–469 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offic
e, 1956).
* On September 10, 1941, Eleanor wrote to her daughter, Anna, who was living in Seattle, “Father told me this morning to tell you that there are still negotiations going on and he might go to Alaska [FDR thought Hawaii too far] to meet the Japs. You and John [Boettiger] are not to mention this to anyone. If he goes he would leave about Oct. 10 and be returning via Seattle about Oct. 21st.” Anna Halstead Papers, FDRL.
† On his return from Japan in 1942, Grew asked Hull why Konoye’s proposal to meet with FDR had not been accepted. Grew said he thought it might have brought peace. “If you thought so strongly,” Hull replied, “why didn’t you board a plane and come tell us?” Grew reminded the secretary of his daily telegrams expressing his feeling about the situation. Later Grew wondered if Hull had read them. Joseph C. Grew, 2 Turbulent Era 1330.
* Kurusu had most recently served as Japanese ambassador to Germany, which made him suspect in the eyes of the State Department. But he had also been Japan’s consul in Chicago, was married to an American whom he had met there (Alice Little), and spoke English flawlessly, which Nomura did not. In retrospect it appears his assignment was indeed made to move the talks forward.
* In his 1946 statement to the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Secretary Stimson expanded on FDR’s remarks. According to Stimson, “If you know that your enemy is going to strike you, it is not usually wise to wait until he gets the jump on you by taking the initiative. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone’s mind as to who were the aggressors. We discussed at this meeting the basis on which this country’s position could be most clearly explained to our own people and to the world, in case we had to go into the fight quickly because of some sudden move on the part of the Japanese.” Stimson Statement, 11 Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 5421–5422 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946).
* Accompanying the war warning was a personal letter from Stark to his friend Kimmel. “I held this [letter] up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today.… Neither will be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing that could happen to us.” Stark to Kimmel, November 27, 1941, 5 Pearl Harbor Attack 2301.
* Repeal of the Neutrality Act carried the Senate 50–37, the smallest majority FDR had won on any foreign policy issue since the war in Europe began. In the House the vote was even closer (212–194), with only Southern Democrats solidly behind the president. Critics who wonder why FDR said so little about racial inequality in the South should consider the source of his foreign policy support in Congress.
† Mount Niitaka (Yu Shan in Chinese), which at 13,113 feet was the largest peak in the Japanese empire, is located in Yu Shan National Park in central Taiwan (Formosa).
* Yamamoto was to have accompanied Konoye to meet FDR had the conference taken place. He advised the prime minister to approach the talks “as though your life depended on the outcome. Even if the discussions break down, don’t get defiant, but leave room for further moves.”
Yamamoto was a regular subscriber to Life magazine and always left his copy in the wardroom of his flagship. When a junior officer asked him to recommend a biography to improve his English, Yamamoto recommended Carl Sandburg’s Lincoln. “I like Lincoln. I think he’s great not just as an American, but as a human being.” The admiral was also very fond of American football. On his way to the London Naval Conference in 1934, he took his staff to see Northwestern play Iowa in Evanston (Iowa 20, Northwestern 7). Hiroyki Agawa, The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy 21, 24, 53 (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1979).
* Because Japan’s original war plan anticipated meeting the American fleet near the home islands, the Japanese Navy had neglected to design ships with a long cruising radius. The destroyers escorting the Pearl Harbor task force, for example, had to be refueled daily. Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept 322–323 (New York: Penguin, 1982).
* Naval historians are fond of pointing out that while Nagumo’s appointment rested on seniority, Kimmel was a “merit” appointee, selected to command the Pacific Fleet over the heads of six more senior admirals. U.S. Congress, Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 75, note 4.
* In the two weeks prior to December 7, 1941, the nine military and naval commanders in the Pacific area received repeated warnings of pending hostile action by Japan. Seven of the commanders, including Admiral Hart and General MacArthur in the Philippines, General John L. DeWitt on the West Coast, and General Frank M. Andrews in Panama, put their commands on a war footing. Hawaii was the only exception. Neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short took Washington’s war warnings seriously. Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations 505–512 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950).
* The judgment of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack is scathing with respect to Admiral Kimmel and General Short. After months of hearings and detailed field investigations, the committee concluded:
The commanders in Hawaii were clearly and unmistakably warned of war with Japan. They were given orders and possessed information that the entire Pacific area was fraught with danger. They failed to carry out these orders and to discharge their basic and ultimate responsibilities. They failed to defend the fortress they commanded—their citadel was taken by surprise. Aside from any responsibilities that may appear to rest in Washington, the ultimate and direct responsibility for failure to engage the Japanese on the morning of December 7 with every weapon at their disposal rests essentially and properly with the Army and Navy commands in Hawaii whose duty it was to meet the enemy against which they had been warned.
Report, Pearl Harbor Attack 238.
TWENTY-FOUR
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people.
—HENRY L. STIMSON, DECEMBER 7, 1941
THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION, like most of America, seriously underestimated Japan’s military capacity. Cartoon caricaturizations of the Japanese as little yellow men with buckteeth and horn-rimmed glasses who were no good at piloting airplanes because of their slanty eyes led to woeful miscalculations up and down the line. Japanese stereotypes of the United States were equally off base, particularly at high levels of government and in the Army. Not only did the Japanese leadership fail to recognize the enormous industrial potential and spiritual strength of the country, they grossly misinterpreted the nature of American society. Because women played no public role in Japan, decision makers had no way of measuring their impact on national policy. As Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue observed, many Japanese leaders had “a childish notion” that because women had a powerful say in America “it wouldn’t be long before they started objecting to the war and demanding a settlement.”1
Pearl Harbor united Americans as nothing else could. If the Japanese had attacked Singapore, Borneo, or even the Philippines, the nation would have been divided over how to respond. But the attack on Pearl Harbor was so unexpected and so devastating that the nation rallied instantly behind the president. Isolationists were stilled, domestic squabbles receded, and debate adjourned. “We are now in this war,” FDR told the country in a fireside chat Tuesday evening, December 9. “We are all in it—all the way. Every single man, woman and child is a partner in the most tremendous undertaking in American history. We must share together the bad news and the good news, the defeats and the victories—the changing fortunes of war.”2
Initially the news was bad. On December 10 Japanese aircraft sank the British battleships R
epulse and Prince of Wales off Malaya. (Prince of Wales had been the site of FDR’s Atlantic Charter meeting with Churchill.) Hong Kong, Guam, Wake Island, New Britain, the Gilbert Islands, and the Solomons all fell within weeks of Pearl Harbor. In the Philippines, American and Filipino troops retreated to the Bataan peninsula and the island redoubt of Corregidor. In Burma, Japanese forces advanced almost without opposition. In Malaya, British and Indian forces, despite a two-to-one, sometimes three-to-one, numerical advantage, proved no match for the better-trained, better-led divisions of General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Singapore, with a garrison of 85,000 troops—the “Gibraltar of the Pacific”—fell on February 15, 1942, the most ignominious defeat of British arms on record. If Pearl Harbor represented the nadir of the U.S. Navy, the defeat at Singapore was as much a disaster for the British Army. Twelve days later, in the Battle of the Java Sea, a Japanese naval force of five cruisers and nine destroyers took on an equivalent American-British-Dutch-Australian formation, sinking all five Allied cruisers (including the USS Houston) and five of nine destroyers. Fighting ended in the Dutch East Indies on March 12, and another 93,000 troops entered Japanese captivity. Allied propaganda notwithstanding, many in Burma, Malaya, and the East Indies initially welcomed the Japanese as liberators who were freeing Asian peoples from European imperialism.3
Roosevelt had not asked Congress to declare war against Germany and Italy. On December 11 Hitler remedied the omission by appearing before the Reichstag to announce that a state of war existed between the United States and the Third Reich. Italy followed two hours later. Neither Hitler (who was at the eastern front) nor Mussolini had been apprised of the attack on Pearl Harbor beforehand. And the strict black-letter text of the Tripartite Pact did not oblige them to follow Japan’s lead. But they were overjoyed to do so. Mussolini welcomed the clarification of America’s status, and Hitler saw the Japanese attack as a harbinger of victory. “Now it is impossible for us to lose the war,” the führer told his generals. “We have an ally who has never been vanquished in three thousand years.”4