At night, the marching conditions were even worse. And the smell of the stagnant water would also have been chokingly oppressive. Conditions were ripe for water-borne infections and septicity. Anyone already suffering from tuberculosis would have likely succumbed to the omnipresent seeping damp that penetrated infected lungs. The cold mud would only have gotten heavier, and the cold water would have dissipated body heat as well. Furthermore, the moans of animals dying prolonged deaths, and the coughing of sick or feverish men would have been a living hell, nightmarish especially in the dark. No fires could be lit other than torches to show the shadowy way. The soldiers would have even fouled their own passage, exacerbating the stench and unhealthiness. Cholera was an ever-present danger in such circumstances of compromised drinking water. Carrying an adequate supply of fresh water could only have become increasingly harder. Like Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s The Rime of the Ancient Mariner (“Water, water, everywhere, and not a drop to drink”), dehydration from lack of potable water in the swamp only worsened the army’s overall spirits.
This marsh passage would have haunted many who survived, and while Hannibal’s iron will pushed them forward relentlessly, he too must have wondered if they were ever going to get out. No doubt he constantly grilled his Boii guides and forced himself to stay alert and set a good example, but Hannibal too would have been greatly fatigued because he could not relax his leadership while the army had such a difficult time making forward progress. Protracted sleep deprivation, exhaustion, and the endless damp all compounded to take their hellish toll not only on men and animals but also on their leader.
HANNIBAL’S LOSS OF AN EYE IN THE MARSHES
In the Arno marshes Hannibal contracted an eye disorder that caused ophthalmia, or inflammation of the eye or eyelid. In four days, before he emerged from the marsh, he lost the sight in one eye. Livy blames the eye problem on temperature fluctuations between heat and cold in the early spring variable weather.24 While it is unknown what the agent of infection might have been, some logical guesses range from an aggressive conjunctivitis caused by detritus in the eye, to bacterial or viral infection from swamp microbes such as bacterial Staphylococcus or waterborne Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Acanthamoeba.25 Medical treatment—for example, irrigating with clean water and an herbal poultice—was impossible given the surrounding swamp water and the length of this debilitating march. (A curious footnote to history is that the Romans seem fascinated with one-eyed enemy generals. Other warrior kings assembled against them were similarly afflicted.)26
Not only did Hannibal lose an eye in the Arno marshes—although some say he lost only partial sight27—but also his war elephants were reduced to the single elephant that he rode personally. According to Cato the Elder as recorded in Pliny,28 this was likely an Asian elephant named Suros (“Syrian”) that may have had one broken tusk.29 One famous phrase that now identified Hannibal to not only his Carthaginians and allies but also to his enemies was “A one-eyed general riding on a huge Gaetulian bust [elephant].”30
Possibly emerging from the marshes east of Faesulae and modern Florence,31 Hannibal’s waterlogged army could stretch out at last on dry ground, camping for a few days to rest and then continuing unmolested in either a southerly or southeasterly direction.32 Although he could still bypass Flaminius at Arretium, Hannibal could raid the rich farmland along the way and replace the dead pack animals and grain, some of which had spoiled with fungal molds in the Arno marsh.
The Celts were thrilled finally to pillage someone else’s territory, as this had been nominally Roman since the late fourth to early third century BCE when Rome had broken the Etruscan and Samnite holds on the region.33 One historian says that by marching into Etruria, Hannibal hoped to exploit Etruscan resentment against Rome, as he had with the Celts, in order to gain Etruscan support against their Roman overlords.34 Hannibal’s Celts now glutted themselves at last on Roman bounty, returning the favor on those Roman legions that had earlier stripped Cis-Alpine Gaul. Hannibal probably did little or nothing to curb the impetuousness of his Celts in their payback to Rome. At the same time, he replenished his supplies and pack animals, especially mules, with the provisions his army needed badly, all the while able to move successfully behind Flaminius’ back.
Hannibal’s swampy trek caused him considerable losses, a seemingly reckless choice of route, given the deaths of Celtic allies and most of his pack animals. The spring of 217 could have been a complete disaster for Hannibal. The element of surprise would work only if Hannibal retained enough of his army and Flaminius had no time to prepare for a showdown against Hannibal. Evidently, Hannibal had much better information and network of informants within the Roman army than Flaminius had of the Punic forces.
Hannibal had to have been doubly relieved. Not only had his army of disciplined veterans survived the Arno ordeal, but also the allied Celts could at last seize the booty he had promised to gain them as allies. Perhaps the best way to judge Hannibal’s costly Arno marsh crossing is to note that he emerged where Flaminius wasn’t looking for him. This part of his plan succeeded. Hannibal had now just turned thirty years of age, no longer young but a man nourished by war since childhood. His greatest battles were yet to come. Even in Livy’s mostly unsympathetic eyes, Hannibal approached the Roman heartland as a heroic yet tragic figure.
Thirteen
* * *
TRASIMENE
Hannibal now capitalized on being where the Roman army expected him least. With renewed supplies and refreshed men, now also laden with whatever goods they had taken from the towns and farms of rich Tuscany and with a careful eye on any Roman troop movements or scouts, Hannibal took ample time and stayed as many miles as possible from Arretium (Arezzo)for as much as several weeks or possibly a month of plunder. If Flaminius had as good intelligence—from Celtic or other Italian spies—he might have been able to catch the Punic army emerging from the swamp and defeat them at their lowest point of exhaustion.1 But he was either completely in the dark or inept with indecision if he actually knew where Hannibal was.
The Roman forces in Arretium knew by now that Hannibal was on the move in Etruria, announced by columns of smoke from burning villages and farms for several weeks, as Polybius records.2 This destruction would be sure to draw the attention of Flaminius, who was known for championing small farmers, and the bulk of his army of conscripted farmers’ sons would have deeply resented Hannibal’s scorched-earth policy.3
Hannibal moved very fast much of the time. Part of his speed of travel was necessary because he could ill afford to fight a larger enemy on its home ground too many times; battle attrition would become desperate with his relatively small army and dependence on Celts. His army had to hope to seize much of its supplies on the fly rather than have too long a train of slow pack animals, easily caught by the Romans.
Hannibal’s decisions in Etruria and his prebattle moves were contingent on the character of Flaminius.4 Whether Hannibal allowed little plundering through the Apennines and his first emerging into the Arno Valley—our sources are silent about it—such a decision would have been sensible because this kind of word spreads fast in relatively well-populated regions such as Etruria and would have revealed his movements en route to the Arno Valley. After the Arno marshes, however, Hannibal seems to have done little to keep his whereabouts secret. His actions may even have been provocative. Perhaps his plan was already laid to trap Flaminius in a place of his choosing. Moving south through the Val di Chiana in central Italy, Hannibal made it appear he was heading toward Rome.5
Surprising Flaminius, Hannibal continued quickly south beyond Arretium to the northern edge of Lake Trasimene and the hills above it. He had formed an audacious plan that would again require the help of nature as well as the impetuous Flaminius. It is vital to understand what Hannibal now knew about Flaminius.
THE CHARACTER AND CAREER OF GAIUS FLAMINIUS NEPOS
Gaius Flaminius Nepos was already a man of contradictions and controversy before Trasimene, an arriviste
with minimal history and a lot to prove, ready to risk everything to advance his career. The Romans call this kind of person with no patrician tradition and no family history in the Senate, a novus homo, “a new man.”6 Like other new men without noble ancestry, Flaminius was seemingly the first in his family to enter the ranks of the cursus honorum,7 or the “course of offices,” as a high elected official, leading ultimately to the Senate. Such advancement was rare at the time but possible, especially after 287 BCE, when the last patrician check on the Plebeian Council was lost, and the plebeians gained political equality.8
But in his case, Flaminius was entirely the beneficiary of the plebeian vote, not patrician backing. He had been a censor9 and a tribune of the plebs and a plebeian consul just a few years before, in 223. His being a novus homo alone would immediately put him at odds with the majority of patricians in the Senate, but his flamboyant disregard for custom and his quarrelsome individuality were the deeper roots of his political problems. He regularly challenged the authority of the Senate, which naturally endeared him to the commoners.
While tribune of the plebs in 232, Flaminius helped pass a popular land reform that distributed recently conquered Etrurian land south of Ariminum to the poor, who had lost much during the war. Naturally, the Senate opposed this, but he did not consult them—a severe breach of custom and the Roman constitution. Flaminius had also greatly angered the patricians in the Senate in 218 by being the sole vote in support of the Lex Claudia law which was intended to stop senators from profiting from commerce abroad. He felt that they were already wealthy enough and believed this practice was a conflict of interest for those who govern. He overstepped his authority by trying to rein in the powerful Senate and was voted down vehemently.
During his censorship of 220 BCE, Flaminius had been responsible for creating and constructing a major trunk road north from Rome, through Umbria, to Ariminum. This was the famous Via Flaminia, one of the oldest Roman roads and duly named after him, crossing the Apennines considerably east of Arretium, a course of 210 miles (329 kilometers). Flaminius was very proud of this success, and to be fair, his leadership had some administrative and financial merit. But this is quite different from good military strategy.
As a patrician himself, Livy was scornful of Flaminius, deeming him unworthy of the office of consul for his multiple infractions. Just like a politician—exactly what Flaminius was—whose acute sensitivity to popular support made him often reactive rather than proactive, Flaminius sought every expedient opportunity, however ultimately foolish, to please his power base among the plebeians rather than appease the Senate. He knew he had no other means of support, unlike his wealthy patrician counterparts, who were landowners or had other commercial bases of power.
But as consul, he went quietly and directly to Arretium as a private citizen would, ignoring all the requirements incumbent on an office-holder before taking such action. This was outrageous to the Senate, and his colleagues promptly recalled him, to be dragged back if necessary. Flaminius ignored the Senate’s messengers. This defiance was unprecedented. Livy says the Senate angrily proclaimed, “ ‘Flaminius’—such was the cry—‘is now at war not only with the Senate, but with the gods.’ ”10
Flaminius had justified to himself that the patricians in the Senate would have delayed him, either to falsify the auspices or tie him up with petty duties that took too much of his time. We don’t know whether the Senate fully understood his character, hastiness, and military inadequacy, but it is possible that they wanted to observe him and gauge his readiness, given the recent military setbacks at Ticino and Trebia. But Livy relates that an animal being sacrificed in the presence of Flaminius—presumably at Arretium—leapt from the altar, escaping before the deed was finished and spattering blood all over the bystanders. This was apparently interpreted universally as “an omen of coming disaster.”11 Livy may have been implying the coming defeat of Rome as a result of Flaminius’ hubris and a divine act. He set up Flaminius against Hannibal: doomed before the battle began.
While not everyone blames Flaminius entirely,12 Livy was not alone in his low opinion of the consul. Here’s what Polybius says about Hannibal’s discovery of Flaminius:
He learned that Flaminius was a thorough mob-courtier and demagogue, with no talent for the practical conduct of war and exceedingly self-confident. Hannibal calculated that if he passed by the Roman army and advanced into the country in his front, the Consul [Flaminius] would on the one hand never look on while he [Hannibal] laid it waste for fear of being jeered at by his soldiery; and on the other hand he would be so grieved he would follow anywhere, in his anxiety to gain the coming victory himself without waiting for the arrival of his colleague [Servilius Geminus]. From all this he concluded that Flaminius would give him plenty of opportunities of attacking him. And all this reasoning on his part was very wise and sound.13
The modern consensus is little different: Flaminius was rash and imprudent, and Hannibal had accurately assessed the man.14
LAYING THE TRAP FOR FLAMINIUS
Ever ready to cite divination as predicting human folly, Livy relates two more omens that spooked Flaminius’ officers as he set out to chase Hannibal with his army. First his horse threw him, and then one of the legionary standards, a metal pole with an eagle and legion ID, was stuck in the ground. No matter how hard the standard-bearer tried, he could not budge it. Livy puts these words in Flaminius’ mouth: “Tell them to dig it out if they are too weak with fright to pull it up.” Flaminius’ lack of humility stands out glaringly in this anecdote. He marched off without first sending his scouts to ascertain the situation. This must have agonized his officers, who knew better. Did Flaminius just rush out without giving his army adequate opportunity to verify where Hannibal was going?
By now it was mid-June. Making sure that Flaminius was following him and could see his movements, Hannibal turned east at the north end of the lake toward Perusia (modern Perugia) instead of south toward Rome. Timing it perfectly, when daylight was finally fading, the last of Hannibal’s army disappeared into the very narrow Borghetto gap between the north end of Lake Trasimene and the steep hills of Cortona. The army of Flaminius had followed Hannibal from a modest distance, arriving at sunset, as Livy noted,15 but the Roman army pulled up short as night began to fall. The soldiers could probably even see Hannibal set up camp at the far end of the lakeside valley. They would camp and pick up Hannibal’s trail the next morning. Looking into the small valley through the Borghetto gap, one can still see at summer dusk—as I did—the last glow of sunset on the hills above even as the little valley is in the dark shadow of the high hills.
But that night, Hannibal shifted his men around to several locations. Under cover of darkness, portions of his army were split up and posted in several of the steep ravines whose streams fed the lake from the north. Had Flaminius’ scouts reported anything, they would have seen only the red glare of the high number of army campfires clustered together in the distance.
The Romans apparently didn’t notice the hidden movements of whole units of thousands of men and horses in the dark, most of them moving upward along the heights of the ravines above the small plain. Hannibal would have demanded stealth and quiet for this maneuver and few if any torches to show the way. Hannibal secreted his Numidian cavalry in the western hills nearest the Borghetto gap. He hid his light infantry of pikemen and Balearic slingers in the hills near modern Tuoro, above the lakeside route. Then just eastward, next to the light infantry, he hid his Celtic allies. Finally, his many units of Africans and Spanish heavy infantry stayed close to his camp in the east of the valley, the only ones who might have been visible the next morning. Polybius states that Hannibal’s army units formed a continuous line under the hills,16 albeit much hidden, so they would be roughly parallel to the lake’s northern shore except at the very end of the lake.
That night, Flaminius’ wary officers must have been telling him not to advance but to wait for Hannibal either to come out or for the a
rmy of the coconsul Servilius to arrive from Ariminum with an array of several legions he commanded, as he would have heard by now of Hannibal’s movements in Etruria. But Flaminius overruled them.
THE BUGLES OF BATTLE, HORNS OF DEATH
When the next morning dawned, nature could not have been more accommodating for Hannibal’s trap. Some ancient poetic sources such as Ovid (a Roman poet of the Augustan Age 43 BCE to 17 CE) say it was the summer solstice, June 21,17 and Hannibal may have already seen in previous days a common local summer phenomenon when a warm air mass over land meets the much cooler air mass over a body of water: fog was thick along the north shore of Lake Trasimene, noticeably hemmed in by the steep hills. Whether or not Hannibal anticipated the early morning fog, he certainly used it to his advantage. Much of his army was invisible in either the foliated hilly ravines or the early-morning fog that hung thick in the valley.
Livy says that Flaminius sent no reconnaissance whatsoever ahead of him. Many have wondered why Flaminius did not send advance scouts into the narrow Tuoro plain before he raced his army through the narrow valley opening.18 Was Flaminius that foolhardy in a makeshift battle plan?
If Hannibal on higher ground saw or heard Flaminius’ vanguard pouring without hesitation into the gap at first light, he then knew his plan would work. He waited until the Roman army advanced in formation all the way to his front line of African and Spanish infantry. Then the war bugles gave the signals with their prepared sounds. The echoing call from all sides across the valley must have bewildered the Romans, surrounded as they were now in soupy fog.
Hannibal Page 12