If the Battle of Zama’s outcome made Rome the undisputed most powerful nation of the world at the time, whose unquestioned supremacy now also was its springboard to dominating the Mediterranean, the year 202 was also a natural conclusion as one of the turning points in ancient world history.1 Carthage did not lose its considerable wealth, in fact, even with the war indemnity and much-diminished navies after 201. Its established trading networks continued to ply goods along the southern Mediterranean coasts between North Africa and the Levant, the eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, where Rome had little footing. The burning of the majority of Carthage’s fleet was certainly beyond symbolic punishment, but there would have been more than a few commercial ships belonging to Carthage that were not in their home port when this punitive conflagration happened. Given how duplicitous Carthage’s leadership could be, this sparing of some ships was likely a deliberate ploy warning just enough sea captains to stay put abroad and not return home during this mandated destruction by a Roman conqueror.
No doubt Rome kept a watchful eye on Carthage after 201. Treating Italians who had fought for Hannibal very harshly—those “traitors” from the Latin allies were beheaded, while Roman deserters were crucified—the Senate in Rome and even Scipio’s foes there allowed Hannibal to survive with Scipio’s approval and likely more than tacit permission, not only because Scipio was still basking in victory but also because he could argue as compellingly for peace as for war.
Hannibal may have at first taken some time to stay out of the public eye of Carthage while repairing to his old family estates at Hadrumetum. Here Hannibal possibly even employed some former soldiers or mercenaries to plant vast swaths of olive trees adjacent to what is now Sousse,2 and the adjacent region around El Djem (ancient Thysdrus) about forty miles to the south later became famous for extensive Roman olive oil production,3 partly because it was close to shipping lanes. If this late source (fourth century CE) for Hannibal’s olive planting is true, he may have tried to prevent similar unemployment woes of soldiery that disturbed Carthage after the First Punic War and led to mercenary troubles.4
What happened to Hannibal during the years after Zama is often difficult to elaborate fully because the volume of press devoted to him thins out considerably. Though he was no longer a visible military foe, Roman spies would still have watched him fairly carefully at home, but this is not always so obvious, since Rome’s historians treated him as less of a threat after 201. A living legend perhaps, but Hannibal was still capable of stirring up more trouble for Rome, especially if he could avoid detection. When he was allowed any added role, Carthage’s leadership was more than apprehensive about Hannibal, particularly if his integrity and incorruptibility seemed to threaten its interests.
For the first few years after Zama, Hannibal’s role in Carthage was a curious one of contradiction. No longer at arm’s length away across the sea, he became instead a familiar figure to his own people at home, necessarily visible in the affairs of state where the people were concerned rather than the oligarchy. While he toed the line with Rome’s economic sanctions and made sure the indemnity was paid as a populist who tried to reform Carthage, beneath the surface Hannibal likely upheld his vow to his father. Like Dido’s invisible wound to her soul smoldering beneath her breast in Virgil’s epic poem the Aeneid,5 an omen of her suicidal pyre, Hannibal’s concealed undying enmity to Rome still fueled enough of his life even if few glimpsed it because he was clever enough to keep it hidden.
There is little question that Hannibal was now a marked man: a larger-than-life personality walking around Carthage with some kind of target on his back. He knew that sooner or later, his luck could run out if he were perceived as Rome’s greatest enemy, however seemingly neutralized in defeat. Hannibal knew that he was now unprotected by an army around him; a Roman assassin or even angry Carthaginians could quickly finish him in broad daylight or in stealth, given his notoriety to both his enemies in Rome and at home.
HANNIBAL THE SUFFETE OF CARTHAGE
Although understanding his motivation after Zama is almost impossible, Hannibal had several methods to transform his persona away from his formidable immediate past as Rome’s greatest living enemy. Did he plan on becoming valuable as a statesman for Carthage and in Rome’s eyes in various capacities as a way to garner some hope of diplomatic immunity? This would certainly be walking a tightrope. The best avenue to do this would not be through the mostly antagonistic Council of Elders but instead to obtain a popular people’s office like that of suffete, a public chief magistrate acting in some way as a judge, a Phoenician and Punic office with arbitration powers.6 Suffete was a related Semitic cognate word to the biblical sho-phet in the book of Judges, recalling the reach and power of a biblical judge.7 The word judge is used for Moses, Samuel, and Samson, among others who led the people of Israel before the monarchy.8 Around the Mediterranean, the idea of the office of suffete was even borrowed into forms of Greek magistracy as in Sparta.9
Well attested in 196, Hannibal took this pathway as suffete elected by the people’s assembly,10 an office that usually lasted only a year11 unless reelected, and it appears that his election by the people of Carthage ran counter to the more aristocratic, merchant- and landowner-dominated Council of Elders, which had long resented popular Barcid leadership since Hamilcar. But an added benefit to being suffete was that Hannibal cultivated the public persona of one who talked sense into Carthaginian politics and on public record of not acting averse to Rome’s interests. As long as he played the part of an honorably vanquished war leader who helped Carthage keep up its indemnity payments, on the visible surface Hannibal could be safer from harm than if he continued to be perceived as a threat to Rome.
It is difficult to assess how much of Hannibal’s new role may have been partly a smokescreen, as some suggest, but it appears that he took the office seriously with industry and integrity. The Romans may have not been completely lulled—not even the pragmatic Scipio—but how much should one beware the lion who no longer roars? As usual from modern military historian Dexter B. Hoyos, one of the clearest analysts of Hannibal on record, Rome was generally ambiguous about this man who was both a fearsome enemy and a resourceful leader to be admired.12 But Scipio, holding Senate offices of censor in 199 and princeps senatus (leader of the Senate) in 198, was the voice of reason before the Senate in trying to keep Carthage stable.
Several recorded events illustrate Hannibal’s new strategy, no longer as military commander seeking Rome’s recognition of Carthage’s ancient territorial claims over sea and trading monopolies but now as a statesman working tirelessly for what remained of Carthaginian sovereignty.
While Hannibal was suffete, he summoned another Carthaginian official—a despotic judge elected for a life term (not a suffete)—who ignored the order to appear before the people’s assembly. Because this judge belonged to the anti-Barcid party and had previously acted cavalierly against the people in financial matters, Hannibal then had him arrested. The official was brought before the popular assembly, not the Council of Elders, which would have exonerated him. Instead, Hannibal denounced him publicly and quickly sponsored a new law in the people’s assembly that made it impossible for anyone to hold the office of judge more than two successive years.13
Rome’s somewhat lenient stance through Scipio in indemnity rather than full conquest, maintaining Carthaginian sovereignty for the time being, was partly because so many Romans among the plebeians wanted peace and trusted Scipio’s judgment.14 They hoped for a resolution that would promise some economic relief and draw down military occupation in North Africa. The heavy indemnity Carthage was made to pay would be better than continuing austerity when they had been living in penury for decades while fresh legions and taxes were levied.
In 196–195 an event drew the final wrath of the anti-Barcid faction. It happened over state embezzlement by powerful oligarchs within the Council of Elders. As suffete, Hannibal kept an eye on financial accounts, including land and sea taxes,
and he noted that some wealthy ruling members of the council were avoiding taxes or had illegal loopholes while also misappropriating public funds entrusted to them, thereby putting the burden of taxation and the Roman indemnity on the people while they personally profited. In the people’s assembly, Hannibal made it publicly known that if the state were repaid, there would be sufficient funds to meet the indemnity to Rome without having to further burden private citizens with higher taxes. Promising justice, Hannibal kept his word and prosecuted several wealthy offenders before the people’s assembly.
Some guilty rulers in the Council of Elders were not only furious that their private pilfering was discovered and that restitution was demanded but also that a Barcid was challenging their oligarchy. They denounced Hannibal in multiple letters to the Roman Senate, claiming he promoted resistance to Rome through secret negotiations with Antiochus III, the Seleucid king who opposed Roman interests. The Council of Elders also accused Hannibal of being in league with Antiochus in plotting war with Rome. Scipio Africanus was evidently among a minority who did not believe the accusations, but eventually others in Rome who were against Scipio triumphed and sent a delegation to Carthage demanding an account of Hannibal and to bring him before the Council of Elders for censure and possibly worse treatment. It is less likely that Carthage’s Council of Elders was seriously afraid he would lead the country back into war and more likely the members were afraid of his power and his leadership. The Roman biographer Cornelius Nepos also maintains that Hannibal expected this Roman delegation would seize him and bring him back to Rome,15 not an unlikely apprehension.
This reprehensible action of Carthage’s rulers against their own countryman—their sole champion for decades—shows how accurate Hannibal’s assessments of his country’s leadership were throughout the war, depriving him of assets when needed in Italy. It may also hint that their support of Hannibal immediately before Zama is also suspect and raises questions of what more Hannibal could have done if he had had Carthage fully on his side throughout the Second Punic War. Carthage may have also expected Hannibal to create more of his own resources through conquest and personal profiteering,16 but such a policy would have been unrealistic and unlike the austere Hannibal.
The Roman Senate’s delegation to Carthage investigating Hannibal included several enemies of Hannibal and perhaps Scipio, especially Gnaeus Servilius Caepio and Marcus Claudius Marcellus, son of the great Roman general Hannibal had killed in an ambush in Italy in 208. Livy makes it clear—possibly sympathetic for once to Hannibal—that “whatever popularity, however, Hannibal gained amongst the people by his action was counterbalanced by the offence given to a large number of the aristocracy.”17 Livy is typically willing to believe, however, that Hannibal was also secretly working against Rome. What is more likely is that now that Hannibal had new resources in Carthage from his suffeteship, he also had renewed intelligence-gathering abilities to gauge what other Mediterranean entities thought about Rome’s growing powerbase beyond Italy. Whether or not Hannibal’s new reach was a web of intrigue is unknowable. But Hannibal certainly understood a relentless Rome would not stop at Zama and would never leave Carthage to itself in North Africa.
This Roman delegation to Carthage in the summer of 195 pretended it was sent there by the Senate to pursue difficulties between the Numidians of Massinissa and Carthage, but Hannibal knew better. With his public official resources as suffete giving him an ear to the ground and full awareness that those who led the delegation were not supporters of Scipio, Hannibal knew his life was in danger in Carthage—both from his own countrymen and from Marcellus, a Roman patrician possibly intent on revenge against his famous father’s ignoble death in ambush. About the only possible truth to any later charges against Hannibal was that he was prepared to flee on a moment’s notice, but this was less the sign of a guilty fugitive than one who knew the cards had long been stacked against him.
HANNIBAL’S FLIGHT FROM CARTHAGE
On a summer day in 195, Hannibal made sure he was seen by day and waited for nightfall. He did not go home as usual but went instead to a Carthage city gate where house servants met him with horses. Leaving Carthage forever, Hannibal rode off into the night and, after changing horses, made it overnight all the way—about a hundred miles—to a seaside estate he owned at the edge of the Gulf of Sidra near modern Chebba on the small headland of Ras Kaboudia. A ship was waiting secretly, ready to cast off, no doubt part of his advance plan. The ship took Hannibal to Cercina Island just offshore from Sfax, where Hannibal was recognized by ships of Phoenician traders and had to improvise a plausible reason for being there. He put out verbal notice that he was on an embassy to Tyre, which was a half truth, since he was indeed heading there for safety. Back in Carthage, his house was searched, but Hannibal was nowhere to be found.
At the Cercina harbor, Hannibal duped the traders and their crews by staging a sacrifice and an elaborate party where everyone else not privy to his escape became drunk with the profuse wine flowing at Hannibal’s expense. Since it was full summer, Hannibal requested from the other sea traders that they loan their sails to cover all the partying crews and captains from the hot sun. Lasting into the night, when the dock was filled with the distraction of noisy celebration and all the others too inebriated to notice, under cover of darkness, Hannibal had the one ship with full sail ready and embarked quietly into the night, sailing straight to Tyre in a matter of a week and leaving any possible pursuit immobilized for lack of ready sails. One historian comments ironically that Hannibal, “Carthage’s greatest son,” finds refuge in Dido’s Phoenician mother city”18 from which legend said she left more than six hundred years earlier.
EXILE IN TYRE
If Cornelius Nepos can be trusted for this detail, the Council of Elders in Carthage likely took added malicious action against Hannibal immediately after his flight to Tyre. Not only was his property confiscated but also his house was razed, and he was declared an outlaw. Carthage possibly sent two ships after him to overtake and seize him.19 Even if Nepos is not entirely factual here, some punitive action would be plausible. Hannibal was wise to vanish from Carthage. It is most likely that he had long been quietly mobilizing the bulk of his private fortune to safety outside of Carthage, possibly even beyond Hadrumetum and partly overseas. Some of this fortune—with whatever possibly remained of Spanish silver Hannibal had retained as his personal war chest and any liquid capital from his family estates in North Africa—must have been put on the ship to Tyre, ready to go at a moment’s notice. As for his family, we have no knowledge of any members escaping with Hannibal.
Hannibal knew that Rome had been deeply concerned about the ongoing problems posed by King Philip V of Macedon. Rome’s alliance with the Aetolian League, the loose confederation of Greek city-states, in 211 had stymied Philip until his final defeat in 197 at the Battle of Cynoscephalae at the hands of Rome under Titus Quinctius Flamininus. Rome was also vigilant and exercised by the ambiguous aims in Syria of Antiochus, who played his own enemies against Rome while not making his own allegiances clear. Antiochus had tried to expand farther into Greece from his territory in Thrace after Philip’s defeat. Closer to home, the old cities of Asia Minor, especially Smyrna in Ionia and Lampsacus in the Troad (the area centered around Troy), had appealed to Rome to protect them. Antiochus diplomatically resisted any Roman intrusion into Asia and in 196 had told surprised Roman envoys that he was consolidating with Ptolemaic Egypt (the Greek kingdom of Alexander the Great’s successors centered at Alexandria) by marrying his daughter to young Ptolemy V—the king of Rosetta Stone fame20—and basically worked to keep Rome guessing while he considered his political and military options.
In contrast to his departure from Carthage, Hannibal was apparently not given a cold reception at Tyre or perceived as an enemy of the state; how much this had to do with Antiochus is unknown.21 What Hannibal did at Tyre is mostly left to guesswork. Phoenician Tyre was the mother city of Carthage, its early colony. The trade wealth of T
yre has long been immortalized in the biblical passage of Ezekiel 27 and abbreviated in verses 9 and 33: “All the ships of the sea and their sailors came alongside to trade for your wares . . . When your merchandise went out on the seas, you satisfied many nations; with your great wealth and your wares you enriched the kings of the earth.”22 No doubt Hannibal wondered if Carthage too was beyond hope and would soon follow Tyre “as prey of the nations” as recorded in the verse of Ezekiel 26:5. Even though now much reduced, Tyre had been so long prominent in the purple dye industry from the murex shell, and its legendary wealth from this and other far-flung trading had caused it to colonize Carthage, that it was famous in poetic memory as well as accepted fact.23 Even though Tyre was under Seleucid dominance as a vassal city of Antiochus, ruler of the Seleucid kingdom around Syria, it still maintained a degree of its legendary trading prominence; part of this trade was directed to its daughter city Carthage and another part oriented to its Levantine supply routes.24
It seems mostly ignored that this long-standing trade between Tyre and Carthage would have been squarely within Hannibal’s focus during his magistracy as suffete while trying to maintain Carthage’s economic health, so while the Council of Elders impugned him at Rome for stirring up trouble with Antiochus, some negotiation could have been necessary for Hannibal. While in Tyre, Hannibal would likely have planned to visit Antiochus as soon as possible, but after a short visit to meet the king’s son in Syria, he finally left Tyre and formally met with Antiochus in Ephesus, the famous city on the Aegean coast of what is now Turkey near Selçuk, in the fall of 195.
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