The earliest writers on this subject generally refrained from accusing Hood of ill intent in corresponding with Richmond. Thomas Hay (1929) made no comment whatsoever about any impropriety in what Hood wrote to Braxton Bragg and Jefferson Davis while serving under Johnston. Rather, Hay wrote of Hood’s replacement of Johnston:
It was a desperate remedy for a desperate military and political situation, and Hood, by the logic of his appointment to command of the army in place of J. E. Johnston, was the one called upon to lead in this forlorn hope. That he came so near to success is a tribute to his indomitable faith and courage, and to the real ability displayed in a campaign that on several occasions put him within reach of victory.1
There is evidence that strongly suggests that when Hood was sent west to join the Army of Tennessee, he was instructed to keep the Confederate high command informed of the situation in Georgia. Hood began his first letter to Davis on March 7, 1864, “I have delayed writing to you so as to allow myself time to see the condition of the army.” One month later, Hood began a letter to Texas Senator Louis T. Wigfall by saying, “Your letter of March 29 has just been received. And I hasten to answer your direct questions …” Unless Davis had explicitly instructed Hood to write, why would the general feel compelled to explain his delay? Similarly, should Hood have refused to respond to Senator Wigfall’s “direct” questions?
It is also interesting to note that in the several substantive letters Hood sent to various Richmond officials, nobody advised him to copy his correspondence to Johnston or counseled the young general of the impropriety of such correspondence. However, the matter was treated in a different manner just a little more than one decade after Hay saw no reason to mention any indecorum in Hood’s correspondence. “In thus communicating directly with Davis and Bragg about the proper strategy for the army,” wrote Stanley Horn in his 1941 The Army of Tennessee: A Military History, “Hood seems to have behaved in a fashion that borders close on insubordination.” Horn’s conclusion ignores clear evidence that Hood was directed to keep the government informed of the situation in Georgia, and by implication suggests that Hood should have disobeyed orders or ignored direct requests for information from Confederate government officials.2
Historian Thomas Connelly made a persuasive argument that Hood had been instructed by Confederate authorities to keep them informed of Johnston’s plans, yet went on to describe Hood’s correspondence with Richmond authorities and Robert E. Lee as “improper.” Connelly also challenged Hood’s truthfulness, claiming that “the correspondence created false impressions in Richmond,” and that “at best, Hood was a chronic liar.” “He had misrepresented the condition of Johnston’s force,” Connelly wrote, and “lied about Johnston’s unwillingness to fight.” While unabashedly calling Hood a liar, Connelly ignored clear evidence of what is now widely accepted as Johnston’s timidity, and offered no proof that Hood knowingly provided Richmond with false or incorrect information. With no evidence to support his allegation, Connelly went on to claim that Hood wanted command of the army. In sending a memo to Bragg in July, concluded Connelly, “Apparently Hood was making his last bid for army generalship.”3
Modern authors picked up the theme that had been absent in books for the first several decades after the war. In his 1992 Decision in the West, Albert Castel, without substantiation, boldly proclaimed that Hood’s memo to Bragg was “nothing more nor less than a bid for command of the Army of Tennessee.” According to Castel, Hood and Bragg were “collaborating for the purpose of assuring Johnston’s dismissal and Hood’s assignment as his successor.”4
Wiley Sword condemned Hood in The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, labeling him a disloyal subordinate who not only misled Johnston but who wrote “poison pen” letters to Richmond within a few weeks of arriving in Georgia. Sword argued that, throughout the campaign, “Hood continued to convey to Davis and Bragg much self-serving propaganda,” and that “Hood’s deception should have been obvious from the beginning.” Sword renewed his criticisms of Hood in a subsequent book Courage Under Fire: “Like a highly placed watchdog, Hood surreptitiously kept up a correspondence with the Davis administration, repeatedly discrediting Joe Johnston in deceitful commentaries about decisions and maneuvers during the Atlanta Campaign.”5
Webb Garrison, Jr. wrote in his 2001 book Strange Battles of the Civil War that Hood, audaciously taking advantage of his war wounds, “exploited his reputation and appearance to gain command of one of the great armies of the Confederacy—the Army of Tennessee.” Garrison provided no primary source for these accusations that Hood engaged in such devious conduct.6
In his 2002 book Look Away, respected historian William C. “Jack” Davis declared that Hood had “shamelessly politicked” to gain command of the Army of Tennessee. In the introduction to his 2005 book on the battles of Spring Hill and Franklin, Eric Jacobson cited only the “effective” arguments of other writers to assert that letters penned by Hood “further damned Johnston,” and that “Hood had been positioning for the job” of commander of the Army of Tennessee.7
In each of these cases, these and other authors failed to provide the full verbatim text of Hood’s letters they deemed so damning and despicable. For example, Connelly described Hood’s April 13, 1864, letter to Bragg as “by far the most damaging letter during the spring,” yet the full text reveals rather unremarkable tone and wording. Furthermore, this letter refers to other correspondence between Johnston’s senior corps commander William Hardee and Bragg, and Robert E. Lee and Hood—neither of which drew criticism from Connelly. Hood’s “most damaging” letter to Bragg reads as follows (italics added):
My dear General,
I received your letters and am sorry to inform you that I have done all in my power to induce Genl. Johnston to accept the proposition you made to move forward. He will not consent as he desires troops to be sent here and it left to him as to what use should be made of them. I regret this exceedingly as my heart was fixed upon our going to the front and regaining Tenn. and Ky. I have also had a long talk with Genl. Hardee and whilst he finds many difficulties in the way of our advancing he is at the same time ready and willing to do anything that is thought best for our general good. He has written a long letter to the President which will explain his views.
When we are to be in a better condition to drive the enemy from our Country I am not able to comprehend. To regain Tenn. would be of more value to us than a half dozen victories in Virginia. I received a letter from Genl. R. E. Lee on yesterday and he says “you can assist me by giving me some troops or driving the enemy in your front to the Ohio River. If the latter is to be done it should be executed at once.” I still hope we shall yet go forward. Tis for the President and yourself to decide. I well know you have to grapple with many difficulties as the President has done since the beginning of this war. He has directed us thus far and in him I have unbounded confidence. Should we from the many impediments in the way fail to move forward from this position we must not allow ourselves to be deceived as to where the enemy will make his main effort. So soon as that is discovered we should concentrate and beat them decidedly. Since McPherson’s Corps has moved up from the lower Mississippi to join the Army of the Potomac or that of the Cumberland would it not be well for Genl. Polk’s troops to unite with this army? As we should then be in a condition to reinforce Genl. Lee in case it should be necessary.
Please present my kindest regards to the President.
Yours truly,
J.B. Hood8
Hood mentioned both correspondence between Hardee and Davis, and a letter from Robert E. Lee. If correspondence between disparate senior military commanders was as inappropriate (or rare) as some observers have asserted, then Lee would be among a plethora of offenders. And yet, no Army of Tennessee historian has ever condemned Lee for corresponding directly with Hood—Johnston’s junior corps commander—regarding major army movements and troop deployment issues.
Another way of judging Hood’s correspondence with
Confederate government officials is to consider whether such conduct was considered inappropriate by 19th century standards. Civil War records are full of correspondence between and among officers who communicated directly with their commanders’ superiors. Of the aforementioned authors, only Thomas Connelly elaborated on the fact that other Johnston subordinates also corresponded with Johnston’s superiors.9 Although Hood did indeed criticize Johnston’s persistent retreating during the Dalton-to-Atlanta campaign, he was hardly alone. In addition to the correspondence between Hardee and Davis mentioned in Hood’s April 13, 1864, letter to Bragg, on June 22, 1864, Hardee wrote to Davis: “If the present system continues we may find ourselves at Atlanta before a serious battle is fought.” Another of Johnston’s subordinates, division commander (and later corps commander) Gen. Alexander P. (A. P.) Stewart wrote to Bragg on March 19, 1864: “Are we to hold still, remaining on the defensive in this position until … [Sherman] comes down with his combined armies to drive us out?” Johnston’s senior cavalry commander, Gen. Joseph Wheeler, wrote to Bragg on July 1, 1864: “I have begged General Johnston to allow me to go to the enemy’s rear every day for the last three months,” but Johnston consistently refused. “Here I am with one third rations of corn for horses, with my men building and defending rifle pits.” Wheeler added to Richmond’s growing anxiety by informing Bragg, “I think it very possible this army may fall back a short distance further. The cavalry leader had also written to Bragg on February 14, March 3, March 7, April 16, June 4, and June 5.10
Civil War records are replete with examples of commanders who corresponded with superiors outside of the chain of command. Although too numerous to chronicle, these examples include Hood’s own subordinates. Their letters—critical and otherwise—are not judged as improper, nor are these officers labeled (nor necessarily should they be) disloyal to their commander. On September 14, Gen. Samuel French, one of Hood’s division commanders, sent a letter to Davis (purportedly on behalf of several disgruntled generals) implicitly seeking Hood’s removal as army commander:
Mr. President: Several officers have asked me to write you in regard to a feeling of depression more or less apparent in parts of this army, and I have declined doing so, but for your own satisfaction it might be well that you send one or two intelligent officers here to visit the different divisions and brigades to ascertain of that spirit of confidence so necessary for success has or has not been impaired within the past month or two. They might further inquire into the cause if they find in this army any want of enthusiasm. I am sure you will pardon my writing to you thus when I tell you it is dictated by the purest of motives and in the spirit of friendship.11
After the Tennessee Campaign ended in December 1864, Hood’s corps commander Stephen D. Lee wrote to Hood’s immediate superior, Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard to discuss “recent events in Tennessee.” On January 2, 1865, Hood’s cavalry commander during the Tennessee Campaign, Nathan Bedford Forrest, wrote to his department commander, Gen. Richard Taylor, seeking intervention by the Confederate high command. Historian Wiley Sword and others mentioned both of these letters, but neither Lee nor Forrest are criticized for their correspondence.12
Letters of complaint and criticism between subordinate commanders and Richmond authorities were not uncommon during the war. Unfortunately, John Bell Hood seems to be among the very few subalterns ever accused of deceitfully undermining his superior by communicating with others.
Civil War historian Len Riedel once described the political infighting of the Army of Tennessee as a “viper’s pit.” He was surely correct. When Hood took command of the army on July 17, 1864, squabbling, jealousy, and inexperience permeated the officer corps. W. W. Mackall, Joseph Johnston’s close friend and the Army of Tennessee’s chief of staff, departed soon after Johnston’s removal —and took with him many of the army’s important records. Johnston’s former chief of artillery, Francis Shoup, replaced Mackall, with Col. Robert Beckham ascending to Shoup’s position as the army’s chief artillerist.13 The only experienced high level senior commander in the army was Willliam Hardee, who so resented the younger Hood’s appointment to army command that he requested a transfer (which Davis initially denied, but would later grant after the fall of Atlanta).
Another of Hood’s three corps commanders, A. P. Stewart, had served in the position only three weeks prior to Hood’s promotion to army command. Stewart, who was brought in from outside the Army of Tennessee, commanded Leonidas Polk’s former corps, and his promotion was not without controversy. General William W. Loring commanded Polk’s corps for three weeks after Polk’s death that June, and was “deeply chagrined” when he was passed over for permanent command in favor of the younger Stewart. In fact, 34 of Stewart’s officers, including nine generals, had petitioned for Loring’s permanent promotion to corps command.
Many other officers joined Hood, Shoup, and Beckham as neophytes with regard to their new responsibilities. Carter Stevenson was the senior division commander in Hood’s former corps, but he was passed over for promotion to temporary corps command in favor of Frank Cheatham, whose own feelings for Hood were likely influenced by his friendship with Hardee and admiration for Johnston. Permanent command of Hood’s former corps was assigned to Stephen D. Lee, who was then serving in Mississippi. Lee, whose wartime experience had been primarily as an artillery and cavalry commander, came to the Army of Tennessee as the youngest lieutenant general in the Confederate army.
Outnumbered by Sherman almost two-to-one, Hood—new to army command himself—had orders to defend Atlanta with three corps of infantry commanded at various times by generals (Stewart, Cheatham, and Lee) new to their positions, and another officer (Hardee) openly resentful of Hood. In addition to Hood’s new chief of staff and new chief of artillery, many division and brigade commanders were strangers to their new responsibilities, including division commands for Gens. John C. Brown, Edward Walthall, Henry Clayton, George Maney, and James Patton Anderson (the latter of whom was transferred to Georgia from Florida).
In a letter to Hood after the war, Major B. W. Frobel wrote that “the world will never know the full extent of the difficulties” Hood endured during the campaigns in Georgia and Tennessee, “with a skeleton of an army, dispirited and broken down, filled with politicians in military garb, who were striving solely for their own advancement.” Another of Hood’s former subordinates, Leopold Perot of French’s division, wrote to Hood after the war, attributing the lack of his success to “the disobedience and jealousy of many of your subalterns.”14
“It seems likely, therefore,” concluded historian Richard McMurry, “that the entire army was pockmarked by pools of resentment” after John Bell Hood took command, and that throughout the long war the Army of Tennessee’s generals “had shown themselves unable—often unwilling—to follow instructions.”15
One of the most persistent Civil War falsehoods is the purported wholesale approval within the Army of Tennessee of Joseph E. Johnston’s handling of the campaign from Dalton in north Georgia down to the outskirts of Atlanta. Scholars who had advocated this were undoubtedly influenced by Hood’s eventual failure to save Atlanta, coupled with his later crushing defeat in Tennessee. Although Johnston seems to have been universally liked as a person, a close examination of letters and diaries written during his Dalton-to-Atlanta tenure reveal varying opinions of his military strategy. In fact, large numbers of officers and soldiers did not approve of his habitual retreating. After reviewing hundreds of journals, diaries, and letters of soldiers who served in the Army of Tennessee, historian Larry Daniel concluded, “those who claim that Johnston’s retreats did not affect morale do so in the face of significant evidence to the contrary.”16
A good barometer of the morale in any army is its rate of desertion. According to a 1970 study conducted by Richard McMurry, Federal records revealed that during the months of May and June of 1864—during the course of Johnston’s command tenure of the Army of Tennessee—an average of 142.5 deserters per week mad
e their way into Federal lines. In July, General Sherman received a slightly higher number of deserters, but it is impossible to know how many left before and after Hood replaced Johnston as commander on July 17. However, that August, the only full month of Hood’s command at Atlanta, desertions averaged 141 per week—essentially the same as when Johnston commanded the army. It should be remembered that this was after the bloody battles of Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, and Ezra Church. Desertion, McMurry concluded, “seems to have been about equally serious under both commanders.”17
Yankee diarists seemed to view Rebel desertions as quite common while Johnston was in command. In mid-June, an Ohio officer recorded the desertion of an entire Southern company; on July 12, an Indiana officer wrote, “I never saw the like of deserters come in they came in squads they say there is lots of their Army would desert if they had a good Chance.” According to a Federal general’s writing from early July, many deserters were being taken after each Rebel withdrawal. Contrary to common belief, argued McMurry, “Federal comments concerning desertion during Hood’s command … seem to be less frequent than their remarks about enemy desertion under Johnston.”18
Johnston’s persistent withdrawals clearly disappointed many Confederates. Private William Adams of the 30th Georgia wrote to his sister, “Well, it looks like we are gone up the spout… . I am worse out of hart than ever.” Private Robert Patrick of the 4th Louisiana, who had earlier written that Johnston was a better general than even Robert E. Lee, recorded in his diary on July 3: “Another fall back. I must acknowledge that it begins to look a little squally for our side.” Two days later, on July 5, Private Adams offered this damning assessment of what was transpiring in North Georgia: “It has been nothing but a run from Dalton down and there must be a stop somewhere, or we had just as well not have an army in front of Sherman.” Adams’s chagrin continued the next day. “It’s a devilish gloomy looking time for us for certain, and I feel despondent,” he complained. “One more retreat and the fate of Atlanta is irrevocably pronounced. ‘It is now or never.’” On July 10, the Louisianan expressed his utter frustration with Johnston, writing, “We can’t run much further, or we will soon be down to the Gulf of Mexico.”19
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