Wiley Sword also made no mention of Beauregard’s efforts with regard to Smith, sharing with his readers only that Hood’s movement to Nashville was intended to provide “positive publicity and salve for Hood’s injured ego.”37
Notwithstanding the flurry of desperate attempts to obtain reinforcements or to persuade Smith to make a diversionary movement into Missouri, it must be again noted that neither Beauregard nor anybody in the Richmond high command suggested that Hood withdraw from Nashville.
While awaiting a reply from the uncooperative Smith, and in acknowledgment of Richmond’s suggestion that his compliance should not be counted upon, Hood and Beauregard sought reinforcements from other possible sources. On December 6, Hood wired Secretary of War James Seddon, “I respectfully recommend that MajorGeneral Breckinridge, with his forces, either be ordered into Kentucky or to join this army.” On the same day, Hood informed Beauregard that the railroad from Pulaski to Nashville was in good condition and, in an effort not to further deplete his army, requested the railroad from Corinth to Decatur be guarded by troops “other than from this army,” suggesting reserve troops from Alabama and Mississippi for that purpose.38
Hood accelerated his efforts to obtain reinforcements. He wired Beauregard on December 7 asking for additional men and any other soldiers from the Army of Tennessee (not at Nashville) to be sent forward “as soon as possible.” Two days later he requested that Beauregard transfer Gen. Joseph H. Lewis’s mounted infantry brigade to Nashville. On December 10, Hood turned to Richard Taylor, appealing for reinforcements from his department, and specifically suggested that garrisons from Huntsville and Corinth be sent to Nashville.39
The next day, December 11, Hood sent a dispatch to Secretary Seddon mentioning, among other things, the subject of conscription. This exchange has been completely mischaracterized by Wiley Sword, who claimed that Hood was angry because only 164 recruits had voluntarily joined the invading Southern army. “Hood reacted angrily and resolved ‘to bring into the army [by conscription] all men liable to military duty.’ If recruits wouldn’t voluntarily flock to his standards,” Sword wrote, “he intended to bring them in at the point of the bayonet.” Sword supported this vitriol by citing a dispatch to Seddon in which Hood wrote only a single sentence on the subject of conscription: “As yet I have not had time to adopt a general plan of conscription, but hope soon to do so, and to bring into the Army all men liable to military duty.” Elsewhere in the letter, Hood discussed only routine issues such as railroad repairs and enemy troop strength. Nowhere in the letter is there the slightest hint of anger, nor is there any comment about intending to bring in draftees “at the point of the bayonet.” Contrary to Sword’s baseless and dramatized depiction, Hood was simply looking to gather conscripts—a common and routine practice by Confederate authorities throughout the South.40
On December 13, Hood asked Beauregard to return Gen. Alpheus Baker’s Alabama brigade, which had been previously sent to Mobile. Describing the hardships under which his troops were suffering, Hood also requested supplies—specifically clothing and blankets—and again asked Beauregard to assist in the repair of the railroad to Decatur, which Richard Taylor had still not done after almost two months.41 In an attempt to reinforce and replenish the officer corps, which had been decimated at Franklin, Hood wired the provost office in Corinth, Mississippi, on December 15 asking that officers from the military courts be immediately sent to Nashville.42
Hood’s unrelenting appeals for assistance proved fruitless. Seven days after the battle of Nashville, during the long hard retreat to Mississippi, Hood received this message from Beauregard dated December 23: “I regret to inform you that no re-enforcements can possibly be sent you from any quarter. General Taylor has no troops to spare, and every available man in Georgia and South Carolina is required to oppose Sherman, who is not on a raid, but an important campaign,” explained Beauregard. “Should you be unable to gain any material advantage in Tennessee with your present means you must retire at once behind the Tennessee River, and come with or send to Augusta, by best and quickest routes, all forces not absolutely required to hold defensive line referred to.”43
Many modern-day scholars accuse Hood of concealing the army’s depleted condition from Richmond, both after Franklin and even after the retreat from Nashville. These accusations directly conflict with the written historical evidence.
Thomas Connelly wrote that Hood’s correspondence with his superiors during the campaign “indicated his clouded thinking—if not his dishonesty,” while Wiley Sword—ignoring Hood’s prompt and accurate reporting of the loss of 12 generals, 4,500 troops, and 50 cannon, and of the army’s later withdrawal from Tennessee—informed his readers that Hood’s messages to Richmond “had been without admission of defeat; indeed, they had minimized the army’s losses.”44
Stanley Horn wrote that on January 3, 1865, Beauregard, then in Macon, Georgia, received a telegram from Hood “that must go down in history as a masterpiece of misleading understatement.” Horn used only a portion of Hood’s telegram, as follows: “The army has recrossed the Tennessee River without material loss since the battle of Franklin.” According to Horn, Hood told Beauregard “nothing of the shocking losses at Franklin; nothing of the disaster at Nashville.” This is completely erroneous. In reality, Hood wired Beauregard within 48 hours of Franklin, lamenting “the loss of many gallant officers and brave men,” and listed the names of the dozen generals killed, wounded, or captured. An army does not suffer the loss of so many generals without also suffering heavy casualties. While attending to the wounded and burying the dead the day after the battle, Hood issued a circular in an attempt to better ascertain his losses on November 30—which was no easy task given the size of the battle and the numbers of troops involved. On December 11, with his army on the hills south of Nashville, Hood sent a more detailed dispatch to both Secretary of War Seddon and Beauregard describing the actions at Spring Hill and Franklin and informing them of the loss of 4,500 men. On December 17, the day after the fighting ended at Nashville during the retreat to Mississippi, Hood informed Beauregard that his army had been defeated at Nashville and lost 50 cannon and several ordnance wagons.45
Like Horn, Sword also attempted to convince his readers that Hood intentionally deceived his superiors. “Beauregard, now at Macon, Georgia read what seemed to be a long-delayed dispatch from Hood about the Nashville battle,” explained Sword. “Immediately Beauregard telegraphed the contents to Richmond, noting Hood’s claim in an accompanying dispatch dated January 3 that his army had safely recrossed the Tennessee River ‘without material loss since the battle of Franklin.”’46
Both authors’ statements are factually incorrect. It is difficult to imagine how Sword’s assertion could be unintentional—unless he simply copied Horn and did not bother to research the source himself. Here is what the heretofore cited January 3, 1865, dispatch from Hood to Beauregard says in its entirety:
The army has recrossed the Tennessee River without material loss since the battle in front of Nashville [emphasis added]. It will be assembled in a few days in the vicinity of Tupelo, to be supplied with shoes and clothing, and to obtain forage for the animals.
The difference between what Hood wrote, and what Horn and Sword claimed he wrote, is not only obvious, but compelling and critical to the entire narrative that Hood was lying to or misleading his superiors. The word “Franklin” does not appears anywhere in the telegram. The only thing false or misleading is how Horn and Sword presented it to their readers.
It is also important to revisit Hood’s December 17 dispatch to Beauregard and Seddon announcing the army’s defeat at Nashville, in which Hood revealed, “We lost in the two days engagements fifty pieces of artillery, with several ordnance wagons.” Hood’s later message on January 3 (“The army has recrossed the Tennessee River without material loss since the battle in front of Nashville”) accurately informed Beauregard that the army had successfully crossed the Tennessee River without losing
more material (artillery and wagons) since what was lost at Nashville—just as he reported in his December 17 telegram. Although highly unlikely, it is possible that Horn was not aware of Hood’s informative December 17 dispatch. However, Sword was certainly aware of it because he referred to its contents on pages 425 and 436 (endnote 11) and 428 (endnote 22) of The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah. Furthermore, Sword cites the Official Records (OR 45, pt. 2, 757) that has Hood’s January 3, 1865, dispatch in the very same chapter in which he accuses Hood of misleading authorities. It is difficult to explain how Sword could not have known that Hood had accurately informed his superiors of his losses at Nashville.47
Another matter to consider is whether Horn intentionally substituted “Franklin” for “Nashville” to make Hood look like a liar, or perhaps misread the Official Records. We will likely never know. But if Sword’s oversight was unintentional, the only logical way it could have come about is if he copied Horn’s quote word-for-word and didn’t bother to check it against the readily available Official Records or think about what was written elsewhere. If so, this demonstrates yet again how some historians duplicate the work of others (especially the melodramatic) without thinking critically for themselves and researching to verify what they are writing. Tragically, this is how falsehoods and exaggerations become cemented in the public mind and popular history as “truth.”48
In addition to accurately revealing the condition of the army via correspondence, on multiple occasions Hood asked Beauregard to personally visit the army. On December 7, Hood requested that Beauregard visit the army at Nashville. After the defeat on December 16 and during the retreat south, Hood asked Beauregard on December 25 to meet the army in Bainbridge or Tuscumbia. On the same day, he sent a member of his staff, Col. J. P. Johnson, to Richmond to personally explain the Tennessee Campaign to Confederate officials. On January 3, while in Corinth, Hood again asked to meet with Beauregard, and finally on January 10 and also on January 11, while in Tupelo, Hood requested that Beauregard visit the army to discuss “important matters.” If Hood was attempting to deceive his superiors or conceal the condition of the army, he would not have followed the course just outlined.49
Beauregard finally arrived in Tupelo on January 13 to meet with Hood, after having left the young commander to his own devices for nearly two months since leaving the Army of Tennessee in Tuscumbia on November 16.50
Hood’s move to Nashville was rational given the circumstances he faced, the possibility of reinforcements or a diversion to weaken Thomas’s army was in play, and when he was driven back in defeat he kept his superiors informed of his situation. Once again, the historical record contradicts many of the leading writers who have asserted otherwise.
1 Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard, 303.
2 Stone, “Repelling Hood’s Invasion of Tennessee,” Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 454; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 299-300; Thomas Van Horne, History of the Army of the Cumberland, 2 vols. (Cincinnati, OH: Robert Clarke and Company, 1875), vol. 2, 223.
3 Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard, 611-613.
4 Dowdey and Manarin, The Wartime Papers of Robert E. Lee, 938.
5 National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, Civil War Sites Advisory Commission on Civil War Battlefields, Battle Summaries, 1997.
6 John Bell Hood letter to Sarah Dorsey, March 30, 1867, John Bell Hood Personal Papers; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 300.
7 Telegram book II and IIa, John Bell Hood Personal Papers.
8 OR 45, pt. 2, 672, 696.
9 Virgil Murphey Diary.
10 G. W. Garrett letter, Confederate Veteran (October 1910), vol. 18, 470; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 300.
11 Hay, Hood’s Tennessee Campaign, 131-132, 136.
12 Ibid., 149.
13 Disapproval of Johnston’s retreating tactics is detailed in Chapter 3 of this book.
14 Napoleon’s Maxims of War (New York: C. A. Alvord, Printer, 1861), 19.
15 Grant, Personal Memoirs, vol. 1, 503, and vol. 2, 380, 382, 384.
16 Hay, Hood’s Tennessee Campaign, 140; Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard, 303.
17 Davis, Look Away!, 321; Hay, Hood’s Tennessee Campaign, 142.
18 Walter T. Durham quoted in “Preserving Nashville’s Past” by Nicole Young, The Nashville Tennessean, January 8, 2012; McNeilly, “With Hood Before Nashville,” Confederate Veteran (June 1918), vol. 26, 253.
19 Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 507; Horn, The Decisive Battle of Nashville, 41; Jacobson, For Cause and For County, 447.
20 OR 45, pt. 2, 666.
21 Ibid.; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 300-303.
22 Ibid.
23 OR 45, pt. 1, 755; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 302-303. The Army of Tennessee’s chief engineer during the Tennessee Campaign was Col. Stephen W. Presstman (often misspelled “Pressman” and “Prestman”). A native of Maryland, Presstman enrolled at West Point in 1846 as a sixteen-year-old and did not graduate, although he achieved high academic scores. Presstman enlisted in the Confederate army in May 1861, and organized a company of infantry in Fairfax County, Virginia, called the O’Connell Guards, comprised mainly of Irish railroad workers. He also served in the 17th Virginia Infantry (Army of Northern Virginia) before transferring to the Army of Tennessee.
24 OR 49, pt. 1, 966-967.
25 S. D. Lee letter to John Bell Hood, April 25, 1879, John Bell Hood Personal Papers.
26 Hay, Hood’s Tennessee Campaign, 141, 168; Horn, Decisive Battle of Nashville, 148.
27 Watkins, Company Aytch, 208; Cunningham, Reminiscences of the 41st Tennessee, 107; OR 45, pt. 1, 46.
28 Ibid., 1,249.
29 Horn, The Army of Tennessee, 406.
30 OR 45, pt. 2, 636, 639-640.
31 Ibid., 665.
32 Ibid., 764.
33 Ibid., 765-766.
34 Hay, Hood’s Tennessee Campaign, 140.
35 Hood, Advance and Retreat, 357-358.
36 Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 506-507.
37 Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 280.
38 OR 45, pt. 2, 653.
39 Ibid., 669, 700.
40 Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 315; OR 45, pt. 1, 658.
41 OR 45, pt. 2, 685.
42 Ibid., 690.
43 Ibid., 726.
44 Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 507; Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 428.
45 Horn, The Army of Tennessee, 421-422; OR 45, pt. 2, 643-644, 699; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 355-358.
46 Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 428.
47 OR 45, pt. 2, 757, 699; Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 428.
48 Both Horn and Sword cited OR 45, pt. 2, 768, which is a January 7, 1865, dispatch from Beauregard to Samuel Cooper. That wire states that Hood reported from Corinth, Mississippi, on January 3, 1865, and that the army had recrossed the Tennessee River “without material loss since [the] battle of Franklin*.” The compilers of the Official Records put an asterisk after the word “Franklin” and added this at the bottom of the page: “ See dispatch as sent by Hood, p. 757.” On page 757 is Hood’s correctly written January 3 dispatch to Beauregard and James Seddon stating, “The army has recrossed the Tennessee River, without material loss since the battle in front of Nashville.” The compilers then added this at the bottom of the page: “* See dispatch as was repeated by Beauregard, p. 768.” It is apparent that the compilers of the Official Records realized the transcription mistake made by someone on Beauregard’s staff and felt obligated to reprint both the erroneous and correct reports—and inserted conspicuous asterisks after the words “Franklin” and “Nashville” to guide readers to both entries. Although it is unknown whether Horn saw and exploited the transcription mistake made by Beauregard’s staff, it is difficult to see how Sword could not have known about the correct page 757 entry since he refers to another entry on page 757 elsewhere in his book.
49 OR 45, pt. 2, 731, 778.
50 Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard, 332.
Chapter 12
“People tend to forget that the word ‘history’ contains the word ‘story.’”
— Ken Burns
The Army of Tennessee: Destroyed in Tennessee?
Those versed in Civil War history and literature are well aware of the difficulty of accurately calculating casualties. Contemporary reports are often nonexistent or incomplete, especially on the Confederate side during the last year of the war. Federal and Confederate definitions of “wounded” differed, and prisoners were often exchanged, meaning their loss in most cases was only temporary. Missing soldiers were often killed, their bodies never recovered, while others were taken prisoner. Many wounded troops eventually died of their injuries or were unable to remain in the service. Armies were also depleted by desertions that, whatever the cause, were losses nonetheless.
Contrary to a common conclusion drawn in much of Civil War literature, the Confederate Army of Tennessee was not “destroyed” during the campaign. The Official Records and Jefferson Davis’s memoirs offer the clearest picture of what actually transpired. Before the Tennessee invasion, on November 6, 1864, the Army of Tennessee’s total effective strength stood at 32,859 troops. After the defeat at Nashville and subsequent retreat, the army numbered 18,730 effective infantry and artillery, and 2,306 cavalry, for an effective troop strength of 21,036.1
John Bell Hood: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General Page 29