To encourage them, he told them about a man he had shot Mann, Sarona, 124 (Hebrew).
the hit squad lay in wait for Wagner Sauer, The Story of the Temple Society, 260. Interview with Eitan, January 24, 2013.
“It had an immediate effect” In time, as part of the reparations agreement between West Germany and Israel arising from the Holocaust and World War II, the State of Israel agreed to compensate the Templers for the property they had abandoned in Palestine. Mann, The Kirya in Tel-Aviv: 1948–1955, 29–30 (Hebrew).
Haganah units began assassinating Arabs For example, after four Jews were killed and seven wounded in a Tel Aviv café on August 10, 1947, a five-man Haganah squad set out to kill the man identified as the commander of that action. They did not find him at home, but they killed five passersby who tried to run away. Yahav, His Blood Be on His Own Head, 91 (Hebrew).
“personal terror operations” Yahav, His Blood Be on His Own Head, 97 (Hebrew).
Yitzhak Shamir, now in command of Lehi Yahav, His Blood Be on His Own Head, 25 (Hebrew). Banai, Anonymous Soldiers, 243. Frank, Deed, 20–21 (Hebrew).
Walter Edward Guinness Ben-Tor, Lehi Lexicon, 198–200. Yalin-Mor, Lohamey Herut Israel, 210–21 (Hebrew).
Shamir ordered Moyne killed Interview with Shamir, January 1997. Michael J. Cohen, “The Moyne Assassination, November 1944: A Political Assessment,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 15, no. 3 (1979), 358–73.
“a new group of gangsters” Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, 1930–1945, 134–48 (Hebrew). Wasserstein, The Assassination of Lord Moyne, 72–83.
bombed the British embassy in Rome Arnaldo Cortesi, “Rome Hunts Clues in Embassy Blast,” New York Times, November 1, 1946.
Lehi mailed letter bombs “Stern Group,” s.111z: Alex Kellar to Trafford Smith, Colonial Office (August 16, 1946). James Robertson to Leonard Burt, Special Branch (August 26, 1946), NA KV5/30.
British intelligence sources warned of a wave of attacks “Appreciations of the Security Problems Arising from Jewish Terrorism, Jewish Illegal Immigration, and Arab Activities,” August 28, 1946, UK NA KV3/41. Interview with Paul Kedar, June 15, 2011. “Activities of the Stern Group,” James Robertson to Trafford Smith, Colonial Office, February 5, 1946, UK NA FO 371/52584. Walton, Empire of Secrets, 78–80.
“Only these actions, these executions” Interview with Shomron, May 26, 2011.
CHAPTER 2: A SECRET WORLD IS BORN
ambushed two Israeli buses Davar, December 1, 1947. Interview with Gelber, May 16, 2011.
Civil war between Palestinian Arabs and Jews had begun Gelber, Independence Versus Nakbah, 119 (Hebrew).
a force of five hundred guerrillas The number five hundred was taken from Kai Bird, The Good Spy, 87.
its high command launched Operation Starling Danin, Tzioni in Every Condition, 222–25 (Hebrew).
poison Tel Aviv’s water supply The poison that was to be used in Operation Atlas was arsenious oxide, and its aim, according to the participants who were interrogated violently by British intelligence, was “to inflict maximum damage” on the common enemies of the Palestinians and the Nazis—Jews, British, and Americans (UK NA KV2/455).
tried to locate the former and kill him The account of the assassination attempts on the mufti was taken from Yahav, His Blood Be on His Own Head, 94 (Hebrew). Gelber, Growing a Fleur-de-Lis, 653.
the first Haganah operation to integrate human and electronic intelligence Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services, 18. Harel, Security and Democracy, 94 (Hebrew).
Salameh survived multiple assassination attempts Salameh was wounded by a mortar shell in the May 31, 1948, battle for Rosh HaAyin, the springs northeast of Tel Aviv that supply the city’s drinking water. He died two days later. The Mufti Haj Amin al Husseini survived all the hits against him and died a natural death in Beirut in 1974. Gelber, Israeli-Jordanian Dialogue, 1948–1953: Cooperation, Conspiracy, or Collusion? 119 (Hebrew).
“We focused on the Arab arms acquirers” Interview with Avraham Dar, April 18, 2012.
The Arab Platoon was established Dror, The “Arabist” of Palmach, 56–58 (Hebrew).
Cooperation between the two units produced an attempt on the life HHA, Testimony of Yoseph Tabenkin, 199.6.
In February 1948, they ambushed al-Khatib HHA 100.100.61. Eldar, Flotilla 13: The Story of Israel’s Naval Commando, 107–108 (Hebrew). Yahav, His Blood Be on His Own Head, 95 (Hebrew).
killing the five Palestinians working on it Not all of the Arab Platoon’s actions succeeded. Some of its members were caught and executed. One such failure was an attempt to use them to carry out a massacre in Gaza by poisoning the water supply. This was done in response to the invasion by the Arab states after the declaration of independence. The two men sent on the mission were caught and killed. HHA 187.80.
“the Arab states have decided finally to launch a simultaneous attack” Political Department of the Agency to Zaslani, May 12, 1948, Central Zionist Archive, S259390.
seven armies attacked The regular armies of six Arab states invaded Israel: Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, along with the Palestine Liberation Army, all acting in conjunction with the internal Palestinian units operating from inside the country.
They far outnumbered and were infinitely better equipped Later research into the War of Independence, some written by a group known as the New or Post-Zionist historians, because of their innovative approach to the Israel-Arab conflict (which many of the “Old Historians” considered wrong), has concluded that from the start there was parity between the Jewish and Arab forces, and that in some of the battlefields the Jews even enjoyed an advantage because of the internal divisions, quarrels, and inferior planning of the Arab side. Morris, Righteous Victims, 209 (Hebrew).
“This will be a war of great destruction and slaughter” The interview with Azzam, which was first published in an Egyptian newspaper in October 1947, has been cited multiple times since then and became the subject of a sharp argument over what he actually meant. Morris, Righteous Victims, 208. Tom Segev, “The Makings of History: The Blind Misleading the Blind,” Haaretz, October 21, 2011.
Though Israel had repelled superior armies Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956, 3 (Hebrew).
They vowed to destroy Israel Golani, Hetz Shachor, 13 (Hebrew).
Ben-Gurion did not need to be persuaded An important intelligence success before the establishment of the state was the outcome of the huge intelligence effort Ben-Gurion ordered to sway the opinions of the members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which was appointed in May 1947 to recommend to the General Assembly what should be done with Palestine, to be in favor of an independent Jewish state. Ronen Bergman, “A State Is Born in Palestine,” New York Times Magazine, October 7, 2011. Interview with Elad Ben Dror, November 12, 2003. Elad Ben Dror, “The Success of the Zionist Strategy Vis-à-vis UNSCOP,” Ph.D. dissertation, Bar-Ilan University.
That day, he ordered the establishment of three agencies The Bureau of the Minister of Defense to the heads of the defense establishment and the intelligence community, Organization of Intelligence Services, February 15, 1959, Ministry of Defense and IDF Archives, 870.22. Ben-Gurion Diary, vol. B. 494, 590. Shiloh, One Man’s Mossad, 120–21 (Hebrew).
Abandoned Templer homes in the Sarona neighborhood Sauer, The Holy Land Called: The Story of the Temple Society, 208.
nothing in those first months and years was so tidy Interview with Isser Harel, March 1999. Siman Tov, “The Beginning of the Intelligence Community in Israel,” Iyunim, vol. 23.
The first challenge that Ben-Gurion’s spies faced The Irgun leader, Menachem Begin, was an extremist in his opinions, but he acted firmly to prevent the outbreak of a civil war, and despite his anger at the sinking of the Altalena and his differences with Ben-Gurion, he ordered his men to accept the authority
of the state and to integrate into the IDF.
Lehi issued several public warnings Sheleg, Desert’s Wind: The Story of Yehoshua Cohen, 88–95 (Hebrew).
Three young men wearing peaked caps jumped out United Nations Department of Public Information, Press Release PAL/298, September 18, 1948, “General Lundstrom Gives Eyewitness Account of Bernadotte’s Death.”
The whole attack was over in seconds Regev, Prince of Jerusalem, 13–17 (Hebrew).
The perpetrators were never caught In the late 1950s, Ben-Gurion resigned and took up residence in Kibbutz Sdeh Boker in the Negev, in a move aimed at encouraging young people to settle in the desert. Yehoshua Cohen also moved there with his family, inspired by the same pioneering spirit. In time he became a close friend and companion to Ben-Gurion, and served as his bodyguard. On one of their walks together, Cohen admitted to Ben-Gurion that it was he who had fired the shots that killed Bernadotte and that he was the person who Ben-Gurion’s spies had been searching for to no avail. Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 316–17 (Hebrew). Regev, Prince of Jerusalem, 100.
The Security Council condemned it as “a cowardly act” “The U.N. Must Act,” New York Times, September 19, 1948.
Ben-Gurion saw Lehi’s rogue operation as a serious challenge Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion, 317.
Lehi ceased to exist as an organization Interviews with Amnon Dror, January 1997, and Menahem Navot, April 6, 2017. Navot, One Man’s Mossad, 24–25 (Hebrew).
for his vigorous action against the underground Harel saw the secessionist organizations as extreme rightists or extreme leftists, and he hated both. “Even back when I was a child [he was born in Russia] I saw manifestations of violence, and arbitrary brutality and the cruel visions of the Bolshevik revolution were deeply etched into my mind. These visions aroused in me a profound and uncompromising dislike.” Harel, Security and Democracy, 78. Interview with Harel, April 6, 2001.
conducted political espionage against Ben-Gurion’s political opponents Harel would later claim this was surveillance of elements that he suspected of forming a new underground or other subversive acts, but he was actually using the Shin Bet as a political espionage agency on Ben-Gurion’s behalf. The agency was keeping tabs on Ben-Gurion’s rivals and critics, even if it was clear that they were not engaged in anything illegal. The agency even set up an ostensibly commercial pro-Ben-Gurion magazine with Shin Bet funds. Called Rimon, it competed with the racy news magazine Haolam Hazeh, which attacked Ben-Gurion. Interviews with Harel, April 6, 2001, Uri Avnery, July 19, 2013, and Arie Hadar, July 8, 2011. Ronen Bergman, “The Shin Bet Secrets,” Yedioth Ahronoth, March 23, 2007.
Those diplomatic overtures obviously were not effective Israel State Archive 3771/70. Sutton and Shushan, People of Secret and Hide, 144–46 (Hebrew). Erlich, The Lebanon Tangle 1918–1958, 262–65 (Hebrew). Interviews with Moshe Sasson, May 1996, Reuven Erlich, December 9, 1999, and Rafi Sutton, May 9, 2012.
“Sharett was vehemently opposed to the idea” Interview with Arthur Ben-Natan, September 13, 2010.
Israeli intelligence services coalesced into the three-pronged community The quarreling over the allocation of authority, resources, and territory between the services has never ended. Every decade or so, prime ministers have set up a secret panel to reformulate a “Magna Carta” for the intelligence community delineating these matters. Those original three agencies would be later joined by four others: LAKAM (acronym for the Bureau of Scientific Relations), in the Defense Ministry, engaged in technological and nuclear espionage; the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, which supervised the country’s nuclear program; the Scientific Administration, which controls, inter alia, the Biological Institute in Ness Ziona, where biological weapons and countermeasures are developed; and Nativ, which was responsible for undercover contacts with Soviet Jewry.
It was also a personal victory for Isser Harel Harel enforced iron discipline in the Mossad as well as a strict adherence to secrecy. He ordered each of the Mossad operatives to adopt a pseudonym and to give code names to each unit, operation, and agent. These code names and pseudonyms had to be used at all times, even in internal correspondence and in internal discussions. This practice has been preserved to this day.
Ben-Gurion kept all of the agencies under his direct control Under the “Residual 32 Section” of “Israel’s Basic Law: Government” (in the absence of a constitution, Israel’s Basic Laws are the country’s highest level of legislation, and the most difficult to amend), it says that the government may do “all it considers necessary” in order to carry out its duties. In effect, this vague phrasing gave the prime ministers of Israel the authority to order secret operations and assassinations with almost no oversight by Israel’s democratic institutions or the press. In the wake of a series of exposés of illegal acts by Shin Bet personnel in the mid-1980s, and the consequent dismissal of the agency’s top echelon, the new leadership requested the enactment of a law that would explicitly define what was permitted and what was not. Such a law was passed by the Knesset in 2002. Since then the Mossad has deliberated about the formulation of a similar law for itself, but these deliberations have always run into a fundamental contradiction: Unlike the Shin Bet, which operates inside Israel and the territories it controls, almost everything the Mossad does constitutes a breach, sometimes flagrant, of the laws of other countries. This type of activity is very difficult if not impossible to circumscribe within the framework of legislation, not to mention that it would be public and constitute a written parliamentary confirmation that the State of Israel allows grave violations of the sovereignty of foreign countries. In May 2017, Mossad director Yossi Cohen decided to put an end to the protracted deliberations and ruled that a Mossad law would not be enacted. Interviews with Dagan, May 26, 2013, “Iftach,” March 2017, “Advantage,” July 2017, “Sasha,” June 2015, and “Serenity,” September 2017.
In Israeli law, there is no death penalty With the exception of Nazi war criminals and their abettors (applied only once, in the case of Adolf Eichmann) and the theoretical power that courts-martial have, which was exercised a few times against terrorists, only to be annulled by the Supreme Court.
Duvall’s real name was Shlomo Cohen-Abarbanel Interviews with Yuval Cohen-Abarbanel, July 1997, and Haim Cohen, July 1997. Ronen Bergman, “Under the Layers of Paint,” Haaretz, August 29, 1997.
To this end, AMAN set up a unit called Intelligence Service 13 This was not the only special operations unit given this number—the marine commandos were called Shayetet (Flotilla) 13. The air force also planned to set up a Tayeset (Squadron) 13, with the mission of transporting Israeli personnel to their targets. The number appeared elsewhere as well—the official date of the Mossad’s founding is December 13, 1949.
“no dog, no rabies” Interviews with Dar, January 5, 2015, and Arie Krishak, March 12, 2007.
“aiming to undermine Western confidence…by causing public insecurity” Unit 131, Mordechai Ben Tzur to head of AMAN, “Events in Egypt, July–September 1954,” October 5, 1954, MODA 4.768.2005.
AMAN’s recruits were amateurish and sloppy Avraham Dar to AMAN director, “Report on Conversation with Defense Minister 29.12.54,” January 10, 1954; and in the years that followed: Dar to AMAN Director and commander of Unit 131, “The Reasons for Leaving Unit 131,” September 30, 1955; Dar to Mossad Director Meir Amit, August 29, 1967; Dar to Prime Minister Eshkol, “Prisoners in Egypt,” September 27, 1967 (author’s archive, received from Dar).
“ ‘We don’t kill Jews,’ he said” Interview with Eitan, September 19, 2011.
Harel himself said, “It never occurred to me” Interview with Harel, March 1999.
The plan unfolded perfectly at first Interviews with Harel, April 6, 2001, Imanuel Talmor, May 1, 2013, and “Victor,” September 2013.
Harel’s people fed the Israeli press false information The son born to Yisraeli’s wife a few months later grew up thinking his father
had abandoned him and his country. Only fifty years later did he learn the truth, from the writer of this book. In my home, in May 2006, the man, Moshe Tsipper, met with Raphi Medan, one of the Mossad men who participated in the abduction. Tsipper sued the state and demanded that he be recognized as a war orphan—his father was on active service when the incident occurred—and that he be shown the relevant documentation. After a years-long process, the Mossad agreed to compensate him financially, but not to reveal the documents. Interviews with Raphi Medan and Moshe Tsipper, May 2, 2006, and Eitan, February 19, 2006. Tel Aviv District Court (in camera), Tsipper v. Ministry of Defense, December 11, 2013. Ronen Bergman, “Throw Away,” Yedioth Ahronoth, May 26, 2006.
were invited to Harel’s home in north Tel Aviv and sworn in Interviews with “Patriot,” August 2011, Harel, April 6, 2001, Shomron, May 26, 2011, and Shamir, January 1997. Shamir, As a Solid Rock, 122–24 (Hebrew). Shlomo Nakdimon, “Yitzhak Shamir: Top Secret,” Yedioth Ahronoth, April 25, 2000.
CHAPTER 3: THE BUREAU FOR ARRANGING MEETINGS WITH GOD
Some of those infiltrators were refugees Morris, Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956, 3–5, 28–68 (Hebrew).
A young captain in Egyptian military intelligence, Mustafa Hafez Argaman, It Was Top Secret, 18 (Hebrew).
altogether some one thousand civilians between 1951 and 1955 Gilbert, The Routledge Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 58. The Jewish Agency for Israel website, Fedayeen Raids 1951–56, https://web.archive.org/web/20090623224146/http:/www.jafi.org.il/education/100/maps/fed.html.
“one of the three Ps—praise, payment or pussy” Interview with Rehavia Vardi, August 19, 1997.
in ten to fifteen of those cases The numbers cited for agents and killings that Unit 504 was involved in at that time are estimates based on interviews. Unit 504 burned most of its records in the 1980s. Interviews with Sutton, May 9, 2012, Yaakov Nimrodi, December 14, 2010, and “Sheldon,” February 1999.
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