Others admired Haddad’s professionalism as well The Mitrokhin Archive, K-24, 365, Churchill College, Cambridge University. Ronen Bergman, “The KGB’s Middle East Files: Palestinians in the Service of Mother Russia,” Yedioth Ahronoth, November 4, 2016. Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive II, 244. Interview with Christopher Andrew, February 21, 2016.
Haddad was independent and resolute Interview with Issaki, September 2, 2015. Mossad, Operation Heartburn, 7.
The PLO had excellent ties Ravid, Window to the Backyard, 49.
Haddad was on especially good terms The link between Haddad and Baader Meinhof was forged by his deputy, Taysir Kubeh, who was in charge of the organization’s secret foreign relations, via Palestinian faculty and students in Germany. Interview with Issaki, September 2, 2015.
Three of the PFLP’s own men Some other Palestinian and German personnel were dispatched to Nairobi to aid with the logistics. The operational order written by Haddad is to be found in Mossad, Report on Operation Heartburn, 68–80.
In the two months before the operation Ibid., 73.
An argument broke out inside the agency Ibid., 30.
There were also operational considerations Interview with Eliezer Tsafrir, October 2, 2015.
“The principle had not changed” Interview with Issaki, September 2, 2015.
enlisted the help of Kenya’s security forces The Mossad had a rich and very positive history of cooperation with the Kenyan security services. Ronen Bergman, “Israel and Africa,” 112–16.
seventeen Israelis flew out Mossad, Report on Operation Heartburn, 30–31.
“There was great anxiety” Interview with Tsafrir, October 2, 2015.
A combined Mossad-Kenyan team Mossad, Report on Operation Heartburn, 36–37.
El Al Flight LY512 Tsafrir, one of the Mossad operatives sent to Nairobi, faced a unique dilemma: He had learned that his niece, Gilat Yarden, was taking this flight. “I didn’t know whether to warn her not to take the flight or to let her take it without warning her,” he told me. “On the one hand absolute secrecy was particularly important. Any leak of information was liable to scare the terrorists off. I was quite sure we would stop them before they could fire the missile. On the other hand—this was my sister’s daughter, and in an operation like this anything could happen. What if we couldn’t find the terrorists? What’s more important, loyalty to the Mossad or to my family?” In the end, Tsafrir decided that the Mossad came first and he let Gilat board the plane, taking responsibility for her life. Interview with Tsafrir, October 2, 2015.
the Kenyans had been completely cooperative Interview with Tsafrir, July 14, 2015, Mossad, Report on Operation Heartburn, 59.
reconsidering the wisdom of bringing the prisoners to Israeli land Interviews with “Eleanor,” September 2014, “Mark,” March 2011, and “Ringo,” July 2013. Mossad, Report on Operation Heartburn, 59–60.
the proposal to dump the perpetrators into the sea As soon as he left the room, Barak summoned a consultation on the subject with senior Justice Ministry officials, headed by State Attorney Gabriel Bach, who was also “shocked to the depths of his soul” when he heard Zeevi’s suggestion. Interviews with Dorit Beinish, September 28, 2014, and “Ringo,” July 2013.
“we decided to play ghost games with them” Interview with Hadar, May 14, 2017.
The senior 504 interrogator, Y. Interview with “Mark,” March 2011.
“Y. didn’t kill him” Interview with Yigal Simon, July 29, 2012.
“The lady [Schulz] made a remarkable impression” Interview with Gazit, July 19, 2017.
“I was pleased” Interview with Hadar, May 14, 2017. Schulz also left a strong impression on John le Carré (David Cornwell), for whom his friend AMAN chief Gazit arranged a visit to the secret detention installation that was nicknamed at the time Villa Brigitta after the German terrorist. The female Mossad staffer who translated the interrogations for Hadar was introduced to le Carré under a false name and title—“prison director Capt. Kaufman.” Le Carré, The Pigeon Tunnel, 109–15 (Hebrew).
entered the room and handed Rabin a note Protocol of cabinet meeting, June 27, 1976 (author’s archive, received from “Paul”). The note handed by Poran is in the author’s archive (received from Avner Avraham). Interview with Amos Eiran, February 11, 2009.
There were four hijackers IDF, History Department, Operation Thunder Ball, November 1977, MODA, 107.79.18, 3–11.
Amin, an ex-boxer and a sergeant in the British Army Ronen Bergman, “Israel and Africa,” 121–39.
Haddad believed that Israel would have no alternative Interviews with Avner Avraham, October 14, 2015, Akiva Lakser, April 1, 2016, and Ido Netanyahu, June 29, 2016. Netanyahu (ed.), Sayeret Matkal at Antebbe, 25–28 (Hebrew).
demanded the release of fifty-three “freedom fighters” Report by Shin Bet director Avraham Ahituv, meeting of Security Cabinet, June 30, 1976 (author’s archive, given by “Paul”).
“They want the five? With pleasure” Interviews with Tsafrir, October 2, 2015.
Rabin listened to the plan, growing angrier by the minute Eventually, it emerged from a recon patrol conducted by the naval commandos along the shore of Lake Victoria that the plan was not feasible because the lake was teeming with crocodiles. Halevy, Reicher, and Reisman, eds., Operation Yonatan in First Person, 38–39 (Hebrew). Interview with Eiran, February 11, 2009.
“with blood on their hands” Interview with Eiran, July 2013. Ronen Bergman, “Gilad Shalit and the Rising Price of an Israeli Life,” New York Times Magazine, November 9, 2011.
“take a military correspondent and lock him up and grill him” Rabin was speaking at an emergency meeting of heads of the defense establishment that he had called on the afternoon of June 30. Chief of staff Mordechai Gur agreed with Rabin that the journalist should be grilled by the Shin Bet. “I think this has to be done, and agree with it one hundred percent. It’s not too late to do it today.” But no such interrogation took place, after Attorney General Barak told Rabin that it would be illegal and forbade it. “Meeting Between Prime Minister and Minister of Defense with Heads of the Defense Establishment,” June 30, 1976 (author’s archive, received from “Paul”).
David rented a plane in Kenya While speaking to them, he was able to take photographs of the control tower from the ground and even to get the information that the air force needed so badly—the diameter of the fueling nozzles at the airport. Interviews with Harari, March 10, 2014, Klein, October 6, 2014, and Avi Weiss Livne, September 12, 2016. Copies of the pictures that “David” took of the Entebbe Airport are in the author’s archive (received from “Ethan”).
the prime minister gave the green light for the raid “Protocol of Cabinet Meetings on July 3, 1976, and July 4, 1976” (author’s archive, received from “Paul”). Interview with Peres, August 4, 2015.
The first Hercules landed as planned Interviews with Yiftach Reicher, November 25, 2013, and Weiss Livne, May 16, 2016. Ronen Bergman, “Operation Entebbe as Told by the Commandos: Planning the Mission,” Yedioth Ahronoth, June 27, 2016. Halevy, Reicher, and Reisman, eds., Operation Yonatan in First Person, 19–32 (Hebrew).
The element of surprise was almost lost Ronen Bergman and Lior Ben Ami, “Back from Africa,” Yedioth Ahronoth, June 17, 2016.
The sound of the rifle brought other Ugandan troops Interviews with Reicher Atir, November 25, 2013, Weiss Livne, May 16, 2016, Amir Ofer, April 1, 2016, Giora Zussman, May 2016, Dani Arditi, June 13, 2011, Omer Bar-Lev, November 15, 2012, Pinchas Buchris, May 2016, Rami Sherman, July 6, 2016, Shlomi Reisman, July 6, 2016, Shaul Mofaz, June 14, 2011, and Betser, June 10, 2016.
the man who’d ordered the hijacking Interviews with “Greco,” March 2015, and “Jacob,” August 2015.
CHAPTER 13: DEATH IN THE TOOTHPASTE
“It was very strange for us” Interview with Yitzh
ak Hofi, Begin Center, January 11, 2002.
Begin gave the military and intelligence agencies carte blanche Interview with Admoni, May 29, 2011.
wanted the Mossad to launch a large-scale targeted killing campaign Begin annulled the decisions by preceding prime ministers (Eshkol signed the order on December 31, 1968, and Meir and Rabin ratified it) to place the hunt for Nazi criminals lower on the Mossad’s order of priorities, and with his vigorous backing, the Cabinet’s security committee resolved on July 23, 1977, “to order the Mossad to resume the search for Nazi war criminals, in particular Josef Mengele. If there is no way of bringing them to justice, to kill them.” From that point on, the Mossad did act with the intent of finding and eliminating Mengele, but these efforts were to no avail. Caesarea did locate Klaus Barbie, “the Butcher of Lyon,” commander of the Gestapo in that city who was responsible for sending thousands of Jews to death camps, in Bolivia. Caesarea director Harari traveled to La Paz to supervise the preparations for the assassination, but in the end he decided to cancel it due to uncertainties about the escape route. In retrospect, he thought that he had been overly cautious: “I think that more should have been done [against the Nazis]. As long as a single Nazi was still breathing in any corner of the world, we should have helped him to stop breathing. Today, when I know the territory where these Nazis were living, Central and South America, and how easy it would have been for us to turn the world upside down there, I think what idiots we were.” Instead of killing him, Israel conveyed the information it had collected about Barbie to France, which extradited him and put him on trial in 1983. In 1987 he was sentenced to life, and he died of cancer in prison in 1991. Interviews with Medan, June 30, 2015, Harari, March 10, 2011, Klein, May 28, 2014, and Yossi Chen, September 11, 2017. Mossad, Caesarea, Revav, commander of Messer, to Mike Harari, April 11, 1978. Mossad, History Department, Looking for the Needle in the Haystack, 2007, 117–220 (author’s archive, received from “Midburn”). Ronen Bergman, “Why Did Israel Let Mengele Go?” New York Times, September 6, 2017. Interview with Hofi, Begin Center, January 11, 2002. Klein, Master of Operations, 236–39.
“Unlike other Israelis” Interview with Nakdimon, February 18, 2015.
diplomatic recognition for the PLO Merari and Elad, International Dimension of Palestinian Terrorism, 130–31 (Hebrew).
Arafat appeared before the UN General Assembly United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-Ninth Session, Official Records, A/PV.2282.
A December 1974 paper prepared by AMAN Intelligence Branch, Research Division, Special Report 12/906, December 25, 1974 (author’s archive, received from “the Biologist”).
“Arafat was the complete opposite” Interview with Amos Gilad, July 31, 2012.
a sharp debate between the Mossad and AMAN Interview with Pressler, July 6, 2017.
“After Arafat’s speech at the UN” Interview with Issaki, September 2, 2015.
Arafat’s name was removed from the kill list Mossad, Operation Heartburn, 105–8.
Sadness switched Haddad’s toothpaste Interviews with Dagan, July 20, 2013, “Bertie,” June 2009, “Eldy,” August 2016, and “Ethan,” June 2015.
Haddad began feeling sick In Aaron Klein’s book Striking Back, a slightly different account appears, according to which the poison was concealed in Belgian chocolate, which Haddad particularly liked, and was given to him by one of his men who was a Mossad agent. Klein, Striking Back, 179–81.
He was first diagnosed A report on the patient “Ahmed,” written by Dr. O. Prokop, Humboldt University, April 21, 1978 (author’s archive, received from Gunther Latsch).
Arafat instructed an aide to approach the Stasi The internal correspondence of East German intelligence about the Palestinians is not devoid of blatantly racist references to the Palestinians, who are called “camel fuckers” in these memos. Stasi provided training and weapons to the Palestinian organizations and together with the KGB urged it to act against Israeli and American targets while also making sure that they would not operate within the Communist Bloc. Information courtesy of journalist Gunther Latsch. Ronen Bergman, “KGB’s Middle East Files,” Yedioth Ahronoth, November 4, 2016.
Wadie Haddad died in great agony “Maj. Gen. Dr. Fister to the ‘Great Minister’ [identity undisclosed, probably Erich Mielke] with the Following Documents on 22.4.78: A Report on the Patient ‘Ahmed,’ Written by Dr. Prokop 21.4.78; Institute of Forensic Medicine at the Humboldt University, Corpse of Ahmed Doukli, 20.4.1978; An Expert Medical Report, number 258/78, by Dr. Geserick, Designated for the Military District and State Attorney, on the Corpse of Doukli, Ahmed. 29.3.78” (author’s archive, received from Gunther Latsch).
“I was very happy when I heard Haddad was dead” I read to Issaki the German doctors’ reports on the horrendous suffering that Haddad went through before dying. He smiled: “These stories of suffering have an effect of their own. They spread out and reach the ears of other terrorists, get into their minds, cause them awe and terror, disrupt their judgment, change their behavior, make them make mistakes.” Interview with Issaki, September 2, 2015.
“When they killed Bouchiki, I was in Europe” Bird, Good Spy, 152.
This interview was distributed to the heads of the intelligence community Interview with “Black,” September 2016.
“Killing Salameh was first and foremost” Interview with Ravid, January 17, 2013.
insisted that Salameh remained a threat Interview with “Ethan,” June 2015.
said that his CIA counterparts had hinted In The Good Spy, Kai Bird describes a similar scene in which the issue of the relations between Salameh and American intelligence was discussed by Alan Wolfe of the CIA and the Mossad in the summer of 1978. Bird, Good Spy, 207–208. Interview with “Legend,” May 2011.
“This man has Jewish blood on his hands” Interview with Issaki, September 2, 2015.
The PLO was officially considered a terrorist organization Memorandum of Conversation: Kissinger, Helms, Saunders, July 23, 1973, and attachment Ames to Helms, July 18, 1973. NA, RN, NSC Files Box 1027.
Ames did all he could to persuade Salameh Bird, Good Spy, 145.
The only point over which Ames saw fit to admonish Salameh Ibid., 126.
Through the Ames-Salameh middleman Ibid., 151.
he organized the visit and arranged meetings Interview with “Jacob,” August 2015.
A deep friendship had formed between Ames and Salameh Bird, Good Spy, 176–78.
The Israelis looked on and ground their teeth Interviews with Harari, March 10, 2014, Klein, October 6, 2014, and Issaki, September 2, 2015.
The CIA escort, Charles Waverly, recalled the visit Bird, Good Spy, 181–83.
Ames and his CIA colleague were not impressed Ibid., 179–80.
The CIA even supplied Salameh with encrypted communications equipment Ibid., 208.
there was only one way this relationship could be interpreted Interview with “Jacob,” August 2015.
“cutting this channel was very important” Interview with “Legend,” May 2011.
“a blue-and-white job” Interview with Harari, March 10, 2014.
Al-Hajj used his network of sources Interview with Amin al-Hajj (in the presence of his former Mossad Case Officer, “Kobi”), August 14, 2014. Ronen Bergman, “Waltz with Amin,” Yedioth Ahronoth, November 14, 2014.
Harari was pleased Interview with Harari, March 29, 2014.
“The idea in encounters like these” Interview with “Black,” June 2015.
Another alternative, placing an explosive device in Salameh’s locker Interviews with Harari, March 29, 2014, Klein, May 28, 2014, and “Tuna,” August 2015.
Rinah’s real name was Erika Chambers Dietl, Die Agentin des Mossad, 85–96, 112, 147.
Rinah and two men were selected for the assassination In addition to practicing the actual killing, the three
also trained to evacuate by sea. It was assumed the Beirut airport would be closed, or at least under tightened security, after a car-bombing downtown. David Shiek, then a young officer and later deputy commander of Flotilla 13, drilled them in coping with emergency situations in which they might be required to swim or to use weapons in the course of evacuation to the sea. Interview with David Shiek, April 11, 2013.
a team from Sayeret Matkal crossed the border Interview with “Lychee,” November 2011.
He could not allow himself another failure Interview with Harari, March 23, 2014.
The operative muttered through his teeth, “Die, motherfucker!” Interview with “Black,” September 2016.
Abu Daoud…ran up and tried to help Bird, Good Spy, 215–16.
Rinah and the two other operatives waited on a beach Interview with Shiek, April 11, 2013.
“At your age, I lost my father” Bird, Good Spy, 217.
CHAPTER 14: A PACK OF WILD DOGS
left the meeting feeling very worried Interviews with Gilad, August 4, 2015, and Gadi Zohar, January 2, 2013.
Gilad wanted to strike first Interviews with Gilad, July 31, 2012, and Galant, August 19, 2011.
the police managed to stop the bus IDF General Staff, History Department, Terror Attack on the Coastal Road, December 1, 1983 (author’s archive, received from “Paul”).
most were burned alive In some later media reports it has been claimed that Israeli panic and misunderstanding of the situation caused excessive shooting that caused most of the deaths, whereas the aim of the attackers was to conduct negotiations for the release of prisoners. Even if this claim is correct, everyone agrees that Abu Jihad ordered his men to kill the hostages if the negotiations didn’t succeed. Uvda, Channel 2, May 26, 2013, “The Terrorist Who Carried Out the Attack on the Bloodbath Bus: I Apologize and I Regret It,” October 31, 2011.
Israeli soldiers also committed a few acts of killing prisoners Most of these cases never reached the courts, including grave actions carried out on March 15 and April 16, among them the murder of “a terrorist, aged about 13.” “Treatment of Prisoners,” Y. Einstein, head of the IDF inspection in the State Comptrollers Office, to the Chief of the General Staff, November 9, 1978 (author’s archive, received from “Bell”).
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