operational and intelligence cooperation…deepened considerably On a visit to Paris on July 5, 2001, Sharon tried to get President Jacques Chirac to change his mind about targeted killings. He had Shin Bet deputy director Diskin describe an operation that had taken place three days before, when an Israeli Air Force helicopter fired four missiles that killed three Hamas operatives, including Muhammad Bisharat, who had been involved in a number of terrorist attacks. He reviewed Bisharat’s history of involvement in suicide terrorism and detailed the requests to the Palestinian Authority to arrest him, without response. Chirac was silent for a moment. Then he cleared his throat and said, “I have to say that at a distance of four thousand kilometers, things look totally different.” From that day, France moderated its criticism toward Israel on this point, though it did not cease entirely. Not long after that, Sharon asked Diskin to accompany him on a visit to the Kremlin to give Vladimir Putin the same talk. Diskin began speaking, but Putin cut him short after three sentences: “I really do not care. From my point of view, you can kill them all,” he said. Then he turned to Sharon and said, “Come, let’s go and eat and drink something.” The attitude toward Israel of French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who replaced Chirac, was much more positive than his predecessor’s, and tolerant of the use of targeted killing. Interviews with Diskin, June 1, 2017, and Nicolas Sarkozy, November 7, 2012.
“In one swoop, the complaints against us ceased” Interview with Eiland, June 5, 2011. The American approach toward targeted killings has changed from one end to the other. When I asked former secretary of homeland security Michael Chertoff what he thinks of targeted killings he replied: “I think they are much better than nontargeted killings.” Interview with Michael Chertoff, May 27, 2017.
to give the Americans all of the files for “Blue Troll” Israeli intelligence’s surveillance of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah led, among other places, to Sudan, which was ruled in the 1990s by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, a British-educated, well-mannered, extremist Islamist cleric. Khartoum had become a willing host for many terrorist organizations and a friend to the states that aided them, such as Iran. In October 1993, Imad Mughniyeh went to Khartoum to meet with two of the most prominent leaders who had found asylum there. One was Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who had been involved in the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. The other was Osama bin Laden, who had harnessed his construction concern to the Islamist holy war. On July 7, 1995, a terrorist squad tried to kill Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, an ally of Israel, by attacking his motorcade between Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, and the city’s airport. Mubarak made a miraculous escape. Thanks to its activities in Sudan, Israel was able to discover that Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden had sent in the hit team. Israeli intelligence was the first to recognize the menace of what is known today as the “global jihad,” and a special desk was set up in the Mossad to handle the phenomenon. The Mossad planned a complex assassination operation against bin Laden, and Rabin signed a Red Page for him. Bin Laden’s secretary was recruited, there was cooperation with the intelligence service of the moderate Sunni Muslim state whence the secretary hailed, and later on there was even surveillance of bin Laden and some preliminary intelligence gathering. But before the final step, which called for the secretary to poison him, the aforementioned Muslim state froze relations with Israel because of the deadlock in the peace process with the Palestinians, and the operation could go no further. Interviews with “Joseph,” January 2015, Ehud Olmert, August 2011, Dan Meridor, August 30, 2006, Nathan Adams, August 21, 1996, and Farkash, March 14, 2011. Bergman, Secret War with Iran, 217–23.
“The attacks on 9/11 gave our own war absolute international legitimacy” Danny Ayalon, the Israeli ambassador to Washington at the time, recalls one of the first meetings after 9/11, when he accompanied some senior Israeli Air Force officers to a meeting with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz: “Rumsfeld began by saying, ‘We need your help. We want to know how you convert intelligence into a rocket that hits a terrorist.’ ” Interviews with Diskin, June 1, 2017, Paul Wolfowitz, July 2008 (thanks to Mark Gerson for help in arranging the meeting), and Danny Ayalon, August 24, 2017.
CHAPTER 30: “THE TARGET HAS BEEN ELIMINATED, BUT THE OPERATION FAILED”
“He was different” Interview with Dichter, November 4, 2010.
He was arrested again in 1988 Israel Defense Forces, indictment, Military Prosecutor v. Salah Mustafa Mahmud Shehadeh, 11524/89, September 17, 1989 (author’s archive, received from “Twins”).
long years in Israeli prisons gave him the status of a hero Shin Bet, Condensed Summary on Salah Shehadeh, June 25, 2001 (author’s archive, received from “Ellis”).
“our feeling…was really hope” Interview with “Goldi,” January 2010.
“Shehade’s positions have become more extreme” Shin Bet, Salah Shehadeh—Military Head of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, November 23, 2003 (shown to the author by “Ellis”).
killed 474 people and wounded 2,649 Special Committee for Examining the Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh, “Testimony of A.L,” 45.
“these guys were not our chief rabbis” Interview with Dichter, November 4, 2010.
“It puts us ILD folks into a very complicated situation” Interview with Daniel Reisner, July 6, 2011.
“we could not approve of killing children” The other half of Reisner’s description was given with a smile. “On the other hand, we were also married to women and we know what wives are like. With women it was easier to authorize opening fire.” Interview with Reisner, July 6, 2011.
the presence of a few adults State of Israel, Special Committee for Examining the Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh, 67.
They would all be allowed to die Minister of Defense, Sorties and Operations Discussion, July 17, 2002 (shown to the author by “Ellis”).
“In the end, we had no choice” Interview with Yaalon, December 21, 2016.
Diskin was not eager to go ahead Shin Bet, Deputy Head of Service, Flag Bearer, appendix, Framing/Activation, July 19, 2002 (shown to the author by “Ellis”).
“between two children” Interview with Farkash, March 14, 2011.
intelligence indicated that the daughter was not at home Shin Bet, The Flag Bearer—Head of Service’s Orders Regarding His Framing, July 21, 2002 (shown to the author by “Ellis”).
“he ordered that the operation be executed” State of Israel, Special Committee for Examining the Targeted Killing of Salah Shehadeh, 69.
“We hit it, and the house collapses, falls down” The pilot was speaking on December 19, 2010, at the Binah Center in Tel Aviv. The transcript was published first by Amira Haas in Haaretz, January 7, 2011.
“The people who were out to eliminate Shehade knew this” Interview with Gideon Levy, March 30, 2011.
“The target has been eliminated” Interview with Dichter, November 4, 2010.
“I feel a slight shudder in the wing” Vered Barzilai, interview with Dan Halutz, Haaretz, August 23, 2002.
considered by many to be the best combat pilot Spector took part in the attack on the USS Liberty on June 8, 1967, in which thirty-four American seamen were killed. Israel claimed the ship was not flying the American flag and that it believed the Liberty was an Egyptian warship, but the reason for the attack has not been clearly established. Some believe that Spector’s signature on the protest letter was his way of atoning for what happened then.
“Shalom, my name is Yoel” “You, Opponents of Peace,” interview with Yoel Peterburg, Anashim, June 27, 2006.
“has taken hold among the cedars” Interview with Weissglass, December 23, 2014.
CHAPTER 31: THE REBELLION IN UNIT 8200
Amir (not his real name) was an NIO Interview with “Amir,” March 2011. He asked to remain anonymous for fear that r
evealing his identity could cause him harm where he is working and studying now.
“Our role in the selection of targets for assassination was dramatic” Interview with “Globus,” April 2011.
the intention was simply to kill someone—anyone Unit 8200, Center 7143, Reaction of Unit 8200 to Information Request Regarding the Bombing of Fatah Facility in Khan Yunis, March 4, 2003 (author’s archive, received from “Globus”).
“ ‘isn’t this precisely the definition of a manifestly illegal order?’ ” Interview with “Amir,” March 2011.
“we intentionally chose opinionated people” Interview with Eyal Zisser, April 1, 2011.
recorded some cellphone conversations between Tom Cruise…and…Nicole Kidman When the commander of the unit heard about it, he had the officer, “Janek,” tossed into military prison, a highly infrequent occurrence in 8200, and he announced that the next soldier caught doing something similar would be ejected from the unit. It turned out, however, that the commanders of the unit were a lot less concerned when it came to the right to privacy of Arabs. In 2014, a group of officers and soldiers from 8200 signed a sharp letter of protest over allegations that some of the signatories had been ordered to listen in to conversations of Palestinians and to note intimate information. This information was then handed over to the Shin Bet so it could pressure and blackmail those Palestinians into agreeing to become agency informants. This information and recordings of the compromising conversations, the letter stated, were also distributed around the unit for the officers’ enjoyment. The IDF never investigated the complaints of these protesters, and they were all thrown out of the unit’s reserves. Interview with “Leila,” December 2015. “Janek” and the IDF media office declined to comment.
“it had never happened and never would happen” Interview with Yair Cohen, August 18, 2011.
“I’m happy not to be in your position at this moment” Reconstruction of events from documents for attack on objective 7068, including operation orders, debriefings, and exchange of internal emails between participants via 8200’s secured server (author’s archive, received from “Globus”).
forty minutes before the operation’s time window closed Interview with Dani Harari, August 18, 2011.
“Unit 8200 is the epitome of the culture of secrecy” Interview with “Roman,” March 2011.
only someone actually pressing the trigger Interview with Elazar Stern, August 18, 2011.
“I could not under any circumstances endorse the act of the NIO” Interview with Asa Kasher, June 5, 2011. A short time after the incident, chief of staff Yaalon said that he had never given an order to kill anyone in the Khan Yunis building. These claims, however, do not accord with written orders and top-secret internal 8200 documents. And in 2012, in an interview for this book, Yaalon, by then serving as deputy prime minister, in effect confirmed that he had ordered the killing, but argued that the order was legal. Yaalon’s statements, however, starkly contradict the position of the ILD of the IDF’s advocate general on the subject of assassinations, which states that only persons “directly linked” to terror are legitimate targets.
“It was clear that we were out to kill” Interview with Kastiel, December 31, 2013.
Malaisha was “framed” and “intercepted,” shot dead The Two Towers case was first published by Uri Blau in Haaretz, November 28, 2008, and caused much consternation in the defense establishment. The Shin Bet immediately launched an inquiry to find Uri Blau’s sources. The discovery came fairly quickly—Anat Kam, a junior officer serving in the Central Command. She was prosecuted and sent to prison. This was followed by a brutal assault on the journalist Blau. Out of fear of arrest, detention, and prosecution, Blau, who was on a trip abroad at the time, delayed his return for an extended period. The Israeli police declared him a fugitive from justice and issued an international arrest warrant for him. When he eventually returned, he was forced to hand over his entire archive to the Shin Bet for destruction. He was charged with aggravated espionage, convicted, and sentenced to four months of community service.
what it called “interception operations” Interview with “Oscar,” May 2014.
“We ran one operation after another, without stopping” According to AMAN’s count, for example, in just one four-month period, between the beginning of July and the end of October 2005, more than seventy terrorists were killed in interception operations.
several variations of the Grass Widow technique were used In 2004, I persuaded the IDF spokesman to allow me to observe one of these Grass Widow operations, code-named “Swamp King,” the aim of which was to flush out and kill Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists in the heart of the casbah of the city of Nablus in the West Bank. The operation was carried out by Paratroop Battalion 890, whose commander, Amir Baram, dealt a lot with Grass Widow techniques, and adopted as his unit’s motto the United States Marines slogan “Patience, perseverance, and sometimes a bullet between the eyes.” At the pre-op briefing he said: “Fire at the center of the body and a little higher, that’s the best. If one falls, take another shot to confirm the kill. Don’t forget, we want him to come out of this dead!” Ronen Bergman, “Code Name Grass Widow,” Yedioth Ahronoth, April 26, 2004. Interview with Amir Baram, March 2004.
the Palestinians were spawning more and more attackers Shin Bet, Survey of Characteristics of Salient Terror Attacks in the Current Confrontation. Analysis of Characteristics of Terror Attacks in Last Decade, 2–5. Ben-Yisrael, “Facing Suicide Terrorists,” 16.
“We felt we had something like a year” Interview with “Guy,” November 2012.
“We had to build a clear-cut deterrent” Interview with Farkash, November 7, 2016.
CHAPTER 32: PICKING ANEMONES
Ibrahim al-Makadmeh knew the Israelis were going to kill him Interview with “Guy,” November 2012.
“the seventy-two virgins in paradise is an option that cannot be proved” Interview with Gilad, August 4, 2015.
calling yourself a political functionary was no longer cover Interview with Farkash, November 7, 2016.
“Drawing analogies between terrorism and a snake…is such an oversimplification” Interview with Ayalon, March 14, 2016.
Operation Picking Anemones was eased into practice Eldar, Getting to Know Hamas, 51 (Hebrew).
“never did such a serious adversary make such a serious mistake” Yassin still wasn’t a target, but what did that matter? If Hamas political and military leaders could all be killed at once, if their bodies could all be found in the rubble of the same building, it would prove what Israel had long contended—that there was no practical difference between the so-called political arm and those who killed Jews. Interviews with Dichter, November 4, 2010, and Ofer Dekel, February 2009.
“We need internal and external legitimacy to carry on with our fight” Reconstruction of the events from interviews with Dichter, November 4, 2010, Yaalon, June 12, 2011, Mofaz, June 14, 2011, Farkash, April 10, 2013, Galant, August 19, 2011, and Eiland, June 5, 2011.
But Yaalon insisted I decided to play devil’s advocate with Yaalon. “What would you have done,” I asked, “if there wasn’t an apartment block next door, only the building where the Dream Team was meeting, and there were three children there too?” Yaalon: “I’d have no problem. I’d authorize it. What’s the problem?” “And five children?” I ask. “Also authorize. Look, we knew in advance that there were likely to be members of the host’s family in the house. We didn’t know how to keep it perfectly clean. From my perspective, there was a distinction between the chances of harming members of the same family and the many dozens who were likely to be hurt in an adjacent building.”
“I saw Sheikh Yassin getting up on his feet from the wheelchair” Dichter was kidding, of course. Actually, Yassin was carried. “We heard the boom above us,” Yassin’s son said. “Abu al-Abed said, ‘We’ve been bombed, ya sheikh, we have to
leave here quickly.’ ” So as not to waste precious time on the wheelchair, al-Abed took the sheikh’s legs, his son took his arms, and together they ran with him to the car outside. Eldar, Getting to Know Hamas, 39.
“civilians were likely to be hurt” Interview with Mofaz, June 14, 2011.
“I looked around the war room” Interview with Dichter, November 4, 2010.
to take “the necessary response actions” Interviews with Shalom, March 1, 2011, and “Guy,” November 2012.
“is liable to set the Middle East ablaze” Interviews with Dichter, June 2012, Gilad, July 31, 2012, and Farkash, March 14, 2011.
“killing everyone else…and not strike at him” Interview with Yaalon, June 12, 2011.
“I also have no problem doing it with a ‘high signature’ ” Interview with Mofaz, June 14, 2011.
“Won’t we look like the Wild West?” Interview with Eiland, June 5, 2011.
“would also have left Hitler immune to attack” Interview with Kasher, June 5, 2011.
the military advocate general was emphatically opposed Interview with Reisner, July 6, 2011.
“he knows we are keeping close track of him” Interview with “Terminal,” November 2015.
She then detonated a bomb Ali Wakad, “Suicide Bomber: ‘I Always Wanted Parts of My Body to Fly Through the Air,’ ” Ynet, January 14, 2004. Riyashi was the eighth female suicide bomber but the first from Hamas. http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2859046,00.html.
“It is much harder to examine women” Interview with Mofaz, June 14, 2011.
AMAN was able to present Attorney General Rubinstein Interview with Yair Cohen, December 4, 2014.
“We had clear intelligence-based evidence” Interview with Farkash, March 14, 2011.
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