THE EC BUDGET AGREEMENT OF 1980
With the Lancaster House Conference still in progress, I had to turn my mind once again to the vexed question of how to negotiate a substantial reduction in Britain’s net contribution to the European Community budget. Figures had at long last been put on the size of that contribution and henceforth it was difficult for anyone to deny the scale of the problem. Also the European Commission had produced a report which indicated that it was indeed possible, in line with well-established Community principles, to achieve a ‘broad balance’ between British contributions and receipts. There were, therefore, some grounds for optimism, but I had no illusion that a settlement would be easy and I was well aware of the possibility of sharp practice. British officials had indicated to those of the presidency my concern at the procedural wrangles which had characterized the previous Strasbourg Council and my desire that the presidency should take a firm line and get the budget discussed early.
By this time, the member states of the Community knew that we were serious. On 18 October I delivered in Luxemburg the 1979 Winston Churchill Memorial Lecture, which, as the occasion required, dealt principally with foreign affairs.
I warned:
I must be absolutely clear about this. Britain cannot accept the present situation on the Budget. It is demonstrably unjust. It is politically indefensible: I cannot play Sister Bountiful to the Community while my own electorate are being asked to forego improvements in the fields of health, education, welfare and the rest.
We had also taken every opportunity to seek wider understanding of the merits of our case. I had talks in Bonn with Helmut Schmidt at the end of October, and on 19 and 20 November there was a two-day Anglo-French summit in London. The Germans and the French knew that I meant business.
In the run up to the Dublin Council, we examined carefully the measures available to us to bring pressure on the Community. Christopher Soames, who had great experience of the ways and wiles of the Europeans, sent me a note to the effect that the Community had never been renowned for taking unpleasant decisions without long wrangling and that I should not worry too much about the cards in my hand because a major country like Britain could disrupt the Community very effectively if it chose. I noted his advice. In this spirit, we had examined quite early on — though we looked at it again later — the possibility of withholding British payments to the Community. For practical and legal reasons this always seemed a non-starter. Nevertheless, I believed that even the possibility caused satisfactory anxiety in the Commission, whose pressure to get a satisfactory settlement was vital. We also had the lever of refusing to agree agricultural price increases, which the French and German Governments — each facing elections — wanted to see. Our moral position was strengthened, too, by the fact that the French had broken the EC law by obstructing British lamb imports: the European Court of Justice found against them on 25 September — though morality counts for little in the Community.
At the next Council — in Dublin at the end of November, the Irish having now assumed the European Community Presidency — the issue of our budget contribution dominated the business. The obvious security risk from the IRA required that I be lodged overnight in splendid isolation in Dublin Castle, the former seat of British rule. The Irish press enjoyed the idea that I slept in the bed used by Queen Victoria in 1897, though I had the advantage over her of a portable shower in my room. Indeed, I was very well looked after. The hospitality was perhaps the best feature of the visit, and contrasted strongly with the atmosphere at the meetings which was extremely and increasingly hostile. I had expected something of the sort. I went to Dublin with a newly tailored suit. Ordinarily I would have enjoyed wearing something new on an occasion as important as this, but I thought twice: I didn’t want to risk tainting it with unhappy memories. This was not, though, the only wise decision I made at Dublin: the principal one was to say very clearly, and with at least as much force as at Strasbourg, the word ‘no’.
The Council opened amicably enough in Phoenix Park at the Irish President’s official residence where he hosted lunch. Back in the Council at Dublin Castle we got down to business. My opening speech set out the facts of our case in somewhat greater detail than at Strasbourg and I elaborated on them in the vigorous debate which followed. There was a good deal of argument about the figures, at the root of which was an obscure and complex issue — how to calculate the losses and gains resulting to individual states from the operation of the CAP. But which ever way one did the sums, there was no doubt that the UK was making a huge net contribution, and unless it was mitigated it was about to become the biggest. We were not arguing that we should be net beneficiaries (though some in Britain would have wished me to); in fact, we were only asking for a ‘broad balance’. It was unacceptable that at a time when we were making cuts in public spending at home we should be expected to make a net contribution of more than £1 billion a year. I emphasized Britain’s commitment to the Community and our wish to avoid a crisis, but I left no one in any doubt that this is precisely what the Community would face if the problem were not resolved.
We had put forward our own proposals on the budget. But the Commission had come up with some of its own and I was prepared to accept their basic approach as a starting point. First, they proposed that action be taken to shift the weight of Community expenditure generally away from agriculture towards structural and investment programmes. The trouble was that this would take too long — if it happened at all. Second, they proposed, in addition, specific spending on UK projects to boost our receipts. But there simply were not enough suitable projects. Finally, on the contribution side, the 1975 Correction Mechanism had so far failed to cut our payments. If it were reformed on the lines the Commission was proposing, it could help reduce our net contributions — but still not by enough: we would still be contributing about the same as Germany and much more than France. Something far more radical would be required.
I made one other point which was to prove of some significance. I said that, ‘the arrangement [must] last as long as the problem.’ It seemed to me then, and even more so by the end of the Council, that we simply could not have these battles every year, all to establish what common sense and equity ought to have made self-evident from the beginning.
It quickly became clear that I was not going to make the other heads of government see matters like this. Some, for example the Dutch Prime Minister, Mr Andries Van Agt, were reasonable, but most were not. I had the strong feeling that they had decided to test whether I was able and willing to stand up to them. It was quite shameless: they were determined to keep as much of our money as they could. By the time the Council broke up Britain had been offered a refund of only £350 million, implying a net contribution of some £650 million. That refund was just not big enough and I was not going to accept it. I had agreed that there should be another Council to discuss the matter further, but I was not overoptimistic after what I had seen and heard in Dublin. For me it went much further than hard bargaining about money, which was inevitable. What I would not accept was the attitude that fairness as such did not seem to enter into the equation at all. I was completely sincere when I had said that Britain was asking no more than its due; and my anger when such a proposition was regarded with cynical indifference was equally genuine.
It was while reflecting on the quintessentially un-English outlook displayed by the Community at this time and later that I came across the following lines from Kipling’s ‘Norman and Saxon’ in my old, battered collection of my favourite poet’s verse. The Norman baron with large estates is warning his son about our English forefathers, the Anglo-Saxons, and says:
The Saxon is not like us Normans. His manners are not so polite.
But he never means anything serious till he talks about justice and right.
When he stands like an ox in the furrow with his sullen set eyes on your own,
And grumbles, ‘This isn’t fair dealing’, My son, leave the Saxon alone.
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p; At the press conference after the Council, I gave a vigorous defence of our position. I said that the other states should not have ‘expected me to settle for a third of a loaf. I also refused to accept the communautaire language about ‘own resources’. I continued to state without apology that we were talking about Britain’s money, not Europe’s. I said:
I am only talking about our money, no one else’s; there should be a cash refund of our money to bring our receipts up to the average level of receipts in the Community.
Most of the other heads of government were furious. The Irish press was vitriolic. One British newspaper, The Times, described my performance at the press conference as ‘bravura’, though there was more criticism from the leader columns. The best comment, I felt, was from Le Figaro, which said:
To accuse Mrs Thatcher of wishing to torpedo Europe because she defends the interests of her country with great determination is to question her underlying intentions in the same way that people used to question those of de Gaulle in regard to French interests.
I liked the comparison.
We used the period between the end of the Dublin meeting and the next European Council to press our case, both in public and through diplomatic means. On 29 and 30 January I had talks with the Italian Prime Minister (later President) Francesco Cossiga. I had already had dealings with Sig. Cossiga in 1979 when the Schild family, my constituents, were kidnapped in Sardinia. I had found him highly competent and deeply concerned. He was also a man of principle, as his earlier resignation as Minister of the Interior after the murder of the former Christian Democrat Leader Aldo Moro showed, and as I already knew him to be from my own experience. Italian politics and Italian politicians do not evoke much understanding or sympathy from the British, or indeed from the Italians, and I confess to sharing some of that disenchantment. But Francesco Cossiga was himself a sceptic about the usual Italian practices. He was the nearest thing to an independent in Italian politics; in negotiations he always played a straight hand; he could be relied upon to keep his word, as he did over the stationing of Cruise missiles in Italy; and he was an undoubted Anglophile and a strong admirer of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as the birth of true liberal politics. I was glad that it was Sig. Cossiga who was due to host the next European Council.
On 25 February Helmut Schmidt came to London again. Our talks centred on the question of our budget contribution and on the German Chancellor’s repeated wish to see sterling within the ERM, and — contrary to the usual misleading press reports — they were useful and quite jolly. On 27 and 28 March there was a full scale Anglo-German summit in London. I sought once more to stress how seriously we felt about the British contribution. Subsequently, I learned that Helmut Schmidt had been telling other Community governments that if there were no solution there was a danger that we would withhold British contributions to the Community. So I had created the desired impression. The European Council due for 31 March and 1 April had to be postponed because of a political crisis in Italy (not an unusual event), but we pressed for a new Council before the end of April and it was finally called for Sunday and Monday 27 and 28, to meet in Luxemburg.
At this time, there was a marked hardening of public opinion in Britain as the result of our treatment by the Community. In particular, there was much speculation about possible withholding of Britain’s contributions, which did not displease me, though I was cautious in public on the subject. I said on Panorama on 25 February that we would consider withholding but would be loath to do it because it meant going against Community law. I also went on French television on 10 March and said:
I wouldn’t expect France to be the biggest contributor if she had an income below average in the Community. And I do indeed assure you that your very distinguished French politicians would be the first to complain if that were so.
I gave an interview to Die Welt in which I said:
We shall do our utmost to prevent matters coming to a crisis. But it must be realized that things cannot continue like this.
The atmosphere in Luxemburg turned out to be a good deal better than in Dublin. I was optimistic. From a discussion I had had with Sig. Cossiga, who had spoken to President Giscard, it seemed at first that the French were prepared to set a ceiling on the size of our net contributions for a period of years irrespective of the growth in the overall Community budget, subject to review at the end of the period. This would have been a step forward. On closer examination, however, it became clear that what the French really wanted was to get decisions on their most politically sensitive topics — farm prices in the CAP, lamb and fishing rights — before settling the budget. Finally, it was agreed that parallel meetings should be held over the weekend: Agriculture ministers would meet and so would a group of officials working on the budget issue.
As a result we did not get around to talking about the budget at all at our first session. Indeed, only after dinner, and the usual foreign affairs tour de table, did I obtain agreement that the official group should resume effective negotiation that evening. The French were the main stumbling block: the proposals their officials presented were much less helpful to us than President Giscard’s had seemed to be. In the meantime, the Agriculture ministers of the other governments of the Community had agreed on a package of proposals which would have raised farm prices, increasing again the proportion of the Community budget devoted to agriculture (quite contrary to the proposals put forward in Dublin) and giving the French a sheep meat regime which was more or less all that they wanted. Against this — for us — distinctly unfavourable background, we received eventually the offer of a limit on our net contribution of about £325 million, applying only to the year 1980. Under a subsequent proposal our net contribution would have been limited to about £550 million for 1981 as well.
My reaction was that this was too little. But above all I was not prepared to have a settlement that only lasted for two years. Helmut Schmidt, Roy Jenkins (President of the Commission) and almost everyone else urged me to settle. But I was not willing to return the following year to face precisely the same problem and the attitude that went with it. So I rejected the offer. The draft communiqué, moreover, was unacceptable to us since it continued to insist on the old dogma that ‘own resources are intended to provide the finance for Community policies; they are not contributions from member states.’ Nor did it make reference to the assurances we had been given on our accession to the Community that action would be taken ‘should an unacceptable situation arise’.
Many reacted to my decision in luxemburg with disbelief: in some circles the very last thing expected of a British prime minister was that he or she should quite so unashamedly defend British interests. But there was, I noted, a contrast between the reaction in some of the press which was extremely hostile and the reaction in the House of Commons and the country, which was thoroughly supportive.
In fact, we were a good deal closer to a settlement than was widely recognized. Great progress had already been made in winning agreement to substantial reductions in our contribution. What remained was to secure these reductions for the first two years with a reliable undertaking for the third. We had a number of powerful levers by which we could apply pressure to this end. The French were increasingly desperate to achieve their aims in the Agriculture Council. There was even talk of overriding the British veto by abrogating the so-called Luxemburg compromise of 1966, established to accommodate de Gaulle. (This was an understanding rather than a formal agreement with the force of law, which enabled any one country to block a majority decision when its vital national interests were at stake.) In fact, precisely this did happen at the Agriculture Council in May 1982 — and this during the Falklands War. However, at this particular time it would have been a dangerous move, particularly since the French had already been found in breach of Community law over lamb imports. The Germans, too, were keen to see higher agricultural prices. Most important of all, the Community would, we thought, probably reach the limit of its financial resources in 1
982. Its persistent overspending was catching up with it, and greater resources could only be made available with British agreement. Ultimately our negotiating position was a strong one.
It soon became clear that Luxemburg, following the clashes in Dublin, had had the desired effect. In spite of talk of the Luxemburg offer having now been ‘withdrawn’, there was evidence of a general desire to solve the budget issue before the next full European Council at Venice in June. The easiest way to achieve this appeared to be a meeting of the Community Foreign ministers.
Peter Carrington, having received his mandate from me, flew to Brussels on Thursday 29 May with Ian Gilmour. After a marathon eighteen-hour session they came back with what they considered an acceptable agreement, arriving at lunch time on Friday to brief me at Chequers.
My immediate reaction was far from favourable. The deal involved a net budget contribution in 1980 higher than envisaged at Luxemburg. It appeared from Peter’s figures that we would pay rather less under the new package in 1981, though to some extent this was sleight of hand, reflecting different assumptions about the size of that year’s total budget. But the Brussels proposal had one great advantage: it now offered us a three-year solution. We were promised a major review of the budget problem by mid-1981 and if this had not been achieved (as proved to be the case) the Commission would make proposals along the lines of the formula for 1980–81 and the Council would act accordingly. The other elements of the Brussels package relating to agriculture, lamb and fisheries, were more or less acceptable. We had to agree a 5 per cent rise in farm prices. Overall, the deal marked a refund of two-thirds of our net contribution and it marked huge progress from the position the Government had inherited. I therefore decided to accept the offer.
The Downing Street Years Page 11