by Brandon Webb
• June 12, 2012—An RPG attack is made on the ICRC compound in Misrata (400 km west of Benghazi).
• June 18, 2012—Protestors storm the Tunisian consulate in Benghazi.
• July 29, 2012—An IED is found on the grounds of the Tibesti Hotel.
• July 30, 2012—The Sudanese Consul in Benghazi is carjacked and a driver is beaten.
• July 31, 2012—Seven Iranian-citizen ICRC workers are abducted in Benghazi.
• August 5, 2012—ICRC Misrata office is attacked with RPGs. ICRC withdraws its representatives from Misrata and Benghazi.
• August 9, 2012—A Spanish-American dual national NGO worker is abducted from the Islamic Cultural Center in Benghazi and released the same day.
• August 20, 2012—A small bomb is thrown at an Egyptian diplomat’s vehicle parked outside of the Egyptian consulate in Benghazi.
In a Senate hearing after the attack, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Matthew Olsen, stated that there was no evidence of “significant advanced planning or coordination for this attack.” This is a viewpoint shared by Matthew VanDyke, who told Business Insider, “This was not a commando style raid, that’s ridiculous, this type of thing can be put together in a matter of minutes with a few cell-phone calls.” VanDyke has stated that some Libyans would have seen concurrent protests at the US embassy in Egypt and elsewhere on satellite television in response to an inflammatory YouTube video that depicted the Prophet Muhammad.
VanDyke laid out his take on the attack for Business Insider, telling them about the extremist training camps in the nearby Green Mountains. “Those camps have been there. There’s no excuse for that. They’re about 2 hours from the consulate, so these guys probably saw it [the protests in Egypt] on TV, made a few cell-phone calls, grabbed some gear, and got on the road.” He went on to state that there was probably no intention for the protest outside the consulate to get violent, at least originally, but then the extremists showed up and used the protestors as a shield.
The problem with this thesis is that further investigation has clearly shown that there was no protest outside the consulate prior to or during the attack. There was an assault by armed gunmen on the consulate that night of 9/11/12, but there was no protest, peaceful or otherwise.
Certain evidence suggests that there was at least some operational planning on the part of the Ansar Al-Sharia militia affiliate that attacked the compound. On the morning of 9/11/12, two Blue Mountain security guards spotted a man in a Libyan police uniform taking pictures of the consulate from a nearby building that was under construction. The security guards briefly detained the man, who was taking the pictures with his cell phone, before telling him to get lost. He drove away in his police car and a complaint was made to the Libyan police station.
Sean Smith also noted this surveillance, posting a comment about it on the internet before he was killed on the night of the attack. As the IT guy for the consulate, Sean spent a lot of time on the internet, sometimes talking to friends and playing video games. On the day of the attack, he posted the following:
(12:54:09 PM) assuming we don’t die tonight. We saw one of our ‘police’ that guard the compound taking pictures
The local Blue Mountain security guards had to have known the deal. They fled the moment the attack began. There is some speculation that they even opened the gate to allow the terrorists ingress into the consulate.
When it comes to Third Country Nationals (TCNs), you get what you pay for. On Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) that house soldiers in Afghanistan, our troops have gone to check on the tower guards at the perimeter to find that they are too busy engaged in homosexual sex to pull guard duty. In Iraq, imported Ugandan gate guards were known to have a “big man” pimping them out for drugs on one US-run FOB. This isn’t to say that all TCNs are bad—many have served honorably alongside American servicemen and women—but no one can feign surprise that the Blue Mountain security men cut and run at the first sign of trouble.
With the Libyan government weak and unable to provide any kind of security, the State Department felt forced to rely on TCNs. The Blue Mountain security firm had hired the February 17 militia for security. The contract with February 17 was allowed to lapse prior to the 9/11/12 attack because the militia no longer wished to be seen protecting Americans in Benghazi.
Without casting blame on local nationals, one of the key institutional failures to protect the consulate happened because the Diplomatic Security personnel were rotated to the consulate on only a temporary basis. This made it very difficult to maintain a consistent security posture and ensure that security upgrades were made to the facility.
Imagine dropping a couple of security guards into buildings built for civilian purposes and asking them to protect these buildings. Just as they are beginning to hire contractors and get a security plan put together, they are yanked out of the consulate and reassigned elsewhere. The newly assigned Diplomatic Security personnel now have to play catch-up once they arrive at the consulate, and by the time they get things up and running, they too are reassigned somewhere else.
As the consulate was really a Temporary Mission Facility that would only be occupied for an unspecified period of time, it was never given the attention or funding that it should have been. Instead, it was an ad hoc facility created to help build diplomatic inroads in Benghazi during a transitional period in Libya, until something more permanent could be established.
That said, some security features were upgraded at the consulate. Jersey barriers were put into place, a safe room was established in one of the buildings, barb wire was strung along the tops of the compound walls, windows were barred, floodlights were installed, and other upgrades were made to the gates. But it was too little, too late.
Previous attacks on US embassies, consulates, and other facilities had resulted in a series of protocols and standard operating procedures when it came to security, but because the Benghazi consulate was designated as temporary in nature, many of these protocols were never carried out or enforced. Meanwhile, Diplomatic Security was pushing to have more agents assigned to Benghazi, and Ambassador Stevens was advocating a more permanent presence there.
One option mentioned prior to the attack was to co-locate the CIA annex and the consulate to help ensure mutual security, but because of the paramilitary nature of the GRS mission, it would not have been a good idea for diplomatic, if not legal, reasons to house the US Ambassador to Libya alongside these CIA-sponsored activities.
Clearly, the Temporary Mission Facility that served as the consulate in Benghazi was underprotected. Ambassador Stevens knew that the rise of Islamic extremism in Benghazi posed a threat and allegedly wrote words to this effect in his personal diary, which was recovered four days after the attack.
Unfortunately, it took the 9/11/12 attack itself and the deaths of four brave Americans to motivate the State Department to improve security in Libya.
4
9/11/2012
IT BEGINS . . .
What you are about to read is a true and accurate account of what happened in Benghazi from the initial attack to the final evacuation. Minor liberties are taken with regard to how the story is told in this chapter, but the truth is at its core. While no one person’s account can represent the entirety of a story, our hope is that by piecing together this complex puzzle, coupling facts with first-person accounts, we can best represent what happened that tragic day. After all, the American people deserve to hear the unvarnished truth.
In his first visit to Benghazi in almost a year, Ambassador Stevens arrived on September 10th, with Sean Smith and two Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) agents. The only other Americans in the compound were three additional DSS personnel assigned there temporarily. In total, seven Americans with four local militia guards were left to promote diplomacy in one of the most hostile and unstable places on earth.
Stevens’s main miss
ion was to promote diplomatic relations with local government officials and pass assessments of Libya’s fragile state of affairs back to Washington. He took one meeting in town on the 10th, but on the 11th, all his appointments were conducted inside the compound as a security measure. The following events are true to the best of our knowledge, and many of the details have never been disclosed before.
Around 7:40pm, the ambassador escorted a Turkish diplomat to the compound’s main gate. Shortly after, around 8pm, a team of UK diplomatic security professionals dropped off borrowed vehicles and equipment, as had been the arrangement since the UK had suspended diplomatic operations in June 2012 due to the increased threat level.
At 9pm, the ambassador and Sean Smith retired to their rooms for the night.
Suddenly: BOOM! A Rocket Propelled Grenade hit the front gate of the compound with thunderous force. The guard stationed at the main gate had long since fled the scene. He was attached to the Supreme Security Council (SSC). The SSC is a loose coalition of militia elements that are providing interim security in Libya. The guard would later tell local press that he drove away under instructions to avoid further civilian casualties.
At the time of the attack, the following personnel were in the compound:
• Ambassador Stevens (Ambassador’s Villa)
• Sean Smith (Ambassador’s Villa)
• 5 DSS Agents (4 in DSS Villa, 1 in Tactical Operations Center)
• 4 Local Security Hired from February 17 Marty’s Brigade (Inside the Front Gate)
The main gate was practically left open. All four of the local security hightailed it out of there, along with the SSC guard, as soon as the assault began. Though the attack was coordinated, the attackers lacked training, a fact that would later play a role in the CIA team rescue. Many of the shots fired inside the compound were fired in the air and aimed at nothing in particular, mostly due to the fact that there weren’t any targets.
The American security officer on duty in the Tactical Operations Center (TOC) could see dozens of armed men entering the compound through the main gate, out of which the ambassador had escorted the Turkish diplomat only an hour earlier. He sounded the central alarm over the radios as soon as he noticed the local February 17 guards fleeing the area. It’s worth noting that the local guards hired by the State Department were armed only with bats, not with firearms of any sort; it’s no surprise they fled.
One of the other DSS agents was radioed by the officer in the TOC and asked to secure the ambassador. He grabbed his rifle and headed to the villa. Once there, he instructed Stevens and Smith to put on body armor, and then led them to a secured area in the back of the building. He locked the door and radioed back their position and that they were secure for the moment. The DSS agent was armed with an M4 assault rifle, handgun, and shotgun. Surprisingly, no shots were fired by the DSS security; this may have been due to their lack of experience and training, and, most importantly, to bad odds. The DSS agent gave his cell phone to the ambassador, who began making calls to the US embassy in Tripoli. They could hear the attackers destroying everything in their path in the adjacent rooms.
One of the remaining DSS agents ran up to the TOC while the other two, upon encountering the attacking force, barricaded themselves in a separate villa with one of the February 17 guards, whom they had run into. Still no shots had been fired in any effort to repel the attackers, most of whom were unarmed.
The attack continued, and the militia members found a stockpile of fuel containers and began to light several vehicles in the compound on fire. They entered the Ambassador’s Villa and started destroying and looting the contents. They then found the locked door behind which the Americans were hidden, and, after unsuccessful attempts to gain entry, they retreated and began pouring diesel fuel into the room. Soon a raging toxic fire was underway as the fuel was lit and burning tires were added to the blaze. None of the fires would be visible to the TOC’s security cameras until 10pm.
The Ambassador’s Villa became immersed in a thick cloud of rubber smoke. It was too much for the Americans inside, and they were forced to crawl on their hands and knees into one of the bathrooms in the rear of the building. The DSS agent attempted to ventilate the room with fresh air by opening a window, but it had the opposite effect, and essentially sucked smoke onto their position at an alarming rate. Visibility in the room was at zero, and the security agent yelled for the ambassador and Smith to follow him out of the room to another exit point. They all must have known that staying inside would mean certain death. They had no choice but to take their chances in the open, at the mercy of the attackers.
The security officer made it out of the building only to find himself alone in a hail of gun fire. He yelled for Stevens and Smith, but there was no answer. He reentered the building several times to try to locate them both, but found neither. In a last, desperate attempt to ventilate the smoke, he broke several windows before calling for help. The ambassador and Sean Smith could not be found. They wound up getting separated from each other amid the chaos, and within minutes each would suffocate from smoke inhalation.
The frenzied looting then overtook the other villas in the compound. The attackers tried but were unsuccessful at gaining entry to both the main space of the TOC and the villa safe room, where the other two DSS agents and a local guard were secure.
THE REGIONAL SECURITY Officer (RSO) sounded the alarm and placed calls to the Benghazi CIA annex (a fortified base) and the embassy in Tripoli. In a panicked voice, he said, “We’re under attack, we need help, please send help now . . .” The call cut off. The CIA’s Global Response Staff (GRS) Team Leader (TL) and Ty Woods conferred. The TL respected Ty’s experience and listened intently as he made his case for the rescue mission. Ty was the senior security operative among them, with over twenty years of Special Operations experience as a Navy SEAL. He was a seasoned GRS agent, respected and loved by all who knew him. To Ty it was a matter of principle: Americans were at risk, and it was their job to help out. He would go alone if need be, and the TL knew it.
The GRS is one among many CIA paramilitary groups. In pop culture terms, GRS agents are similar to Jason Bourne without the complex spy work. GRS agents work closely with CIA case officers and analysts to ensure that missions and security are tactically sound. Typical agents have a minimum of ten years of Special Operations experience. They come from all over: Army Green Berets, USMC Recon, Air Force Para-Rescue/Combat Controllers, and, like Ty Woods, the Navy SEALs. Agents undergo a rigorous security clearance process with a series of tests that involve shooting, small unit tactics, and driving. They are held to the highest of standards, and more than one seasoned operator has failed the CIA’s operational readiness test standards. There is also another group that is recruited to conduct what we call “static” security. These men are mostly regular military and law enforcement professionals who are highly trained in base security.
Contrary to the many media myths about Benghazi, requests for help were not denied by the Obama administration. It appears as if every informed agency and organization tried its best to give whatever help it could during the attack. As you will soon see, this would also be true at the smallest unit level, where several American patriots in Tripoli would do anything to rally to the aid of their fellow countrymen.
Ty and the TL made their case to the CIA Chief of Base (COB), but it fell on deaf ears. It is rumored that the COB initially said absolutely not—he refused to authorize the GRS agents to conduct the rescue. Ty was relentless and assertive in his pursuit, refusing to take no for an answer; he explained that unless they did something, all of the people in that compound would be dead. A few minutes later, it became clear to the Chief of Base that Ty and the rest of the GRS team were going to go with or without his permission. It is unknown whether he relented and authorized the rescue attempt or simply turned a blind eye. Only the CIA After Action report holds that information, and it is unlikely to surface for
years to come. Regardless, it was Ty Woods’s persistence and patriotic sense of moral duty that ultimately resulted in his getting the go-ahead for the rescue.
The GRS agents, all former Special Ops, would listen to Ty as he briefed them on the plan. It’s worth noting that, while there would have been no time to come up with a perfect plan, a good plan executed immediately will save lives. If you wait too long to come up with a brilliant idea, people die. Ty would have known this, and his plan must have been 90% instinct, honed over three decades of service to his country. (He had served twenty years as a SEAL and the rest of the time as a GRS operative.)
Six of the seven of them loaded up in two Toyota Land Cruisers. The Land Cruisers had a much larger capacity than the armored sedans. They did not drive through the consulate’s main gate, as that would have been too obvious. Instead, using the element of surprise, they planned to conduct an L-shaped ambush on the main body of attackers, and then shoot and maneuver to the TOC to link up with the other DSS agents. The Cruisers would stop short on the side of the walled State Department compound. They would lock the vehicles and use them to climb the main compound wall and take up positions. Nobody would fire a shot until the small team was in position, and then they would unleash Hell. Ty had radioed to the DSS agents in the TOC and told them not to fire on their position as they were coming over the wall. To a man, everyone in that room knew what needed to be done, and all of them were more than willing to follow Ty into the fight. They would do whatever they had to in order to save their fellow Americans. Most of the men in that room had spent half their lives serving their country in some capacity.
One advantage that the CIA team had over their inexperienced State Department security counterparts was that they knew the area like the backs of their hands, especially their immediate surroundings. There were hundreds of planned routes to and from their base into the dusty and dangerous streets of Benghazi. They had picked up dozens of CIA sources in an effort to hunt down stray chemical and nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction. Like Syria, Libya had its own dirty past, and the CIA had been conducting a very important mission to ensure that yellow cake uranium didn’t make it onto the black market and into extremist hands.