As a further reinforcement the serviceable units of II.SS-Panzerkorps, made up of the Frundsberg and Hohenstaufen divisions, were sent to Model on September 5th. Commanded by Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich, the corps had been reduced to the strength of a reinforced brigade by the fighting in Normandy and the attempts to save the units trapped in the Falaise pocket. They were completely exhausted. Model stationed both divisions in what he considered safe areas around Eindhoven and Arnhem, a seemingly insignificant decision which was to have far reaching implications for the very near future.
Central to Model’s plan was the continued occupation of Antwerp, or at least the denial of its port facilities to the Allies. He immediately ordered his only available unit, 719.Infanterie-Division under Generalmajor Karl Sievers, to move towards the front and assist in the defense of the city.
Sievers was an experienced soldier who had commanded 16.Lufwaffen-Feld-Division during the fighting in Normandy and realized that his slow moving infantry formation could not possibly arrive in time to intervene in the battle for the city. Largely on his own initiative, he positioned his division on the eastern outskirts of Antwerp along the Albert canal between Merksem and Hasselt, a front of some sixty kilometers. Although stretched to their absolute limit, Sievers’ men could at least deny the bridges across the canal to the enemy.2
Travelling between the canal crossings, Sievers personally organized retreating units and stragglers and incorporated them into his division. Fortuitously, the artillery and engineer battalions of 347.Infanterie-Division arrived in the area by train and, together with the first battalion of SS-Grenadier-Regiment Landstorm Nederland, made up of Dutch volunteers, Sievers was able to reinforce his front.3
On Sievers left, running south towards Maastricht, the line was held by the survivors of 85.Infanterie-Division, commanded by Generalleutnant Curt Chill, a veteran of the Russian front. The division had been severely depleted by the Normandy battles and the retreat across northern France and had been ordered to return to Germany. Realizing the gravity of the situation, Chill disregarded his orders, absorbed the survivors of 59.Infanterie-Division together with other stragglers, and moved his men towards the Albert Canal.4
On September 7, after heavy fighting, advance elements of the British Guards Armored Division forced a crossing of the Albert Canal at the junction of Sievers’ and Chill’s divisions, taking the town of Helchteren and advancing as far as the crossroads at Hechtel, some 15 kilometers from the Dutch-Belgian frontier on the road to Eindhoven. Held by the battalion of Ersatz-und Ausbildungs-Regiment Hermann Göring from Chill’s Kampgruppe, the garrison was quickly reinforced by two battalions of Fallschirmjäger under the command by Major Franz Grassmel, which had been positioned in the nearby village of Wijchmaal. Armed with nothing heavier than Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons, Major Grassmel’s men held out against two full armored regiments, which were unable to dislodge the defenders but did manage to surround the town. Although several attempts were made to reinforce the Fallschirmjäger, including a determined assault conducted on September 8 by the Jagdpanthers of Major Erich Sattler’s schwere Heeres-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559, all met with failure.
On September 10, the British regiments attacking Hechtel succeeded in outflanking the German position, reaching the banks of the Meuse-Escaut Canal, almost 30 kilometers in the German rear. Within forty-eight hours, the Irish Guards had secured a crossing near the town of Neerpelt. The capture of Neerpelt presented the British with a direct route along Highway 69 to Eindhoven, Nijmegen, Arnhem, and the Rhine. Major Grassmel, realizing that his position at Hechtel had lost any strategic significance, withdrew the garrison and left behind over 200 wounded men who could not be evacuated. The town itself was almost completely destroyed.
Within twenty-four hours, the Germans had organized the first in a series of counterattacks against the bridgehead at Neerpelt. The initial attacks were made by Fallschirmjäger Regiment von Hoffmann and Fallschirmjäger Regiment von der Heydte, both elements of Kampfgruppe Chill, and reinforced by a mixed Waffen-SS unit led by Sturmbannführer Heinrich Heinke, who commanded the replacement battalion of 10.SS-Panzer-Division. Heinke’s group was made up from infantrymen of his own battalion and SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 21 and supported by a number of Sturmgeschütz III assault guns, almost certainly from schwere Heeres-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559.5
The British managed to hold out against the counterattack by continuously reinforcing the bridgehead. Student blamed Oberstleutnant von der Heydte, the overall commander of the counterattacking force, and replaced him on September 14 with Oberst Erich Walther, an experienced paratroop officer who had fought in Norway, Holland, Crete, Sicily, and at Monte Cassino. Kampfgruppe Walther was reinforced with additional units including Luftwaffe-Bewährungs-Bataillon 6, a penal unit, which had been transferred from Italy in such haste that the men were still wearing their tropical uniforms. On September 15, in driving rain, Walther sent von der Heydte’s men into the attack once more while a battalion of Hoffman’s regiment and Heinke’s SS grenadiers conducted a diversionary assault. Once again the Germans were unsuccessful, driven back by intense artillery fire and losing three of the Panzerjäger battalion’s assault guns in the process. On the following day Student ordered Walther to continue with his attacks, but it was soon apparent that the British were far too strong. Walther convinced Student that it would be wiser to consolidate his defenses and the Germans limited themselves to minor probes.
Although very much on the defensive, the Germans had slowed the Allies progress in the north and in places pushed the British and Canadians back. Although Model’s plan to hold a line on the Albert Canal had been thwarted, the rapid advances of August had degenerated into a series of bloody localized battles so fluid that the concept of a frontline was often meaningless in an area where the maze of water obstacles meant that the German always had another line to fall back on. No small part was played by the displays of leadership and initiative of commanders such as Generalleutnant Chill, whose actions alone would allow Student the time to deploy 1.Fallschirm-Armee. Other scratch units made up of Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine personnel were also rushed to the front. The survivors of 15.Armee quickly followed, whom the British had allowed to escape through Antwerp.
Further to the south, Patton’s US 3rd Army had been ordered to advance until his tanks ran out of fuel. By September 6, they were closing on Nancy on the Moselle River. During the evening of September 7, the tanks of Panzer-Brigade 106 Feldherrnhalle, commanded by Oberst Dr. Franz Bäke, attacked the exposed flank of US 90th Infantry Division around Thionville. Both Bäke and the commander of 1.Armee, drawing on their experiences of the Russian front, had assumed that the American infantry would panic and retreat in confusion when confronted with a night attack. The Germans were surprised, however, to find that it was not long before the defenders were mounting their own counterattacks. As the sun rose, the American infantrymen were joined by their tanks and Bäke’s Panzers found themselves out of contact with their commander, scattered in a maze of small villages and hamlets, prey to American bazooka teams. By the end of the day, Panzer-Brigade 106 had lost half of its tanks and tank destroyers, over sixty armored halftracks, and almost three-quarters if its personnel killed, wounded or taken prisoner. This had been the first action in which these independent brigades, an initiative of Hitler’s, had been sent into action. It had proven a dismal failure. In addition, Panzer-Brigade 106 had been slated to take part in a counterattack in the direction of Reims, planned by Hitler since August, which would now be seriously weakened. Within days, units of 3rd Army reached Trier and had occupied large sections of the Maginot Line, while 1st Army had reached the Siegfried Line east of Aachen. On September 15, after more than a week of fighting, US troops entered Nancy, which the Germans had evacuated on the previous day.
On September 18, in an attempt to reduce the bridgehead which 3rd Army had established on the eastern bank of the Moselle, General Hasso von Manteuffel’s 5.Panzerarmee lau
nched a counteroffensive towards Lunéville, approximately 15 kilometers south-east of Nancy. The attack began with Oberst Heinrich-Walter Bronsart von Schellendorf’s Panzer-Brigade 111 attacking directly towards Lunéville. Although heavy fog kept the US fighter bombers away, the weather was so bad that the German attacks were completely uncoordinated from the start and soon devolved into a series of isolated skirmishes. The American units around Lunéville were soon reinforced by elements of two armored divisions and the German’s were repulsed, leaving over twenty disabled tanks on the battlefield. Having failed to take Lunéville by direct assault on the first day, Manteuffel simply bypassed the town and moved towards the north.
On September 19, Oberst Freiherr von Seckendorf’s Panzer-Brigade 113 attacked the salient which had formed around the town of Arracourt. Starting off at 8:00 am, the tanks of Panzer-Abteilung 2113 managed to overrun the eastern and southern flanks of the American position. They pushed as far as the headquarters, where they were driven back by a battalion of self-propelled howitzers firing over open sights. The heavy fog that had initially given the Germans the advantage of surprise now came to the aid of the defenders, with the Panzers advancing blindly to within visual contact of the enemy. At close range the heavier armor and superior range of the German tanks counted for little and the Americans were constantly being reinforced with fresh infantry and armored units. The defenders were further aided by the German commanders’ persistence in pursuing the same avenues of attack.
On the following day, the remnants of Panzer-Brigade 111 and parts of Panzer-Regiment 15 of 11.Panzer-Division renewed the attack on the salient. Although they were able to threaten the American positions, they were beaten back by the end of the day by the tanks of US 4th Armored Division and, rather bizarrely, a bazooka-armed observation plane. On September 21, the skies at last began to clear and US fighter bombers ranged across the battlefield all day. Four days of intense and confused fighting had bought the Germans absolutely no advantage at great cost in both men and equipment. Hitler blamed Blaskowitz, the commander of Heeresgruppe G, and replaced him with General Hermann Balck, who immediately set about organizing an attack for the following day.
On September 22, Manteuffel sent his tanks against the northern edge of the Arracourt salient. They ran head-on into the screen of American light tanks and armored cars that shielded the main force of 4th Armored Division, which was dangerously close to driving a wedge between 5.Panzerarmee and General Otto von Knobelsdorff’s 1.Armee. These units were no match for the tanks of Panzer-Brigade 111, but they held the Germans long enough for a force of tanks and tank destroyers to be rushed to the threatened area. As the morning fog lifted, the Panzers found themselves confronted by a wall of fire thrown at them by the collective force of tanks, artillery batteries, and the inevitable fighter bombers, which appeared as soon as the skies cleared. Panzer-Brigade 111 effectively ceased to exist as a fighting force, losing most of its tanks and personnel, including Oberst Bronsart von Schellendorff, who was killed as he led his brigade. Manteuffel felt that the American defense might break if any further pressure were applied and committed the remaining tanks of Panzer-Brigade 113. The brigade made repeated attacks throughout September 22 and the following day, when the brigade commander, Oberst von Seckendorff, was killed. Although 5.Panzerarmee had by now been reduced to just twenty-five serviceable tanks, Manteuffel continued to conduct offensive operations for three more days until the clearing weather brought the US fighter bombers out in large numbers and forced the Germans to abandon the offensive. Somewhat ironically, a determined attack made by the infantrymen of 559.Volksgrenadier-Division on September 24 almost overran the lead elements of 4th Armored Division near Château-Salins and the Grenadiers were only beaten back by sustained air attacks. What became known as the Battle of Arracourt was the largest armored engagement that US forces had taken part in up to that time and the performance of the American tank crews had surprised the German commanders. But while the battle was in progress, 3rd Army was informed that its fuel supplies would be restricted and the consequent pause in the American advance convinced the Germans that their offensive, though costly, had been ultimately successful.
Although the days between the capture of Nancy and the commencement of the fighting around Arracourt had been comparatively quiet along much of the front line in Belgium and Holland, by the evening of September 16, German units were reporting signs of continuous movement behind the enemy’s lines that suggested a large assault was imminent. Throughout the following morning, the men of Kampfgruppe Walther watched in awe as wave after wave of Allied transport aircraft flew directly over their positions heading towards the north-east, only to return some hours later flying in the opposite direction. At exactly 2:00 pm, intense and accurate artillery fire began falling on the German positions, followed almost immediately by an aerial bombardment blasting the length of the Valkenswaard road. An hour later, tanks of the Irish Guards moved out of their bridgehead in the opening phase of Operation Garden, the ground offensive aimed at linking up with the Allied airborne forces dropped earlier that day between Eindhoven and Arnhem as part of Operation Market. The British expected that the airborne units would easily seize the Arnhem bridge over the Nederrijn, as the Rhine is known in Holland, while British armor would smash a path through Eindhoven, Nijmegen, and then on to Arnhem to relieve the paratroops with two to three days—that is by September 20 at the latest.
The British offensive ran into trouble from the very beginning, for although the initial bombardment had destroyed all nine anti-tank guns of a Panzerjäger company set up along the Valkenswaard road, a single infantry platoon armed with Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons accounted for nine tanks and a personnel carrier and was able to hold up the entire British column long enough to deny them Eindhoven and its bridge, which they had expected to take by late afternoon.6
When the Eindhoven Bridge was finally captured, a full forty-eight hours later, the British paratroopers in Arnhem had been completely surrounded. In a further setback, Eindhoven was attacked by the Luftwaffe during the night of September 19, while the town was packed with British tanks and supply vehicles.
The airborne phase of the operation had also met with much stiffer resistance than was anticipated. It will be remembered that Model had moved the divisions of Obergruppenführer Bittrich’s II.SS-Panzerkorps to the Arnhem area to rest and refit and these veterans of the Russian and Normandy fronts would now supply the core around which the German defense was built. Importantly, Bittrich’s divisional commanders had taken it upon themselves to retain many of their armored vehicles, which should have been handed over to other units. On the western edge of the city, a Kampfgruppe commanded by Generalleutnant Hans von Tettau and composed of army, navy, and air force personnel was formed and thrown into combat within hours of the first landings. Kampfgruppe von Tettau could also call on the battle-hardened NCO candidates of the SS-Unterführerschule Arnheim and the tanks of Panzer-Kompanie 224. The latter were French vehicles captured in 1940 and, although obsolete, were more than a match for airborne infantry.
Most of the fighting at the Rhine Bridge was undertaken by the reconnaissance battalions of the Frundsberg and Hohenstaufen divisions from Bittrich’s corps. They were supported by the first battalion of Panzergrenadier-Regiment 21 and the Tigers of schwere Panzer-Kompanie Hummel, an Alarmheit unit raised from Panzer-Ersatz-Abteilung 500. The other available units of the Hohenstaufen division, formed into three Kampfruppen, made up the bulk of the German force on the eastern side of Arnhem at Oosterbeek. They were later reinforced by Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 280 and the Tiger tanks of 3.Kompanie, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 506. On the southern edge of the city, known as the Betuwe, the remainder of the Frundsberg division with Kampfgruppe Knaust were tasked with holding up the expected attempt to relieve the paratroopers in Arnhem. On September 19, they were perfectly positioned to intercept the landing of the Polish Parachute Brigade.
During the next week, while fighting raged in Arnh
em and Oosterbeek, the units of Kampfgruppe Walther facing the armored advance along the Valkenswaard road managed to not only delay the British but to cut the highway at several points in their rear. Indeed, on September 23, the British commander had been forced to detach a task force from the Guards Armored Division and send it some 19 kilometers to the south to secure the road. On the following day the road was again cut, this time at Veghel, approximately 30 kilometers north of Eindhoven, by the tanks of Major Berndt-Joachim Freiherr von Maltzahn’s Panzer-Brigade 107 which had arrived in the area from Aachen just days before. On the same day, the Allied command decided to abandon the operation’s main objective, a crossing of the Rhine, and to establish a front at Nijmegen. Although the British managed to re-open the highway on the following day, they now found themselves defending a huge salient which Model lost little time in counterattacking.
On September 30, in an effort to widen what was now being called the Nijmegen Corridor, the Allies launched an attack towards the town of Overloon, which lies some 25 kilometers east of Eindhoven close to the western bank of the River Maas, this time with the US 7th Armored Division in the lead. The front line here was held by Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 21, a Luftwaffe Flak unit, and a Kampfgruppe under the command of Sturmbannführer Franz Roestel, which had been sent south after taking part in the defense of Arnhem and was primarily composed of SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 10 equipped with fifteen Jagdpanzer IV L/48 tank destroyers.
This battle, which was overshadowed at the time by the fighting taking place along the Moselle, was in fact one of the fiercest struggles of the campaign. The American tanks valiantly threw themselves at the German lines time and again but were stopped on each occasion by a combination of the extensive minefields and the skilful deployment of Panzer-Brigade 107 and Kampfgruppe Walther, both of which were used as a mobile reserve. Persisting with their attacks, the Americans reached Overloon on October 2, but were once again pushed back in savage fighting, which at one point descended into a hand-to-hand struggle. The Allies began to realize that, once again, they had underestimated their opposition. As if to drive home the lesson, the Germans managed to launch no less than seven counterattacks on Wednesday, October 4 alone. By the end of the week, 7th Armored Division was completely exhausted and was replaced by the British 11th Armored and 3rd Infantry divisions. The British formations took four days to prepare their assault on Overloon and, at around noon on October 12, advanced in two columns from the east and west, preceded by a massive artillery barrage. The British found themselves mired in the same swampy ground that had held up the Americans but managed to enter the town after two days of hard fighting. The last German defenders, barricaded in the church, refused the offer of surrender and fought on to the last man. The outlying village of Loobeek was taken on Monday, October 16 and Venray, further to the south, was taken on the following Thursday. The Battle of Overloon ended the general Allied advance in this area as the divisions would be needed for the operations to clear the Scheldt Estuary far to the north.
Death Ride of the Panzers Page 8