4.32. Disabled during the fighting for the outer suburbs of Strasbourg in January 1945, this Jagdpanzer38(t) Hetzer is almost certainly one of the five such vehicles on hand with Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1553 of 553.Volksgrenadier-Division at the beginning of the year. This unit also reported two Marder III and a single Marder II on hand at the same time.
4.33. Destroyed in the fighting in northern Luxembourg in late 1944 or early 1945, this Pzkpfw IV ausf J is fitted with the mesh Schürzen commonly referred to as Thoma Schild. More correctly termed Drahtgeflechtschürzen, these screens were adopted in September 1944 beginning with Pzkpfw IV ausf J Fahrgestellnummer 92301 and were found to be as effective as the steel plates in use at the time. The Thoma Schild screens were also incorporated into the assembly of the tank destroyers based on the Pzkpfw IV chassis and would probably have been extended to other vehicles had the war continued.
4.34. Photographed near Inden, east of Aachen, on December 17, 1944, this captured Sturmgeschütz III ausf G features the cast mantlet of the main gun which was a standard feature of these vehicles from November 1943. The gun travel lock, situated on the hull front directly below the main gun, was fitted from July 1944. The presence of Zimmerit anti-magnetic mine paste applied in the so-called waffle pattern identifies this as vehicle assembled by the firm of Alkett prior to September 1944. The wire brackets welded to the hull front and driver’s side mudguard are non-standard and are almost certainly a filed modification. The addition of concrete to the front of the crew compartment was commonly seen on assault guns at this time on both the Western and Eastern Fronts and began to appear sometime in late 1944.
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1 Often referred to incorrectly as 6.SS-Panzerarmee, this formation was not incorporated into the Waffen-SS until April 1945. The Panzer-Lehr division had been rushed to the front in late November in an effort to deny Strasbourg to the Allies. After heavy loss it was returned to OB West reserve at the insistence of Rundstedt.
2 The codename translates into English as Watch on the Rhine and was taken from the name of a patriotic song. It was deliberately chosen for its defensive connotations. Bayerlein, who attended the September meeting, later remarked on the sense of unease felt by all those present except, apparently, Hitler.
3 The RAD or Reichsarbeitdienst was a national labor service whose members were armed and had received some basic military training. In 1945, the RAD would supply the recruits for four infantry divisions and two mountain brigades.
4 Like Remer’s brigade, the Führer-Grenadier-Brigade had been formed from one of Hitler’s escort units. Both were upgraded to divisions in early 1945.
5 As part of Operation Greif, German soldiers dressed in American uniforms were to infiltrate the Allied lines and generally cause confusion by spreading rumors, misdirecting traffic, and altering or removing signposts. Their primary mission was, however, to seize a number of bridges across the Meuse River. Commanded by the legendary Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, the brigade was supposed to have been made up from men who could pass for native English speakers outfitted in US Army uniforms and equipped with American vehicles and equipment. In actuality, Skorzeny was forced to accept soldiers who spoke little or no English and sometimes dressed in outdated or incorrect uniforms. There were also not enough captured US Army vehicles and ten Panthers and Sturmgeschütz III assault guns were disguised, rather unconvincingly in the case of the latter, to give the appearance of an Allied armored vehicles.
6 At least eighty-four of the men captured at Baugnez were later murdered by a follow-up unit of 1.SS-Panzer-Division. Although the exact circumstances remain unclear, Peiper, Dietrich, and other Waffen-SS officers were later tried for the crime and convicted. Another similar massacre, which has only recently come to light, took place on the same day at Wereth, about 10 kilometers north-east of St.Vith.
7 The battle group from Panzer-Lehr-Division was commanded by Oberstleutnant Joachim Ritter von Poschinger and consisted of Panzergrenadier-Lehr-Regiment 902 supported by two companies of tanks from Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130. The lead units of 2.Panzer-Division were organized into two Kampfgruppen. The first, under Hauptmann von Böhm, was formed around the division’s reconnaissance battalion; the second, stronger battle group under Major Ernst von Cochenhausen contained a full Panzergrenadier regiment and the Panthers of I.Abteilung, Panzer-Regiment 3. Both battle groups from 2.Panzer-Division were completely destroyed in the fighting after Christmas Eve.
8 Major von Lüttichau’s command consisted of a company of Panzer IV tanks from Panzer Regiment 2, two companies of tank destroyers, three companies of Jagdpanzer 38(t) Hetzers, most of Grenadier-Regiment 1119, and several ad hoc units under the orders of Oberkommando Oberrhein. The codename Sonnewende or Solstice was, rather confusingly, used for several operations during the war, including the commando raid on Tito’s headquarters in Yugoslavia and a major counterattack conducted in Pomerania in 1945.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE END
By the spring of 1945, the strategic reserve that the Wehrmacht had built up in the last months of the previous year had been exhausted. The Anglo-American armies had been fighting on German soil since the struggle for control of Aachen in October 1944 and in the first weeks of the new year had pushed the Germans back to the starting points of the Ardennes Offensive. The campaign in the Rhineland against the Americans had further weakened the German Army, leaving only badly depleted units to defend the east bank of the Rhine.
An Allied offensive to crush the German divisions on the western bank of the river began on March 1 with an attack on a broad front towards Köln in the north and Trier in the south. Fighting with the few tanks and Grenadiers left to them, 9.Panzer-Division, 11.Panzer-Division, 3.Panzergrenadier-Division, and the remaining infantry formations of 15.Armee attempted to hold up the American armored divisions while engineers destroyed the twenty-two road bridges and twenty-five railway bridges across the Rhine. In five days of savage fighting the German divisions were largely destroyed. On March 6, US Army units entered Köln just as the explosive charges on the Hohenzollern Bridge were detonated. This bridge had been one of just four remaining Rhine bridges left standing by that date.1 However, by an incredible stroke of luck, the Ludendorf Bridge at Remagen, over 40 kilometers to the south, was captured intact on the next day when some of the demolition charges fixed to the structure failed to explode. Within two days the Americans had a complete infantry division across the bridge and this was very quickly followed by two more infantry formations supported by tanks.
Over the next weeks the Germans threw every imaginable weapon at the bridge, including super-heavy artillery, floating mines, Kriegsmarine underwater demolition teams, and finally the Luftwaffe’s new Arado Ar 234 jet bombers, escorted by ME 262 fighters. Hitler was incensed at the loss of the bridge and several officers were court-martialed and shot. The Führer also used the crisis at the front as an excuse to sack Rundstedt. He was replaced as OB West by Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, who arrived at Model’s headquarters three days later to be briefed on the situation. An armored counterattack on the growing bridgehead was mounted on the same day by the remaining tanks of 9.Panzer-Division and 11.Panzer-Division, which attacked the American perimeter near Bad Honnef, about 7 kilometers downstream from Remagen. By this time, both German formations were divisions in name only—they could muster just thirty serviceable tanks for the attack, which did little more than consume the available stocks of fuel. Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, the commander of the Panzer-Lehr-Division, was given the task of reducing the bridgehead. In addition to the infantry of five Volksgrenadier divisions, Bayerlein had under his control the tanks of his own division, Panzer-Brigade 106 Feldherrnhalle, and the staff of LIII.Armeekorps. The remnants of the two divisions that had made the attack on Bad Honnef remained in the area for some time and reinforcements were being assembled in the shape of Panzergruppe Hudel, an ad-hoc formation consisting of the Tiger II tanks of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 506, t
he equivalent of two full companies of Jagdpanthers from schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 654, and schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 512 equipped with Jagdtiger tank destroyers. Commanded by Major Helmut Hudel, a veteran of the Russian, North African, and Italian campaigns, this powerful armored group was continuously hampered by supply and mechanical problems, with three Jagdtigers lost to breakdowns and the Jagdpanther battalion never able to field more than eight or nine of its full complement at any one time. It was March 23 before Hudel’s Kampfgruppe was fully assembled and able to take part in the fighting, by which time the Americans were breaking out of their bridgehead.
The inability of Bayerlein and Model to agree on a coordinated plan of attack, partly due to their mutual animosity, meant that the attempts to destroy the American bridgehead were limited to small unit actions where Allied penetrations were hampered more by the terrain and weather. On March 11, the day Kesselring arrived at Model’s headquarters, the Americans were able to complete the first pontoon bridge over the Rhine and were pouring men and equipment into the Remagen bridgehead. Up to this point, the German resistance on the Western front had been conducted with aggressiveness and efficiency, meeting each new emergency by scraping together just enough tanks and troops to at least slow the Allied advance. Now mobile units could not find enough fuel to even reach the front line, if they were lucky enough to have any vehicles to move. Although German industry had been able to sustain—and in some cases increase—production through 1944, the Allied bombing campaign was at last having an effect and all classes of weapons and ammunition were in short supply. In addition, the bulk of the Wehrmacht’s armored force was deployed against the Red Army, which had already overrun East Prussia and most of Pomerania. Until the end of the war, the defense in the west would be left for the most part to battle groups formed from depleted formations and training school personnel backed by the boys and old men of the Volkssturm.
On March 13, US 3rd Army commenced a large scale assault into the Saar-Palatinate region, crossing the Moselle on the following day and breaking through the Siegfried Line within three days. On March 21, US Army units advanced from the Remagen bridgehead as far as Siegburg, a distance of over 10 kilometers; that night, elements of 3rd Army crossed the Rhine at Nierstein-Oppenheim, 15 kilometers south of Mainz, almost unopposed. By March 23, Major Hudel’s Kampfgruppe was at last committed to the battle. Supported by the Panzergrenadiers of 11.Panzer-Division in a counterattack near Eitorf on the northern flank of the Remagen bridgehead, the heavy tanks and tank destroyers could not hope to hold the strong American armored units. The next day Kesselring ordered Model to send what remained of 11.Panzer-Division to the south to support Oberkommando Oberrhein.
As Hudel’s tanks were pushed back from the Remagen bridgehead, the British and Canadian armies in the northern sector of the front launched the largest offensive of the campaign since the D-Day landings, codenamed Operation Plunder. During the first weeks of February 1945, the area between the Maas and the Rhine east of the Dutch-German border had been cleared and British tanks had fought their way through the thick forests of the Reichswald. They pushed the Germans back to Wesel, where General Alfred Schlemm’s 1.Fallschirm-Armee was able to hold a sizeable bridgehead until March 10, when the last units withdrew across the Rhine and destroyed the bridges behind them. The Germans had been allowed to withdraw in good order and 1.Fallschirm-Armee, which was now defending the east bank of the river, had been able to save most its artillery and supply elements. In addition, Schlemm could call on the tanks of 116.Panzer-Division and 15.Panzergrenadier-Division, although these two formations combined were able to field the equivalent of two Panzer companies.
On March 23 the main assault on the Rhine began, preceded by an intense artillery barrage that seriously wounded General Schlemm. General Günther Blumentritt, the commander of LVII.Panzerkorps, would command briefly in his stead. As the British and Canadians were crossing the river, Hitler demanded that a counterattack be launched at the American bridgehead at Oppenheim, south of Mainz, only to be told that not a single reserve formation was available on the Western front. Indeed, the British crossing and the expansion of the resulting bridgehead had met with such surprisingly light resistance that Prime Minister Churchill crossed the river on the second day, venturing as far forward as the Wesel railway bridge, just 200 meters from the town center. By March 25 the town of Wesel, which had been almost completely destroyed by the Allied artillery, was securely in British hands. On the southern front, both Mainz and Darmstadt were captured by American troops on March 26; it is telling that the OKW situation map for that day records no German units in the area except the headquarters of 7.Armee. However, at Aschaffenburg, just 20 kilometers to the east, the Germans hung on tenaciously until April 3, defending the town with little more than a battalion of engineers and an increasing number of stragglers.
As the Allies advanced deeper into German territory, the many training and replacement establishments were ordered to form defensive battle groups from whatever personnel and vehicles might be available. Many of these formations were organized with very little notice and some enjoyed a measure of success, such as Panzer-Lehr und Ausbildungs-Abteilung Tiger, formed from the staff of Truppenübungsplatz Paderborn, east of Dortmund. Fighting as infantry, the 160 men of the battalion were able to hold, and then push back, an American assault on the small town of Wewer. Two days later an armored group, made up of eighteen Tiger I and nine Tiger II tanks and referred to as Panzergruppe Paderborn, attacked US Army units at Borchen, 2 kilometers to the south.2
As courageous as the German defensive efforts were, they could not accomplish any more than small local successes. On April 1, 1945, the two US Armies, which had been heading east and north, linked up at Lippstadt on the Dortmund-Paderborn road and cut off over 300,000 German troops in the Ruhr area. On the following day British armored units, opposed by the last tanks of 15.Panzergrenadier-Division, reached the Dortmund-Ems canal but found that all the bridges had been destroyed. The far bank was held by a number of Hitler Youth boys, led by officers of the Waffen-SS who preferred to be killed rather than allow the enemy to pass. Making the best use of the terrain and harassing the British tank crews with accurate sniper fire, the Germans held on against concerted attacks and intense artillery bombardments. After two days of fighting the British armored divisions gave up and simply bypassed the German position. It was not until April 6 that the best part of two British infantry divisions were able to dislodge the defenders.3
As the British armored units were pushing towards the east, a small Kampfgruppe was moving in the opposite direction, almost straight towards them. Consisting of just five Panther tanks from the Fallingbostel training area and under the command of Major Paul Schulze, the group was ordered to make contact with Panzer-Lehr-Division, which was fighting in the Ruhr Pocket. Joined by a platoon of six Tiger tanks led by Oberleutnant Rudolf Fehrmann, Schulze’s tanks were able to push over 30 kilometers into the enemy’s rear before they were forced into battle on April 9 at Wietersheim, about 40 kilometers east of Hanover. In the brief fight that followed, four of the Panthers were lost and one of the Tigers was damaged. The Germans were, however, able to break through the Allied defenses into the outskirts of Frille, north-east of Minden, and take prisoner thirty British paratroopers who were holding the town. The damaged Tiger, commanded by Unteroffizier Franzen, returned to Fallingbostel on its own tracks and was repaired. By April 11, Schulze’s remaining tanks had fought their way to Bückeburg, a few kilometers to the south of Wietersheim, where two of his Tigers become bogged down as they were negotiating the muddy tracks of a heavily wooded area. The surviving Panther attempted to recover the heavy tanks but also became bogged. Realizing that they could not be moved, Schulze ordered the crews to destroy all three tanks. Shortly after this, Oberleutnant Fehrmann and the crews of the abandoned tanks, unable to keep up with Schulze, were captured by a unit of the US Army advancing from the south. The remaining tanks moved on to Achum, wher
e they were engaged by an American armored unit that was able to knock out the Tiger of Feldwebel Bellof, killing the crew. However, the last Tiger, with Major Schulze on board, accounted for three Sherman tanks and an armored car before capturing a fuel truck complete with its cargo and maps. During the night the Tiger, with the captured fuel truck, reached Lauenau and early the next morning passed through Nienstadt, directed by an American MP who failed to realize that they were Germans. On the western side of the town, the Tiger ran into a column of Allied vehicles. After destroying a tank and an armored car, it was also able to free about 200 German soldiers who had been held captive in a nearby barn. Now with a second American truck in tow, Major Schulze decided to head back towards the German lines. At dawn on April 12, Schulze discovered a large Allied command post at Barsinghausen and made plans to attack it. However, the Tiger finally ran out of fuel at Hohenbostel, less than 2 kilometers short of their objective, where Major Schulze ordered the crew to destroy the tank and disbanded his Kampfgruppe. In the meantime, the Tiger of Unteroffizier Franzen, which had returned to Fallingbostel to be repaired, was ordered to move to Ostenholz and report to Kampfgruppe Grosan.
Death Ride of the Panzers Page 15