Of course, that point is one that the Russian Communists themselves would agree on – traditional Russian rule was archaic. That was their whole premise in overthrowing it and executing the Tsar and his family, purging anyone with ties to the old order, and so on.
It also perfectly maps to what the Soviets actually did afterwards.
“It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted. In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it.”
This is, of course, now agreed upon by all except a fringe handful of die-hard Stalinists. Hard-leftists the world over agree that Stalin did a bunch of terrible things for his own personal power, and due to his own paranoid personality.
***
SOVIET POWER AND AIMS
After outlining psychology, Kennan gets into practical matters. This is particularly fascinating –
“We have now seen nature and background of Soviet program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?
Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query under reference, is conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2) subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet Government does not admit responsibility.
Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated to serve basic policies (a) to (d) outlined in part 1. Actions taken on different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in purpose, timing and effect.
On official plane we must look for following:
(a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.
(b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm. However, other points may at any time come into question, if and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a "friendly Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, question of Soviet base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.”
This analysis is fascinating and penetrating – Soviet leaders, Stalin particularly, would only advance a goal publicly after it was nearly won privately. Until then, they would use covert agencies like NKVD and KGB to subvert enemies, weaken their systems, all the while denying their involvement until the matter was a fait accompli.
Kennan thus answered this question –
Western leaders: What just happened?
Kennan: The Russian leaders are power-obsessed liars.
Kennan goes on to list the Soviet strategy for infiltration, espionage, and subversion; emphasis added to make skimming easier–
“Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on this plane are following:
1. Inner central core of Communist Parties in other countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines, despite legality of parties with which it is associated.
2. Rank and file of Communist Parties. Note distinction is drawn between those and persons defined in paragraph 1. This distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign Communist Parties represented a curious (and from Moscow's standpoint often inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered underground, while rank and file--no longer even taken into confidence about realities of movement--are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely innocent of conspiratorial connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through [apparent omission] organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate political party.
3. A wide variety of national associations or bodies which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor unions, youth leagues, women's organizations, racial societies, religious societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing houses, etc.
4. International organizations which can be similarly penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and women's organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western governments in world affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR
5. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.
6. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan, Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on racial groups within Soviet Union.
7. Governments or governing groups willing to lend themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists, etc. Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be placed extensively at disposal of USSR”
***
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
In Kennan’s final section of the Long Telegram, he outlined the extremely pragmatic and flexible nature of the Soviet leaders and how they responded to pressure –
“This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force is undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:
(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventunstic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sen
sitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.
(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.
(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.
(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.”
The amazing thing about this document?
It basically correctly predicted the next 50 years.
*The Soviets were not as fanatic as the Nazis; they were flexible and opportunistic and would reverse and change course. This proved true in Greece and Turkey immediately, the Berlin Airlift when Stalin tried to blockade it, etc.
*They were still the weaker force, and could be stopped if the West cooperated. Implications for: NATO, re-industrialization of Germany, Marshall Plan, rebuilding of Japan.
*The Soviet Union faced potential collapse every time they had a transfer of power. This eventually proved true when Gorbachev tried to modernize and “finish” the Soviet system with true openness and elections… the whole system came crumbling down.
*Genuine goodwill and world-building was the most effective way to counteract Soviet agitation and destruction.
Kennan concludes on a cautiously hopeful note –
“Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.”
And ends it:
“Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After Al, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.
KENNAN”
***
THE SOURCES OF SOVIET CONDUCT
The American State Department, and indeed, all of the government, was at perhaps its most important crossroads in history. As we have seen, there were certainly defenders of Communism – some out of opportunism, some out of idealism, some out of ideology, and some – indeed – bribed and paid off with Soviet loot.
All the most easily found summaries of Kennan’s work online are… garbage. You should read the original stuff.
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm
In Foreign Affairs, Kennan published a longer essay version for the American public under the pseudonym “X”, though it was commonly known that Kennan wrote it.
The title of the article was “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, but it’s been relegated and trivialized under the heading “X Article” in the world’s archives –
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X_Article
(That summary is garbage and entirely misses the point, but it does have its own Wikipedia page.)
Foreign Affairs is still alive and running as a publication; Kennan’s original article is still up, albeit behind a paywall –
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1947-07-01/sources-soviet-conduct
An unabridged full copy is here –
http://www.historyguide.org/europe/kennan.html
It elaborates on the situation in a more essay-like, less terse format.
It would reshape American policy and thinking: it outlined containment, the internal and external pressures of the Soviet system, and the thinking and origins of the Soviet leaders’ sentiment.
***
COLD WAR
Next chapter, we will finish our series on Temporal Control with Infinite Fronts, dealing with how President Truman responded to infinite and infinitely flexible Soviet pressure.
Last chapter, we outlined the domestic political forces that made Truman VP (and thus suddenly thrust into the spotlight as President after less than three months on the job, and completely in the dark on many key matters). Understanding these types of pressures and politicking is critically important – the Machinations behind the scenes, seemingly so trivial, that set the world in motion.
In this chapter, we are learning about history, yes, but also abstractly about Power and Analysis – Kennan’s analysis was one of the most important in modern history. His Long Telegram from Moscow, and the subsequent Sources of Soviet Conduct essay, set the tone for the next 50 years of American history; we will deal with the actions the American leaders took from it next week, as well as key lessons for how to navigate large crises.
***
THE NATURE OF ANALYSIS
The world often makes little sense until you sit down and do analysis.
Kennan nails a number of key points of good analysis:
*Background
*Context
*Subject-Matter Expertise
*Critical Thinking
*Pragmatism
*Drawing on a Variety of Sources
*Elaborating where necessary
*Being terse and brief where possible
*Including practical takeaways
*Organizing the material to be useful in decisionmaking
The Long Telegram and subsequent Sources of Soviet Conduct essay were one of the finest pieces of analysis in American history; perhaps only the Federalist Papers advocating for the ratification of the Constitution had a similarly enormous impact.
It’s hard intellectual work, to be sure, but our readership tends to be forward-thinking people. I can’t recommend enough that you actually go read Kennan’s Long Telegram and Sources of Soviet Conduct. These two pieces of writing changed world history.
Next chapter, we’re going to go deep into what you should do once you know the problem.
But how do you know the problem?
Analysis.
You need to analyze situations. Follow Kennan’s model. Don’t do naive or idealistic analysis, don’t blindly trust promises or casual surface-area facts. Great analysis shows strengths and weaknesses, shows where defense is required, where offense is called for, where patience prevails, where idleness is fatal.
Ask yourself: how good are your skills of analysis?
It is a learnable skill. Reflect on it, read Kennan once now, brush up on the Cold War a bit more, and then read him again. Reading his work makes you smarter.
Just thinking about thinking goes a long way to improve one’s ability to read a situation correctly.
And isn’t that a necessary precursor to making the best choices in complex and high-stakes situations?
“This man is your FRIEND. He fights for FREEDOM.”
That’s true. I would’ve broken bread with any Russia
n soldier fighting the Nazis. They were genuinely good men.
But they were led by a cruel and brutal man, a bank robber and extortionist, who channeled all the skills he learned in his training to be an Orthodox priest (oh, you didn’t know Stalin trained in a seminary as a priest as a young man? it’s true, look it up)… he used his mix of religious skills, oratory, and criminality to lead the world down into chaos.
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