were not necessarily always composed of hoplites. Or, to put it another way, technology more often responds to, than creates, tactics.29
NOTES
I wish to thank Professors A.H.Jackson, Josiah Ober, and Mark Edwards, who kindly read an earlier draft and offered many helpful suggestions.
Works referred to by author alone or with short title or date are cited in full in the Bibliography to this volume.
1. Precise estimates of all components of the panoply may be impossible since most archaeological finds show substantial corrosion of bronze. Wood shield cores and spear shafts, as well as the interior leather padding of helmets, greaves, and shields, are nearly all lost; no representative weights, then, can be confirmed. Students at California State University, Fresno, have fabricated various types of metal helmets, body armor, shields, spears, swords, and greaves. They tell me that the total weight of the entire ensemble is nearly 70 lbs (over 31 kg). A sample of (subjective) scholarly opinion follows (all weights converted to pounds): (1) total panoply: over 70 lbs (G.Glotz and R.Cohen Histoire grecque II, Paris, 1938:347); 70 Ibs (L Montross, War Through the Ages, New York, 1946:8); 72 Ibs (J.F.C.Fuller Armament and History, London, 1946:37; Delbrück 1975:86). (2) breastplate, helmet, sword: 35 Ibs (Donlan and Thompson 1976:341 n. 4). (3) shield: 13.5 Ibs (H.Blyth (1977) has a full discussion of fabrication and materials based on careful examination of a surviving wood core); 16.5 lbs (Connolly 1981:47); 15.5–17.5 lbs (Donlan and Thompson 1976:341 n. 4); 18 Ibs (Warry 1980:35). (4) spear: 2.2 Ibs (Markle 1977:325). (5) breastplate: 40–50 lbs (Snodgrass 1967:123). See Hanson 1989:55–88 for a small sampling of ancient complaints over equipment, weight, and difficulty in usage. See Connor 1988:10 n. 30; P.McKechnie, Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century BC (London, 1989): 94 n. 12; and A.H. Jackson's chapter in this book, for estimates of the cost of arms and armor.
2. Pritchett, War 4.46–51 has collected the ancient testimonia. The Greeks rarely indicated precise duration in hours. I assume that the common generic statement epi polu must include anything from a few minutes to up to an hour or two. Most battles were decided essentially within an hour; mopping up, pursuit, the killing of stragglers and capture of prisoners could, of course, take much longer. I have watched well-conditioned students duel in full armor (ca 70 lbs/31.7 kg) under the early afternoon sun of late May (90°F/32°C); most are exhausted within minutes. Donlan and Thompson in their careful studies found it was impossible to re-create the 'mile-run' of Marathon; they concluded that men in armor could manage a speed of 5–6 mph for little over 200 yds (8–10 kmh over 182 m). See Delbrück 1975:83–5 for a lengthy discussion over the problems of endurance for men on the move and weighted down by armor.
3. For this change in tactics and reduction in the panoply, see Snodgrass 1967:93–4; Anderson 1970:27–37; Hanson 1989:57–8, and especially Chrimes 1949:362–8.
4. Some of this reluctance (e.g. Courbin [in Vernant 1968:90]) to admit this is well illustrated by Cartledge (1977:20) who, like Pritchett and Latacz, seems willing to accept earlier phalanx tactics. At one point, for example, he rightly suggests: 'Salmon fails to do justice, it seems to me, to the fact that the Greeks invented the double-grip shield: why should it not have been with the phalanx in mind rather than the other way round?' Yet, on the same page he states: 'The hoplite shield was invented by c. 700. Hoplites properly so called (i.e. operating in phalanx formation) followed somewhere in the first quarter of the seventh century, the precise date varying naturally from state to state' (emphasis added). However, it seems improbable to me that the Greeks would have had specific tactics only 'in mind' or even 'in progress' and thus proceeded to manufacture precise equipment for a form of fighting which existed in theory only! Surely men must have already been phalanx fighters of some sort and thus created the items of the panoply through a process of trial and error to meet their own demonstrated needs, that is, to improve their battle efficacy in massed array.
5. Modern methods of procurement also reflect this sequence. The Pentagon usually publishes criteria for new weapons systems based on their own evolving particular tactical and strategic needs; the defense industry then develops technology that meets those military requirements. Reversals in the process are seen by the public as deliberate distortions, cynical attempts to sell new weapons that are not needed. True, on occasion, an innovative breakthrough (e.g. gunpowder, rifling) can sometimes suggest new tactical applications, but this is rarer, and it is usually a matter of modifying, rather than creating, tactics. (One can even here argue that musketry grew out of a general call to increase missile velocity and thus to penetrate fortifications and body armor.) For example, fighter aircraft in the First World War were developed in response to pilots who desired a new technology superior to the aerial exchange of revolver and rifle fire: battle in the air antedated the appearance of true fighter aircraft. No one would suggest that air combat grew out of the discovery of novel aerially mounted automatic weapons. Even though there is a 'chicken-or-egg' character to the dilemma, the same can be said of most weapon discoveries: they do not burst from the head of Zeus without some consideration of the battlefield.
6. For earlier use of the round shield, see P.Schauer, 'Der Rundschild der Bronze und Früher Eisenzeit,' Jahrbuch des Römische Germanischen Zentralmuseums Mainz (27) 1980:196–246; Snodgrass 1964b: 37–68. For the breastplate, cf. Snodgrass 1964b: 72–90; 1967:59–60; 1971:33–50, and, more generally, cf. Garlan 1975:124; Courbin (in Vernant) 1968:89.
7. This view has been most cogently argued by Snodgrass 1965, following Nierhaus. See also W.Donlan, 'Archilochus, Strabo, and the Lelantine War,' TAPA 101 (1970) 137; Salmon 1977:86–90 (who dares the phalanx earlier than Snodgrass's 650 BC). A modified version accepts the
gradual, incremental introduction of weapons, but postulates a closer relationship with phalanx tactics, the idea being that once the shield was known, the equipment mandated new tactics, cf. Garlan 1975:123–4.
8. Lorimer first argued for the radical change in tactics based on the discovery of the porpax and antilabe. Both Cartledge (1977:20) and, to a lesser extent, Greenhalgh (1973:73), have supported this view, but with important additions and modifications. They stress (contra Snodgrass) the unsuitability of the hoplite shield for skirmishing and individual combat, and therefore believe the double-grip inevitably led around 700 BC to new tactics, some of which, according to Cartledge, were already 'in progress' or 'in mind.'
9. Although my concern here is not with these larger issues, I shall suggest briefly in the epilogue that, if there was a reform, it must be associated with equipment, not tactics, and thus probably was without wider social and political ramifications (ca 700 BC).
10. Van Wees (1986:302) cf. especially Latacz (1977:36–8). Most recent studies have questioned the certainty of either late or early dates for the phalanx. For example, Cartledge (1977:20) points out: 'Arguments from visual and literary art are too insecure to decide the issue.' The problem in ascertaining an exact date lies in the intrinsic limitation of the contemporary genres, both pictorial and literary, which precludes any argument from silence (cf. Pritchett, War 4.72 n. 212). Quite simply, even if a vase-painter wished to portray a phalanx before 650 BC, he would not have yet had the technical capacity to do so (cf. Cartledge 1977:21 n. 75; Salmon 1977:91; Pritchett, War 4.41). In a rather different manner, Ahlberg (1971:49ff), who presents dramatic visual evidence which often supports Latacz's and Pritchett's conclusions from Homer, likewise seems to suggest that the apparent soloists of early vase-painting are no proof at all for the absence of earlier mass formations. Her Late Geometric pictorial examples may reveal phalanx-like tactics, though in a convention not easily understandable to those (i.e. us moderns) unacquainted with the painters' peculiar techniques at this time. The same surely holds true of Homer and—only a generation or two later—the lyric poets. Both were 'working within the conventions of a tradition. But in this case the tradition was entirely epic and so singularly inappropriate
for describing a new hoplite context' (Cartledge 1977:25). Cf. Van Wees 1986:286; J. Griffin, Homer on Life and Death (Oxford, 1980) 48; Latacz 1977:45. Remember that even the dry, unheroic narrative descriptions of phalanx battle in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon often comprise anecdotes concerning just a few individuals, e.g. Eurytos and Aristodemos at Marathon, the 'old man' at Mantineia, or Sphodrias and his son at Leuktra.
11. Pritchett, War 4. 30; Latacz 1977:48ff. Pritchett, like Latacz earlier, has made an exhaustive reexamination of the so-called 'phalanx' passages in the Iliad, and argues persuasively that they must represent massed attacks of some sort even if lacking precisely the organization and precision of the classical model. For a list of some of these lines, see Snodgrass 1964b: 176–7, who rejects them all. Latacz, though, who devoted an entire monograph to the subject and whose treatment of these passages has
superseded all earlier discussions, proved in 1977 that such references must illustrate mass formations. Indeed, he made the next logical assumption: how could there then be any subsequent hoplite reform in tactics (1977:237–44)? Cf., too, Kromayer and Veith (1928:23), Lammert (1921—'Schlachtordnung' col. 1625), G.S.Kirk (in Vernant 1968:110), and especially A.Lang, The World of Homer (London, 1910) 5 1ff. For the idea that phalanxes also fought in the first Messenian War, see Detienne (in Vernant 1968:139); Pritchett, Topography 5. 20–1.
12. The presence of occasional duelling with missile weapons need not rule out the general preference for massed conflict in Homer (e.g. Delbrück 1975:59; Van Wees 1986:286); Latacz (1977:46–9) has demonstrated that references to the 'mass' (e.g. plethus) exist almost everywhere in the Iliad and are the rule rather than the exception; the rarer soloist passages receive greater detail and length because of the heroic quality of the epic genre. Nor can phalanx tactics be discounted in the Iliad because the hoplite panoply had not yet fully emerged. All kinds of arms and armor were used in massed attacks throughout Greek and Persian history (e.g. Xen. An. 1.8.9; 7.8.15, and, if we can believe the Cyropaedia on Persian practice, Cyr. 6.2.10; 6.3.23; 7.1.33). See Salmon (1977:91): 'Uniformity of weapons and of methods may not yet have been thought vital for the phalanx: what mattered was its cohesion and the unflinching maintenance by the members of the group.' For a collection of examples where 'hoplites' employ a variety of weapons, see Pritchett, Topography 5.22–3; War 4.11–13. Consequently, scenes on early vases or in Homer which suggest soloists equipped with javelins and non-hoplite armor are not arguments against the presence of the phalanx. We must also keep in mind that while the term 'hoplite' nearly always suggests 'phalanx' tactics, the reverse is not always true. Phalanxes at various times and places could be composed—no doubt less successfully so—of variously armed warriors, but hoplite infantrymen—perhaps the most perfect of all phalanx fighters—rarely fought outside massed formation. Their use as epibatai (Krentz 1985a: 53) on ships was a special circumstance (ships offer far different 'terrain' than flat plains) and should not be construed as evidence of their suitability as soloists on land. The career of Demosthenes in Aitolia and Sphakteria and the rise of light-armed skirmishers assumes the unsuitability of hoplites outside the phalanx (e.g. cf. also Polyb. 9.15.7.ff.; Thuc. 4.129).
13. Cf. e.g. Cartledge 1977:20 n. 73; Chrimes 1949:361–2; Lorimer 1947:107–8.
14. (1) The shield offered less protection for the right side, e.g. Thuc. 5.71.1; Xen. Hell. 4.4.11 (cf. Cartledge 1977:20) and thus was 'shared' by two combatants along the line (Plut. Mor. 220A). (2) It also restricted maneuverability (Cartledge 1977:20). Many (e.g. Snodgrass 1965:85; Salmon 1975:85 n. 6: Greenhalgh 1973:73; Krentz 1985a: 60–1) fail to appreciate just how clumsy a 3 ft (ca 1 m) shield actually was, carried on the forearm by a man not much over 5 ft 6 ins (1.67 m) in height and wearing 50 lbs (22 kg) or so of other bronze armor on his head, back, and legs, holding an 8 ft (2.4 m), double-pointed spear. Cf. Hanson 1989:66; Donlan and Thompson 1976:341; Lorimer 1947:76–7. Tyrtaios'
description (1.11.16), then, of a shield covering a man from shin to shoulder is probably not an exaggeration or proof of some pre-hoplite body shield, as is sometimes thought. After all, if the diameter of the hoplite shield was 3 ft (less than a metre), we can readily imagine only 2 ft 6 ins (76 cm) of unprotected flesh below and above the rim on a 5 ft 6 ins (1.67 m) crouching hoplite. See e.g. Greenhalgh 1973: figs 45, 50, 54, 67, 72. The lack of the telamon made protection for the back impossible, cf. Greenhalgh ibid. 73–5. Also, the expense and difficulty in construction was considerable. See H.Blyth, who examined carefully one of the few extant wood cores (currently in the Vatican Museum):
The frequent references in literature to enormous shield factories (e.g. those of Kephalos and Pasion) suggest a far more elaborate procedure (e.g. lathe work, glue, bronze and leather working) than the occasional, on the spot creation of flat wood or wicker shields (e.g. Xen. Hell. 2.4.25). For other references to the general unsuitability of hoplite equipment to individual skirmishing, cf. Holladay 1982:94–5. Heavily protected spearmen with such awkward shields never appear as soloists in other cultures at other times. We can imagine what a disadvantage the 'hoplite' would be at in the Roman gladiatorial arena when matched against the Thracian, Retiarius, Samnite or Mirmillo, all of whom had either swords or two types of offensive weapons and, of course, much different body armor and shields.
15. I do not understand why the shield is often termed 'convex' by modern scholars; should we not approach discussion of the shape from the vantage point of the men who carried such equipment? The usual Greek adjective koile reflects this view and is translated as 'hollow' or 'concave'; kurte (convex), on the other hand, was rarely used by the Greeks in association with the shield.
16. Cf. Donlan and Thompson:
It is significant to note that running the prescribed distance with the shield in chest high position required an average increase of 28% in energy expenditure for each subject…The hoplite shield, which appears to have weighed about sixteen pounds, could only be carried isometrically, and the considerable energy expenditure required sharply limits the distance over which troops could sustain great effort.
(1976:341, emphasis added)
Cf. Ar. Nub. 987–9 for an ancient example of the complaints over the need to produce nearly a third more in 'energy expenditure.' This disadvantage brought about by radical concavity must be behind Asklepiodotos' opinion (Tact. 5) that the best Macedonian shield is one 'not too hollow'; otherwise, the shield, which hung from the neck by a strap, would be too bulky and could not fit conveniently close to the chest.
17. In literature, cf. Tyrt 11.24; Eur. Tro. 1196–200; and especially Arrian Tact. 16.13. A sampling of vase-paintings: Ducrey 1985: pls 2,47,62, 84, 85, 178, 187; Anderson 1970: pls 2A, 12. In general, see Connolly 1981:54; Hanson 1989:68–9. For references to the unusual bowl shape of the shield, cf. Plut. Mor. 241 F 16 (as a bier for a corpse); Thuc. 7.82.3 (as a collection dish for money); Aen. Tact. 37.7 (to rest on the ground and resonate sounds of enemy miners below). Remember, the conical hill at Argos was dubbed the aspis.
18. The recurring 'heresy' that there was no push or othismos has recently (and rightly) been rejected once more. See Holladay 1982; Anderson 1984; Hanson 1989:171–84 and especially Pritchett, War 4.65–7.
19. Cf. Snodgrass 1964:37–54. If we can believe Diodorus (23.3.1), the early Romans assumed that round shields were properly to be used with the phalanx, rectangular shapes with maniples.
20. Cf. Snodgrass 1964:133. It may have been used occasionally in late Mycenaean times (e.g. Snodgrass 1967:29).
21. For some preserved remains, cf. H.Weber, Olympische Forschungen (Berlin, 1944) 1.154–8, pls 63–8. Markle 1977:325; G.M.A.Richter, 'Recent acquisitions by the Metropolitan Museum of Art' AJA 43 (1939) 194–201.
22. Sauroter and sturax are often used interchangeably. However, sauroter (used in epic, Ionic, and late Greek, e.g. Hom. Il. 10.153; Hdt. 7.41.8; Polyb. 6.25.6; 11.18.4; AP 6.110) seems to be the more precise term and, although it should mean 'lizarder'
(?), might perhaps really be derived from the long, slender shape of the spike which tapered to a point at the end and thus resembled a lizard (saura, sauros) or, more likely, a lizard's tail. Sturax, on the other hand, is Attic (Xen. Hell. 6.2.19; Pl. Lach. 184) and probably originated from the resin-bearing tree of the same name, which sometimes could be used for javelins or spears (e.g. Strab. 12.7.3). Since sturax could refer to the shaft as well (Onas. 10.4), often the diminutive sturakion was properly used for the spike alone (e.g. Thuc. 2.4; Aen. Tact. 18.10). Ouriachos (cf. oura=tail) is a general term for butt or end, and is on occasion used specifically for the butt of the spear and perhaps also is to be identified with the hoplite butt-spike itself (e.g. Hom. Il. 2.443; AP 6.111; Hdt. 9.75). In Homer, the choice of either ouriachos or sauroter is apparently determined by solely metrical considerations.
Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience Page 12