Hungarian Premier Istvan Tisza increasingly pressured Conrad to prevent an invasion of Hungary. In turn, Conrad exhorted General Boroević that his fifteen-division army encountered “a mere twelve-division enemy force.”112 Ignoring the debilitation of the Third Army, Conrad demanded that Mezölaborcz be held, while the Russians continued to deploy a seemingly endless flow of reinforcements.113 Meanwhile, a new wave of subzero temperatures caused the proliferation of frostbite, with some infantry regiments sustaining 50 percent casualties.114 The Third Army situation had become so perilous that in defiance of direct orders, Boroević hurled arriving reinforcements into battle piecemeal. On 1 February Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin, delayed by XIII Corps’ late arrival, finally joined the ill-fated offensive. The Army Group divided into two groups: one marched west and the other east along the existing railroad lines. The meter-and-a-half-high snow halted the western column forward movement on its second operation day.115
In the meantime, the Russians counterattacked the Habsburg positions in the Baligrod area during a driving snowstorm with temperatures of −21°C. The assault threatened V Corps’ rear echelon areas, and after days of fierce fighting, it widened the gap between V and XVIII Corps. This substantially increased the threat of a breakthrough of the defensive line and Habsburg defeat. When Russian troops crossed the San and Stryj rivers, it required prompt and immediate action to reconquer Stryj Valley to prevent the encirclement of South Army’s suddenly exposed flanks.116 Orders to maintain present positions at any price received the reply: “We will hold, cost what it will!”117 Poor visibility conditions made South Army frontal assaults against fortified Russian entrenchments risky, and they achieved little.118
Displeased with Third Army’s VII and X Corps’ constant retreat movements, Conrad warned that the entire Habsburg military situation would be compromised if the corps failed to hold their positions. Generals Conrad and Boroević’s divergent perceptions on strategy and tactics produced growing personal discord, inflamed by disagreement on how best to utilize in-transit reinforcements.119 Boroević argued that heavy snowfall had wreaked havoc on his battlefront and obstructed critical supply routes, while his undermanned Landsturm labor units simply could not maintain the supply roads. He also reported that he required another 6,000 troops just to maintain steady supply movements.120
The 37th Honvéd Infantry Division again reported that severe losses left its front lines untenable. In just four days, the V Corps unit sustained almost 80 percent casualties (10,500 troops to 2,000), while on average 500 soldiers a day either froze to death or succumbed to frostbite.121 Also, in a matter of days, another Honvéd regiment reported 2 officers and 500 men dead or missing, 10 officers and 203 soldiers wounded, and 630 sick (many from frostbite and hypothermia). Because of the acute situation, medics, the wounded, and noncombat personnel had to charge into the front to stem the enemy tide.122 On 3 February, deep snow limited all travel to skis. On 4 February, the regiment endured a third day of marching over the difficult terrain, with the demanding exertions leaving the troops exhausted and incapable of action. The loss of thirty-two front-line officers further diminished the unit’s fighting capabilities.123 The division retreated without any apparent serious enemy pressure. To prevent a catastrophe on this portion of the front, 33rd Infantry Division was ordered to support the decimated division.124
X Corps’ 2nd Infantry Division now defended a five-kilometer snow-covered, densely wooded front with just 1,000 soldiers. On 22 January the division numbered 8,150 troops. The 2nd and 24th Infantry Divisions together had declined to far less than half a full-stand division.125 The 2nd division encountered fierce battle in six different defensive positions around Mezölaborcz. Division commanders warned corps headquarters that as a result of the twelve days of battle, their troops could not resist another Russian night attack. Only retreating and allowing the troops time for rest and rehabilitation could prevent military disaster. When the 2nd Infantry Division retreated overnight to 1 February, it exposed the neighboring 24th and 34th Infantry Division positions, forcing them to withdraw also, followed shortly by the 29th Infantry Division.126 Exhausted troops, many having marched through deep snow during the night, were hurled into battle at daybreak.127 Feeble attempts at launching counterattacks failed because of inadequate troop numbers and extreme troop fatigue.
Group Szurmay also sustained heavy battle losses (three battalions reduced to 130, 150, and 300 men, respectively). Troop fatigue prevented Infantry Regiment 68 from launching an attack.128 General Szurmay requested better mountain equipment, while his infantry received little artillery support and multiple shells sank unexploded into the deep snow. When the 7th Infantry Division supported a frontal assault toward its objective, the Turka roads, it collapsed when the troops encountered intense enemy fire. Infantry regiments 19 and 79 sustained devastating losses, some attributed to frostbite.129 Two infantry brigades halted by huge snow masses and fatigue had to withdraw.130 Even after receiving replacement troops, they numbered just 1,300 men. Severe weather conditions continued to claim as many lives as combat.131 Numerous frozen corpses lying across the land-scape presented a gruesome sight.
Also, on 1 February an aircraft landed in Fortress Przemyśl conveying an order to form combat-ready units from garrison troops to prepare for a possible breakout attempt. In a worst-case scenario, a skeleton force would remain in the fortress to destroy infantry weapons, artillery, and fortress gun turrets, while the remaining garrison attempted to pierce enemy siege lines to join the field armies.132 Intercepted Russian radio transmissions regularly revealed enemy intentions, which prevented disaster. XVIII Corps again reported its Landsturm troops to be unreliable because some simply abandoned their positions while others refused to reoccupy those lost. Some infantry companies had been reduced to thirty or forty men.133
Although III Corps had been specifically ordered to maintain its current frontier ridge positions, the lack of numbers prevented it. On 2 February, Fourth Army commenced assembling its designated forces for its 7 February attack to relieve enemy pressure on the Mezölaborcz area. Meanwhile, III Corps’ left flank troops retreated. After sustaining grievous losses, its two divisions numbered half their normal stand. VII Corps’ 17th Infantry Division also lost almost half of its troops, many to frostbite.134 As battle continued to rage at Mezölaborcz, the Russians launched further storm attacks. Infantry regiments 81 and 88 finally prepared to launch a counterattack on 6 February, but the continuing VII and X Corps retreats jeopardized the overall situation.135 The few arriving reinforcements were dispatched piece meal into the numerous front-line gaps.136
Meanwhile, as Italian demands for territorial compensation to maintain its neutrality increased, rumor had it that Rome would declare war by the end of April if its demands remained unsatisfied.137 Conrad again insisted that the diplomats await improvement in the Carpathian military situation before complying with Italian demands.138 On 2 February, a joint ministerial council meeting in Vienna discussed the matter. On the same day, Group Szurmay’s demanding mission resulted in heavy casualties and halted attack efforts, terminating in an evening retreat. If the group retreated much further, the Russians could invade Hungary. German general Ludendorff charged that Szurmay’s unnecessary retreat endangered neighboring South Army’s 3rd Garde (German) Infantry Division.139 While battle raged, snow-bound areas remained impassable. VII, X, and XVIII Corps could barely defend their positions.140 On 3 February, Group Szurmay again received orders to maintain its positions at any cost, while the Russians continued their vicious attacks. Habsburg soldiers could not even attack weak enemy positions because of the wintry conditions and steep icy approaches. This forced them to fire their weapons while standing upright, making them sitting ducks to the defenders.
Conrad informed the emperor’s military chancellery that the unfavorable Carpathian conditions, combined with tenacious Russian defensive efforts, precluded his achieving the anticipated victory, but he also criticized Germany’s lack of c
ooperation, brutal egotism, and ruthlessness.141 He claimed they minimized their own battlefield failures and exaggerated even the slightest victory while trivializing any Habsburg achievements. Berlin’s persistent diplomatic and military pressure to cede territory to Italy to assure its neutrality galled Conrad, considering that he transferred his Second Army to the German front in November 1914 to assist in the protection of the industrial province of Silesia from invasion.
On 2 February numerous V Corps’ 37th Honvéd Infantry Division staff officers reported to sick call. Corps numbers had declined precipitously, and despite protective measures, frostbite cases continued to increase.142 XVIII Corps also reported numerous cases of frostbite. A neighboring brigade’s failure to launch an ordered attack forced a V Corps division to retreat, creating a major breach between it and Group Szurmay positions and inviting an enemy breakthrough. The V Corps main supply depot, located seventy-eight kilometers away, entailed traversing two particularly difficult mountain passes. On one desolate cart path, it required three hours to travel one kilometer. An enemy attack appeared imminent, threatening the corps flank and rear echelon positions.143
XIX Corps received orders to launch an attack toward Baligrod on 3 February, but the 29th Infantry Division commander considered it a hopeless endeavor. General Zanantoni suggested delaying the attack until the situation improved.144 Fortress Przemyśl witnessed a further rations reduction and slaughtered an additional 7,200 horses. The deteriorating physical condition of man and beast dashed any hopes for a successful breakout attempt. A minimum of 3,500 horses would be required just to reposition artillery to any threatened areas and maintain regular delivery of shells and ammunition. At night, troops foraged for food outside the fortress perimeter.145 A citadel provisions report indicated that food supplies would last until 7 March, horse feed until 4 March. On 3 February, air reconnaissance reported a seven-kilometer column of Russian artillery and infantry approaching Sanok, another twenty-kilometer-long column moving southward.
The Russians unleashed artillery barrages against the fortress’ northwest and southwest walls. Harassing enemy fire became constant, ending a period of relative calm. Enemy assaults launched on 12, 13, and 18 February sought to tighten III District defensive perimeter lines. On 19 February a further Russian assault failed, but on 13 March, czarist forces captured a Habsburg stronghold at Na Garoch-Batyce.146 Disaster threatened when the enemy again broke through VII Corps 20th Honvéd Infantry Division lines, forcing a retreat that increased the threat to Mezölaborcz from the northwest and exposed X Corps’ 2nd Infantry Division’s flank position. An attack by at least six Russian battalions and devastating heavy enemy artillery forced the division’s retreat.147 The artillery fire particularly threatened division battle trains, prompting 2nd and 24th Divisions to rush theirs rearward. After hand-to-hand combat, a portion of the 2nd Division front collapsed.148
On 3 February the Third Army crisis worsened even further when the Russians hurled massive waves of troops against the battered VII and X Corps north of Mezölaborcz, intensifying the friction between Conrad and Boroević.149 On that fateful day, XVIII and X Corps surrendered additional territory. Strong enemy pressure also extended the gap between III and VII Corps, providing the Russians an excellent opportunity to exploit.150 Meager reinforcements attempted to thwart an enemy breakthrough at this vulnerable position. Because of the deteriorating situation, the earlier plan to deploy combined infantry regiments 81 and 88 and the 106th Landsturm Brigade to launch an attack had to be abandoned. General Boroević ordered his left flank corps units to defend their positions at any cost while contemplating inserting the in-transit VIII Corps at his right flank to launch a powerful counterattack. However, the new crisis situation made this unfeasible.151
The transfer of the VIII Corps ten days after the launch of the offensive raises the question why it was not utilized earlier to achieve better mass for the original attack. Meanwhile, overpowering enemy attacks threatened the entire Mezölaborcz area, which also endangered the abysmal Third Army supply situation.152 Even if the weather improved, it would require three to five days to reopen key transport arteries.153 Supply train stoppages continued unabated while extensive snow drifting made the Lupkov forest railroad line inoperable. Overnight, fresh snowfall required further troop energy for shoveling paths before commencing any movement.154
Infantry regiments 81 and 88, participants in key future battles, experienced difficult approach marches to the front. On 3 February the troops marched six and the next day twelve and a half hours through dense woods, to enter battle the next day. For three days the exhausted and inexperienced Infantry Regiment 81 soldiers suffered from hunger, exposure, and frostbite. March Brigade units returned both regiments (81 and 88) to full strength before they entered battle, but both retreated after enduring fierce battle and sustaining excessive casualties. The Russians, contrary to their usual practice, proved relentless in their pursuit of the retreating troops, capturing many prisoners of war as entire units were cut off from escape routes.155
Also on 3 February, XIX Corps Infantry Regiment 33 dwindled to 300 troops, having sacrificed 1,500.156 Corps troops must defend their positions, otherwise the Cisna transportation hub would become exposed to attack. The deteriorating Third Army troop conditions concerned army command because they could not anticipate any immediate improvement in the overall situation. General Boroević rushed any available replacement troops into his collapsing lines.157 He preferred to surrender terrain to avoid further unnecessary casualties while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements, but Conrad ordered that all lines be held whatever the cost because he remained deeply concerned about VII and X Corps’ retreat movements and the widening gap between III and VII Corps.
Major obstacles continued to hobble South Army in its offensive efforts, while complaints multiplied about the lack of artillery support. The rugged mountain terrain favored the defenders. German artillery batteries still remained too far from the front to be effective.158 The overall situation required that South Army continue its efforts to encircle the enemy’s main retreat route as the Russians continued to threaten Habsburg positions in the San River Valley, specifically the single road connection to the V Corps rear echelon area. The few available reserve troops consisted of very young or older soldiers, many recovered from wounds or sickness.159
Under mounting pressure, Conrad ordered a gradual retreat until the Fourth Army attack could assuage the Third Army’s desperate plight. Meanwhile, heavy czarist artillery barrages drove X Corps battle trains away from the Mezölaborcz area.160 The Habsburg military crisis had plateaued! As dense fog continued hindering Third Army artillery fire, enemy troops pierced X Corps defensive lines while exhausted 2nd Infantry Division soldiers fought hand to hand along their five-kilometer defensive line during a driving snowstorm.161 When forced to retreat, the division began the movement under terrible conditions. Czarist troops smashed through the stunned Habsburg troops, which sustained additional casualties they could ill afford.162 An XVIII Corps retreat jeopardized the earlier V Corps gains.
On Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s front, heavy snowfall sabotaged the 6th Infantry Division attack. Of 1,000 casualties, half resulted from illness, a quarter from frostbite.163 Sickness or frostbite struck one hundred troops per day. On 4 February, the Russian assault on Mezölaborcz halted rail traffic to Lupkov, the main Third Army eastern flank supply line. Only the czarist failure to immediately pursue retreating Habsburg troops prevented a cataclysmic defeat. When Mezölaborcz finally fell during the night to 5 February, the victors paused to celebrate their bloody victory.164
On Group Szurmay’s front, 66th Infantry Brigade lost half its stand to frostbite and physical overexertion in less than a week. One XVIII Corps unit dwindled to fifty to sixty men and three machine guns; nevertheless, it received orders to hold its extended positions. The lingering transportation difficulties resulted in half of necessary supplies reaching the front.165 Essential railroad traffic becam
e even more congested.166 The Russians also assaulted the defenders’ flank and rear positions on the high terrain they had just conquered at Borynia near Uzsok Pass.167 Czarist units, some neck-deep in snow, extended their attack at the San River area, forcing the hapless defending units across the river on 6 February. All able-bodied soldiers were thrust into battle in a desperate attempt to stem the enemy onslaught.
The appearance of sunshine allowed Habsburg units to finally receive much-needed artillery support, while the enemy hurled additional reinforcements against the Third and South armies.168 General Boroević again implored Conrad to spare his troops from further suffering by terminating the present operations until weather conditions improved. Pressured by the dire situation at Fortress Przemyśl, Conrad denied the request, planning to renew the offensive in the same area as the recent failed effort, but this time on a more compressed front.169 He did not want to have to accept responsibility for the loss of Fortress Przemyśl. However, by early February Third Army had proved not only incapable of achieving its multiple missions but even of maintaining its positions. It must be recalled that its offensive had been launched with insufficient troop numbers and little consideration for the ramifications of a winter mountain campaign. Field commanders too often received orders that they could not expedite under the grueling circumstances.
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