Corps’ assault produced unexpected gains: the 41st Honvéd Infantry Division, after traversing very difficult snow-covered terrain, seized a portion of the dominating Magurczyne position. Other Habsburg battlefield reports were far less encouraging. Little progress transpired along the Baligrod roads (the major offensive effort), and various attempts to advance created gaps between units.86
Corps Schmidt commenced its advance with only brigade-size units of the 27th and 32nd Infantry Divisions, insufficient to render a notable success. Third Army finally joined the Second Army offensive efforts. When XVII Corps’ 45th Infantry Division advanced, fierce battle erupted. Artillery fire reverberated throughout the Laborcz Valley as VII Corps attempted to advance over the forward ridges.87
Attacks continued on 1 March where earlier battle had proven successful while inserting the few reserve troops. Because field commanders could not rely on receiving adequate reinforcements, they had to pin their hopes for victory on their present troop numbers. The tardy arrival of several divisions designated for the offensive signified that weaker forces launched the difficult missions.
In the meantime, the main XIX Corps attack force (29th, 34th, and 41st Infantry Divisions) continued its advance, while the Magurczyne position and surrounding high terrain received technical reinforcement, which proved difficult to overcome. Several rows of barbed wire made the approach to the Russian positions even more problematic because the enemy had entrenched itself in several reinforced lines. The 29th and 41st Honvéd Infantry Divisions encountered strong enemy positions. The 34th and portions of the 29th encountered lighter resistance. XIX Corps troops encircled the enemy positions at Magurczyne, then 41st Honvéd Infantry Division stormed the main position three times, each attempt halted by flanking enemy artillery fire.88
Map 8. Military Situation Second Half of March 1915
Overpowering the strong enemy defensive positions appeared unthinkable, considering the battle-weakened condition of the attacking troops and lack of effective artillery support. The available artillery batteries contained a majority of light-caliber guns with limited stores of shells, but significant artillery preparation against the strong enemy positions was imperative for the Second Army to advance. Without it, the infantry again made the ultimate sacrifice. XIX Corps, for example, counted just three cannon batteries in the combat area. Table 4 lists artillery pieces per kilometer of front, showing just how little support was available for the infantry.
Table 4. Artillery Pieces per Kilometer of Front
Units Front (in km) Guns Guns per km
XIX Corps 8 50 6
Corps Schmidt 12 74 6
XVIII Corps 8 56 7
V Corps 20 38 1.8
Group Szurmay 28 220 8
Source: KAN, B/23, Mayern, 2. Armee im Karpatenschlacht.
Terrain and supply traffic difficulties continued to affect operations. The supply route between Rostocki Górne and Nagypolany finally became capable of two-way traffic, but this was negated in part by the pressing necessity to repair other supply route sections.89 Nevertheless, the offensive continued. Second and Third Armies reported limited progress, while the Fourth Army’s anticipated attack to relieve enemy pressure against Third Army’s northern flank was canceled. Fourth Army launched a diversionary strike from the Second Army main effort on 6 March—over a week later than planned, and too late to affect Second Army efforts. One participant in the events explained, “On March 1 fog and heavy snow is falling. We are losing all sense of direction. Entire regiments are getting lost, resulting in tremendous casualties. On 6 March there was a complete change in the weather; clear skies, thaw during the day and −20°C overnight, causing the slopes to ice over.”90
The Russian High Command had meanwhile ordered reinforcements to its threatened left flank area. On 1 March, the newly created Russian Ninth Army launched an overwhelming four-corps attack against Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s right flank positions, forcing its troops to abandon them. The reinforcing XI Corps, set to arrive on 4 March, needed to cement a new defensive front. The enemy advanced into the northern Bukovina as far as the Pruth River. Thus, as Second Army launched its offensive, the previously victorious Army Group’s success had been halted. When the enemy changed its Chriffre (decipher) key, the Army Group broke it and could ascertain czarist intentions beforehand and react accordingly.
The recently deployed XIII Corp on Pflanzer-Baltin’s front discovered superior enemy numbers opposing it.91 General Letschitzki’s Ninth Army launched a general attack to protect its threatened extreme flank area and expedite a major attack launched further west. The Russians intended to sever General Pflanzer-Baltin’s forces from the Carpathian Mountains and catch and destroy them. The czarist XVII and XXX Corps assaulted westward, while XI Corps advanced southward. Meanwhile, Habsburg XIII Corps northern flank positions were attacked as a major force struck the flank and rear of Corps Czibulka, threatening to cross the Dniester River.
General Pflanzer-Baltin prepared a middle group of two infantry and two cavalry divisions to disrupt czarist railroad lines, particularly in the Stryj River area, and prevent an enemy crossing of the Dniester River. On the opposite flank, the battered XIII Corps defended the Lomnica River line.92 The newly formed Habsburg cavalry Group Marschall’s intended offensive at the XIII Corps’ northern flank was delayed on 27 February. Meanwhile, Russian pressure forced XIII Corps defenders north of Stanislau to retreat. Another enemy column crossed the Lomnica River and broke through Corps Czibulka and Group Marschall fronts on 28 February. Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s situation had also become critical. Its commander doubled his efforts to prevent a Russian crossing of the Dniester River, although his defending troops’ flank and rear positions were threatened. XI Corps vanguard troops would soon arrive, followed by the German 5th and Austro-Hungarian 6th Cavalry Divisions.
An example of problems encountered on the mountain front may be seen from the following artillery captain’s diary excerpts. His guns had to be transported over mountain terrain blanketed by a meter of drifting snow. When snow melted, the few navigable roads became swampy.93 Weakened and exhausted horses and artillerists traversed the wretched, inhospitable terrain. The steep snow-covered slopes raised the threat of possible avalanches. Multiple supply route segments were too narrow to allow artillery passage, while others traversed deep segmented brooks with ice-covered banks without bridges. Travel required ropes because wagon wheels became suspended over precipices. Fourteen horses were necessary to pull one gun or an ammunition wagon.94
When the artillery unit arrived in Lopienka, men and horses immediately collapsed. All sank into the snow and drifted into death-like sleep. It had required forty-eight hours to traverse forty kilometers (the first twelve hours entailed twenty-five kilometers to Cisna, the remaining nine, twenty-four hours). There had been no sleep for the men for ten hours.95
Company losses included three dead, nine wounded, twenty-seven with dysentery, twelve with typhus, fifty-seven with severe diarrhea, and three with frostbite. Yet the infantry suffered more than any other troops and remained barely battle worthy. The soldiers ate half-cooked meat and cold preserved canned food. They drank melted snow that trickled down from a cemetery above them, causing a sudden onset of intestinal sickness. From the original 4,000 men, 200 survived after a few days of battle. A large number of casualties resulted from frostbite cases.96
In one emotional passage, the author, a horse lover, described how few of the remaining animals could be utilized. At best, just one-third of the horses could march. Many fell ill, struggling against the daily adversities, and were shot when no longer able to perform their duties. The author then related his own personal tragic experience:
My horse, which so often saved my life, should neither be set free to die in misery from hunger along the roads, nor be sent to the so-called “recovery horse hospitals” to then be harnessed to a wagon and driven to death. The course of action that must be taken was quite obvious, but no shot fired in t
he entire campaign would be as difficult as this one. I readied my pistol; my hand wavered. My thoroughbred, a most noble creature, lay exhausted on the ground. He greeted me with a faint whinnying. . . . I dropped my pistol, but the horse whinnied again, so I raised my weapon and fired. Collapsing in the snow, for only the second time in the war, I wept.
Typical of his diary accounts is the following passage:
There were only 250 Landsturm troops and 70 horses remaining. We had to traverse to the next pass, about three kilometers away. Following ceaseless exertion, which brought us to the edge of collapse, the artillery battery arrived at Cisna. We were at the limit of our resistance capabilities and half starved. To our surprise there were neither quarters nor food available for us.97
The VII Corps commander, Archduke Joseph, wrote on 28 February:
From Nagyberzseny onwards, more than 1,000 workers are constructing a passable road. Along the way, we advance on the muddy soil very slowly. . . . [There is] extremely fierce machine gun and infantry fire. The 10:00 p.m. report relayed that my troops have entrenched themselves 50 to 200 paces from the enemy’s position because they have sustained very serious casualties.98
Despite the unrelenting weather conditions, the Second Army offensive continued until 5 March. The 50,000-man assault force achieved little initial progress even though they possessed a numerical advantage. The effort soon appeared doomed, partly as a result of the chronic lack of artillery support. The enemy also sustained enormous losses, which led General Tersztyánsky to speculate that perhaps he could penetrate the Russian defensive lines. He later realized that the twelve-kilometer attack front was too confined to achieve a breakthrough because the enemy rapidly reinforced its front.
In addition to a lack of proper protective uniforms, including their cardboard-soled boots, a repeated complaint emphasized that field overcoats contained a substitute material that inadequately protected against cold, dampness, or wind. Soldiers’ extremities became increasingly susceptible to frostbite while the White Death relentlessly claimed many additional lives. On 6 February, for example, Infantry Regiment 7 reported that more than half of its casualties had succumbed to cold-related illnesses. Jäger Battalion 9, with 490 infantry remaining, lost 510 men, 45 to frostbite and 115 reported missing, presumed frozen to death. Bosnian-Hercegovinian Regiment 2, with 2,750 soldiers, lost 530, including 100 to frostbite and 100 missing in action. Unit log book entries recorded widespread frostbite. In early February, frigid subzero temperatures claimed the lives of 26 officers and 1,800 men of the Croatian 42nd Honvéd Infantry Division in just two days. Half the losses resulted from frostbite, another 25 percent succumbed to the White Death or were listed as missing in action.99 The 6th Infantry Division incurred 1,000 casualties between 30 January and 4 February, half of which succumbed to cold-related illnesses; others froze to death.100 These conditions created escalating bitterness toward the Hinterland, except toward individual soldiers’ families.
Many of the Second Army units (formerly the Third Army eastern flank) suffered from extreme battle fatigue. During the first offensive, Habsburg Third Army divisions had diminished to regiment size and smaller. X Corps continued its attempts to regain the critical Lupkov railroad station, but attacking along the steep, unforested southern slope ridges proved exceedingly difficult.101
With Fortress Przemyśl defenders on the verge of starvation, Viennese diplomats voiced concerns relative to Italy entering the war, which could spell disaster for Austria-Hungary. Early March czarist counterattacks forced General Conrad’s attention to the Dukla Pass area. He ordered Third Army to seize the pass while Fourth and Third Army inner flank troops pressured the enemy.102
While reinforcements were necessary to sustain the Second Army attack on 1 March, multiple 13th and 31st Division units had not arrived on the front. Third Army efforts floundered when its X Corps attack encountered strong Russian positions on the Magura heights, where flanking enemy artillery and machine gun fire produced heavy casualties. Thick fog blanketed the battlefield until noon; then heavy snowfall buried valleys and higher elevations, with temperatures again plummeting to well below freezing.103 The unrelenting weather conditions prevented effective artillery support for the troops, with the futile infantry attacks producing only additional bloodshed. VII Corps in particular sustained severe losses from launching uncoordinated attacks without adequate artillery support. Subsequent night attacks resulted in little success, but fierce battle erupted at daybreak. Corps casualties listed 271 dead, 805 wounded, and 100 missing in action.104 The usual communication difficulties also hindered effective action. Group Szurmay, for example, reported that it required twice as long to have telegraph messages deciphered, requiring thirteen hours instead of the customary six!105
Meanwhile, Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s XIII Corps military debacle now threatened its rear echelon positions. A retreat order could not be dispatched immediately because corps troops were dispersed throughout the wooded mountain terrain and could not receive the order in time.106 Reports that the czarist II Cavalry Corps, 11th Infantry Division, and the anticipated transfer of its XVII Corps (3rd and 35th Infantry Divisions) to its Ninth Army raised concern. The army battered open an eight-kilometer gap between Pflanzer-Baltin’s two major battle groups. If the enemy successfully penetrated Pflanzer-Baltin’s lines, it would force a retreat into the Carpathian Mountains. The arrival of XI Corps momentarily saved the situation, but a few hours later, the Russians again smashed into XIII Corps, forcing it into further retreat. The army group’s western front area now became endangered. Second Army received the mission to draw as many czarist units as possible to its front to relieve the escalating enemy pressure on Pflanzer-Baltin’s flank positions.
General Conrad warned that surrendering Fortress Przemyśl would have a serious demoralizing effect on the army and damage the monarchy’s and its army’s prestige. He goaded his freezing, combat-fatigued armies that their duty remained to liberate the fortress, and not one day could be lost in that effort. Because the estimated fortress food stores would be depleted by mid-March, the offensive must be continued at all cost.
Also, the Second Army’s left flank VII, X, and XIX Corps reported additional serious casualties after launching uncoordinated attacks against entrenched enemy positions without sufficient artillery support.107 Entire regiments again became disoriented in the dense fog and wind-driven heavy snow. Group Szurmay, for example, had to limit its efforts to patrol activities.
General Tersztyánsky continued his offensive efforts on the Baligrod front, attaining some cursory gains but no decisive advantage. The enemy’s tenacious defensive efforts won the day, and additional reinforcements thus became necessary to even maintain the few hard-won territorial gains. Second Army nevertheless continued its offensive effort while still awaiting the arrival of the 13th and 31st Infantry Divisions.
A X Corps’ 24th Infantry Division 1 March battle report cited the various difficulties aggravating accurate position orientation. Enemy fire from three directions on the condensed front produced severe losses. Troops became entrapped 100 paces before enemy defensive positions, with the attack collapsing before the second row of czarist barbed wire. A night retreat avoided further unnecessary losses and a possible debacle.108 Worse, the division could not count on neighboring 34th Infantry Division support because it was presently fighting against the main enemy position at Lupkov and sustaining significant losses. Fortunately, the enemy did not press its advantage. Troops also suffered from frostbite and dysentery. The division fought on rugged terrain after the attack had commenced late because of dense fog. Its left flank forces sustained 233 dead and 922 bloody casualties.109 Thus 41st Honvéd Infantry Division, bearing the brunt of an attack, had to retreat, sustaining heavy casualties partially as a result of effective enemy artillery fire.110
XVIII Corps suffered defeat south of Wetlina, its 101st Landsturm Infantry Brigade sacrificing 1,200 men.111 The most recent replacement troops had insufficient tra
ining, proving unfamiliar with the basics of weaponry. Furthermore, the language difficulties encountered with Romanian and Ruthenian recruits combined with their lesser battle worth further exacerbated the brigade’s situation while casualties mounted. Having participated in battle since 25 January also took its toll. Between 1 and 15 February, the brigade lost over 1,000 men. On 1 March alone 271 troops died, 805 were wounded, and 100 were reported missing in action. In view of battle reports citing troop demoralization, the brigade was almost disbanded.112
Nevertheless, Conrad and Böhm-Ermolli continued to seek a military decision, calculating that by early March, in-transit reinforcements would buttress the critical Second Army left flank area. However, losses also accelerated for the Third Army III, VII, and X Corps. VII Corps, involved in intermittent fierce battle, reported that between 1 and 4 March, 1,123 soldiers were dead, 2,167 wounded, and 602 missing in action.113 Low morale became prevalent.
Fourth Army received orders to transfer an additional infantry division, the 14th, to Third Army and launch its own offensive along the Gorlice roads.114 Further examples of casualties: XVII Corps sustained severe losses during sporadic night and day battle. Between 1 and 15 March, XIX Corps sacrificed about 1,000 men each day. The 32nd Infantry Division numbers sank to almost half. Infantry Regiment 41 combined its remaining five companies into one. The enemy also sustained frightful losses.115
By nightfall of 2 March it became evident that victory could not be achieved because each renewed effort was countered by powerful czarist counterattacks that sought to reconquer any lost territory. Meanwhile, the Russians struck both Second Army at the Baligrod roads and Third Army X and VII Corps in the Laborcz Valley, resulting in costly casualties.116 Many commanders hoped that the Russians would wear themselves out with the repeated counterattacks, but enemy efforts continued until 10 March, although Habsburg forces launched another futile endeavor on 6 March.
Blood on the Snow Page 18