Reebok, 112
Regulation Fair Disclosure (SEC edict), 277
regulators. See law enforcement/regulators; specific person, agency or department
research
as advertisements for investment banking clients, 84
Becker case and, 74
Galleon Group and, 114, 124, 126
for hedge funds, 51
independent, 75–84, 94, 269–70
investment banking and, 75–80
SAC Capital and, 80, 82, 94, 109
SEC and, 77
for small/average investors, 78
and specialized industries workers as researchers, 51
See also analysts/researchers; expert networks; mosaic information; specific person or organization
RJR Nabisco, 265
Roberts, Mary, 296
Rom, Edmund, 229, 284
Romney, Mitt, 298, 300
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 23, 25, 28
Ropes & Gray, 170, 171, 173, 218, 322
Rosenbach, Gary, 114, 148, 153, 158, 166, 169, 171–72, 218, 328
Rosenfeld, David, 268
Rugg, Arthur Prentice, 26, 28, 328
Ruiz, Hector, 188, 189, 328
“Rumi.” See Khan, Roomy
SAC Capital
A&P-Pathmark deal and, 72–73, 74
allegations against, 68–69
Amazon.com trades and, 160
arrest and conviction of employees of, 8–10, 312–13
assets/returns of, 9, 10, 68, 81, 85, 86, 94, 115, 246, 267, 268, 274, 315, 324, 328
Biovail and, 93, 107, 271, 280–81, 307–8, 321–22
Burrough profile about Cohen and, 265–68
Choo-Beng Lee and, 205, 206, 209–10, 276
civil fraud charge against, 312
Cohen personal investment in, 315
Cohen role in, 87–88, 243–44, 245, 271, 298
compliance department at, 245, 272, 275, 277, 278, 281, 282, 312
Conheeney assurance about survival of, 275
cooperators and, 87, 276, 302, 312
coordination of government information about, 219
CR Intrinsic unit at, 243–44, 279, 296
culture at, 66, 69, 87, 93, 114, 166, 206, 231, 232, 245, 271, 278
defenders of, 276–77, 278
Dell trades of, 312
document retention policy at, 278–79
“edge” of, 9, 10, 80, 206, 271–72, 281, 294, 297, 300–301, 318
Elan and Wyeth trades of, 303, 305, 306, 307
emails of, 279, 304, 305
expert networks and, 81, 82, 94, 109, 208, 209, 222, 232
Fairfax Financial and, 93, 270, 271, 280–81, 325
FBI/Chaves/Kang investigation of, 4, 9, 69, 85, 91, 92, 93–94, 108, 109, 146, 179, 219, 231–32, 244, 271, 299–300, 301, 306
fees charged by, 67
financial crisis of 2008 and, 180, 244, 246
founding of, 50, 67, 106, 279, 322
fraud charges against, 74
Freeman and, 231–32, 276, 278
front-running at, 74
as “full commission” firm, 95
Galleon compared with, 114–15, 116
Goldman Sachs and, 131, 302
Hollander and, 243–46, 271, 276, 278
Horvath and, 288
“hub and spoke” trading model at, 298
impact of Cohen indictment on, 319
importance of, 3
insurance for investors at, 281
investor base of, 315
investor support for, 281
Jiau and, 278
Justice Department and, 68, 85, 179, 268, 281, 304, 306
Kang and, 92, 209, 271, 301–3, 304–5, 307, 308
Kinnucan and, 81, 84, 94, 221, 222, 229, 230–31, 234
leverage and, 68, 92, 94
Madoff comments about, 95
Martoma case and, 280, 306–7, 308, 309–10, 312
mosaic information and, 94
Nvidia trades at, 312
organization/structure of, 87–88, 243–44, 279
organized crime compared with, 277
Pathmark trades and, 72, 73–74
promotional brochures of, 271
public relations for, 277, 317
risk-taking at, 105
SEC fine for, 315, 316–17
SEC/Wadhwa investigation of, 74, 88, 91, 96–97, 108, 179, 219, 245–46, 262, 268, 270, 272–74, 277, 281, 301, 303–6, 307, 308, 312, 316, 328
sexual harassment case against, 93, 279–80
and sharing of information among law enforcement agencies, 96–97
size and influence of, 3, 81, 94, 179, 278
Slaine and, 151, 152, 160, 178, 276
trading patterns at, 66, 67, 68, 74, 81, 85, 91, 94, 95, 96–97, 116, 146, 178, 179, 267, 294, 303, 312
trading records of, 304
trading volume at, 50
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York and, 91, 94, 97, 244–45, 258, 268, 302
Vivus case and, 295–98
Wall Street relationship with, 271–72, 319
See also Cohen, Steve “Stevie”; specific employee
Salomon Smith Barney, 56, 79, 325
Samberg, Art, 88–91
San Pietro restaurant (New York City), 228–29
Sandisk, 293
Sard, George, 253, 266, 268, 277
Sard Verbinnen, 266, 300, 312, 314
Scaramucci, Anthony, 274–75, 276–77, 278, 315, 316
Schapiro, Mary, 200, 203, 204, 261, 328
Schottenfeld Group, 218
Schumer, Chuck, 224–25, 226
Schwarzman, Steve, 180
Section 10-b, 31, 32, 36, 38
Securities Act (1933), 11, 25–26, 31
Securities Exchange Act (1934), 11, 25–26, 31. See also Section 10-b
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
accomplishments of, 204, 262–63
analysts/researchers and, 78, 79, 80
anonymous letter about Galleon sent to, 125
Cary as chairman of, 30–33, 34, 36
commitment to enforcing laws about insider trading within, 14
Cox as chairman of, 105–6, 183, 201, 203, 261, 264
creation of, 11
and debate about insider trading, 13, 18
definition of insider trading and, 263–64, 273, 284
and difficulties of prosecuting cases of insider trading, 64
Dowd complaints about, 254
elections of 2012 and, 300
enforcement unit of, 117, 201, 203, 204, 312, 317
evaluations of personnel at, 184
examinations unit of, 117
expansion of, 31, 51
expert networks and, 207
FBI relations with, 161
financial crisis of 2008 and, 143, 200, 201, 203–5
flash crashes and, 263
formation of, 328
Franklin circle of friends and, 103
funding/resources for, 48, 111, 144, 184, 264
and future insider trading cases, 319
goals of, 111
Grassley inquiry about FINRA/Funkhouser referrals to, 273
hedge funds compared with, 111
insider trading as focus of, 12, 29, 76
insider trading “working group” within, 106
Justice Department relations with, 239
Kennedy (John F.) administration and, 29
Kennedy (Joseph) as head of, 23, 24, 29
Levitt as chairman of, 48, 51, 201
limitations/problems of, 34–35, 74, 184
New York Stock Exchange tips for, 262
“perspiration effect” enforcement approach of, 35
Pitt as chairman of, 260
Pitt with, 34
politics and, 88–90, 201, 205
powers and authority of, 25–26, 31–32, 45
prevalence of insider trading and, 104
public relations efforts of, 223
“pu
mp and dump” and, 24
and purpose of laws governing markets, 10–11
Regulation Fair Disclosure of, 277
reputation/image of, 184, 201, 204, 262–64
Schapiro as chairman of, 200, 201, 203, 204, 261, 328
as serious about crackdown on financial crimes, 223
strategy of, 111
strengths of, 97
surveillance/tracking systems at, 95, 101, 106, 128, 237
and tips as “black holes,” 74
Wadhwa promotions at, 258, 261–62
Wadhwa reputation and, 141
as Wall Street patsy, 90
Wall Street views about, 143
“Wells Notice” of, 312, 316
wiretaps and, 177, 184–85, 242
See also specific person or case
Sedna Capital, 114, 116, 117, 124, 302, 328
self-regulation: of Wall Street, 52–53
“sell-side” analysts, 75
Senate Judiciary Committee
Aguirre and, 88, 90
Bharara and, 225, 226
sexual harassment case: at SAC, 93, 279–80
Shah, Deep, 162, 176, 234–35, 328
Shankar, Gautham, 218
Shearman & Sterling, 121
Shimoon, Walter, 83, 221, 233, 234, 269, 282, 328
Siegel, Martin, 41–42, 55, 56, 103, 108, 225, 287, 306, 328
Sitrick, Michael, 271
60 Minutes (TV program), 107, 266, 271
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, 105
SkyBridge Capital, 274–75, 277
Slaine, David
ambitions of, 147–48
appearance and personality of, 1–2
and Babcock-Franklin-Guttenberg case, 150
Chaves and, 150–51, 152, 154–55, 159–60, 172, 173, 174, 216, 233, 286
at Chelsey Capital, 101, 103, 148
Cohen/SAC Capital and, 3, 151, 160, 178, 276
as cooperator/FBI informant, 1, 2, 4–6, 8, 150, 154–56, 159–60, 165–71, 173, 217–18, 285–86, 328
deal for, 5, 7
debate about insider trading and, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18
Dickey and, 168
Drimal and, 150, 157–58, 160, 165, 166, 167–68, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 177, 216, 217–18, 285–86
“edge” of, 2
Efficient Markets Theory and, 13, 14
emotional and physical problems of, 168–69, 177, 287
family of, 5, 6, 7
FBI initial knowledge about, 2
FBI investigation of, 4, 147–49, 151–52
Franklin and, 101, 103, 156
Goffer deal and, 170–71, 172
importance to federal investigations of, 6–7
interest in hedge funds of, 147
Justice Department praise for, 285
Kinnucan compared with, 285
leaks about, 285
Makol and, 1, 5–6, 150, 153–55, 156, 167–69, 170, 173, 177, 186, 216, 286
at Morgan Stanley, 2, 147, 149, 150–51, 154, 168, 328
outing of, 285–86
Perfect Hedge role of, 6–7, 157
personal life of, 149, 151–52, 177, 294
personal and professional background of, 7, 147, 148–49
personality of, 153–54
post-Rajaratnam case undercover work of, 7
as prototype of inside trader, 152
Rajaratnam/Galleon case and, 3, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 154, 158, 160, 167–68, 186
Rajaratnam relationship with, 148, 154, 167, 186
reputation of, 1–2, 4, 147, 149, 168, 169, 218
Rosenbach and, 148, 153, 158, 171–72
SEC fines for, 286
sentencing of, 285, 286
suspension of, 147
UBS tips and, 150–51, 155
views about Wall Street and insider trading of, 154, 181
wealth of, 149, 151, 155
wire on, 165–71
Slaine, Elyse, 155, 156, 169, 177, 286, 294
Slaine, Mason, 156
small/average investors
and Bharara media statement about insider trading, 223
and comparison of Rajaratnam, Gupta and Madoff, 250
and debate/questions about insider trading, 12, 13, 15–16
Facebook IPO and, 16
financial crisis of 2008 and, 216
and Goldman Sachs-Buffet deal, 198
and Levitt image at SEC, 201
Martha Stewart case and, 60, 61
in 1990s, 43
Rajaratnam case and, 263
as reason for law enforcement focus, 10, 11
research reports for, 78
SEC evaluations of personnel and, 184
unavailability of information for, 91
views about insider trading of, 11, 318
soft dollars, 94–95
Spence, Gerry, 282
Spherix Advisers, 205, 207, 324
Spitzer, Eliot, 27, 43, 48, 78–79, 80, 82, 110–11, 124, 260, 328
Sprint, 252
Standley, John, 72–73
Star, Marylin. See Gannon, Kathryn
statute of limitations, 302, 317
Steel, Bob, 197
Steinberg, Michael, 8–9, 276, 288, 298, 312–14, 328
Stewart, Martha, 59–65, 66, 67, 97, 141, 145, 152, 207, 238, 257, 266, 324, 325, 328
Stillman, Charles, 309–10, 314, 319
stock manipulation, 25, 26, 31, 307
stock market crash (1929), 11, 24, 26–27
stock market crash (1987), 42
stock ratings, 76
Streeter, Jonathan, 235–37, 238–43, 244, 247–50, 251, 252, 255, 258, 328
Sullivan, Martin, 142
Supreme Court, New Jersey: Fairfax-SAC case and, 270
Supreme Court, U.S.
Chiarella case and, 38–39, 40
Dirks case and, 33, 34–36, 39–40
O’Hagen case and, 43–45
Winans case and, 42
surveillance/tracking systems. See specific person, organization, or case
Symington, Fife, 236
Tamil Tigers, 116, 129
Taylor, Kieran, 190
technology
disruptions of markets by, 263
flash crashes and, 263
and increased risk-taking on Wall Street, 48
and specialized industries workers as researchers, 51
technology companies
research about, 82, 83–84
stock ratings for, 76
See also specific company
terrorism, 129, 131, 163, 164, 256
Texas Gulf Sulphur case, 36–37, 38–39
Third Point, 271
Thoresen, Matthew, 291
3Com, 170–71, 172, 173, 285, 322
Time magazine, 85–86, 259
Title III. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
Today’s Special (movie), 210
Tong, Andrew, 93
“too big to fail,” 317, 319
Travelers Group, 49
Treasury, U.S., 22, 142
Trivium Capital Management, 138, 161
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 198
UBS, 2, 100, 101, 103, 150–51, 155, 244, 324, 325
“unindicted co-conspirators,” 288, 312–13
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York
expansion of, 47–48
FBI and, 227–28
leaks and, 254
Martha Stewart case and, 60, 61–63
See also Bharara, Preetinder; Giuliani, Rudy; specific case
U.S. Postal Service, 41
Vanity Fair
Bear Stearns story in, 265–66
Cohen profile for, 265, 266, 267–68, 275, 277
Vivus, 295–98
Wachovia Bank, 197–98
Wadhwa, Sanjay
Anticevic case and, 112
Bharara meetings with, 261
Cohen/SAC Capital case and, 262, 301, 303–6, 307, 308, 328
&nbs
p; commitment to enforcing laws about insider trading of, 14, 318
and ethnic aspect of Rajaratnam case, 180–81
expert networks investigations and, 208–9, 262
FBI and, 118–19, 128, 141, 161
first SEC case of, 111
Gupta case and, 195–96, 327
insider trading as focus of, 143, 262
Justice Department relations with, 127, 128, 262
Kang and, 161, 177, 211, 301, 302–3, 304–5
Khan case and, 128–29, 130, 141, 177, 181
Kumar and, 194, 195–96
and limitations of SEC, 184
Makol and, 112, 128
Martoma case and, 305–6, 307
motivation of, 181
NYSE case of, 262
personal background of, 113, 114, 181
personal life of, 303
politics and, 205
post-Rajaratnam investigation activities of, 258, 261–62
presentation about Khan-Rajaratnam to other agencies by, 128–29
professional background of, 110, 111, 114, 143
publicity about, 262
Rajaratnam deposition and, 121–25
Rajaratnam/Galleon Group case and, 110, 116–19, 125–26, 127, 129–30, 180–82, 184, 194, 199, 201, 209, 210–11, 249, 250, 261, 262, 301–2, 328
Rajaratnam wiretaps and, 177, 301
reputation of, 141
Schapiro and, 200, 261
SEC evaluations of, 184
Sedna Capital case and, 114, 116
style of, 109–10
views about SEC of, 111, 112
Waksal, Sam, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 157, 328
Wall Street
business model in 1990s of, 48–51
as “buyer beware” territory, 25
Chaves views about, 146
commercial banking and, 49
compensation and bonuses on, 104–5
complexity of, 75
culture of, 49–50, 196, 256–57
and debate about insider trading, 16
FBI views about, 145
financial crisis of 2008 and, 196, 256–57
hierarchy on, 50
information as central to trading activities of, 50–51
leverage and, 48–49
new product development on, 48
Obama contributions from, 200
public views about, 63
race/ethnicity on, 113–14
Rajaratnam as scape goat for crimes of, 256–57
risk-taking on, 48–49, 143, 202, 203
SAC relationship with, 271–72, 319
SEC as patsy for, 90
self-regulation of, 52–53
views about SEC of, 143
Wall Street Journal
Bharara investigations and, 226, 228
Blodgett story in, 79
Cohen as reader of, 67
Cohen stories in, 85–86
Cox as reader of, 183
and debate about insider trading, 183
expert network investigation and, 228
“Heard on the Street” column in, 42
Kanjilal as reader of, 77
Circle of Friends Page 40