After a short time, Wilburn and Queen decided to walk down the line to Freeman’s platoon, which was quite a distance away, to try to figure out what was happening. They soon discovered that Freeman didn’t know any more about the tactical situation than they did. He had no idea where the remainder of the company was, but he had received instructions over the radio to send a squad and contact Anthony’s mortars. When Freeman asked Queen to take Hargrove’s squad to the mortar position Queen, who had been hoping to find Allen and get a situation briefing, reluctantly agreed.
It took about an hour of struggling through the woods and calling “Buffalo” before they finally found Andrade, who led them to Anthony’s platoon CP. “Red Horse” didn’t know anything either, and he pointed to Cliette’s position, which seemed to be about another mile away! It was about 2200 hours before Queen returned to Wilburn’s position. A radio message from Allen was waiting for him: he would meet Queen the next morning.
About 2300 hours, a harassing and interdicting white phosphorus shell hit behind 2d Platoon’s CP, but no one was hurt. It was not until later that the Rangers learned that one of the battalions had had to evacuate a position after taking it during daylight hours. The unit had to make a night attack and retake it without additional assistance. A hell of a firefight broke out in front of the 2d Platoon that lasted about three hours. With the drama and exhaustion of the day behind him, a frustrated Queen finally sacked out with Wilburn and Plater in what appeared to be an abandoned winter wheat field.
On 27 March, the company was attached to the 1/187th at 0900 hours. Queen left 2d Platoon and moved down the hill and finally located the Company CP in a hut on the edge of the village facing a huge field of green rice or wheat. The large field consisted of about five acres, with growth more than two feet tall. Queen was still angry at Allen’s failure to meet him the night before. However, a hot cup of chocolate from First Sergeant West smoothed over the situation. At 1000 hours, the unit moved into a reserve position on the left flank of Hill 148, west of the Sinchon River. About 1400 hours, the Rangers crossed the river and joined Company C, 64th Tank Battalion. The area along the river bank was being shelled by what appeared to be a 75mm self-propelled gun off to the north. No one was hurt crossing the river, and contact was made with the tanks.
The harmless shelling continued intermittently for approximately thirty minutes. Farther south, about one-half mile down river, the engineers and P&A (Pioneer and Ammunition) Platoon built a ford for vehicles. The tank-infantry team moved forward to occupy a circular defense, with the Rangers dug in between the tanks. Friendly artillery fire was plotted in and around the team’s position. No contact was made with the enemy during the remainder of the day or during that night. The tank-infantry team was the all-black 758th Tank Battalion from the 82d A/B Division. The battalion had moved first to Texas, and then Georgia, and was redesignated the 64th Tank Battalion. Company C was commanded by Captain “Acie” McLain, with whom Captain Allen and Queen had served at Fort McClellan, Alabama, in late 1945. The Buffalo Rangers recognized, greeted, and visited briefly with many old friends from Bragg.
The company occupied its position on Hill 125 throughout 28 March, where it was reinforced by the 4th Ranger Company about 1300 hours. The 1/187th launched an attack just as the 4th Company moved into the line. The Rangers of 2d Company were ordered to hold their position until the small knob to the north was captured by 4th Company. The tanks supported the attack on Hill 507 by the 1/187th. The 4th Company, minus tank support and the 2d Ranger Company’s mortars, attacked and captured Hill 279 at 1500 hours. The 4th Company had only two platoons with it at the time because others had been split off for different missions. The battle was short but well fought by 4th Company. A 4th Company BAR man seemed to spark the attack. The enemy grimly held on to the reverse slope of the hill, showering the assaulting platoon with hand grenades. Jackson, of the mortar section, recalled the fire support missions and remarked, “I remember 4th Company attacking this mountain top; it was full of Chinese. It appeared as if every Chinaman in Korea threw grenades at them. And, after they threw the grenades, they ran like mad!”
According to Queen, it was a spectacular fight of platoon-sized units. Lieutenant Waterbury, platoon leader, was wounded several times but continued fighting until the hill was captured. Queen talked with Waterbury as he was on his way to the aid station in the rear. He was grinning about winning the Purple Heart. The entire unit was in high spirits, as they had been itching for a fight after having been misused as CP guards for so long.
The Buffalo Rangers moved into battalion reserve on Hill 148 east of the Sinchon River at 1700 hours. The company had hardly started to dig in when a blinding rainstorm blew up, forcing everyone to the nearest hole for cover. Queen slept in the sitting position in a half-dug cave with Lieutenant Chum and Lieutenant Kim, two Korean officers who were serving as interpreters. Chum seemed pretty unhappy because officers had to dig foxholes in the American Army. He was unhappy in 2d Ranger Company in general, and sought to rejoin 4th Company when it returned to Taegu. Two prisoners were taken during that day’s action, but no further contact was made with the enemy.
On 29 March, the Buffalo Rangers continued holding their position on Hill 148. At 1130 hours, Company A, 7th Infantry, 3d ID, passed through the company position to attack to the north. Officially relieved, 2d Ranger Company assembled within the 1/187th vicinity. All assembled personnel were moved quickly by trucks at 1330 hours. The RCT was officially relieved by the 3d Division at the same time.
Land-Tail Out of Munsan-Ni
The exact date, time, and place that the RCT company trains linked up and entered the air head are not shown on the Morning Report. No one remembers them physically being available until the 187th RCT was relieved and started the motor march back to Taegu. The men in 4th Ranger Company constantly complained about the lack of food, so 2d Rangers must have been in the same condition or had resorted to more “moonlight requisitioning.” On 26 March, First Sergeant Way of the 4th Ranger Company wrote in his diary, “Road march to Hill 146. Company getting just a bit hungry.”
[29 Mar 1951] RECORDS OF EVENTS
Departed the Village of Sinchon Korea about 1430 hours
29 Mar 51 by mtr march Arrived in Suwon Korea about
2000 29 Mar 51 trp psn were relieved by element of the 3rd
Inf Div Morale of troops excellent
Asgnd: 113Present for Dy: 105 Sick: 1Hosp: 6KIA: 1
[30 Mar 1951] RECORDS OF EVENTS
Departed Suwon Korea approximately 1100 hours 30 Mar 51
Arrived in Taegu Korea approx 0530 hours 31 March 51 Morale of troops excellent
The 4th Rangers, after relief, started back to Taegu via truck and rail. The 187th RCT returned to Taegu in army service. The 2d Rangers arrived back in Taegu about 0530 hours on Saturday, 31 March 1951. Sergeants David T. Buford and Herculano Dias were admitted to the hospital. Corporal Donald L. Felder was admitted to the hospital but would return to duty on 3 April. Corporal John W. Gould was assigned and joined from the 187th ARCT. Sergeant John “Pop” Jones was admitted to the hospital on 2 April and would not return.
In the Aftermath of the Historic Jump—Racial Booby Trap or Act of Sabotage?
[4 April 1951] Morning Report
RECORD OF EVENTS
Reld fr atch 187th RCT atchd 7th Inf Div Ltr TWX Eighth US Army (EUSAK) dtd 28 Mar 51 Departed Taegu Korea by rail at 1030 hrs arrived Andong, Korea 2400 hrs distance traveled approx 80 miles.
The 2d Ranger Company now had seven officers and ninety-five enlisted men available for duty. It continued northward, departing Andong about 0100 hours on Thursday, 5 April, and arrived at Chunchon at 1000 hours. The distance traveled was approximately seventy-five miles. The Buffalo Rangers billeted and rationed with the Netherlands (Dutch) Battalion that had been attached to the 38th Infantry, 2d ID, since December 1950 because of the division’s heavy losses.
The Buffalos reached the 7th Infantry Division Repl
acement Company at Chechon-ni and picked up fifty-two “leg replacements” on temporary duty for two weeks of training for possible formation of another Ranger company (or battalion). These men were a big, big surprise to everyone. The company strength for duty suddenly shot up by fifty percent (from 103 to 155). The two weeks of training were recorded on the Morning Report, but Special Order 96 stated that these men were assigned “for an indefinite period for training.”26
There were many suspicious thoughts about this surprise, as the regular wartime planned replacement system was just beginning to function and furnish timely replacements to the 8th Army. First, only the Negro replacements to the 7th Division were sent to 2d Ranger Company. Second, there was no advance notice of these replacements. Third, their military occupational skills (MOS) were extremely varied, including infantry, artillery, drivers, mechanics, and cooks. Fourth, they were neither airborne-nor ranger-qualified soldiers, nor were they volunteers for the same. Finally, they remained assigned to their regular units, but were on temporary duty “for training”—after having just completed thirteen weeks basic and advanced training.
The area around Chechen was chosen for billeting and training. At the same time, 2d Ranger Company also received a few triple volunteers or shove-outs from the 187th ARCT; these, too, were not expected. They were airborne- qualified but had not gone through Ranger training. The 187th ARCT already had a few Negro paratroopers and at least one black officer, Captain James Miller, 2d Battalion Surgeon. The question discussed among the veteran Rangers was whether these guys were quitters or eight balls.27
Terrell, John Jr.RA13348307 PfcMOS: 7475
Vails, Robert A. Jr.RA12327222 PfcMOS:7475
On 12 April, the company received another 113 Negro EM for training purposes. The company strength was now up to 269. These replacements were not only more infantrymen and artillerymen, but also included combat engineers, ordnance men, artillerymen, military police, quartermasters, and even a bandsman (a trumpeter who brought his personal instrument with him). On 16 April, another 78 EM were attached for training, so the company’s nominally authorized strength was now assigned. This group also included more infantry, engineers, ordnance, and a bandsman. Second Company was very glad to get the bandsman and taught him the American and Chinese bugle calls. He imitated Chinese bugle calls during combat training, and was used to jazz up the Buffaloes’ walking fire-attack. Throughout April, as fast as more black replacements were received, they were sent to the Buffalo Rangers. By the 23d of the month, the Company had 404 enlisted men. Numerically speaking, this strength easily constituted enough manpower to form nearly three companies (except for the lack of officers).
Background and Perceptions of Racial Pressure
Within the Buffalo ranks everyone felt that General Ferenbaugh was a pretty straight shooter and fair in his reports about the unit’s service and combat performances. There were no records of courts martial, AWOLs, or poor performances under fire. On 6 February, he had reported that 2d Ranger Company was performing its assigned missions although at only sixty-one percent authorized strength, and praised its members for their specialized training and high esprit de corps. What Ferenbaugh didn’t know was the burning desire of the Buffalo Rangers to erase the myth—particularly among officers from the South—about black troops being unable and unwilling to fight except under white leadership. These feelings were directed primarily at General Almond, who had always blamed and castigated his black personnel for the World War II failures of the 92d ID in Italy.
At this time the Buffalo Rangers did not know that an evaluation and review was being performed by then-Lieutenant General Ridgway. The general had reached the conclusion that the expectations of Ranger companies to conduct long-range penetrations and raids on hostile installations were highly unrealistic. He believed that using Rangers in this manner was beyond their capabilities and invited their destruction. When Ridgway succeeded MacArthur as Far East Commander, he passed his views on to Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, who assumed command of the Eighth Army in mid-April 1951. Van Fleet ordered his G-3, Brigadier General Gilman C. Mudgett, to carefully survey and report on the Ranger situation. Within a month, General Mudgett reported the “conclusion that a Ranger battalion at Army level would meet with general approval.”28
Concerned about the employment of the Ranger companies under divisional control, Colonel Van Houten sent Lieutenant Colonel James Y. Adams to Korea as an observer of Ranger activities. Van Houten felt that each of the six companies was being deployed in a variety of what he considered faulty ways. In a personal letter to Major General Maxwell D. Taylor, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Van Houten expressed his concern about forming the companies into a provisional battalion under 8th Army control and attached to the 187th ARCT for operations, training, and logistical support.29 Ranger units should not be placed under the 187th ARCT’s operational control, he argued, because they would likely become just another airborne infantry battalion because the 187th was in need of replacements. Van Houten insisted that Rangers could still accomplish the missions visualized by General J. Lawton Collins if they were an independent unit under the control of Eighth Army.
On 12 May, one month after assuming the Far East Command, Ridgway reached the conclusion that too much attention had been placed on airborne missions. Van Houten submitted a draft TO&E for the Ranger battalion, a proposal he wrote to the Department of Defense in Washington to provide several recommendations about the Army’s racial situation involving the complex and touchy issue of black soldiers in the Eighth Army. Ridgway felt that the 24th Infantry Regiment should be deactivated and replaced with the 14th Infantry. The black personnel of the 24th would be integrated into other units on an individual-MOS basis. Ridgway concluded that the members of the other black units, the 3/9 (2d ID), the 3/15 (3d ID), and the 64th Tank Battalion, should be integrated with white personnel. Finally, Ridgway also moved to integrate the service units, as well as the 40th and 45th National Guard Divisions being deployed to Japan.
Ridgway took the high moral ground that it was un-American and un-Christian for free citizens to be taught and subjugated in the manner we were. Plus, the change might ensure an esprit de corps that a fighting army needed. Ridgway’s idea was neither foreign nor a complete surprise to the Pentagon high command. Two other Army studies of blacks in Korea had recommended the same thing. The top leaders, Major General Anthony C. McAuliffe, G-1, and Taylor, G-3, also had endorsed and favored this “full” desegregation move. However, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace’s advice was to move slowly and carefully. Once the complete desegregation gate was opened, he cautioned, it would be harder to retreat should it not be fully successful. Only General Wade H. Haislip, in the Department of the Army, strongly opposed it.
Word soon spread via rumors within the 8th Army that desegregation had met with the approval of Van Fleet, and that many of the senior generals favored it. A few others opposed it, notably General Almond of X Corps. The wheels of complete desegregation turned very slowly, and it was not until 1 October 1951 that the 24th Infantry was inactivated.30
None of this information was known to the Buffalo Rangers in April 1951, when they received the mission of training for combat survival. Although the task came as a complete surprise to the Buffalo Rangers, they were glad to get fresh manpower from which they hoped to create additional Rangers after the Munsan-ni jump. Since the replacements had received only seven weeks of basic training on individual weapons and had no training on the bayonet (which was Captain Allen’s favorite Ranger weapon), the 2d Ranger Company’s first task was to get them in top physical condition. It was approaching springtime, so bare-chested road runs, speed marches, and bayonet training were the order of the day. Training stressed self-sufficiency of the lowest unit and drilled the concepts of movement to contact; fire and movement; support fire; assault with marching fire; capture of objective; reorganization; preparation for counter-attack; inspection of personnel and equipment; and sign
als/communication. The typical day began with a road march in the approach formation while carrying light packs, weapons, and ammunition to the training site. Replacements were mixed in with the regular troops. The men started with a squad in the attack and worked up to the company in the attack.
Queen was worried that 2d Ranger Company would be committed to a mission destined for failure. He knew it was rumored that these units had not passed their Army Training Test (ATT) and were incapable of providing close support combat fire to the infantry units without too many errors (short rounds). Failures of this sort would provide the opportunity for Corps to send in some white officers to get promotions and awards…at the expense of black Ranger fodder. Almost daily, from 6 to 24 April, a red-headed major driving an X Corps headquarters jeep observed the training exercises. He arrived about 0900 hours and parked on a hill overlooking the training area, observed what 2d Ranger Company was doing, and took a few notes. None of the men of 2d Ranger Company remember him introducing himself or visiting the company CP to explain his actions or purpose.
Without warning, on 24 April the Buffalo Rangers were relieved of their special “leg replacement” training mission.
Morning Report
[24 April 1951] RECORD OF EVENTS
VOCO relieved from training mission of 7th Inf Div and attached 31st RCT for employment unit departed Hangyee, Korea approx 1345 hrs via mtr march Arrived 7th Division Forward at 1500 arrived 31st RCT 1600 hrs distance traveled approx 20 miles rec’d mission to defend the high ground (Hill 613 in the vicinity of UT 265 070). Morale of troops excellent.
Not until 1994 would men from the 2d Ranger Company—including its officers—learn that Almond had gotten his racial policy endorsed and implemented by Ferenbaugh as follows:
Colored troops who arrive in this division, if they have the proper MOS’s, will be assigned to the 2d Ranger Company. Others who are assigned by error will be returned to Eighth Army Replacement Battalion. Personnel will not be mixed within units. If Ranger Company becomes greatly over strength, another company will be formed.
Edward L. Posey Page 12