It was reported on September 25 that a thousand veteran sharpshooters, all over 60, asked General Guisan to accept them in the army for auxiliary service. The General thankfully wired the group that they could do as they desired. Leaders of the sharpshooters’ organization declared that almost all of their 3,000 members would serve if Switzerland were attacked.87
A large map published in the New York Times on October 1 illustrated possible German invasion routes through the neutral states of the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. The Dutch had a unique military strategy involving the flooding of the lowlands, which would turn them into swamps, and the placement of fortifications behind the inundated areas.88 Their plan, however, would not be executed when the Germans attacked.
The Times map showed invasion routes under France’s Maginot Line at the Basel Gap, and another route southwest into Switzerland under the Jura and then past Geneva toward Lyons in France. While the Swiss had no Maginot Line, the country was filled with field fortifications, artillery positions, tank traps, hidden concrete-covered trenches and machine-gun nests. Bridges were mined and road obstacles were in place.89
As the French and Germans engaged in artillery duels on the Rhine-Moselle front, German troops massed near the Swiss frontier between Basel and Schaffhausen and also at Vorarlberg. On October 3, all Swiss army leaves were canceled and fortifications were strengthened.90
Operations Order No. 2, which General Guisan issued on October 4, 1939, described critical positions in the north that must be held, and then asserted that the fight would be to the death:
At the border and between the border and army position, the border troops and advance guard persistently delay the advance of the enemy. The garrisons at the border and between the border and the works and positions making up the defensive front continue resistance up to the last cartridge, even if they find themselves completely alone.91
The order also provided that obstacles of all types and destruction of bridges would slow down the advance of the aggressor.92
This astonishing order—that the Swiss militiaman must fire every cartridge and, implicitly, fight to the death without surrender—was in sharp contrast to the policies of other European countries, which surrendered to Hitler either with a command that their troops not resist, or after a short fight.
The October 4 plan of General Guisan and General Staff Chief Labhart was to mass infantry along a line of rivers, lakes, and mountains parallel to Germany. Modern artillery was in short supply, so nineteenth-century 84mm and 120mm pieces were put in place.93 Most importantly, the individual marksman with his rifle was the key element. There was no reserve—it would be a fight to the finish.94
In front of the massed riflemen was a chain of blockhouses and forts built between 1934 and 1939, with machine guns, anti-tank obstacles, minefields, and artillery. This chain ran through the Alps in the south and east, along the Rhine River and through the Jura Mountains toward Geneva. The main line of resistance, utilizing the lakes and mountains as natural barriers, would stop the German panzers.95
Britain and France had declared war on Germany, but, unprepared, they failed to open an aggressive front. Their window of opportunity to attack while the bulk of the Wehrmacht was occupied in Poland closed by the end of September. After the Polish capitulation the major elements of the fully mobilized German Army were quickly moved to the west. Britain at this time had only 158,000 troops in France.96 By October 10, Hitler was pushing for an offensive against the unprepared Allies, although his cooler-headed generals advised him that, in view of the lateness of the year, it would be better to wait until spring.97
British military leaders told newspaper correspondents in London on October 20 that the Allies foresaw a German offensive on the Western Front supported by 1,500,000 troops. They anticipated that the Germans might attack through Belgium, the Netherlands or possibly Switzerland in order to avoid a frontal assault on the Maginot Line.98
American war correspondent William Shirer, then stationed in Berlin, wrote in his diary after returning from a visit to Switzerland: “The country has one tenth of its population under arms; more than any other country in the world. . . . They’re ready to fight to defend their way of life.” He had asked a Swiss businessman on the train “whether he wouldn’t prefer peace at any price (business is ruined in a Switzerland completely surrounded by belligerents and with every able-bodied man in the army) so that he could make money again.” The Swiss replied: “Not the kind of peace that Hitler offers.” When the train crossed the Rhine from Switzerland into Germany, Shirer described the eerie sight: “the same unreal front. Soldiers on both sides looking but not shooting.”99
Despite the extremely dangerous situation, the French decided that the deteriorating weather would suffice to stall the Germans, and on October 29 demobilized 100,000 men. On the same day, the Swiss increased their military preparations. The General Staff shifted troops to meet a new situation created by the concentration of German forces between Constance and Munich and around Freiburg. Agricultural leaves for Swiss peasant soldiers were canceled, and troops on leave were recalled to the Basel area. Then early snows arrived to assist the Swiss defenses. Three to four feet of snow blocked most Alpine passes, and the Jura highlands, which extended into France, became impassable.100
The Germans continued to mass troops along all borders with Switzerland, from the region near France all the way to the Tyrol by Italy.101 Sixty to a hundred Wehrmacht divisions were reported to be concentrated along the Western Front. Switzerland continued to be discussed as an invasion route, but Allied observers believed that the Swiss Army could make a successful defense.102
At the recommendation of General Guisan, on November 10 the Federal Council called up an unannounced number of troops. Since the army’s full mobilization at the beginning of the war, some units had been released and various leaves approved, always with the understanding that the troops would be recalled immediately if the army was needed at full strength. The next day, the Federal Council empowered General Guisan to call all able-bodied men whenever he decided that the defense of the nation required it. Previously, orders for full mobilization required the government’s approval before they could be issued.103
Meanwhile, the Führer narrowly escaped an assassination attempt which might have spared the world what was to come. Georg Elser, a private citizen, placed a bomb at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich on November 8, but Hitler finished his speech early and left before the explosion. Elser was apprehended while attempting to escape over the Swiss border.104 The German press trumpeted that Elser’s tracks led to Switzerland, alarming the Swiss of a possible retaliatory action by the Nazis. These polemics coincided with the further build-up of German troops in southern Germany and the Black Forest.105
“Something’s in the wind,” wrote William Shirer from Berlin. “Party gossip about a mass air attack on England. A drive through Holland and Belgium. Or one through Switzerland.”106
On November 20, Hitler told his generals that they had little to fear from the United States, because it was neutral, and that “I shall attack France and England at the most favorable and earliest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is of no importance.” 107
Nor, to Hitler, was that of Switzerland. There had been repeated violations of Swiss neutrality by German aircraft and anti-aircraft fire, which had wounded Swiss border residents. German planes had even staged a “pamphlet bombing” over Switzerland, dropping propaganda leaflets. German Minister Otto Köcher apologized for these events.108
In November, the French High Command warned General Guisan that they anticipated a German attack proceeding through Switzerland. When the French brought up troops near Basel, Guisan feared that the French intended to invade first. He warned them that the Swiss would resist invasion by any party. Guisan soon learned from Swiss intelligence that Hitler had postponed the offensive.109
In the north, the Soviet Union attacked Finland on November 30, 1939, and Hitle
r officially approved of the deed, although his true feelings were doubtless more complex.110 The Swiss were encouraged by the resistance of the Finns from the Mannerheim Line and their forests against Russian armored attacks.111 The Finns demonstrated that a small population could, in fact, successfully resist a strong aggressor.112 Swiss journalist August Lindt, who would later advocate radical measures for Swiss resistance, reported on the action at the Finnish front.113 Like the Swiss, the Finns were known as a nation of riflemen and skiers.
Through the winter of 1939–40, the period known, except in Finland, as the “Phony War,” Swiss defenders dug into what became known as the “Army Position.” The Army Position anticipated resistance in the north from the Austrian border to an area near the Maginot Line. If defeated there, the Swiss forces would retreat south into the Alps for their last stand.114 From the Réduit National (literally, the “National Redoubt”) or mountain fortress, centered on the St. Gotthard massif, the Swiss could control the transportation routes across the Alps.115
On December 28, General Guisan ordered the formation of a new army corps to be ready before the border foothills were cleared of snow in the spring. This would be the fourth corps, and it would consist of 100,000 men under the command of Colonel Labhart. As Chief of the General Staff, Labhart had authored the reorganization, which, along with the extended eligibility for service from 48 to 60 years, had increased the size of the Swiss militia to 600,000. Virtually everyone was considered fit to serve—even the blind, who listened for planes in anti-aircraft units.116
As 1939 ended, Contemporary Review recalled Machiavelli’s statement, “the Swiss are most armed and most free,” along with Napoleon’s dictum, “Nature destined Switzerland to become a League of States; no wise man would attempt to conquer it.”117 During that winter, many French, Britons and even Germans retained hope that Europe could still be spared a major conflagration on the level of 1914–18. To the Swiss, however, the point was moot. If the Allies and the Reich did call off their war, unallied Switzerland would remain as much threatened from the Nazi behemoth as ever.
Switzerland had the largest percentage of soldiers in the world compared to overall population—600,000 soldiers in a country of 4 million. That number would continue to grow in the years to come. Just as important, and heard everywhere inside Switzerland, was the slogan geistige Landesverteidigung, the concept best expressed in English as “spiritual national defense.”118 Evoking the nation’s proud heritage of freedom and independence, and the utter determination of the average Swiss to defend his homeland, the term became a rallying cry for the nation as it faced the most powerful threat in its history.
Chapter 4
Spring 1940
All Fall But One
NEW YEAR’S DAY, NORMALLY A HOLIDAY OF HOPE AND CELE-bration, was in 1940 an occasion for the people of Europe to wonder what horrors awaited them. Nazi Germany no longer disguised its aggressive designs in diplomatic language, historical rationales or covert intimidation. After the invasion of Poland, questions of national supremacy were referred to the battlefield. During the winter, German U-boats had slid out into the Atlantic to wreak their havoc in the cold seas. The British were pouring strength into the continent to support the defense of France. The French continued to work on their Maginot Line, correctly assuming the enemy would not dare a frontal assault. The German General Staff, in secret as always, laid out its specific plans for conquest. The question on the minds of the Allies at this point was when the Nazis would strike next, and where.
In London, The Times quoted military analysts who predicted that if the Germans attempted to outflank the Maginot Line through Switzerland, their thrust would not succeed. An attack through the former Austrian border, between Ragaz and the eastern end of Lake Constance, would require crossing the Rhine, which was protected by forts and pillboxes. The next logical target would be Appenzell and St. Gallen, mountainous cantons with few roads, where small forces might pin down a more numerous enemy. If the invaders made it to the open regions east of Zurich, they would be confronted by Lake Zurich and the Limmat River, the banks of which were fortified.1
If the Wehrmacht made it past these obstacles, it would find itself at the Swiss Plateau, which extends 100 miles southwest to the Lake of Geneva. Only 40 miles at its maximum width, the hilly area containing forests and rivers (the Reuss, the Aare and the Sarine) was flanked by two mountain ranges: the Alps on the south and the Jura on the north. A large army might squeeze through, but without room for maneuver and exposed along the way to Swiss troops who would fight from the Jura and the Alps as well as from the fortifications along the rivers. If the invaders reached Lake Geneva, French forces would be waiting at the fortifications on the Haute Savoie and in the Jura Mountains.2
Confronting the Germans would be a 600,000-man-strong Swiss Army, said The Times, “well armed and so abundantly equipped with machine guns, infantry guns and other automatic weapons that it possesses the highest relative firing power on the Continent.” The French would back up the Swiss troops.3
By early 1940, the Swiss could mobilize 650,000 men on short notice, a number that would continue to rise in succeeding years.4 The German General Staff estimated that it would take forty days to cross Switzerland and that “it would be necessary to oppose five Germans to one Swiss to achieve that result.”5 It was common knowledge that the Swiss would mount a stubborn defense. The Times reported: “All able-bodied men are individually trained to be defenders of their native mountains. Like the Finns, they are a nation of marksmen and of skiers.”6
The “Winter War” in Finland demonstrated that a small, armed country could defend itself against superior numbers. The Finns learned their shooting skills from the Swiss, who now had much to learn from the Finns. In Switzerland, large numbers of women began to practice marksmanship skills.7
When the Military Department found it necessary to restrict the issuance of practice ammunition to 24 cartridges per civilian shooter, the Swiss Shooting Federation expressed concern. The campaigns in Poland and Finland had devoured enormous amounts of ammunition. However, as noted at that time by National Councillor Valloton in a meeting of the Swiss Parliament, the value of the Finnish Army’s shooting effectiveness consisted not in mass fire but in single shots. Finnish army commander General Field Marshal von Mannerheim asserted in an interview: “Rifle shooting has played an important role in this war. Our best shooters had special tasks. Look after shooting in Switzerland!”8 Rudolf Minger, head of the Swiss Military Department, stated:
We learn from the fate of the Finnish, a small but heroic people. . . . A military mission should be sent to Finland. Concerning shooting in Switzerland, I can assure you we stand on the ground that individual shooting is very important. Everything is adjusted to it.9
“The offensive seems imminent,” wrote correspondent William Shirer on March 1. “From what I saw in the Netherlands, the Dutch will be easy pickings for the Germans. Their army is miserable. Their famous defensive waterline is of doubtful worth.” (Dutch military plans called for flooding areas to bog down tanks, not anticipating air attacks and paratroopers.) By contrast, Shirer continued, “Switzerland will be tougher to crack, and I doubt if the Germans will try.10
In deepest winter, when an invasion was unlikely, many Swiss soldiers had been released to go back to their homes and jobs. On March 4, however, Switzerland advanced a scheduled remobilization. Bavarian and Austrian formations were moving into areas opposite the Swiss frontier from the Rhine to Lake Constance.11 Additional mobilization orders were issued as increased German troop concentrations were reported. Switzerland called up 400,000 men in response to the build-up.12
Meanwhile, the Swiss press expressed skepticism regarding both Anglo-French and Nazi professions of goodwill toward neutrals, although Switzerland was regarded as distinctly sympathetic to the Allies.13 Swiss papers also continued to provide their own analyses of German public opinion.
For instance, the Basler Nachrichten (Basel Even
ing News) opined on February 9 that Germans blamed the Nazis for their suffering.14 Hitler had lost popularity because he exposed Germany to armed conflict.15 In Bavaria, the paper argued, anti-Nazi sentiment was engendered by traditional animosity toward the Prussian mentality: “All this does not imply that Germany is ready for a revolution. Civilians are disarmed, and so powerless.” Some Germans thought Germany would profit from defeat, which would destroy Nazism and Prussian militarism, while others thought victory would generate a military dictatorship and then a monarchist restoration. Germans longed for, it was asserted, the return of legality, freedom and human dignity.16 The ongoing analysis in the uncensored Swiss press of German domestic sentiment, accurate or not, was closely followed by the Nazi leadership in Berlin, Goebbels in particular.
Propaganda Minister Goebbels demanded that the press and even the public opinion of neutrals must be truly “neutral”—in other words, never critical of National Socialism. The Nazi press asserted that Switzerland granted her citizens a license to abuse Germany. Newspapers in major German cities joined in waging the campaign of criticism against Switzerland. Elizabeth Wiskemann, in Fortnightly magazine, commented: “So systematic has the German press campaign been that it has appeared not altogether unlike the journalistic artillery-fire which is apt to precede a Nazi invasion.”17
Nazi-Soviet cooperation continued during 1939–40 as Germany traded manufactured goods for foodstuffs and raw materials from Russia.18 The Germans were also heavily dependent on the import of iron ore from Sweden. In Finland, the Soviet Union continued to take heavy losses as its attacking armies flailed helplessly in the thick northern forests, but during February they finally breached the Mannerheim Line in the south, presenting the Finns with a crisis. In one of the great ironies of the war, the Allies in response prepared an expeditionary force of British, French and Polish troops to aid Finland, a future German ally, in its war against Germany’s future antagonist, the Soviet Union. The Royal Navy prepared to transport troops to Norway, from which point they would march to support the Finns. On March 6, however, Finland sued for peace with Russia and on the 12th agreed to Russia’s terms, the most important of which was the handover of the Karelian isthmus north of Leningrad.19 Against long odds, the Finns had held out heroically since November 1939.
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