by Dale Brown
If they couldn’t make it to Andrews, key government leaders would be evacuated immediately to an “undisclosed location,” which almost everyone in Washington knew to be the Mount Weather Special Facility, code-named “High Point,” the 434-acre mountain base near Berryville, West Virginia, operated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to implement the National Continuity of Government Plan. From the High Point underground-bunker complex, the A-list government and military leaders holed up there had a direct secure videoconference link with the White House Situation Room, Air Force One, the Pentagon, the Navy’s E-6B National Command Post, and the Air Force’s E-4 National Airborne Operations Center—anywhere the president or the strategic warfighting commanders were likely to be in an emergency. But neither the president nor anyone in his cabinet would evacuate Washington unless absolutely necessary, and it was up to Secretary of Defense Robert Goff and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Venti to give the president their recommendation.
After receiving a fast status briefing from Venti—and a slightly more detailed briefing from the commander of NORAD, General Randall Shepard—Goff immediately called the White House operations staff and gave them a “no imminent threat” message. It was not an easy message to send: If he made a wrong decision, it could mean the avoidable loss of hundreds, perhaps thousands of lives, including those in the highest levels of government. Goff was usually ebullient, cheerful, and smiling, but when he was angry, his expression and features turned dark, bordering on wide-eyed maniacal. The Joint Chiefs chairman, Air Force General Richard Venti, had not seen the secretary with such an evil visage in quite some time.
Naturally, the person responsible for giving him this expression was the same person that caused him to have it the last time: Patrick McLanahan.
“I find plenty of fault to go around here,” Goff went on, “but let’s start with the main instigator of this mess. General McLanahan, to say you overstepped the bounds of your authority is being far too generous. It’s as if you have never heard of a chain of command, a direct order, or a commanding officer. Your actions in this entire episode are a disgrace to your uniform, and I think it’s about time we investigate whether or not you should be wearing an American military uniform.
“However, just because we don’t like the person who pulled the fire alarm doesn’t mean we can ignore the smell,” Goff went on. “General Houser, I understand and concur that you have plenty of reason to be angry at this gross contravention of authority and chain of command. I’m not an analyst, but I tend to agree with your opinion that we don’t have enough information to make an accurate assessment. However, your recommendation that we do nothing is astounding to me. If it were any other person giving you this information, I think you’d do more, but because the information came from McLanahan, you recommended no action.” Goff turned to General Venti. “General? Recommendations?”
“Sir, I know how everyone feels about General McLanahan, but I happen to think the man is a true professional and that his analysis is timely and accurate,” Venti said. “If he thinks there is a danger out there, we should do something about it. I recommend that we establish an airborne-radar and fighter patrol over northern Alaska immediately while we fully activate the North Warning System. General Muskoka?”
“The Third Wing from Elmendorf provides AWACS radar coverage for northern Alaska,” Thomas Muskoka, commander of Air Combat Command, responded from his headquarters at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia via a secure video teleconference link. “The Three-fifty-fourth Fighter Wing from Eielson provides F-16 alert fighter patrols, backed up with alert F-15s from Elmendorf—fifteen to twenty minutes away, max. This can be set up in a matter of minutes.
“Over the rest of the northern U.S., we deploy AWACS radar aircraft from Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma over central Canada, deploy Air National Guard air-defense fighters from Fresno and Klamath Falls to northern bases, and reconfigure other Air National Guard fighters from St. Louis, South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana, Colorado, Michigan, Iowa, and Minnesota for air-defense duties. The AWACS planes can be deployed within a few hours. Reconfiguring the fighters will…take some time.”
The shock on Goff’s face was obvious to everyone, no matter how hard he tried to hide it. “How long, General?” he asked.
“The Fresno and Klamath Falls fighters on ready alert can launch within a few minutes,” Muskoka said. “If we can arrange tanker support, which is almost a certainty, we can put them on airborne alert, armed and ready for action.” He spread his hands resignedly. “The other aircraft were never meant to be alert aircraft, but respond only to general mobilization and—”
“How long, General?”
Muskoka shrugged. “Seventy-two hours at the earliest, sir,” he responded. Goff’s lips parted in surprise. Muskoka added quickly, “Fresno and Klamath Falls should be able to launch perhaps a half dozen aircraft, F-15s and F-16s, within a few minutes. They’ll have to do a unit recall to get more aircraft, but with regular ongoing training sorties, we should have another half dozen aircraft ready to go in an hour or two. If you need more than a dozen fighters right now, sir, I’d say we’re in deep shit.”
“I just never dreamed…I mean, I never thought it took so long for us to get fighters in the air, especially after September eleventh,” Goff said.
“Sir, we can get a fighter in the air with guns to cover one hundred percent of the U.S. that’ll look real tough and pretty for CNN,” Muskoka explained, “but launching a fighter to chase down a Cessna 182 who makes a wrong turn and flies over the White House is a lot different from chasing down a Russian bomber or a cruise missile—doing real air-defense work.” The frustration on Muskoka’s face was obvious. “Besides, I want to know who’s going to pay for all this—it sure as hell shouldn’t come out of my budget!—and mostly I want to know why we’re putting so much stock in McLanahan’s analysis. He’s a bomber guy, not an intel weenie, for Christ’s sake!”
“As you were, General,” Venti warned.
“Excuse me, sir, but you’re talking about putting a half dozen air-defense fighters on airborne alert over Canada, plus recalling a bunch more—on McLanahan’s say-so? With all due respect, sir, I’d prefer a little more reliable confirmation myself.”
“You’ve got all the confirmation you need, General,” Venti said. He looked at Goff, who nodded and made an entry into an electronic notebook. “Make it happen.”
“Roger, sir,” Muskoka said, and he could be seen in the videoconference screen lifting a phone to his ear and giving the orders.
“General Shepard, what’s the status of your sensors and radars?”
“Operational and ready to respond, sir.” U.S. Air Force General Randall Shepard was the commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, in charge of monitoring and defending against a missile or bomber attack on North America; he was also “dual-hatted” as the commander of U.S. Northern Command, in charge of defending against military or terrorist attacks on the United States. “The long-range radars of the North Warning System are currently operational, with a few maintenance exceptions, which should not impact the system’s effectiveness. The long-range radars have a range in excess of two hundred miles, depending on terrain and atmospheric conditions. The short-range radars can be activated within a relatively brief period of time, depending on local conditions.
“All NORAD-gained fighter-interceptor units are fully operational: four F-16Cs on alert at Eielson, four F-15Cs at Elmendorf, and four CF-18s on alert at Cold Lake, Alberta, Canada—plus the Klamath Falls and Fresno units,” Shepard went on. “I believe each wing can generate one or two more aircraft in a matter of hours, and they can generate their entire force in about two days.”
“Only twelve fighters available for all of western North America?” Goff asked incredulously.
“Sixteen, including the continental U.S. fighters,” Shepard said. “We’re at full authorized manning, sir. We have just enough funding to field the units we
have out there right now. The southern-U.S. and drug-interdiction duties get all the funding, and have for many years.” He looked at Patrick McLanahan’s image on the video teleconference screen and added, “I still find it hard to believe we’re under a Russian bomber threat, but be that as it may, we can respond to any threat.”
“What about OTH-B?” Goff asked.
Shepard at first appeared to be confused, then pained, before replying, ‘Sir, I think the staff or General McLanahan is in possession of outdated information. We operate only one OTH-B array, out of Bangor, Maine, which is dedicated only to atmospheric sampling and experiments as directed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or on request by the Department of Homeland Security—which, by the way, has never put in a request to use it. The West Coast OTH-B system is in warm storage, and the Alaskan system was canceled about fourteen years ago and was never even completed.”
“Can the West Coast system be reactivated, General?” Goff asked.
“Yes, sir—but it would take about two weeks to calibrate it and certify its accuracy and reliability,” Shepard replied. “Even then it might not be reliable enough to give you the information you want. The AWACS planes are your best bet, sir. You get them airborne, and we can plug them into the network right away and have wall-to-wall coverage. The AWACS information is merged into North Warning and all the other ground-radar facilities, and it forms a very complete three-dimensional picture.”
“The AWACS are on the way, General Shepard,” Venti said. He turned to Goff and said, “Sir, I request that NORAD direct Eielson, Elmendorf, and Cold Lake to generate NORAD-dedicated Bravo-force alert sorties as quickly as possible.”
“Agreed,” Secretary Goff responded. The “Bravo” alert sorties were additional crews and fighters readied for duty behind the frontline planes and crews; unfortunately, it usually took several hours to prepare them for action.
“On the way, sir,” Shepard said immediately, picking up a phone. General Muskoka made a note and handed it offscreen to his deputy. NORAD usually requested support from Air Combat Command for additional planes for the fighter-interceptor alert mission, so he wanted his fighter units ready to get the call and start lining up birds.
“General Houser, what other support can you provide for this operation?” Venti asked.
“Sir, the best support Space Command can offer, other than the systems already mentioned, is the Defense Support Program constellation,” Houser replied. “The DSP satellites are designed to detect the ‘hot dots’ from ballistic-missile launches but can be tuned to detect smaller heat sources, such as bomber exhausts, traveling across the cold ocean or polar icecaps. It’ll take away from their primary function of ballistic-missile launch warning, and as such I recommend against retuning DSP. Once we get the AWACS planes airborne, sir, I think we’ll have all the coverage we need.
“Unfortunately, HAVE GAZE and SLOW WALKER are committed to operations in Central Asia, and it’ll take several days to focus them in on any specific area of northern Alaska or Canada.” HAVE GAZE and SLOW WALKER were infrared satellites and sensors designed to detect and track small missiles and aircraft. But unlike DSP satellites, in which just three satellites could cover the entire globe, the other two satellites had to be focused on a specific area to be effective. “DSP and AWACS are the best options we have without degrading our strategic surveillance.”
“I agree,” General Shepard said. “If the Russians really are gearing up for some sort of offensive, NORAD relies on DSP for the first indication of ballistic missile launch, both land-and sea-based. All our other ballistic-missile launch-warning systems are limited because they require the missiles to cross the relative horizon—that reduces launch-warning time anywhere from two to eight minutes. Only DSP gives us instantaneous launch warning.”
“Very well—we won’t reconfigure DSP,” Goff said. He was ready for the meeting to be over with. “All right, we have AWACS planes on the way from Eielson, plus the alert fighters, plus fighters on the way from the CONUS bases, and we’re firing up the North Warning radars. Anything else we’re overlooking?” No response. “In that case…”
“Sir, I’d suggest dispersing the bomber and fighter fleet to alternate-generation bases or to civil airfields,” Patrick McLanahan interjected. “If the Russians do attack, I believe they wouldn’t go after civilian targets, only military ones. Military aircraft would therefore be safer at civil airfields.”
“General McLanahan, I’ve agreed to the increased surveillance measures because I think that’s a prudent step and because we have much of that infrastructure already in place,” Secretary Goff said irritably. “But I’m not going to agree to any more moves that would disrupt day-today operations or create increased anxiety among our people, our allies, or the Russians until I get more information.” He paused, looking around the conference table. “Anything else?”
“Yes, sir,” General Muskoka of Air Combat Command chimed in. He looked uncomfortable but pressed on: “General Luger of the Air Battle Force submitted a mission plan to me that could supply you with the information you need. His proposal is to send a small armed recon force into Yakutsk, Russia, to ascertain the exact level of tanker-aircraft activity there. According to the satellite images, Yakutsk is turning into some kind of major Russian tanker base all of a sudden. General Luger feels that we may only be seeing a small portion of the aircraft there.”
“That damned Air Battle Force outfit is not an intelligence organization,” Houser retorted.
“Pardon the fuck out of me, Houser,” Muskoka said, “but I’m not here to listen to your opinions about my operations forces!”
“Knock it off, both of you,” Venti warned.
But Muskoka wasn’t nearly done shooting back at Houser. “This is what I’m telling you, Houser: Dave Luger’s Air Battle Force ground team is in the Aleutians, and they’re in position and ready to do a sneak-and-peek operation to Yakutsk,” he went on. “Now, unlike McLanahan, I trust Luger.” Patrick’s face remained stoic despite the direct indictment, but if Muskoka noticed Patrick’s lack of reaction, he made no indication of it. “If it was McLanahan, he’d already be in Yakutsk by now raising all kinds of hell. Luger pushed his men to the limit of his authority and stopped, and I commend him for it. The question I put forth to the secretary and the Chiefs is simple: Do you want Luger’s boys to go forward or not?”
“What’s your recommendation, General Muskoka?” Secretary Goff asked.
“Luger’s Tin Men are the only assets we have in that entire region prepared to get us the information we need,” Muskoka replied. “His plan is simple, it involves only a few aircraft and men, and it has a fairly good chance of succeeding. In about two hours, we can get the scoop on Yakutsk. I recommend you authorize them to proceed. They might appreciate a Marine Force Recon or Army Special Forces team standing by to back them up.”
“I’ve got a unit ready to go,” offered the commandant of the Marines Corps, General Paul Hooks, after quickly studying a report handed to him by an aide. “Bravo Company, First Battalion, Fourth Marines, Eleventh Marine Expeditionary Unit–Special Operations Capable, is right now at Fort Greely, Alaska, finishing up a joint-forces exercise with the U.S. Air Force. We should be able to back up your guys.”
“Hold it, hold it,” Goff said, raising his hands. “I’m not authorizing an armed incursion into Russia at this time—I don’t care how good they are. Tell General Luger to stand by and wait for my word. I don’t want to aggravate the situation any more than we already have. Anything else?” Goff asked. Before anyone could reply, he said, “I wish you all could be in the room when I give this to the president—maybe you’d have a better understanding of the consternation you cause when communications break down and personalities and emotions get in the way of clearheaded thinking. General Houser, General McLanahan, stay with me. Everyone else, thank you.”
When the others had logged off the secure connection, Goff went on, “General McLanahan, Gener
al Houser has requested that you be relieved of command of the Nine-sixty-sixth Information Warfare Wing, pending the results of a court-martial. I think you’re familiar with the charges. As is traditional in these cases, I’m offering you the opportunity to resign your commission in lieu of standing for court-martial.”
“With respect, sir, I object to the offer,” Houser said. “I request that McLanahan be bound over for trial.”
“Your objection is overruled,” Goff said. “General McLanahan?”
“Sir, before I respond to these charges, I have one last report to make to you and to General Houser concerning this air-defense situation—”
“There is no ‘air-defense situation,’ McLanahan!” Houser snapped.
Patrick held the classified folder up to the camera. “May I, sir?”
Goff sighed, then nodded. “Make it quick, General.”
“Sir, I ran a scenario through the Strike Assessment Catalog computers using the latest intelligence data coupled with the information we now know of deployment of Russian strategic forces in Siberia,” Patrick said.
“What scenario?”
“The possibility of success of a Russian bomber attack on the United States of America,” Patrick replied.
“Give me a break, McLanahan!” Houser cried.
“It is the absolute latest information available,” Patrick went on. “To make it even more conservative, I accelerated defensive time frames in our favor by fifty percent and decreased the size of the Russian forces by fifty percent. The results were the same: The United States can be successfully attacked from the air by Russian strategic air-breathing forces, and about half of all American nuclear-capable forces, especially land-based missiles and bombers, would be destroyed.”