Many think that it is reviewing that needs to be reformed, but I believe the culprit is the species, which surrounds itself with lies, and calls the lies culture, the way squirrels build their nests of dead twigs and fallen leaves, then hide inside. In any case, as the German philosopher Lichtenberg observed, when reader’s brow and book collide, it isn’t always the book that is lacking brains.
Following the hubble-bubble of its initial reception, The Recognitions was left in a lurch of silence, except for those happy yet furious few who had found this fiction … about the nature, meaning, and value of “the real thing” … found it to be the real thing. The rumor was that William Gaddis himself had published a pamphlet excoriating the reviewers of his book and citing their malfeasances one by one. The truth, when it lies down among lies, such as those falsehoods, slanders, and distortions with which I salted the opening of this intro, takes on their odor of oleo, and is soon indistinguishable from them. Gaddis did check facts for a living once. He did banana-boat out of South America. It would scarcely matter except that contexts corrupt. Bedfellows bite. Turncoats will steal from their own pockets and betray even linings. Cozenage est un dangereux voisinage. Actually, a pseudonymous New Yorker named Jack Green published three articles on the qualities of the book hacks who had inflicted their skills upon The Recognitions. He called it, rather directly, “Fire the Bastards!” and the Dalkey Archive Press has reissued it in fine form. There, in addition to much of the data I have already used, I learned that one of these gentlemen attributed the book to William Gibson.
So a slender ring of fans kept the work afloat for the next twenty years, but its neglect, I think, was due to factors having little to do with its alleged difficulty or the dubious distinction of having a cult following. If you are to remain known while writing books (for the books themselves are likely to have a mayfly’s life), you must either court the media and let publicity be your pimp, à la Truman Capote and Norman Mailer, or cling like old ivy to the walls of the Academy, passing your person around from campus to campus like a canapé on a party tray. One way or another, you are thus able to appear in public often and collect the plaudits of hands that might as well clap, since they are otherwise empty. You read your work with histrionic polish, or display a practiced wit and your increasing ease on talk shows. You review. Yes, you do; you descend to your opponents’ depths, where you’ll be seen as just another shark. You sympose. You give interviews. All of it adding to the stuff about and by you that a student, a critic, or a scholar must consult. For you are as large as your library’s catalog entries. Meanwhile, you instruct beginners on how to be a genius, giving selected students a professional boost, and forming around your tutorial self, over the years, growing rings of gratitude, your career likewise enlarging as steadily as the trunk of a weedy tree.
William Gaddis, aka Gibson, aka Green, aka Gass, did none of these customary career-enhancing things, remaining, as the politicians’ escape phrase always conveniently claims, “out of the loop.” Out of the network. Not in the swim. Nor did he write a new book every fortnight just to prove how easy it is, for we all know how easy it is, and how desirable, for that way you can continue to feed your few friends what they are used to, and there are publisher’s parties to go to, and more and more nice notices, even raves, since now aren’t we all old pals? We must remember that the same hacks who condemn, for a price also praise.
Silence became his mode, exile (in effect) his status, cunning in scraping by his strategy, while compiling data and constructing other people’s niggling or nefarious plots, building another long book out of our business world’s obsession with money, manipulation, and deception, composing a hymn to Horatio Alger, music made of inane, conniving, sly, deceitful speech. JR did okay at the store for a time, and gathered in the National Book Award, but I think it was less read than The Recognitions, less enjoyed, and could not produce, of course, the same surprise. Furthermore, although clearly created by a similar sensibility, and expressing a common point of view, JR was as different from the earlier novel as Joyce from James. But do not put down what you have to go to JR yet, even if it is almost as musical as Finnegans Wake, a torrent of talk and Tower of Babble, a slumgullion of broken phrases and incomplete—let’s call them—thoughts; because there is plenty to listen to here; because we must always listen to the language; it is our first sign of the presence of a master’s hand; and when we do that, when we listen, it is because we have first pronounced the words and performed the text, so when we listen, we hear, hear ourselves, singing the saying, and now we are real readers, for we are participating in the making, are moving the tune along the line, because no one who loves literature can follow these motions, these sentences, half sentences, of William Gaddis, very far without halting and holding up their arms and crying out, Hallelujah, there is something good in this gosh-awful, god-empty world.
Which is almost the whole point of what we do.
And accounts for the purity of Gaddis’s artistic intentions, and the reality of the work, for he actually makes grace abounding out of fakes astounding. Furthermore, the progression from the concerns of The Recognitions to those of JR is completely reasonable. The Recognitions, indeed, tackles the fundamental questions: What is real, and where can we find it in ourselves and the things we do? But a generation later, there are no fundamental questions to be posed. JR creates a thoroughly decendental world. It is a world of mouth, machination, and money. A few reviewers of JR, more perceptive than most, longed for the spiritual struggle of the earlier book, but—reader—just look around: That struggle has been lost. The large has been smothered by the small. Be petty enough and the world may make you a prince. The cheat, not the meek, has inherited the earth.
Yes, we must follow the instructions we are given at the conclusion of JR:
… remember this here book that time where they wanted me to write about success and like free enterprise and all hey? And like remember where I read you on the train that time where there was this big groundswill about leading this here parade and entering public life and all? So I mean listen I got this neat idea hey, you listening? Hey? You listening …?
Then, if we are properly obedient, we shall have scarcely reached the second page of The Recognitions before we have the hearing of a paragraph like this, which introduces us to Frank Sinisterra, at the moment masquerading as a ship’s doctor, but a counterfeiter by trade:
The ship’s surgeon was a spotty unshaven little man whose clothes, arrayed with smudges, drippings, and cigarette burns, were held about him by an extensive network of knotted string. The buttons down the front of those duck trousers had originally been made, with all of false economy’s ingenious drear deception, of coated cardboard. After many launderings they persisted as a row of gray stumps posted along the gaping portals of his fly. Though a boutonnière sometimes appeared through some vacancy in his shirt-front, its petals, too, proved to be of paper, and he looked like the kind of man who scrapes foam from the top of a glass of beer with the spine of a dirty pocket comb, and cleans his nails at table with the tines of his salad fork, which things, indeed, he did. He diagnosed Camilla’s difficulty as indigestion, and locked himself in his cabin.
I particularly like the double t’s with which our pleasure begins, but perhaps you will prefer the ingenious use of the vowel i in the sentence with which it ends (“which things, indeed, he did. He diagnosed Camilla’s difficulty as indigestion, and locked himself in his cabin”), or the play with d and c in the same section. But these are rich streets and should be dawdled down, not simply to admire the opening alliteration but to enjoy the fact that this paper money-man is made of paper, or to visualize the gesture, as suitable as a finger’s, and certainly as unclean, which sweeps his pint’s excessive foam away, or above all to appreciate the hidden pun that runs from “foam” to “comb,” contriving the decombing of Frank’s beer’s head.
No great book is explicable, and I shall not attempt to explain this one. An explanation—inde
ed, any explanation—would defile it, for reduction is precisely what a work of art opposes. Easy answers, convenient summaries, quiz questions, annotations, arrows, highlighted lines, lists of its references, the numbers of its sources, echoes, and influences, an outline of its design—useful as sometimes such helps are—nevertheless very seriously mislead. Guidebooks are useful, but only to what is past. Interpretation replaces the original with the lamest sort of substitute. It tames, disarms. “Okay, I get it,” we say, dusting our hands, “and that takes care of that.” “At last I understand Kafka” is a foolish and conceited remark.
Too often, we bring to literature the bias for “realism” we were normally brought up with, and consequently we find a work like The Recognitions too fanciful, obscure, and riddling. But is reality always clear and unambiguous? Is reality simple and not complex? Does it unfold like the pages of a newspaper, or is the unfolding more like that of a road map—difficult to get spread out, difficult to read, difficult to redo? And is everything remembered precisely, and nothing repeated, and are people we know inexplicably lost from sight for long periods, only to pop up when we least expect them? Of course; the traditional realist’s well-scrubbed world, where motives are known and actions are unambiguous, where you can believe what you are told and where the paths of good and evil are as clearly marked as highways, that world is as contrived as a can opener; for all their frequent brilliance, and all the fondness we have for these artificial figures, their clever conversations and fancy parties, the plots they circle in like carouseled horses, to call them and the world they decorate “real” is to embrace a beloved illusion. The pages of The Recognitions are more nearly the real right thing than any of Zola’s or Balzac’s.
There’s no need for haste; the pages which lie ahead of you will lie ahead of you for as long as you like them to. It is perfectly all right if some things are at first unclear, and if there are references you don’t recognize; just go happily on. We don’t stay in bed all day, do we, just because we’ve mislaid our appointment calendar? No, we need to understand this book—enjoy its charm, its wit, its irony, its erudition, its sensuous embodiment—the way we understand a spouse we have lived with and listened to and loved for many years through all their nights. Persons deserving such devotion and instinctual appreciation are rare; rarer still are the works which are worth it.
It may be helpful, however, to place The Recognitions in the center of all stories, where it belongs, in order to get a grip on the novel’s basic strategy. First, a model archetypal plot:
A baby boy is born. In former times, before equalization was achieved, the parents in our history would have been important—they were gods and goddesses, heroes and their consorts, kings and queens—because what happened to them had to be significant not just for themselves but for the whole of their society. So this child will be an heir, and, as Joseph Campbell has pointed out, he will have a thousand faces. Signs of several sorts—omens, portents, the prognostications of soothsayers—warn the father (the king) that the birth of this son endangers him, so the king has his child taken away and exposed to the harshness of the wilderness, where he will surely perish, but perish at Nature’s hand and not at the hand of his father (a sophistry our signers of death warrants still practice). However, if the father in question is as forthright as Chronos (or Saturn, if you like), he simply swallows his rival. The first recognition belongs to the parents, and it is that the new generation will one day assume the position and powers now possessed by their elders. Although passing away is as important as coming to be for the health of the species, it is rarely welcomed, and is usually postponed as long as possible.
At the time the infant is borne off (if it does not already possess a mark of identity), it is inadvertently given one. Oedipus, you recall, had his feet pinned as though he were being trussed like a bird for the spit. Whether left on a doorstep, set adrift in a basket, or abandoned on a hillside, the child is found by a totem animal and raised as one (Romulus and Remus are brought up by wolves), or he is rescued by a shepherd or a fisherman, who becomes his foster parent. It is in this period of exile, during which the boy grows up in a foreign land, that the second recognition occurs, either through a slowly increasing inner conviction that he is “other” and important and has a destiny or because, at some point, his foster parents tell him something of his history. This is our “hero’s” first recognition, and it is primarily negative; put crudely, he says, I am not a wolf; I am not a bear; I am not of peasant stock. “What am I doing in Akron, Ohio?” Hart Crane wonders; “Utah,” Ezra Pound insists, “is not my middle-name.”
Soon he sets out in search of his true homeland and his real identity. This part of the tale is in the form of an odyssey: a lengthy journey, during which the young man overcomes a series of obstacles that test his character, certify his skills, and establish his stardom, as do the labors of Hercules, or any Wanderjahr. His final trial, it turns out, is usually the solution to some sort of conundrum, and is a spiritual or intellectual trial rather than a physical one (Oedipus solves the riddle of the Sphinx).
Much later, after Oedipus has been rescued from his fate by his foster parents, and has wandered through the world in search of his true home (his Odyssey), he arrives in a place he has no memory of, and by chance (that is, by Fate) encounters the king, his father. His maimed feet determine his identity, the king is appropriately alarmed, and in a kind of contest (the agon) the son defeats him, and receives his reward, the hand of the queen. This recognition could be mutual, and the contest, consequently, clear-eyed, but the recognition is often put off, as in Sophocles’ version of the Oedipus story, until many years have passed. The first arc of our narrative is now complete. It begins with a boy’s birth and ends with his marriage, or comus; hence it is called a comedy.
The second part of the story repeats the first, but from the father’s point of view, for marriage means a new rival will soon appear upon the scene. If we stay with our original protagonist, there follows for him a period of peace, during which time he establishes his rule and prospers along with his people. Meanwhile, in another country, his banished child grows restless and continues his searches. It is important to realize that from one point of view our “hero” is precisely that, from another point of view he is a unredeemable villain, and that the crimes of banishment and usurpation are repeated one generation after another without remission. The story’s second arc ends, then, with the death of the hero at the hands of the son he has wronged, and it is called, of course, a tragedy.
However, a hero who is overthrown and dies is hardly a hero, especially when, as so often happens, he is torn to pieces or sacrificed or eaten. Clearly, he would not have lost the contest, the battle, the election, the war, the woman, unless he was betrayed, as Germany was by the Treaty of Versailles, as the South was in the Civil War, as every loser always is: by bad officiating, rotten luck, corporate scheming, political cabals, racial plots. We may have dropped the ball, but we did so because we were stabbed in the back. So there is usually a Judas or two hanging around, waiting to do some dirty deed, an Iago with a hankie up his sleeve. We can disloyally switch our allegiance to the new ruler—the king is dead, after all, so long live the king—but if we remain with our original character, what have we to miss and mourn but scattered bits of a disgraced corpse or a sealed tomb to pass a lifetime’s vigil by? Well, the bits get put back together one way or another; the hero rolls away the stone that stoppers his grave; the followers of the betrayed and crucified king recognize him as restored and alive; whereupon, like Dionysius (his history now complete), he is pulled from the plot like the first gray hair, his name is given to a constellation, and he goes to dwell in the company of the gods.
And we—you and I—insofar as we are able to identify with the nature and life of this heroic figure, will overcome death and be redeemed as he was; For he, and the ups and downs of his career, merely embody the uncertain cycle of the seasons. “In the juvenescence of the year came Christ the t
iger.”
There is another section of this tale that might be mentioned, although it tends to be heretical in its content, popular rather than ensconced in any canon. While the hero of one cycle is enjoying his queen and ruling his kingdom, you remember, the son (the hero in another version) was in exile and on his odyssey. Similarly, when the king is slain, and a new king assumes command, the dead lord can be imagined as living in exile in the country of death—in the underworld—and there he will undertake another trip, and face other trials, while awaiting his resurrection. The Christian tradition describes a “harrowing of Hell”: a struggle between the crucified Christ and the Lord of Hell—there, like two cocks, in the pit itself. And this phase will possess its own set of recognitions.
Poets, novelists, mythmakers rarely try to narrate the entire tale, but usually will decide to focus on one element of the story, and elaborate it (odysseys provide many such opportunities), or they will alter the ontology of the enterprise, as Sophocles does, making not action but understanding the central theme of the cycle. Because Oedipus’s deeds have been so heedlessly performed, he blinds himself, once his eyes have been opened to what he’s done, with a brooch taken from his lover-mother’s garments. This physical blindness is, of course, a prerequisite to his now-powerful inner sight.
Suppose, now, I reenact this tale, furnishing it with details that will suit my place and time and special interests, as if none of its features had ever been seen before, as if none of its acts had ever been performed, as if none of its aims had, in any previous place or period, been realized. My rituals would be make-believe; they would be counterfeits; and their effects would depend upon the suppression of the original “once upon a time,” and its replacement by my later sly reenactment. My story would be a usurper unless it recognized its kinship with all earlier versions, and it would risk overthrow the moment acknowledgment of that kinship were forced upon it. The long and unique quotation from Sir James Frazer’s seminal book, The Golden Bough, which Gaddis inserts in The Recognitions, permits us to recognize (although we have now known it for some time) that the practice of scapegoating is ancient and happens often and has seasonal motives. If crucifying a monkey or a rat has an air of superstitious desperation, what quality are we to assign its Christian counterpart?
A Temple of Texts: Essays Page 20