That is to say, between 370 and 359 the Macedonian state collapsed and was in
the process of being dismembered.
Any Macedonian who knew anything about the history of his country knew
that they had been at this pass before. A quarter of a century earlier, in the 390s, a very similar situation had existed; half a century earlier the kingdom had been divided for two decades or more; in between there had been a convulsive crisis within the royal family. In all four of these crises – in 454–430, 413, 399–391 and 370–359 – the succession to the kingship had been disputed, and in each case
many had died. The crisis of the 360s was thus a recurrence of an old pattern.
The kingdom of the Macedonians had existed since the seventh century.
Its early history is known only through myth and the usual later genealogical
self-aggrandizing of the ruling dynasty, 1 which claimed descent from a Greek family of Argos, which was ultimately descended from Temenos, a relative
of Heracles; from these notions the royal family is called either Temenidai or Argeadai. This early ‘history’ is unproven and unlikely. It is only from the end of the sixth century that some relatively clear information can be discerned, thanks to external interest rather than to any internal records from the kingdom.
The crucial facts about Macedon are, fi rst, that it was a kingdom, and that it remained so long after most Greek states discarded their kings; and, secondly, that the kingdom lay in a large, rich, well-watered plain surrounded by uplands inhabited by non-Macedonians. These were less numerous and affl uent, or
perhaps merely less well fed, than the plainsmen. These two elements went
together and reinforced each other, so that Macedon was constantly threatened
by invaders, and required a full-time war leader to be in command, a man who
could organize and lead the military forces of the plains in defence of, or in retaliation against, raids from the surrounding hills. The kingship was the heart of the Macedonian state, and a crisis within the royal family was one which
affected all Macedonians. The extensive plain also fostered the existence of a large
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
2
landowning baronage, who fought on horseback, and who was kept in fi ghting
trim by their constant need to ride out to defend the kingdom.
The heart of the kingdom lay in the plainlands north of Mount Olympos,
and those around the Thermaic Gulf, Pieria, Emathia, Almopia, Bottiaia, an area about 100 or so kilometres from south to north and half that from east to west, a large country for Greece. It was watered by several rivers which fl owed out of the hills on the west and north and converged to discharge into the Thermaic Gulf, where the alluvium they carried had been turning the head of the gulf into marsh.
The valleys of these rivers in turn provided routes out of the plain into the hills
– but they were also routes by which the hillmen could raid the plain.
Beyond the enclosing ranges of hills were a series of upland valleys, each
the home of a people who were also near-Greek – Tymphaia, Elimaia, Orestis,
Eordaia, Lynkos, Pelagonia, all with their own kings. This region is generally called Upper Macedon; as one moved further from the heart of Macedon so the
languages spoken ceased to be Greek and became Illyrian and Thracian. 2
The coasts of the kingdom were accessible to seamen, and several Greek
colony-cities had been planted there – Dion, Methone and Pydna especially.
Across the Thermaic Gulf numerous cities were founded in the peninsulas of the Chalkidike, so called because so many of the cities were founded from the city of Chalkis in Euboia. This area comprehended up to 30 cities, including Therme,
which gave its name to the gulf. Most of these were small, but, besides Therme, there were notable cities at Potidaia and Olynthos. This was, therefore, a Greek land rather than Macedonian. 3
These cities were organized as republics on the Greek pattern, choosing their
magistrates annually, their male citizens mobilizable into a phalanx army at need.
The Macedonians, by contrast, tended to be cavalry. This restricted the effective force the kings could muster to those who were wealthy, that is, the barons. The Macedonian infantry was untrained, and consisted of a levée en masse of the male population, mainly peasant farmers, poorly armed, lacking discipline and
cohesion. 4 The urban centres in the kingdom were relatively small, local market centres rather than developed political entities, and were dominated politically by the baronage.
This difference in organization for war put the Greek cities in a strong
position, at least defensively, since a hoplite phalanx bristling with long spears was not something cavalry could easily face, the untrained infantry was incapable of fi ghting it, and the walls of the cities were an effective deterrent. The hillmen of the inland states were organized like the Macedonians, but were less numerous; their lands were geographically smaller and could not produce large numbers
of soldiers.5 Macedon’s wars with its inland neighbours were thus generally successful; those against Greeks usually not. The whole area was therefore in a constant fl ux of confl ict, in which no power was capable of dominating the others
M A C E D O N 3 7 0 – 3 5 9 b c : A F A I L I N G S TAT E
3
for long, and in which momentary alliances based on briefl y perceived identities of interest could be formed, and as quickly abandoned.
The theoretical advantage lay with the Macedonian kingdom, because of its
sheer size and the numbers of its people; it was the largest state in the Balkans south of the Danube. The Greek cities were relatively small and were in control of the land around them for only a short distance – perhaps a day’s walk away from the walls. The inland tribal states were each limited to a narrow valley enclosed by hills, a situation in which the population and resources were necessarily limited.
Macedon’s power remained no more than potential, partly because of economic
underdevelopment and a social organization which limited its military power,
but also because of the problems of the royal family.
The fi rst king of whom much is known is Alexander I, who ruled in Macedon
when the Persian Wars engulfed Greece and the Aegean. For 30 years it was a
Persian sub-kingdom, and Alexander and his father were helped to expand their
territories, particularly eastwards, but Alexander also established some sort of control over several of the hill states along his western border. 6 He was ambitious, slippery, devious and cunning, exactly the qualities required to survive and
prosper in the dangerous times of the Persian Wars. He permitted the Persian
forces to traverse his kingdom – he could hardly do otherwise – but he also made contact with the Greeks, operating so effectively that neither side took umbrage.
As the Persian power ebbed after 478, he sidled up to the victorious Greeks. He had established his Hellenic credentials by proving to the judges at the Olympic Games that he was of Greek descent by citing the story of his Argive ancestors.
The judges accepted his claim, though it is more than likely fi ctitious and
mythical.7 This did not apply to his people, though they spoke a Greek dialect: Alexander’s claim was personal. As he conquered more lands, these new areas
became Macedonian; Pelagonia and the rest had been thought of as Illyrian until the Macedonian conquest, when they became, and remained, Macedonian. 8
Alexander’s imperial expansion employed methods traditional to the
Macedonian kings. In some areas he conquered and expelled the inhabitants,
replacing them with Macedonians. This seems to have been the main method
used in the early expansion of the kingdom. Just what this method invol
ved,
however, is not clear. To drive out a whole people was extremely diffi cult; more likely it was the ruling group which went, perhaps taking some of their followers with them, but leaving the bulk of the peasantry behind. So the Macedonian
conquest was the imposition of a Macedonian ruling group upon the existing
peasantry. The net result would be an increase in lands and wealth for the
baronage, and an increase in their numbers as younger sons gained estates. 9
The second method was imposing an overlordship. The royal houses of the
western kingdoms in the hill states remained in place, despite the successes of Alexander I, and are noted by Thucydides in his account dated to the year 429.
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
4
They had presumably been defeated in battle; the peace agreement which
followed will therefore have guaranteed the continuation of the royal house’s
rule, and marriage alliances were arranged with the Macedonian royal house
– Thucydides calls these kingdoms, ambiguously but revealingly, ‘allies and
subjects’.10 The subject kings were required to render armed assistance to the Macedonian king when he asked. Needless to say, the subordinate kingdoms
tended to break away when they could.
Macedonian society was one in which the king was the leading member of
a fairly widespread aristocracy which ruled over a submissive peasantry. The
aristocracy was always keen to acquire new lands, hunting was their favourite
pastime, and their mode of fi ghting was on horseback. Their support of the
king was to an extent voluntary, solicited by his generosity with lands and gifts and feasts. Into such a polity, the subordinated kings of the hill kingdoms fi tted without diffi culty. Below the social level of the baronage was the peasantry, required to produce the food which supported the aristocratic superstructure,
but also at times required to take up arms to see off an invader under the
command of the barons and ultimately the king. In cultural terms the lords were to a degree Hellenized; the peasantry generally illiterate; economically all lived close to subsistence level.
Macedon in the fi fth century was, therefore, a large state, loosely structured, fairly thinly populated and unstable. Its effectiveness depended to a large degree on the vigour and activity of the king. In internal relations the king had to keep the lords and barons on his side, and had constantly to conciliate or dominate the subordinate kings of his western border regions. The barons were liable to become disgruntled at almost any real or imagined slight; the hill kings would much rather have had their complete independence. The frontiers were indefi nite and often the scene of skirmishing warfare. In both internal and external affairs, the kings required the deviousness and cunning which Alexander I showed so
successfully.11
After the Persian War, the main power Alexander faced was Athens, fi rst as the leader of the Delian League, and later as the hegemon of its empire. They came into confl ict over control of the mouth and the lowest crossing of the Strymon River. The crossing was Macedon’s gateway to further east; the river was Athens’
entry into the continent from the sea. To add an extra edge to the situation,
rich sources of gold and silver existed in Mount Pangaion, just east of the river.
Almost simultaneously, in 477, Athens seized a Persian base, Eion, on the coast, and Alexander seized the crossing, Nine Ways, inland. 12 The local Greek colonial cities along the Macedonian coast and in the Chalkidike and on the Thracian
coast were meanwhile recruited into the Delian League. 13
The combination of menaces from outside and instability within was faced
by every king of Macedon in the century after the Persian withdrawal. This is the
M A C E D O N 3 7 0 – 3 5 9 b c : A F A I L I N G S TAT E
5
basic explanation for the erratic fortunes of the kings and their kingdom in that time. Any continuity of policy was broken by the diffi culties attendant on every royal succession. The only method of succession visible to us was designation by the previous king, though his choice was not always accepted by others. 14 Death of a king was therefore normally followed by a struggle for succession between those men who could be considered his heirs, a group which was restricted to the males of the Argead family. This inevitably encouraged interference from outside, attempts at independence by the subsidiary kings, and the possible division of the kingdom between heirs. It also rendered the life of any king somewhat precarious: assassination was the repeated resort of those who were disappointed in their
ambitions.
Alexander I died about 454, leaving at least fi ve living sons by at least two wives. He appears to have set up three of them as kings over various sections of his kingdom. This extended into the kingdom he ruled directly the system of
suzerainty on the western borders. So Perdikkas II, the eldest or most vigorous son, was regarded as the king; Philip ruled lands along the eastern border, perhaps Amphaxitis, the land between the Axios River and the hills to the east; Alketas ruled somewhere else, it is not known where. Two other brothers, Menelaos and
Amyntas, had no principalities of their own, but certainly survived and will have had landed estates for their livelihood. The whole situation is unclear and subject to controversy.15
Such a division had been Alexander’s responsibility, but it could also be an
arrange ment made between the brothers. It may have been subject to acceptance by the Assembly of the Macedonians – or perhaps it was only the person of the
king who was so subject. The Assembly is a vague entity in the sources, but it would seem to be composed of wealthy landowners, the barons, but was also
attended by non-noble freemen. The Assembly, if it followed the pattern visible in other Greek tribal states, met every spring and autumn (at the equinoxes),
probably at Dion in Pieria, and at Aigai. When the king died, his successor
presented himself to the Assembly for acceptance by acclamation. There is, in
fact, no record of a king ever being rejected. Special meetings could be called, no doubt by the king, and any sizeable group of Macedonians could be regarded as
an Assembly.16
It follows that the determinant of the royal succession was fi rst of all the
previous king, but his decisions could be altered. Succession was confi ned to members of the royal family, the Argeads, but this was a fairly large group. Kings were liable to marry more than once, either serially or polygamously; this all imported a good deal of uncertainty into the process. Assassination, murder and civil war were part of that process.
Alexander I’s division of the kingdom led to a generation of trouble. Philip
disputed Perdikkas II’s authority as king, but was eventually driven out and
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
6
probably killed. When Perdikkas himself died, about 413, Alketas claimed the
kingship, perhaps having been emplaced as successor by the dead king; this was disputed by Perdikkas’ own son Archelaos, and it was the latter who emerged as king. Whether this was due to a belief among the Macedonians that it was his
due as the son of the last king, or simply because Alketas and his sons died in the fi ghting, is unknown. 17 The time of division was also one of weakness, and two areas at least, Bisaltia, east of the Axios, and the Edones, even further east, became independent under their own kings. The western regions of Upper Macedon
became even more loosely attached than before. During this period also Athens
managed to found its colony at Amphipolis at the former Nine Ways, with the
aim of controlling the trade route along the Strymon Valley, and the mineral
sources of Mount Pangaion. 18
Archelaos made
attempts to develop his kingdom’s power but results came
only slowly. He reopened a profi table silver mine in Bisaltia, let Athens build ships in a Macedonian dockyard, selling the city the timber for the work, and developed a more effective army. After the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War he
meekly did as Sparta told him. Macedon did not have enough strength to cut a
large fi gure in international affairs in the face of either Athens or Sparta. 19
Archelaos, however, made progress at home. He subordinated Elimaia and
Orestis on the west. With Athenian help he conquered the Greek city of Pydna
on the coast and moved its population inland 3 or 4 km. He pushed his control
eastwards to the eastern side of the Chalkidike. He pushed north along the Axios River to gain control of the crucial Demir Kapu Pass by planting a Macedonian
settlement a little way beyond it, blocking access to it from that direction. 20 This involved a decade of effort and warfare, and had required the enlargement of
his military forces.
He also moved his royal seat from Aigai on the Haliakmon to Pella on the
northern shores of the Thermaic Gulf. This marked a partial break with the past, though the kings continued to be buried at Aigai, and the Assembly still took
place at Aigai. A greater openness to the outside world would result from the
move, for Aigai was awkwardly inland while Pella was a seaport, more central to the kingdom, and residence there brought the king closer to the problem frontiers of the north-west and the east.21
Archelaos was killed in 399, either in a hunting accident or as a result of a
conspiracy in the royal court.22 Between his death and the fi nal accession of his cousin Amyntas III in 391, four other men were kings: Orestes, Archelaos’
child, who died or was killed; Aeropos, Archelaos’ half-brother who was regent for Orestes, and whom he succeeded as king, dying after a reign of only two or three years; Amyntas II ‘the Little’, a son of King Perdikkas’ brother Menelaos, who was killed by one of the courtiers called Derdas, whom he had humiliated;
Alexander the Great Failure Page 2