Alexander the Great Failure

  within 50 km of Pella and Aigai. Elimaia, the southernmost of the hill states, was in dispute with its southern neighbour and Amyntas had arbitrated the

  disagreement, which he could only have done had both been independent of his

  authority. 46 Between Elimaia and Lynkos, Orestis was thus also no doubt out of Amyntas’ reach, though King Derdas had been Amyntas’ ally in the Chalkidian

  war. The whole of the west was dominated by the extensive kingdom developed

  by Bardylis over the previous generation.

  The humiliations heaped on Ptolemy brought his assassination in 365, just as

  had those of Alexander II. His killer was his own ward, Perdikkas III, who was thus making it clear that he had come of age. 47 Perdikkas was the fourth ruler in fi ve years. The problems of the kingdom – murders in the royal family, intervention

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  13

  by outsiders, internal rebellions – had again emphasized its weakness. The basic problem was still the structural weakness of the kingdom, which left the person of the king vulnerable, and the kingdom’s military strength always minimal.

  Perdikkas, almost as young as his brother Alexander had been when he succeeded to power, was less impetuous, but then he had witnessed the troubles of the last fi ve years at close range, which would make anyone cautious. His organization of the killing of Ptolemy at least suggested a personal decisiveness.

  In the developing confl ict between Thebes and Athens, Perdikkas opted to ally with Thebes, and some of the hostages – who had been taken originally to control Ptolemy – were returned, including Perdikkas’ younger brother Philip, who was

  about 16 or 17 at the time. The Theban alliance with Macedon was part of the

  Theban programme of developing a naval strength, to challenge Athens, but for

  the moment this was not yet effective. 48

  The Athenian general Timotheos came north with a major fl eet to counter this

  threat. He seized control of the cities of Pydna and Methone on the Macedonian coast, and of Potidaea in the Chalkidike, thereby establishing control over much of Macedon’s seaward aspect; thus preventing ships being built for Thebes. He

  made diplomatic contact with the Thracians and the ruler of Pelagonia to the east and north of Macedon.49 Perdikkas’ kingdom was thus virtually surrounded by Athenian power and allies, while the death of Pelopidas in 364 removed the one Theban politician who was seriously interested in the north. Having thus neu tralized Macedon, Timotheos then set about his real work, which was to besiege the city of Amphipolis. This all convinced Perdikkas to bend with the political wind, and he joined in Timotheos’ siege:50 a policy shift which was soon reversed.

  Perdikkas was showing himself to be just as slippery and devious as any of his royal ancestors. The war in Greece came to a climax in 362, when the allies Athens and Sparta fought Thebes at the battle of Mantineia. The Thebans won but their leader Epameinondas was killed, and Thebes proved to be less than resolute

  afterwards. Perdikkas’ war with Athens included a most unpleasant defeat in

  battle, but he also made quieter advances, and at some point he managed to

  insert a Macedonian garrison into Amphipolis, which implies that he had gained control over the approach road and so of the Bisaltia area. Timotheos had to give up the siege of the city in 360; whether this was before or after the introduction of the Macedonian soldiers is not clear. 51 Perdikkas’ manoeuvring had clearly aligned his kingdom against Athens, just at the time that, despite the defeat at Amphipolis, Athenian power in the Aegean was again unchallenged.

  These events suggest that Perdikkas had a fairly effi cient military force at his disposal. It was partly cavalry, the traditional arm of Macedonian power, but

  he must also have had a force of hoplite infantry, probably fairly small in size, to be able to put an effective garrison into Amphipolis. Amyntas III had had

  some troops of this type, and Alexander II will have inherited them, and it was

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  presumably this force which he had used in Thessaly. The indications, therefore, are that they were used as garrison troops. Perdikkas, of course, had to maintain a large cavalry force, since this was the arm his northern and western enemies would use, and this was the Macedonian baronage’s preferred method of fi ghting, for reasons of prestige if nothing else. His infantry will have come in part from the Greek cities within his borders, and from the several parties of Greek settlers imported and settled in the kingdom in the past, but it is probable that the troops posted to Amphipolis were mercenaries, since the posting was clearly expected

  to last some time.

  Perdikkas ruled for about fi ve years. He showed suppleness in his diplomacy,

  combined with an insistence on resisting Athens. He employed at least one Greek expert, Kallistratos, an exiled Athenian politician, to reform his fi nancial system, which brought him an increase in the customs duties he collected – or rather

  brought him a higher fee from those who bid for the farm of those duties. 52 Yet the undeveloped nature of the kingdom is suggested by the results of that very reform, for the king’s income from the customs farm rose from 20 to 40 talents a year, a derisory sum for a state the size of Macedon: in fact, it shows that there was very little trade to tax.

  The basic weaknesses of the kingdom remained fi rmly in place, therefore, and

  such reforms and developments as Perdikkas was able to begin were long-term

  affairs. Only when he had wealth could he develop an army, but maybe it was

  because he was making progress that the Illyrians attacked him. Bardylis was

  always aggressive, and he had attacked Perdikkas’ kingdom very early in his reign, perhaps in 365 or 364. 53 In 360 he sent a great raid into Epiros, which was only partly successful. 54 This would require the next raid to be more productive, and Macedon was the new target. Perdikkas, faced by the biggest attack from that

  quarter for a generation, took the whole of the Macedonian armed forces to meet it. He was beaten, 4,000 of his soldiers lost their lives, and Perdikkas himself was killed as well. 55

  A new king had to be installed quickly. Perdikkas’ (and Alexander’s) younger

  brother Philip was present, and had survived the disaster. He had been a loyal supporter to Perdikkas during his reign, being granted, it seems, a section of the kingdom to rule, and he was no doubt known to many of the Macedonians who

  were present at the meeting of the Assembly, which was, in effect, the survivors of Perdikkas’ army. He controlled whatever there was of government in Macedon, which meant the royal court and the army. He was the man on the spot, adult,

  experienced, clearly able and intelligent. Given that Bardylis’ victorious army was invading, and other threats would obviously soon emerge, Philip’s assumption

  of the kingship and acclamation of the Assembly were obvious and immediate

  steps to take. He was clearly accepted as king very quickly.

  There had been alternative candidates. One was Perdikkas’ son, Amyntas,

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  15

  but he was only a child. The two men who had already attempted to seize the

  kingship reappeared: Pausanias, Ptolemy’s opponent in 367, was supported

  by the Thracian king Kotys; Argaios, the rival of Amyntas III in the 390s, had Athenian support. These two were probably brothers, so their attacks may have

  been coordinated, though it is more likely they were rivals. Then there were the three half-brothers of Philip himself, the sons of Amyntas III and his secondary wife Gygaia: Archelaos, Arrhidaios and Menelaos. Archelaos at least made some

  sort of a bid for the kingship in 359, but they were effectively ruled out because of their external sponsors; Philip arranged the death of Archel
aos, and the other two half-brothers fl ed. 56 Furthermore, apart from the invasion of the victorious Illyrians under Bardylis, the Paionians, who lived to the north, beyond the Demir Kapu Pass, were gathering to join in. 57

  There is a possibility that Amyntas was accepted as king, with Philip installed as his guardian and regent, on the pattern of Aeropos/Orestes and Ptolemy/

  Perdikkas. The evidence for this arrangement is, however, late, poor and

  unconvincing: a passage in Justin, who was epitomizing Trogus, whose work was

  based on other sources, and an inscription from Lebadeia in Boiotia, now lost; 58

  this is all very distant from Macedon in 359. The only reason to assume that there was a regency is if one assumes also that there was a rigid rule of succession of father to eldest son. It was certainly the usual practice, though in crises other factors clearly operated, particularly the preferences of the deceased king.

  Perdikkas had presumably been unable to indicate any such preference. Philip

  was ruthless about eliminating internal competition and killing off pretenders whenever they appeared, but Amyntas lived on in the palace unmolested. 59 It follows that Amyntas was not seen as a threat to Philip’s kingship. We must

  conclude, therefore, that Philip became king directly after Perdikkas’ death, and was accepted as such by the court and the Assembly.

  There were surely doubts about him and about his accession. He was not much

  older than his brothers when they had succeeded, and both had failed; nor had his father been wildly successful as king. Yet the only other adult claimants were those with foreign support and the only internal claimants were even younger than

  Philip. So another reason he became king was the lack of any real alternative.

  He took over a kingdom which had failed for the second time in 40 years. Each

  failure had lasted a decade (399–391, 370–359). It would be reasonable to assume that Macedon as a political entity was unviable. If Philip failed as his brothers had, the reviving Chalkidian League was likely to move in. The cities of the coast had been lost, the hill kingdoms were independent or subject to Bardylis. If

  Philip had been killed in the great battle, it is unlikely that Macedon would have survived as anything more than the name of a region. This was precisely the sort of situation in which it was necessary for new policies to be attempted. Philip survived, and he had ideas.

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  World view I: 360 bc

  The previous chapter concentrated single-mindedly on Macedon, an unimportant

  minor state until the accession of Philip II in 359. Few people paid much attention to it at any time, and other powers rarely had any diffi culty in walking all over it when they chose. Philip II changed all that, and from soon after his accession Macedon became an important power, and then a great power. This will be the

  story pursued in the following chapters. Meanwhile it will be well to take a wider look at the surrounding world, which was to be the political environment in

  which Philip, and then Alexander, had to operate.

  When Philip II became king, he already had, unlike most of his royal pre-

  deces sors, some experience of the world outside his kingdom, and he was also

  the fi rst Macedonian ruler to make a serious mark on that world. The collapse of the kingdom he had inherited was surely no surprise to outsiders. So Philip’s and Macedon’s impact in the next generation was therefore unexpected and

  unexpectedly powerful. One reason for this was Philip’s abilities; and another was the condition of the world outside his kingdom.

  The Greek city states to the south, after another inconclusive war, had met

  and concluded a Common Peace in 360, mainly because of mutual exhaustion.

  The peace agreement did not make any serious attempt to sort out the various

  quarrels between the cities, but it did include a clause by which each city

  should keep what it had. This allowed all involved to sink back into a period of recuperation; though it scarcely ensured a durable peace. 1

  Sparta refused to be involved; but then Sparta had been the main loser in the

  war, having been deprived of its ancient conquests in Arkadia and Messenia, and of its hegemony over the rest of Greece. The condition of Greece at the peace was thus one in which the old powers were diminished, but in which new powers had

  not yet emerged. Sparta’s loss of empire was mirrored by Athens’ diffi culties in holding members to its new league, which they perceived as scarcely needed now that Sparta had been reduced. Thebes proved to be less of a threat to everyone else now that its two political leaders, Epameinondas and Pelopidas, had died.

  A brief period of Thessalian unity under Jason of Pherai in the 370s had been

  ended by the Thebans. The Common Peace might have inaugurated a time of

  balance, since experience suggested that a new imperial power could be blocked by a timely combination of those who felt threatened, but it did not promise to

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  18

  last long, for the balance was always liable to be upset fairly easily, and the only way to re-balance affairs was by another war.

  Beyond Greece other events took priority. The Greek cities of Sicily and

  southern Italy had solved the problem of internecine fi ghting by the very opposite of a balance of power. The greatest of them, Syracuse, had succeeded in reducing all the rest to provincial status three decades earlier. The dire threat of being conquered by Carthage, the wealthy African city which controlled the western

  end of Sicily and the opposite North African coast, had been the stimulus. Under the leadership of Dionysios, the Syracusans had driven Carthage back to its last Sicilian foothold, and the rest of the island had been united under Dionysios as a consequence; he had then extended his control into southern Italy.

  The price was that Dionysios could not be removed, and he managed to so

  institutionalize his power that he could bequeath it to his son, Dionysios II, in 367. The only Greek political term which seemed to fi t this situation was ‘tyrant’, but in effect it was a monarchy. For the past 40 years Greek Sicily had formed a powerful kingdom dominating the central Mediterranean. The result was a

  Common Peace of a different sort.2

  Carthage in the end accepted the situation and turned to concentrate on

  trading with the rest of the Mediterranean and developing its own African

  hinterland. It maintained a strong defence of its Sicilian outpost in the western end of the island, and had other outposts in Sardinia, the Balearic Islands, along the North African coast, and on the south and east coasts of Spain; it dominated the whole of the western Mediterranean. 3

  The northern Mediterranean coast was lined with Greek cities from northern

  Italy to the north-eastern corner of Spain. Massalia (modern Marseilles) was the main power here, but was only of the second or even third rate compared with

  Carthage and Syracuse. Its citizens tapped the trade of inland Gaul along the

  Rhône Valley and the Atlantic route by way of Tolosa. 4 Most of Italy, away from the southern peninsulas, was in the process of developing in its own indigenous way. Both Carthage and Syracuse were watching the situation in central Italy

  with some interest, not to say anxiety, for a new power centre was busily

  emerging.

  There were cities throughout the Italian peninsula from the Po valley

  southwards, except in the mountainous spine, and the whole land was organized

  as a set of clearly defi ned states, cities or tribes. Greek cities dominated Campania and the southern coasts, Latin cities to the north of that, and Etruscan cities between the Tiber and the Arno. The Etruscans had expanded both to the south

  and to the north-east, so that other Etruscan cities were founded in the Po

 
valley and in Campania; native Italian communities were developing as cities

  elsewhere: the competition for land and wealth was stimulating fortifi cation

  and urbanization. The whole process was volatile and extremely disturbing,

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  made more violent by the intrusion of bands of fi erce Gallic warriors, who had conquered the Po valley about 30 years before, and raided into the central and southern parts of the peninsula frequently ever since. 5

  By 360 bc one city, Rome, had begun to emerge from the pack as being bigger,

  more populous, better organized, and with a more intelligent programme of

  imperi al ism, than any others. It had developed under both Etruscan and Greek infl uences, though using the Latin language, and now dominated a group of

  smaller Latin cities which had long formed a religious and defensive league. Rome had recently sorted out its internal affairs, by the Licinian-Sextian laws of 367, and took the lead in combating the Gallic raids. 6 Carthage had been suffi ciently impressed by all this to make a new treaty with Rome which recognized Rome’s

  political supremacy in central Italy. 7 Syracuse had also reacted, by sending ships to raid the Latin coast.8 The word had reached Greece, where those who noticed such things were impressed enough to decide that such a notable city must

  be Greek.9

  How much of all this Philip II knew when he became king is not certain, but

  he was clearly familiar from his years in Thebes with the condition of Greece.

  Living in the house of Pammenes, a prominent Theban politician, in the 360s,

  will have been an education in power politics and political manipulation few

  contemporary places could match. The power of Syracuse was a familiar thing,

  and Dionysios had certainly extended his infl uence to the mainland, proudly

  displaying his wealth at the Olympic Games, just as Philip’s ancestor, Alexander I, had argued his way into the competition a century before, and just as Philip

  himself was to do later. At Corinth, Syracuse’s mother city, Dion, the uncle of Dionysios II, lived in exile, learning and teaching philosophy, and harbouring his own ambitions. The Italian and Carthaginian situations were more distant, but