wholly unmilitary aspect, such as Claudius, felt the need to seal their accession by a military victory. In the Hellenistic world, the pattern was set, but power and authority was not dependent on victories. Antigonos’ rivals and contemporaries were able to make themselves kings without them. In many ways it was safer not
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to depend on military prowess, and this was shown by the nemesis which at once engulfed Antigonos and Demetrios.
Antigonos’ clearly stated ambition, revealed by his self-proclamation as king
and his successes at Athens and Salamis, brought his enemies together again,
though it took some time for them to come to an actual alliance. Antigonos had a window of opportunity to make good his kingship. Kassander attacked Athens
when Demetrios sailed east, but came up against a united city, a revived Athenian navy, Antigonid assistance to the city, and the enmity of the Aitolian League. For a time Athens was victorious, but Kassander built ships of his own, and by 304
he had returned to blockade the city by land and sea. 3
Antigonos followed up Demetrios’ triumph at Salamis and his proclamation
by a campaign designed to fi nish off Ptolemy. A huge army of 88,000 men, with 83 elephants, marched south along the Syrian coast, accompanied by Demetrios’
fl eet of 150 ships and 100 transports. But the fl eet was damaged by gales, failed to establish a landing and the army’s supplies ran down. Ptolemy’s defences held and the invaders had to retreat. 4
Demetrios turned to attack Rhodes, which had refused to help in the Cyprus
campaign on the grounds that it was friendly towards Ptolemy. 5 This attack on a neutral Greek city was one of the great sieges of the ancient world, lasting a year (305–304). Demetrios’ ingenuity was taxed to the limit, as was the endurance of his soldiers and that of the Rhodians. Ptolemy sent in relief supplies, but his own defeat two years before had severely reduced his ability to intervene. In the end, with Rhodes untaken and Athens under severe pressure as a result of Kassander’s blockade, Demetrios called off the attack. Rhodes agreed to assist him against everyone except Ptolemy,6 and he sailed off to recover ground lost in Greece.
Antigonos continued to make the political running by the attacks on Egypt
and Rhodes, but both were very public defeats, and in the aftermath of these
adventures his rivals took royal titles themselves. Ptolemy seems to have been the fi rst, some time after his defensive victory, and at the earliest in January 304, possibly somewhat later. 7 Seleukos followed, even though he was in the east at
the time,8 as did Lysimachos,9 who emerged as a major player for the fi rst time.
Kassander is said to have refrained from taking the title, but his coins give him the title of king, as does an inscription.10 These men had been acting as kings for years, and both Seleukos and Ptolemy had been called kings by their non-Macedonian, non-Greek subjects, who were unconcerned by the minutiae of
Macedonian politics. Even Athens had addressed Antigonos as king as early as
307. 11 The use of the title spread to Sicily (Agathokles), the Bosporan state in the Crimea, and even to the tyrant of the city of Herakleia Pontike. 12
Demetrios’ return recovered the Antigonid position in Greece. The alliance
with the Aitolians revived, he recovered that with the Boiotians, relieved Athens, and took Kenchreai, the port of Corinth.13 But Demetrios indulged himself in
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such a bombastic and egocentric way in Athens as to disgust many Greeks. He
interfered in Athenian internal politics, took up residence in the Parthenon with his women, drank to excess, and accepted addresses calling him divine. Yet he
was still a highly competent commander, and in the spring he moved quickly,
capturing Sikyon and Corinth by cleverly disguised surprise attacks, and took
control of much of the northern Peloponnese. 14
In spring 302 Demetrios announced the re-establishment of the league of
cities of Greece, a revival of the old defunct League of Corinth of Philip II.
Demetrios’ version is referred to as the Hellenic League to distinguish it from the original. 15 Its membership was smaller than Philip’s league, but otherwise it was similarly constituted. Demetrios was hegemon and commander-in-chief in wartime; and by centring it at Corinth, he was attempting to recapture the idea of the old league, but it was clearly understood to be an instrument of Antigonid imperialism, and he put a garrison in the Corinthian acropolis, and strenuously conscripted military manpower. How it might have worked in time of peace is
unclear, but it did institutionalize Antigonid power in Greece on a more formal and perhaps a more acceptable basis than anything Kassander or Ptolemy had
tried, and it gave Greeks at least some say in its affairs.
Even before the formation of the new league, Kassander had offered to make
peace. Antigonos demanded surrender, apparently convinced that Demetrios
would be able to fi nish Kassander off anyway. Kassander refused, and renewed
his pleas to the allies for assistance. 16 He was already allied with Ptolemy, who had handed over Corinth to him some time earlier, and both had been victims
of Demetrios’ attack at Sikyon. The attack he faced from Demetrios also clearly threatened Lysimachos. The evidence of a continued Antigonid ambition to
reunite the empire and do away with his rivals was enough to bring these western allies into another alliance. Contact was made with Seleukos, who also joined in. 17
Yet again, Antigonos’ ambition had frightened the others into a coalition.
Demetrios invaded Thessaly in 302, having wasted a good deal of time being
initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries at Athens (forcing the Athenians to
conduct the ritual at the wrong time of year for his own convenience). He had
an army of 56,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, but did not make as much progress as he should have, given the fact that his army was double that of Kassander’s in size. Kassander had established strong garrisons in Pherai and in Phthiotic Thebes, and put his main army into a well-fortifi ed entrenched camp. Demetrios was blocked. 18
It is a sign of the desperation of the allies in the face of the great power wielded by Antigonos and Demetrios, that they took unusual chances. Kassander sent
part of his army to join Lysimachos, who crossed the Straits to invade Antigonos’
home base in Asia Minor; 19 Seleukos marched all the way from the east, through the Armenian mountains, to join him. 20 It was these two, Lysimachos and
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Seleukos, who had scarcely been heard of in the previous fi ve or six years, who were to do the main fi ghting.
The work of Lysimachos in his satrapy of Thrace is not well known, but a
general outline can be discerned from the fragmentary sources. 21 He built on the original conquest by Philip II, which had been fairly superfi cial, and was able to conquer the area. He fought the Odrysae, the main Thracian people
south of the Haemos Mountains, and the Getai to the north, established effective control over the Greek cities of the north Aegean coast, the Thracian Chersonese, and the Straits, and founded his new city of Lysimacheia. He cultivated good
relations with Byzantion, which benefi ted from the peaceful conditions he
established in its hinterland, and which was as hostile to Antigonos as everyone else. When reinforced by 8,000 men from Kassander’s forces, he was able to
leave his kingdom and take a substantial army, trained and toughened, to invade Antigonos’ Anatolian lands.
Seleukos, like Lysimachos (and indeed like Ptolemy and Kassander), had
con cen trated in the last years on de
veloping and organizing his state in the east.
It is relevant to his achievement there that he was the only one of Alexander’s offi cers who had not repudiated his Iranian wife. Not only that, but Apama was the daughter of Spitamenes, the great leader against Alexander 20 years before.
Seleukos spent as long in Baktria on this visit as Alexander had in his original conquest. What he achieved is not recorded, but he probably achieved more in
terms of pacifying and organizing the land than Alexander. 22
Seleukos had moved on, like Alexander, into India. He had an equally hostile
reception. By 305, northern India was united under the rule of Chandragupta
Maurya. Seleukos did not have to fi ght every tribe and city, but he made no
progress. The two men fought a war of which details are unknown, and Seleukos
clearly lost. Peace was made in 304 or early 303, and Seleukos handed over
substantial territories to Chandragupta: the Indus Valley was recognized as
Mauryan, along with Arachosia and the Paropamisadai (that is, the lands south
of the Hindu Kush). 23
Seleukos marched back to the west in 303 with an army which was unusually
strong in cavalry, the arm most useful in the east. He also had a huge elephant force, for Chandragupta had given him 500 of the beasts as part of the peace
settlement. It took all year to get them to the west, by which time there were only 480 of them left. 24 The result was that Seleukos established himself fi rmly in the east in strength and was able to recruit a substantial army there. When he began his march back to the west in 303, therefore, Seleukos had an unusual but potent army under his hand: he reached eastern Anatolia with elephants, 20,000
infantry, and no fewer than 12,000 cavalry.25 To any other commander of the time this was an unpleasantly unbalanced force, but in the result it proved to be the war winner.
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Antigonos had always had the advantage of control of the greater part of the
surviving army of Alexander and access to the major recruiting areas of Greece and Asia Minor, and so had maintained his military superiority. He had also
acquired the surviving treasure of the Akhaimenids, and so he could pay for
that army as well. Neither Ptolemy nor Lysimachos had such access or wealth.
The former had to recruit where he could, hence in part his lunge towards
Greece, his capture of parts of southern Asia Minor and his control of Cyprus
and Cyrenaica; Lysimachos’ conquest of Thrace gave him access to Thracian
manpower, and much of the army he took to Asia Minor in 302 will have been
Thracian in personnel. Kassander was restricted to the Macedonian levy and such mercenaries as he could afford. Seleukos’ reinforcement was decisive.
In the winter of 302 the decisive theatre of war was Anatolia, and Antigonos
had suddenly been forced on to the defensive. Demetrios and Kassander were
stalemated in Thessaly, but Kassander was holding in play Demetrios’ army,
which was much larger than his own. Lysimachos, with perhaps 30,000 soldiers,
campaigned into Ionia and western Asia Minor and then withdrew into a great
entrenched camp in the north near Dorylaion. Antigonos brought his own
forces north, together with a large treasure from the store at Kyinda in Kilikia, to face him. Several of his commanders in Asia Minor had defected to Lysimachos
– another indication of his inability to inspire true loyalty. 26 Seleukos marched his mobile army through the Armenian mountains, to winter in eastern Anatolia. 27
No one was prepared to campaign in the Anatolian winter.
Ptolemy, faced with the war being fought in Greece and Asia Minor, was
unable to do a great deal. His military forces had hardly recovered from the
Cyprus disaster four years before and naval forces were nearly destroyed at that time. This hampered his participation, though he had obviously been working
to rebuild his strength. When he joined the alliance, therefore, Ptolemy was able to move into southern Syria, taking over the cities as he went in a repetition of his several campaigns for the past two decades, but this seemed unlikely to have much effect on the main event. 28
The winter saw considerable activity by Antigonos. Demetrios and his army
came from Greece to combat Lysimachos. 29 A rumour was spread in Syria that Antigonos has beaten both Lysimachos and Seleukos and was marching to fi ght
Ptolemy with his whole army. 30 Antigonos sent a raid against Babylon. 31 None of these measures worked. Ptolemy removed his main army back to Egypt when the
rumours reached him, but left garrisons in all the cities he had occupied. 32 Later he was ridiculed for this retreat, but, had there really been an Antigonid army attacking him, he had adopted exactly the right strategy: his enemy would have been tied up in a series of sieges, or blocked at Sinai and the Nile. The armies of the allies in Anatolia would then have marched south to trap the Antigonid forces between their armies and Ptolemy’s somewhere in southern Syria.
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The raid against Babylon was mainly aimed at bringing Seleukos into
Babylonia. This would make him march to the attack out of Babylonia by way of
Mesopotamia. On that route he would have faced the fortifi ed cities established in western Mesopotamia and northern Syria in the last few years, the major river crossing at the Euphrates, and two major mountain ranges, the Amanus and
Taurus, both diffi cult for an army to penetrate. Antigonos could have held him up at any of these passes and crossings indefi nitely, but especially at the Taurus, where only a small force would be needed to block the Kilikian Gates.
Seleukos, by his northern approach march, had clearly worked this out and
he ignored the Babylon raid. Instead, he crossed into Anatolia by way of the
Armenian mountain routes, and camped for the winter in Kappadokia. We hear
of no opposition mounted by the Medians, the Armenians or the Kappadokians
to his invasion, though all were effectively independent. No doubt Seleukos had prepared the way in advance by diplomatic contacts; they were neighbours of
Antigonos, and very likely were as fearful of him as was everyone else.
Lysimachos was driven back when Demetrios arrived with the main Antigonid
army from Greece. Demetrios had made a truce with Kassander, but half of
his army, the Greek troops who served as the army of the Hellenic League, was
left behind; they simply went home, leaving Kassander supreme in Greece.
The league vanished. Kassander sent more troops to assist Lysimachos, though
many of the men were lost when their transports were shipwrecked on the Black
Sea coast. 33
Lysimachos played for time. He manoeuvred out of Antigonos’ reach, moving
from the camp at Dorylaion to another camp closer to Seleukos’ approach route.
Antigonos was not prepared to face the losses involved in an assault on either camp. This was the same tactic as Kassander used against Demetrios; no doubt
he and Lysimachos had discussed the matter beforehand. Demetrius took up
winter quarters near the Propontis, and Antigonos near Lysimachos’ old camp.
Antigonos still faced three enemy armies, but he had gathered all his main
strength; Lysimachos was within reach of Seleukos, and the two joined in the
spring. 34
After some manoeuvring in the spring, the battle was joined at Ipsos in west
central Anatolia. The allies’ force was more or less equal to that of the joint forces of Antigonos and Demetrios, except that Seleukos had fi ve times as many elephants and a superiority of cavalry.
Demetrios’ cavalry drove back part of the allied cavalry under Seleukos’ son Antiochos, but Antiochos kept him in play
and the Seleukid elephants prevented Demetrios from returning. The Antigonid
infantry was threatened both by the rest of Seleukos’ cavalry and by his elephants: part of the phalanx surrendered, the rest were crushed. Antigonos, over 80 years old, died fi ghting. Demetrios escaped. 35
This campaign by six kings and their armies initially separated by several
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thousands of kilometres is even more extraordinary than those of Philip or
Alexander or Antigonos and Eumenes. It reveals much about the principals:
the ingenuity of Seleukos, Ptolemy’s caution, the recklessness of Demetrios, the obduracy of Lysimachos, the age and slowness of Antigonos, the cunning and
carefulness of Kassander. The determination of the allies is also a mark of the fear which Antigonos’ ambition had animated in them, for in the past they had
all reneged on such coalition agreements, and they were playing for themselves above all. The alliance could not last beyond the battle: it did not last even as long as the subsequent settlement, but then there was no reason why it should.
Three of the victors were contemporaries and colleagues of Alexander, and
Kassander was a younger contemporary. All had memories, perhaps vivid, of the
conqueror, and of the great empire he had acquired. Antigonos and Demetrios
aimed at reconstituting that empire, and had been dragged down by their less
ambitious enemies, as they might have put it. Yet Demetrios survived, and his
escape was not a lone journey: he took a small army of soldiers with him, and
he had control of his great fl eet. 36 Once free of pursuit, he was able to count on a fair quantity of territory still under his control – Corinth, Boiotia, part of the Peloponnese, a number of the Aegean islands, Cyprus, Tyre and Sidon, amongst
others – and his fl eet commanded the sea. Athens, however, sent a message to
Alexander the Great Failure Page 22