nothing less than a kingdom of his own. As Seleukos rode towards Macedon,
he will have fi nally realized that none of these was going to come to him. The prospect of the reunifi cation of the empire will have been the talk of Seleukos’
court as soon as the war with Lysimachos began. It would also have been clear to Ptolemy II in Alexandria. We do not know if there was communication between
the two half-brothers, but it would not be surprising if Ptolemy II encouraged Keraunos to strike, promising support. If Keraunos gained a kingdom by himself, he would be less of a threat to Ptolemy. So, as Seleukos rode north from his late enemy’s city of Lysimacheia, Keraunos decoyed him off the road to view an old
open-air altar, and there, when they were apparently alone, he stabbed him to
death. 30
The deaths of kings are rarely decisive. That of Philip II did not defl ect the Macedonians from establishing control of Greece and invading Asia; the death
of Alexander did not encourage the disintegration of his empire, which only
occurred some years later. But the death of Seleukos Nikator – ‘the Victor’
– marked the end of the last chance for Alexander’s empire to be reunited. He
had developed a viable governing system in his kingdom over the 30 years and
more, with more elements of social justice and fewer elements of screwing the
last drop of wealth out of the peasantry than Ptolemy’s Egypt. The Seleukid
system resembled that of Antigonos in lying comparatively lightly across the bent shoulders of the working population. Seleukos was less brutal than Antigonos
and more reliable and consistent than Demetrios in his general policy, and
unlike the rule of Kassander, Lysimachos, or Ptolemy, his death did not set off an internecine, murderous confl ict within his family. Of all the successors of Alexander, Seleukos was the last to emerge as a great ruler, and was the one most likely to create an enduringly united empire; which was, of course, why he was murdered.
14
New kings, and disaster, 281–277 bc
Macedonia had no king but plenty of claimants. Arsinoe II held Kassandreia,
intending one of her sons should become king as his father’s successor; she had a force of mercenaries with her, but her authority extended no further than the city gates. Agathokles’ widow Lysandra also had a claim through her children,
though they had been with Seleukos in Asia and perhaps never reached Europe.
Antiochos, still in the east, had a claim as his father’s son. Antigonos Gonatas had a claim as the son of Demetrios. Pyrrhos had a claim as a former king.
There was also a grandson of Antipater, a son of Kassander’s brother, also called Antipater, now old enough to pretend to the throne of his uncle and his cousins.
The multiplicity of claimants portended serious trouble for the Macedonians,
yet it was only a more than usually complicated succession crisis.
There was also Ptolemy Keraunos. He was Seleukos’ murderer, which marked
him as a claimant; and like Antigonos and young Antipater, he was a grandson
of old Antipater. After the murder he rode back into Lysimacheia, collecting a group of his friends on the way, metaphorically waved his bloodstained dagger, and announced himself to the soldiers and citizens as the avenger of Lysimachos.
This was all surely planned. Lysimacheia, the city founded by Lysimachos where he lived for much of his reign, was the one place in his former kingdom full of his supporters. The soldiers there are said to have been Seleukos’, but many of them were former troops of Lysimachos from Macedon who would be the obvious
men for Seleukos to take with him into Macedon. Being assured of Seleukos’
death, they acclaimed Keraunos as king. He set off to Macedon to establish his authority. 1 Despite claiming to avenge Lysimachos, he was aiming to recover only Macedon, at least for now.
Keraunos’ fi rst priority was to gain control in Macedon, which necessarily
involved fending off his competitors. He could claim the ratifi cation of the acclamation of the soldiers at Lysimacheia, but challengers would dispute this. The fi rst of these on the scene was Antigonos, who brought his fl eet north. He was met by Keraunos at sea somewhere near the Thracian Chersonese, 2 where Keraunos was victorious, using Lysimachos’ fl eet, some of which had been Demetrios’.
Pyrrhos was preparing an expedition to Italy and was looking for armed help:
Keraunos gave him several thousand soldiers and 50 elephants. 3 These must originally have been Lysimachos’ men and beasts, but Keraunos will have handed
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
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over the men he least trusted, and they would have been the volunteers. Pyrrhos also in effect recognized Keraunos as Macedonian king by this transaction, and the agreement included a marriage link, when Pyrrhos married a daughter of
Keraunos. 4 Keraunos also contacted Ptolemy II, but apparently received no further encouragement. 5 The death of Seleukos was all Ptolemy required. Some contact was also made with Antiochos, who might be expected to look for
revenge, but who had his hands full for the present. He sent Patrokles to save the position in Asia Minor, and clearly could not come west himself. 6
Keraunos was thus doing very well in fending off his rivals: Pyrrhos to Italy, Antiochos stuck in Syria, Antigonos defeated, Ptolemy II not interested, and he had gained control of the Macedonian army. His most urgent internal problem
was Arsinoe and her control of Kassandreia. Keraunos attacked the city, but
failed to take it, then resorted to diplomacy. He offered Arsinoe marriage and the recognition of her children as joint kings with himself. Her eldest son, Ptolemy, argued against this, and when she insisted on accepting, he left. 7 Arsinoe accepted marriage to her half-brother, went through a splendid wedding and a ceremony
of acceptance as queen at an army Assembly, but then saw her new husband
murder her two younger sons on their wedding night. She left, fl eeing to her
brother in Egypt.8 Keraunos had thus rid himself of all his rival pretenders, in and out of Macedon, using a series of methods – diplomatic, naval, military,
marital, murderous – which were quite comparable in variety, success and speed to those used by his predecessors: the methods of Philip II and Alexander come insistently to mind.
One pretender who had got away, Arsinoe’s eldest son, Ptolemy, returned
to the fray in spring 280, having recruited help from an Illyrian king called
Monounios. The invasion failed but involved a good deal of fi ghting inside
Macedon.9 Ptolemy now presumably headed for Egypt, where his uncle provided him with a small principality at Telmessos in Lykia. 10 This all took from later 281 to the early part of 280. As a result Keraunos was fi rmly king in Macedon, but not wholly secure yet. He had not removed all his competitors decisively, for Antigonos, Antiochos and Pyrrhos were only repelled. The Macedonians could
be reasonably satisfi ed with him for the moment.
Pyrrhos had received an appeal for help from the southern Italian city of Taras and decided to follow in the steps of Spartan and Epirote predecessors and go
to its assistance. So keen were the others to see him go that he was given the use of some of their troops. This was the cause for which Keraunos contributed a
sizeable force. Pyrrhos asked for help from Antigonos and Antiochos as well,
ships and cash respectively, but they may not have bothered to contribute once it was clear he was really going. 11 He stayed in the west for fi ve years, and the mayhem he created on his return fully justifi ed the measures the others took to speed him on his way. He sailed off during 280.
N E W K I N G S , A N D D I S A S T E R , 2 8 1 – 2 7 7 b c 167
Antiochos may have been on his way to the west when he heard of the death
of his father. He had presumably left the farther east settled and peaceful, and no doubt under a strong governor. There was certainly a satrap in offi ce in Baktria fi ve or so years later who was capable of sending reinforcements of elephants to the west; he was a man therefore with arms to hand, and perhaps diplomatic
contacts with India. 12
Antiochos had a lot to do when he arrived to take up his inheritance. He had
been king in the east for over ten years and was scarcely known in the west, and not at all in Asia Minor. He had trouble in Syria, in Seleukis, the area of the four great new cities. The problem is not well understood, for the only evidence is an inscription from Ilion referring to rebels and trouble, but it also says Antiochos brought peace to the area. 13 This, and a journey into Asia Minor in the spring of 280, will have fully occupied his time and energy. The trouble in Syria may have involved interference by Ptolemy II, though this is no more than an assumption. 14
By the time he was free, Keraunos was in control in Macedon.
The defeat of Antigonos Gonatas by Ptolemy Keraunos had repercussions
in Greece. A group of cities along the north coast of the Peloponnese formed
themselves into the Achaian League during 280; 15 this was not an immediate threat to Antigonos, but it created a stronger local state less amenable to pressure.
Some other cities, probably including Argos and Megalopolis, expelled their
Macedonian garrisons, a sensible diminution of Antigonos’ curious state; the
Achaian cities may have done the same before forming their league. 16 One of the Spartan kings, Areus, suddenly emerged from his hermit state to challenge both Antigonos and the Aitolians in a revival of an ancient dispute concerning lands belonging to the temple at Delphi.
The troubles these challengers faced in 281–280 prevented them from pur su-
ing their campaigns against Keraunos, which under other circumstances would
be their fi rst priority. This may perhaps be attributed to Egypt. Ptolemy II, by his control of the Island League, the island base of Kos, and the maritime
approaches to the Aegean from Egypt, had infl uence all round the Aegean basin.
It was in his interest to see that Keraunos was provided for, so as to neutralize his powerful claim to the Egyptian throne. A kingdom would do, preferably one at
a considerable distance from Egypt and where he would be kept busy: Macedon
was ideal.
Ptolemy could not assist Keraunos too openly, for this would only draw the
attention of Antiochos. By the spring of 280, the problems of Syria had been
mastered and Antiochos was operating in Asia Minor, where several areas,
notably along the Black Sea coast, including Herakleia Pontike, sought to assert their independence. Ptolemy was able to secure control of several places on
the southern coast of Asia Minor – or perhaps he resumed control of places
his father had held – but he did so without provoking Antiochos to hostilities.
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
168
Even installing a garrison of Ptolemaic soldiers in Miletos17 did not provoke a war. But Antiochos, as much as any king of the time, was capable of selecting
his priorities.
It is tempting to look for the hand of Ptolemy and his money in Antigonos’
troubles in Greece. No evidence actually exists but the sudden emergence of a
Spartan army under Areus and the formation of a new Peloponnesian League by
him, the liberation of several cities from Antigonos’ control, and the formation of the enduring Achaian League, all at the moment when to distract Antigonos
was materially to assist Ptolemy Keraunos, must be seen as suggesting an outside helping hand at work. Above all, Areus will have needed money to undertake
his curious and futile adventure, and Ptolemy was the most obvious source
for this.
The main benefactor, therefore, from the deaths of both Lysimachos and
Seleukos, was Ptolemy II, who saw his royal rivals dead, his threatening half-
brother distracted and fully occupied in Macedon, his Aegean rival Antigonos
signifi cantly reduced in power, and his own territories expanded by small but signifi cant gains. His neighbour Antiochos was heavily engaged in Asia Minor, and so was less of a threat than his father had been. Ptolemy also received and gave refuge to Arsinoe II, who, at least at fi rst, was perhaps regarded, with her surviving son, as a possible threat to Keraunos or even Antiochos; later he found an even better use for her.
Antiochos picked off many of his external enemies with relative ease partly by simply ignoring Ptolemy’s provocations. Pyrrhos’ request for some troops for his western expedition was probably ignored once it was known he was actually going.
An agreement with Antigonos was reached, probably after some naval fi ghting,
which was to be sealed by the marriage of Antigonos with Phila, the daughter
of Seleukos and Stratonike (and so Antiochos’ stepdaughter and half-sister, and Antigonos’ niece). This agreement may not have been fi nalized until 278, but any confl ict between the two kings seemed exceptionally pointless while Keraunos
was king in Macedon. 18 Keraunos himself was offered and accepted some sort of an agreement by Antiochos, which can only have involved recognition of his
kingship, though no doubt Antiochos had many mental reservations on this. 19
Antiochos operated in as canny a way as Keraunos and Ptolemy, if without the
bloodthirstiness of the former and more openly than the latter.
Antiochos chose to rule in Asia Minor with a light hand, which meant that the
incipient small principalities were tolerated. Philetairos at Pergamon controlled a substantial part of Lysimachos’ treasure, and was effectively independent as well as rich. 20 He gained the goodwill of Antiochos by retrieving his father’s body from Lysimacheia (Keraunos, short of cash, had demanded a ransom for it). 21
This put Antiochos under obligation to him; Philetairos’ ultimate aim, as of so many in such a position at the time, was independence. In the north, Pontos
N E W K I N G S , A N D D I S A S T E R , 2 8 1 – 2 7 7 b c 169
and Bithynia were both independent, as was Herakleia Pontike. Herakleia had a
worthwhile navy, and, along with Byzantion, Chalkedon and Teos, formed the
Northern League, as a mutual self-defence. Antiochos was soon at war with both Bithynia and Herakleia, a continuation of the quarrel they had with Seleukos. 22
By early 279 a new international equilibrium was approaching: Ptolemy II
was fi rmly in power in Egypt, southern Syria, Cyprus and the Aegean islands,
though Magas remained independent in Cyrenaica; Antiochos had brought most
of his father’s Asian inheritance under his own control, but he had a problem
with the northern states, and had given up on Macedon and Thrace for the
present; Pyrrhos had gone to the west; Antigonos Gonatas had been reduced to
a few Greek fortresses and his defeated fl eet; the Spartan king had gone home; in Macedon, Ptolemy Keraunos had seen off his rivals and had driven out his
half-sister and her children. His acceptance by the Macedonians as their king had been decisive, insofar as a decision had been made. He defended the kingdom
against invasion and extended his power over most of it; he was therefore the
legitimate king in Macedon.
At this point Macedon was suddenly invaded, in the summer of 279, by a
new set of barbarians from the north, Celts, whom the Greeks called Galatoi, Galatians. They were in the Danube area in Alexander’s time, where he had
briefl y encountered them. They were as aggressive as he was, and answered
him with defi ant statements. 23 Since then more of them had moved eastwards, forming a substan
tial predator state centred in the area of modern Belgrade,
later the kingdom of the Scordisci. 24 The preoccupations of states in Greece and Macedon prevented serious attention being paid to these developments, if
indeed knowledge of them reached Macedon, the Balkan state most concerned.
The involvement of the Illyrian king Monounios in a Macedonian war in 280
implies that he was not under any threat from the north at the time. Kassander had fought Galatian raiders south of the Haemos mountain range some years
before25 and a raiding band reached Thrace briefl y in the later 280s.26 There were plenty of premonitory warnings, though events in Macedon had been so
all-consuming since Kassander’s death that it is likely no one spared time or
attention to appreciate the previous build-up of tension which the invasion of 279 implies. What actually happened was so unexpected and unusual that no one
who predicted it would have been believed.
The Galatians not only appeared suddenly but their attacks were also quite
without precedent, and were all the more terrifying for that. The early encounters were seen as the normal incidents of frontier warfare, if anyone thought of it, and Macedon had not suffered a serious barbarian invasion since the early days of
the reign of Philip II, except that brought on by Ptolemy, son of Lysimachos with Monounios – but the Illyrians were familiar enemies, and fairly easily beatable.
From the point of view of the Galatians, the situation looked very promising.
A L E X A N D E R T H E G R E AT F A I L U R E
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Kassander and Lysimachos had driven off the minor raids they had met, but
the fi ghting had not been easy. The Macedonians and Greeks may have been
ignorant of much of what was going on in the north, but the Galatians clearly
had a good idea of what had been happening in Macedon; the number of coins
of Philip II spread through the Balkans argues frequent trade relations, and where trade goes, so goes information. 27 What they could see was continued turmoil, kings repeatedly dying or driven out (in 297 (twice), 294, 287, 285, 281) and, in 281–280, civil war. Keraunos had no friends, only enemies. His control of
Alexander the Great Failure Page 28