by Bob Woodward
The Pakistani leader conferred the Hilal-e-Pakistan award on Biden. The ceremony had an absurd pomp to it. The Pakistanis joked that the one requirement was that Biden wear the medallion on inaugural day and every January 20 after that. The office then cleared out so that Biden and Graham could talk with Zardari behind closed doors.
Biden told the Pakistani president about Obama’s thinking, “Afghanistan is going to be his war.” Obama might soon send more troops, but this would be meaningless if Pakistan and the U.S. were not working together. “We can’t fix Afghanistan without Pakistan’s help.” American success would depend on Pakistan, and U.S. taxpayers would not support assistance to Pakistan if the Taliban and al Qaeda continued to operate from Pakistani sanctuaries to kill U.S. soldiers and plot attacks.
The ISI ties with the Taliban cast doubt in American minds, Biden said. Pakistan has got to stop providing safe haven. Your military and intelligence service have to get their act together.
Zardari talked about his wife.
“I may not be as experienced and knowledgeable, but my mission is not different from hers because it is about my children. You need to help me gain sufficient ground at home. You know this country is awash with anti-Americanism, and they’re going to hate me for being an American stooge. You have to give me economic resources so that I can win over the people, that there’s something in it for them.”
The extremists have the money to fight and the Pakistani government lacked the funds to match them, Zardari said. Pakistan needs a stimulus package of its own. His claim about the anemic economy was accurate. An emergency loan from the International Monetary Fund in November had saved Pakistan from defaulting on its foreign debt, rescuing the nation from possible bankruptcy.
“I get that,” Biden said. “I’m a politician.”
“I am going to help clean up the ISI,” Zardari said. “We have to get out of these games.”
Biden said that the Obama administration would like a fresh start with Pakistan, one where their interests were better aligned. “If you do not show spine,” he said, “then all bets are off.” Biden mentioned that his own son, Beau, was in the U.S. Army serving in Iraq.
Graham thought Biden had ably walked a fine line between reassuring and pressuring. When his turn came, he said the American public was “war weary,” tired of the conflict that had dragged on for more than seven years.
“Mr. President,” Graham said, “the indecision that plagues your country has got to come to an end. You’ve got to figure out who your enemies are, who your allies are, and act accordingly. We’re your allies. We’re not your enemies. But there’s limitations to what we can do to help because of public opinion and resources back home. For every school we try to build in Pakistan, there’s somebody in South Carolina saying, ‘Why aren’t you building a school here? We need it just as much.’ Joe and I understand the strategic importance of your country or we wouldn’t be here. It was the first place we came. It wasn’t an accident.
“I was Senator McCain’s chief ally. The election is over. We lost the election. I am part of the loyal opposition, but I’m here with my friend, the vice president [elect], to let you know that Senator McCain and myself … the people who were on our side, are going to follow this president in terms of giving you the help you need.”
“You’ve got to pick,” Biden said. “You can’t keep playing one side against the other. We got briefed by the CIA. The CIA thought that a lot of our intelligence was compromised” by the ISI alerting the terrorist camps we were targeting for drone strikes.
Zardari responded with emotion about how he had been fighting terrorism all his life, and reminded them that his wife had been killed by terrorists.
“I appreciate the loss of your wife,” Graham said.
Zardari raised the eternal problem of India, and the endless hostility between the two countries.
“You know,” Biden said, “we’re looking for change.”
• • •
To Graham, Zardari did not inspire confidence. He would have liked to tell him exactly what was on his mind, “The whole fucking place is burning down here, pal, you know? You may not see it, but I do.”
Biden was struck by the CIA analysis. Segments of the Afghan Taliban insurgency such as the Haqqani network had virtual immunity in Pakistan, and al Qaeda was free to set up and run training camps. Who was in charge?
Next on the agenda, Biden and Graham were flying to Kabul to meet with Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
A small, gentle-looking man with a salt-and-pepper beard, Karzai had been selected to lead Afghanistan after the Taliban regime fell in late 2001. A minor Pashtun tribal leader, Karzai spoke pristine English, causing American officials to often think their conversations with him could be more candid. But he had been diagnosed as a manicdepressive, according to intelligence. Karzai was on medication and had severe mood swings.
After 9/11, CIA and U.S. Special Forces teams brought him back from exile into Afghanistan under the cover of night. He rallied villages to fight the Taliban. In the middle of the battle to retake the city of Kandahar, the U.S. accidentally dropped a bomb near Karzai. A CIA officer known as Greg V. threw himself atop Karzai and saved his life. Both men survived and Karzai frequently spoke with great emotion about his rescue.
But after an Afghan constitution was in place and Karzai was elected president in 2004, his relationship with the U.S. became more volatile. He began to routinely berate the Americans for civilian casualties.
The evidence of corruption in Karzai’s government and family only exacerbated the tensions with the United States.
His half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, ran Kandahar like an Afghan version of New York City’s infamous Boss Tweed. Ahmed Wali had been on the U.S. and CIA payroll for years, beginning before 9/11. He had belonged to the CIA’s small network of paid agents and informants inside Afghanistan. In addition, the U.S. government paid him money through his half-brother, the president.
More importantly, he was the landlord of some CIA and military facilities in Kandahar. A measure of his influence—and corruption—was that he was getting hefty rents from U.S. taxpayers on properties in Kandahar that he arguably did not own or control. His government-sponsored tenants included the Kandahar Strike Force, a paramilitary group of Afghans the CIA used to attack suspected insurgents. There was also evidence that Ahmed Wali profited from the opium trade.
Among senior U.S. policymakers there was a constant debate: Should we be in bed with this guy? The CIA argument was standard—he gets results, provides intelligence and support for important counterterrorist operations. It was necessary to employ some thugs if the United States was going to have a role in a land of thugs. Cutting him off might break Ahmed Wali’s control of the city, and Kandahar might be lost entirely. Lose Kandahar and we possibly lose the war.
But the CIA had few illusions about him. He was not in any sense a controlled agent who always responded to U.S. and CIA requests and pressure. He was his own man, playing all sides against the others—the United States, the drug dealers, the Taliban and even his brother if necessary.
On the flight to Afghanistan, Graham said, “I dread this meeting.”
“Me too,” said Biden. CIA reports showed a staggering level of corruption, inaction and snarled intelligence relationships that went back decades. Biden wanted to break the dependency relationship that had developed between Karzai and the Oval Office. President Bush had a videoconference with Karzai almost every two weeks. At times, Karzai sat his infant son in his lap during the head of state tête-à-têtes. When anyone in the U.S. military or the U.S. embassy in Kabul confronted Karzai, he invoked his special relationship with the president of the United States.
Biden and Graham agreed to push Karzai. The planned state dinner would not be the traditional feel-good session.
For about 30 minutes before the dinner, Biden and Karzai spoke alone.
“We have no interest in making life tougher for you,” Biden told
Karzai. “But you have a real stake in our success. And you have no interest in making life tougher for us.
“We need to understand whether you’re able to do the hard things that need to be done to move this forward, just as we’re going to have to look whether we’re able to do the hard things necessary to move this forward.”
That’s exactly right, Karzai said.
Graham and the American entourage as well as Karzai’s cabinet milled outside the door, waiting as if this was a papal conclave to see what color smoke emerged from the chimney. Karzai and Biden came out seemingly pleased by their conversation. They sat down opposite each other at a massive dinner table, with about 15 people on each side.
Karzai had staged the evening. He called out to each of his cabinet members. “Defense Minister, tell us what you’re doing.” Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak stood up and delivered a report. “Interior Minister, tell us what you’re doing.” Afghan Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar did the same. Once the performance ended, Biden turned to Karzai.
“I wanted Senator Graham to come to let you know that the election is over at home,” he said. “We’re here to make a commitment to your country, but, Mr. President, things have got to change. President-elect Obama wants to be helpful, but this idea of picking up the phone, calling President Obama like you did President Bush, is not going to happen.”
I understand, Karzai said. He seemed eager to accommodate, gushing with lines like “Wonderful” and “No problem” as Biden talked.
“Mr. President,” Graham said, “the economy in America is on its knees. If we don’t see some progress on corruption, on better government, Republicans are not going to continue to vote for more troops, more money for Afghanistan if we don’t see some real change.”
Biden criticized Karzai’s failure to govern with all of Afghanistan in mind, his unwillingness to travel the country and build a political consensus among the many tribes and ethnicities. He mentioned the ornate homes of Afghan officials near the presidential palace, no doubt paid for by the U.S.
“You’re the mayor of Kabul,” Biden said, meaning Karzai was isolated in the capital. “Replacing governors willy-nilly has got to stop.” Karzai routinely doled out provincial governorships as favors to his political supporters.
Graham broached the subject of Ahmed Wali Karzai. “Mr. President,” he said, “now you can’t come to Afghanistan without hearing about your brother.”
“Well, show me the file, Senator,” Karzai replied.
“We will, one day,” Graham said.
The mood began to sour. Karzai seemed offended.
“There’s only one issue that troubles us,” Karzai said, “and that’s civilian casualties. We need to work together on this. People here don’t want you to leave. Your interest is to defeat terrorism. We will help.”
“We’re doing everything we can to minimize civilian casualties,” Biden answered. “In a war, they can’t all be avoided. You know that.” It would help, he added, if Karzai didn’t hold news conferences denouncing the U.S. every time there were allegations of civilian casualties. “You need to come to us. We will find the facts each time, but what we have to avoid is immediate public statements that don’t reflect the facts.”
Graham, the Air Force Reserve lawyer, jumped in. “Our rules of engagement are very sensitive to civilian casualties,” he said. “And nobody hates it more than the people involved, but, Mr. President, we cannot be accused of every bad act the moment it happens based on what a Taliban press release says. You’re feeding the enemy. You’re empowering them to get more involved in the civilian population.” The requirement to get a warrant before a raid was absurd, he said. “We’re in the middle of a war.” Graham realized he was getting hotter. “We’re not going to ask our troops to become cops. We want to be partners. Nobody would like the first person to go through the door [in a raid] to be an Afghan more than Lindsey Graham, but the first person through the door is an American. And the hope is that one day the first person through the door will be an Afghan.” But, he told Karzai, he had to cease playing to his domestic audience.
“You have to be in on this with us,” Biden added. “If this is not a war for you, then we won’t be sending our warriors.” The death of innocent Afghans sets back American interests, Biden said. “When we break their hearts, we’ll lose their minds.”
Karzai seemed to realize he had hit a sensitive nerve. “It’s not a criticism,” the Afghan president said. “It’s letting you know there’s a problem.”
But let’s deal with that problem in private instead of press conferences, Biden said.
Karzai’s tone sharpened. Civilian casualties were a public matter. The Americans seemed to believe the death of, say, 30 Afghan villagers was insignificant. And Biden should not have belittled him in front of his own cabinet.
“This has gone on for too long,” Karzai said. “The Afghan people will not support it.”
“We may have reached that point ourselves, and we’ll have to cut our losses,” Biden said.
“The Afghan people must be partners, not victims,” Karzai said.
“I believe we can and will do a better job on this,” Biden said. “But if you don’t want us, we’re happy to leave. Just tell us. Instead of sending 30,000, maybe it’ll be 10,000. Or maybe it’ll be nothing. Or we could just send you economic assistance. If you don’t want us, just tell us.”
At that, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, William Wood, interrupted them as a desperate marriage counselor might.
“I think this has been a useful conversation,” he said. “It shows frustrations on both sides.”
“We’re just poor Afghans,” Karzai said. “I know no one cares about—”
Biden threw down his napkin. “This is beneath you, Mr. President.”
It appeared to be a struggle for both men to contain their tempers. Graham had been to so many of these freaking dinners he could barely count them. But this was “a dinner to remember,” he later said. It ended shortly after that exchange. By the time they returned to the embassy, the ambassador was flooded with calls from distressed Karzai cabinet members asking, is this okay? What’s going on?
Biden’s visit was shrouded in secrecy. There were no public statements or press briefings. Biden and Graham later met with the commander in Afghanistan, U.S. Army General David McKiernan, who didn’t share as pessimistic a view. Biden indicated to McKiernan that he would be getting more troops and asked: Can you pull this off?
McKiernan said, “We’re not losing, but to get off the fence to where we’re actually winning we need these additional troops.” He had a pending request for 30,000 that the Bush administration had not acted on.
There were positive signs in Regional Command East, which contained the Hindu Kush mountains. American troops had performed admirably, securing the valleys and towns. “We’re getting to the point where the gains are irreversible,” McKiernan said.
But in sharp contrast, Regional Command South was rapidly deteriorating. RC South included Kandahar and Helmand provinces. It was the nexus of the Taliban insurgency, the drug trade and Karzai’s nepotistic corruption. What was being done in the east that was not being done in the south? Biden asked.
McKiernan struggled to answer. More emphasis had been put on the east and there was better cooperation with the Afghans there, he said.
Biden was not persuaded. If the U.S. was really winning in the east, then the best move would be to reverse-engineer that success and replicate it in the south.
What about al Qaeda? Biden asked. The terrorist group was the reason the Americans were in this country. What was their presence like in Afghanistan now?
“We haven’t really seen an Arab here in a couple of years,” McKiernan said. For all practical purposes, there was no al Qaeda there. That confirmed what Biden suspected. Al Qaeda—the impetus of this war—was a Pakistani problem.
“I’m looking forward to working with you,” Biden said, shaking McKier
nan’s hand.
The vice president–elect believed that off-the-cuff conversations often yielded more insights than formal presentations. As he made his rounds with the troops, after asking the basic “How’s it going?” he then slipped in a “What are we trying to do here?” Everyone—colonels, lieutenants, sergeants—gave a different answer.
“Basically, we’re trying to rebuild this country,” said one, “so that it can stand on its own two feet.”
Another said, “We’re trying to get al Qaeda.”
Biden replied, “But I was just told they’re not here.”
A more common answer from the front-line troops was, “I don’t know.”
Tony Blinken, 46, Biden’s top foreign policy adviser for the last seven years and now his national security adviser, was on the trip. A lawyer who had served as a staffer on the Clinton National Security Council, Blinken joined his boss and Graham for a session about what they had seen. “I don’t know if they can ever pull this off,” he said.
This idea of building up the Afghan government, Biden said, and the army and the police in a functioning way, is maybe a bridge too far. Was it doable?
“I don’t know if it’s doable or not,” Graham said. “I had the same doubts about Iraq,” but this seemed to be the best chance they would get. “How does it end? Does Karzai ever govern better? I don’t know,” Graham said. “He’s been given too much room to maneuver without accountability.” He was certain, however, that this visit had been a good start for engaging anew with Karzai.