by Bob Woodward
“We need to have that box,” Panetta said. “We need to be able to conduct our operations.”
Kayani said he would see that they had some access.
The Americans pressed on the Haqqani network. The Pakistanis had their 7th Infantry Division headquarters nearby. Why was there little sharing of intelligence?
Kayani did not explain.
Jones and Panetta left feeling they had made only baby steps. “How can you fight a war and have safe havens across the border?” Panetta asked in frustration. The latest intelligence showed trucks crossing the border that were full of Taliban combatants with all kinds of weapons packed in the back. They were being waved through into Afghanistan to kill Americans at checkpoints controlled by the Pakistanis. “It’s a crazy kind of war,” Panetta said.
The U.S. needed some kind of ground forces, he concluded. “We can’t do this without some boots on the ground. They could be Pakistani boots or they can be our boots, but we got to have some boots on the ground.” The U.S. quick-strike JSOC units were too visible. The main alternative was a giant expansion of the covert war. His 3,000-man Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams (CTPT) were now conducting cross-border operations into Pakistan.
Lute supervised the writing of a three-page trip report to the president that Jones signed. It contained a pessimistic summary, noting first the gap between the civilian and military authority in Pakistan. The U.S. was getting nowhere fast with these guys, talking with Zardari, who could deliver nothing. On the other hand, Kayani had the power to deliver, but he refused to do much. Nobody could tell him otherwise. The bottom line was depressing: This had been a charade. Jones said he was once again alarmed that success in Afghanistan was tied to what the Pakistanis would or would not do. The White House was almost right back to where it had started with Pakistan in 2009.
Second, the report said the Pakistanis did not have the same sense of urgency as the Americans. Should there be another terrorist attack in the U.S., the Pakistanis suggested that something could be worked out after the fact. There were regular terrorist attacks in Pakistan, so they could not understand the traumatic impact of a single, small act on the U.S. homeland. The Pakistanis were making another mistake by applying that same logic to India. They did not comprehend that India might not show restraint if LeT, the group behind the 2008 Mumbai attack, struck there again. Indian Prime Minister Singh, who had barely survived Mumbai politically, would have to respond.
But the Pakistanis also wielded tremendous leverage over the U.S. because they gave tacit approval for drone strikes. Furthermore, the intelligence indicated the Pakistanis believed the U.S. would not jeopardize their relationship because some 70 to 80 percent of the U.S. and NATO supplies for the Afghanistan War came through Pakistan, and there was no way to supply everything by air. The Pakistanis would not even have to close the supply routes, just allow some of the extremists to shut down bridges and overpasses.
The options for Obama would be significantly narrowed in the aftermath of an attack originating out of Pakistan. Before such an attack, however, he had more options, especially if there was a way for Pakistan to make good on his four requests. Some 150 visa applications for U.S. military and intelligence operatives were being withheld that were over six weeks old, and U.S. embassy personnel were now required to renew their visas every 90 days. The Pakistanis were dragging their feet on visas for U.S. personnel to carry out the transfer of equipment that the Pakistani military needed. It was insane, Jones thought.
The easiest accommodation would be for the Pakistanis to share the names of all airline passengers traveling to or from Pakistan. The investigations of the two bombing attempts in New York City by Zazi and Shahzad established that both went to Pakistan for training, but the U.S. government did not have any record of their travels.
The Pakistanis had countered in the past that disclosing airline data would violate their sovereignty. They also suspected it would give the U.S. insight into where their intelligence officers were going. Most ISI agents were flying east to India or Bangladesh, so the U.S. had proposed just getting data on flights heading west to the Persian Gulf, Europe and the United States. But the Pakistanis had stubbornly resisted.
In the event of a terrorist attack, Lute worried that it would be hard for Obama to defend Pakistan because their leaders had refused to do what had been simple and easy, especially on the visas and passenger lists. If two near-misses were the leading edge of a trend, what would it take to wake the Pakistanis up?
When I interviewed President Obama two months after the failed Times Square bombing, he played up Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts. “They also ramped up their CT cooperation in a way that over the last 18 months has hunkered down al Qaeda in a way that is significant,” he said.
“But still not enough,” I interjected.
“Well, exactly.”
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It had been a rough 16 months for Dennis Blair. The DNI had failed in his effort to name the chief intelligence officer in each foreign capital. The CIA had won and the feud had gone public. Blair had also conducted a nonpublic war against two other sources of power for the CIA. In his view, the CIA was using the President’s Daily Brief as a house rag for telling Obama their triumphs—even something as minor as an operation involving three guys and a pickup truck. He edited out these advertisements for the CIA’s wares, saying, “I’m not going to give that to the president.”
He also went after the CIA covert action programs, attempting to trim them and align them more with overt U.S. policies. “Covert action programs should continually be considered for transition to non-covert activities,” he wrote in one SECRET proposal rejected by the White House.
Blair grew so frustrated that at one point he declared, “I think the CIA is fundamentally an organization that’s like a really finely trained, not very smart, dangerous animal that needs to be controlled very closely by adults.”
By May 2010, President Obama was telling Jones and others, “Isn’t it about time to get rid of Blair?” There had been too many fights with the CIA. And Blair had also pushed too hard for a no-spying agreement with the French that Obama and the rest of the cabinet opposed.
Without informing Blair, members of Obama’s staff began shopping around the DNI job, talking about it with deputy secretary of state Jim Steinberg, Chuck Hagel, a former Republican senator from Nebraska, and John McLaughlin, a former deputy director of the CIA. When word about this reached Blair, he complained and soon had a meeting with Obama.
The president listed his reasons why the retired admiral was not working out as DNI. Blair responded to them in writing, defending himself and detailing his accomplishments.
After reading Blair’s response, Obama phoned him on Thursday, May 20. “I have decided and I’m going to make the change,” the president said.
He then offered Blair a face-saving exit. Take your time, weeks, even months, Obama said. Come up with a personal reason or any explanation. He would support any story Blair wanted, the president said. A smooth transition was in everyone’s interest. After all, they were at war.
Blair was deeply offended. He wasn’t ill. His family was fine. And he had told people he would stay as DNI for four years because part of the problem with the office had been the constant turnover at the top.
“You want me to lie?” Blair asked.
No, Obama said, I didn’t mean that at all.
Fire me, Blair basically said.
That’s exactly what Obama did.
Within several minutes of the conversation, Jake Tapper of ABC News reported on the network’s Web site that Blair was leaving.
About 5 P.M. on June 21, Gates called Jones. “There’s an article coming out in Rolling Stone magazine that’s not very good about McChrystal,” he said. It contained some disparaging and mocking comments from McChrystal and his senior staff about administration officials. One unnamed McChrystal aide called Jones a “clown” who is “stuck in 1985.” McChrystal himself was quoted sayin
g that Obama’s strategy review was “painful” and “I was selling an unsellable position.” Recounting McChrystal’s stay in Paris, including a heavy-drinking evening with his wife and senior staff, the article revealed the commanding general as anti-French. Gates said he planned to release a statement reprimanding McChrystal, but hoped to salvage the situation and avoid a setback to the war strategy.
“I’m not sure that goes far enough,” Jones said. “This is pretty sensational stuff.” The article also quoted unnamed McChrystal aides who took shots at Biden, Holbrooke and Eikenberry.
McChrystal called Biden about the profile. “I have compromised the mission,” he said.
He also apologized to Holbrooke and said he had offered his resignation to Gates.
Later that evening the president met with Emanuel and Jones, who recommended that Obama order McChrystal back to Washington. Don’t do anything now, Jones suggested, but sleep on it.
Obama agreed and the next morning McChrystal was ordered to return to Washington—a dramatic statement in itself. Jones told Gates that protecting McChrystal was noble. “But you don’t want to put yourself between him and the president.”
Gates proposed that he issue the first two paragraphs of his statement criticizing McChrystal, and Jones agreed. “I believe that General McCrystal made a significant mistake and exercised poor judgment,” Gates said in his statement.
At the Pentagon, Geoff Morrell, Gates’s spokesman and confidant, was in agony. It was like seeing a funnel cloud rising for Gates and the whole military establishment. The article would once again expose the messiness and mistrust between the White House and the military. Morrell’s job was to quell what he called the “family feud,” downplay its significance, respond to protect the military without appearing disloyal to the administration. To get into detail about the rift would only further reveal the divide that he believed was, in part, a consequence of the prolonged AfPak strategy review. The fact was that the White House had its version, claiming that the president had dramatically asserted civilian control while the military version was that it had basically gotten what it wanted. The tensions had abated in public and since gone underground. Now they were headed for another public airing. He tuned into Gibbs’s noon press briefing, knowing that the press secretary would be operating under presidential instructions.
“Is removing the general from his position at least an option the president is considering?” one reporter asked.
“I would say all options are on the table,” Gibbs replied.
Fair enough, Morrell thought.
“I think the magnitude and graveness of the mistake here are profound,” Gibbs said next, shooting way beyond Gates’s comment that it was a mistake and poor judgment.
Gibbs reported that Obama was “angry” upon seeing the article and was recalling McChrystal “to see what in the world he was thinking.”
“So you’re questioning whether or not General McChrystal is capable and mature enough for this job he has?”
“You had my quote right,” Gibbs said.
Morrell was sickened. Gibbs was relishing it too much, “like a pig in shit,” as he told others later.
The next day Obama accepted McChrystal’s resignation, and he proposed that Petraeus take over. Though it would involve a technical demotion because as central commander Petraeus was the boss, it was an idea that would address both the military and political problems. The Iraq hero would come to the rescue of Afghanistan.
Obama met alone with Petraeus for 40 minutes. Obama told me, “Dave Petraeus was the only person who fit the bill.”
I noted that it was a demotion.
“He certainly doesn’t consider it a demotion,” the president said. “I think that Dave Petraeus understands that this is the single most important job that anybody in our military could be doing right now.”
At 1:43 P.M. on Wednesday, June 23, the president announced the changes in the Rose Garden. He said he admired McChrystal’s “long record of service,”
“remarkable career,” and “his enormous contributions.” Pulling out all the stops, the president added, “Indeed it saddens me to lose the service of a soldier who I’ve come to respect and admire.”
He said that Petraeus would “maintain the momentum and leadership that we need to succeed.
“He is setting an extraordinary example of service and patriotism by assuming this difficult post.” Calling Afghanistan “a very tough fight,” Obama said, “I welcome debate among my team, but I won’t tolerate division.”
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In the interview I had with the president on July 10, 2010, Obama offered his thoughts about the nature of war and his efforts to limit and eventually end American’s combat role in Afghanistan.
Where would you begin a book—or movie—about your handling of the Afghanistan war? I asked. What would be the first scene?
“You know,” he answered, “I’d probably start it back in 2002, when the debate was taking place about the run-up in Iraq. And that was probably the first speech I gave on foreign policy that got a lot of attention.”
This was the speech he gave as an Illinois state senator at a rally in Chicago, declaring himself one of the early opponents of President Bush’s plan for a war in Iraq. It became famous during the presidential campaign. He said such a war would lead to a “U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences.”
Isn’t this undetermined cost, time and consequence, I asked, “the nature of all war?”
“You are absolutely right,” Obama said. “To quote a famous American, ‘War is Hell,’” he continued, referring to the line by Union Civil War General William Tecumseh Sherman. “And once the dogs of war are unleashed, you don’t know where it’s going to lead. When I entered into office, we had two wars taking place. So once you’re in, what you’re trying to do is impose clarity on the chaos.”
I was struck by the strong language—“Hell” and “the dogs of war” and “chaos.” He clearly saw the dark, unfathomable side of war.
“You have an obligation,” he continued, “to work over, again and again, your goals, your mission, your progress. Are we staying focused? Are we preventing mission creep? Are we clear about the endgame?” The policymakers had to have extraordinary discipline during wartime, he added. “It entails so much of the country’s resources, so much of our blood and treasure, and unleashes so many passions.” And he worried about “the ease with which something [war] gets momentum.”
“And you can’t lose a war or be perceived to lose a war, can you?” I asked.
“I think about it not so much in the classic, do you lose a war on my watch? Or win a war on a president’s watch? I think about it more in terms of, do you successfully prosecute a strategy that results in the country being stronger rather than weaker at the end of it?” He noted there would be no formal surrender in either the Iraq or Afghanistan wars.
“It is very easy to imagine a situation in which, in the absence of a clear strategy,” he said, “we ended up staying in Afghanistan for another five years, another eight years, another 10 years. And we would do it not with clear intentions but rather just out of an inertia. Or an unwillingness to ask tough questions.”
He reaffirmed his timeline—that in July 2011 he would begin thinning out U.S. forces. “Sometime next year we will have been there 10 years,” Obama told me. “A decade. By far our longest war. And I think it is part of my obligation as president to look at our efforts in Afghanistan, in the context of all the other issues that face this country and our long-term national security.” So his timeline, he said, reminded everyone “there’s urgency here,” that the international forces would not be there forever. “It forced, I think, our military to think not in terms of infinite time and infinite resources.”
The president said his message to the Afghan government was: “Our commitment to your long-term security and stability will extend for a very long time, and in the same way that our commitm
ent to Iraq will extend beyond our combat role there. But it’s time for us to start thinking in terms of how you guys are going to be able to stand on your own two feet.”
Near the end of the interview, the president noted that since much of the story had to do with the relationship between civilian leadership and the military, he ought to offer his views.
“I am probably the first president who is young enough that the Vietnam War wasn’t at the core of my development,” he said. He was 13 in 1975 when the United States finally withdrew from Vietnam.
“So I grew up with none of the baggage that arose out of the dispute of the Vietnam War. I also had a lot of confidence, I guess, coming in that the way our system of government works civilians have to make policy decisions. And then the military carries them out. You know, I don’t see this as a civilian versus military situation the way I think a lot of people coming out of Vietnam do. I also don’t see it as a hawk/ dove kind of thing.
“So a lot of the political frames through which these debates are being viewed don’t really connect with me generationally. I’m neither intimidated by our military, nor am I thinking that they’re somehow trying to undermine my role as commander in chief.”
At the beginning of the interview, which was scheduled for an hour, the president told me, “You’re on the clock.” He called final halt after one hour and 15 minutes. “That’s it, I have to go, all right?”
“Okay,” I said. “There are unanswered questions.”
“Of course there are,” he said, rising from his chair in the Oval Office.
“Thank you, sir.”
As we walked out together, Obama said, “Sounds like you’ve got better sources than I do.”
“No, sir.”
“Have you ever thought of being the DNI director?” he asked, laughing lightly. “Huh? Or CIA?”