The tactical problem of fighting a convoy through against a powerful surface battle group plus U-boats and aircraft was a difficult one. The standard tactic for defence of a convoy against powerful surface units was to scatter, but for fighting off U-boat or aircraft attack the best defence was to remain together. As I have mentioned, Admiral Tovey was not in agreement with the ‘scatter’ approach even in the event of attack by Tirpitz. One reason may be the belief held by some that the Barents Sea gave too little room for the effective dispersal of a large convoy. Had the convoy not scattered, Tirpitz and consorts would certainly have attacked, no doubt causing substantial losses. Probably the only safe, but temporary, alternative at the time Tirpitz was discovered to have left her home port was to reverse the convoy’s course and await developments, perhaps trying to draw the German surface units after the merchant ships onto Victorious’s aircraft or the Home Fleet battle group – much as Rear-Admiral Hamilton had hoped to do with his cruisers. However, given Hitler’s paranoia concerning damage to his heavy ships (a factor unknown to the Allies), it is doubtful that he would have sanctioned a chase far enough to the west for this to have been possible – and at some point the convoy had to be fought through, one way or another. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound found himself confronted by several extremely difficult options, but it is reasonable to suggest that instead of issuing peremptory orders he might have been better advised to keep Tovey and Hamilton apprised of precisely what was known of enemy surface ship movements, and leave decisions on the best course of action to the officers on the spot. Rear-Admiral Hamilton alone knew the prevailing weather conditions, which during the course of the voyage varied from very good visibility to thick fog, flat calm to full gale, and was in the best position to evaluate the prospects for evasion or defence. It has been suggested that a contributing factor to Sir Dudley Pound’s decision may have been the inclusion of US Navy ships with the escort, and the repercussions which might ensue should one or more of them be sunk while under British command. This may have been a factor, but what must be said is that those who have never had to hold such a post at such a time, can only guess at the pressure and stress which must be endured.
—♦—
Pressure and stress were also getting to the political leadership. Winston Churchill now had to try to explain the loss of so much valuable matériel to Stalin, against a background of complicated and mistrustful relations with the Soviet Union. Despite pacts and public reassurances of mutual support by and between the three principal allies in the European war, Churchill and Roosevelt feared that if Russia’s horrendous losses continued to mount Stalin might conclude a separate peace with Hitler. At the same time Stalin entertained suspicions that Britain and the United States might change sides and join Germany’s war against Russia; there being, after all, no enthusiasm for Bolshevism whatsoever in the governments of the Western democracies.
Churchill tried to soften the twin blows of the fate of PQ17 and the resultant cancellation of the next summer convoy, PQ18, by alluding to the build-up of troops for a second front (for which Stalin had long been pressing). Stalin, however, had German armies racing across his country and was in no mood to be mollified.
To escape the advancing Germans, most Soviet government departments were sent eastwards to Kuibyshev. Stalin, however, remained in Moscow, which was where Winston Churchill visited him in August. Churchill was subjected to another lambasting over PQ17 and made acutely aware of the seriousness of the military position. On his return to London the British prime minister, convinced that a convoy should be pushed through to Murmansk in September to maintain vital Anglo-Russian cooperation, notified the Admiralty that despite their sound military reasoning against a further summer enterprise, a convoy and escort should be assembled and despatched at the earliest possible opportunity.
PQ18 sailed from Loch Ewe on 2 September 1942, and consisted of thirty-nine merchant ships joined by a further six in Iceland. Escorting this convoy, something of an armada had been assembled by the Admiralty. By drawing warships away from other duties a Home Fleet battle group comprising two battleships, a cruiser and four destroyers maintained position to the north-west of Jan Mayen Island, while from Western Approaches Command six destroyers and five trawlers accompanied the convoy as far as Iceland. Taking the convoy on to Murmansk the close escort comprised two anti-aircraft ships, two destroyers, four corvettes, three minesweepers and four trawlers. An additional fighting destroyer escort of sixteen ships plus a light cruiser joined two days out from Iceland, and for the first time an escort aircraft carrier accompanied an Arctic convoy into the Barents Sea, itself escorted by two further destroyers. Also in the area were three cruisers supporting homebound convoy QP14, and two cruisers and a destroyer operating a regular relief trip for the garrison at Spitzbergen. Covering the convoy’s southern flank and on the lookout for German surface units operating from northern Norway were up to ten submarines. Determined to keep tight control of the situation and in close touch with the Admiralty to avoid any chance of a repetition of the PQ17 débâcle, Admiral Tovey remained at Scapa Flow while his Home Fleet second-in-command, Vice-Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, took command at sea.
Those in the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe who should have put two and two together appear not to have realised that their success against PQ17 had been the result of an unintentional combined operation between surface ships, U-boats and aircraft. The consequence of this, and Hitler’s reluctance to commit his big ships, was that attacks on PQ18 were left to U-boats and the Luftwaffe. Commencing on 13 September and lasting nine days, a stream of ferocious attacks was launched against the convoy. Thirteen of the forty-five merchant ships were lost, at a cost to the Luftwaffe of forty-one aircraft, and three priceless U-boats to the Kriegsmarine. Following the PQ17 débâcle, fighting thirty-two ships through was a considerable relief to the Allies, but the loss of thirteen was a substantial price to pay; and the huge escort required put a severe strain on the Royal Navy, particularly in the number of destroyers required. Also caught up in the attacks, the homeward-bound convoy QP14 lost three merchant ships out of fifteen, plus a destroyer, a minesweeper, and an oiler.
—♦—
Almost from the moment Germany invaded Russia, Stalin had pressed for a second front in Europe. This proved impractical in the early stages, but Churchill and Roosevelt did agree on Operation Torch, an Anglo-American landing in North Africa. Torch drew all available escorts from convoy and other duties, and warship cover for the Atlantic convoys was so weakened that losses increased sharply. Churchill again faced the prospect of having to advise Stalin that convoys to Russia would have to be cancelled, in all probability until January 1943.
He attempted to obtain escort reinforcement in the shape of twelve US destroyers, but Roosevelt had to decline owing to the requirements of Torch and other commitments. The Admiralty also hoped that ships might be obtained from the Mediterranean to escort a Russia convoy, but instead of giving them up, Admiral Cunningham, C-in-C Mediterranean, asked for more. The problem was outlined by the Admiralty in a minute to the Prime Minister dated 22 November 1942, which stated essentially that:
• The situation in the North Atlantic is severe and cannot be allowed to continue. The Minister of War Transport fears that if convoys continue to be knocked about in the Atlantic as at present the signs are that merchant seamen may refuse to sail.
• Long-range aircraft for the Atlantic have been approved but it will be some time before they are operational, also weather conditions greatly reduce the number of days on which they can operate.
• Proposals made to the United States and Canada to temporarily augment escorts over the western portion [of the Atlantic] mid-voyage have been agreed, although this weakens their escorts on the run west of Newfoundland and would have to be cancelled if U-boats return in strength.
• To deal with the eastern portion of the mid voyage [not covered by air support], we must provide two reinforcing groups. One can be scraped to
gether from ships returning from ‘Torch’, and it may be possible to obtain US agreement to releasing British ships working on the convoy route from Guantanamo to New York.
• Convoy PQ19 can be run on 22 December by reducing the destroyer escort from sixteen to seven but this may necessitate cruisers going right through [to Russia] with the convoy. Admiral of The Fleet does not like substitution of cruisers for destroyers, but sees no alternative.
• We have previously agreed with the USSR to run three convoys every two months. This is now out of the question, and the best possible is one convoy every thirty-three days. This will cause severe strain on Home Fleet destroyers.
• The USSR may not be able to accept more than one thirty-ship convoy every thirty-three days as they have only twelve unloading berths and each ship takes ten to twelve days to unload. There is also some doubt as to whether the Russian railways can handle even one thirty-ship convoy every thirty-three days.[19]
With the battles along the Russian front, and at Stalingrad in particular, consuming men and matériel at a relentlessly escalating rate, Soviet insistence on further convoys reached a new intensity. It is worth bearing in mind that on top of all the military difficulties to be overcome, by the end of 1942 Britain was desperately short of food and raw materials herself. To take an example, only 300,000 tons (304,800 tonnes) of commercial bunker fuel for civilian use was to be had in the country, and this was used at a rate of 130,000 tons (132,080 tonnes) per month.[20] Nevertheless, Churchill realised that regardless of all difficulties, it was again necessary to ‘stand the hazard of the die’, and on 24 November cabled Stalin advising:
• Although US President unable to lend twelve destroyers have made arrangements for convoy over thirty ships to sail from Iceland 22 December. Germans have moved bulk of aircraft from North Norway to Southern Europe to counter ‘Torch’. German surface forces in Norway still on guard.
• Shipping is limiting factor. To do ‘Torch’ we had to cut transatlantic escorts so fine that first half of November was worst month so far. UK and US budgeted to lose 700,000 tons per month and still improve margin. Over the year average losses are not quite so bad, but first fortnight in November was worse.[21]
Given the task of arranging the defence of the convoy Admiral Tovey proposed a change from the usual method to take into account, and take advantage of, the Arctic winter:
From late November to mid January the lack of daylight is such that air reconnaissance in the Arctic is virtually impossible. Provided that a convoy is of such a size that it can be handled and kept together, it therefore stands an excellent chance of evading both U-boat and surface attack and even of completing the passage without the enemy’s knowing of its existence. A large convoy, on the other hand, is likely to fail to keep company, and to split (as did QP15) into a large number of small groups, covering a vast area and unaware of each other’s position or composition. Such small groups would be more liable to detection by U-boats than a single concentrated convoy and would present the enemy surface forces with an ideal opportunity for an offensive sweep. Our own covering forces are always handicapped by having to identify a contact before they are free to attack; the enemy need not do so. The splitting of the convoy into a large number of scattered units would greatly add to this handicap.[22]
The Admiral’s contention that greater control could be exercised over smaller convoys was accepted and it was decided that the thirty-ship convoy for December would be run in two fifteen-ship sections. It was also decided to drop the PQ prefix in favour of JW; while for return convoys RA replaced QP.
—♦—
From the last quarter of 1941, the supply of fuel oil for the German navy had been critical. By April 1942 deliveries from Romania had fallen from 46,000 tons (46,736 tonnes) to 8000 tons (8128 tonnes) per month, and this was promised to the Italians for their campaign to keep the Mediterranean open to Axis shipping.[23] Such shortages did not, however, affect the submarines or pocket battleships, which burned diesel oil – still in comparatively plentiful supply. On the afternoon of 19 November 1942, at one of his regular meetings with Hitler, Grand Admiral Raeder again drew the Führer’s attention to the problem and received orders to return Lützow to Norway in view of her diesel-burning engines. Raeder also primed Hitler for the use of surface units by pointing out that while there were presently twenty-three submarines assigned to the Arctic, of which ten were in operational zones, during the months of almost perpetual night, submarine operations would be much less effective due to the absence of aerial reconnaissance and adverse weather conditions.[24] On the surface, with good visibility a U-boat could spot a convoy’s smoke 30–40 miles (55–74 km), away, while in bad visibility prospects for making contact would be cut to 20 miles (37 km) with the use of hydrophones.[25] Second World War submarines could spend a comparatively limited time submerged owing to the need to recharge batteries and replenish their oxygen supply, a significant problem in the storms and blizzards of the Arctic winter. As a result of these considerations, and the fact that in the early years of the war detection equipment could only identify a submarine under water, the U-boats’ favoured method of attack was at night on the surface. This approach was not best suited to the violent weather of the Arctic winter.
Raeder followed up his intention to use surface vessels by authorising Admiral Commanding Cruisers, Vice-Admiral Oskar Kummetz, to devise a plan to be put into action at the next opportunity.
—♦—
While the political leadership and the generals and admirals conducted their grand strategy, for the men of all sides who fought in the Arctic there were two enemies – their human foe, and the weather. Often the latter would prove to be the more unforgiving, an enemy not only uncomfortable and inconvenient but packing a heavy punch.
CHAPTER 2
COLD COMFORT
‘What was life like in the Arctic in destroyers?’ I asked Lieutenant-Commander John Patrick ‘Paddy’ Donovan, MBE, RN.
‘Bloody!’ was his pithy comment.
Paddy Donovan was born in Weymouth, Dorset, in 1919, into a naval family – both grandfathers had been in the Navy, as had his father and three uncles. During the Second World War his elder sister Kathleen became a WREN petty officer and his younger brother Tim also followed him into the ranks, but tragically went down with the battlecruiser Repulse in December 1941. His elder brother Mick had also been earmarked for the senior service but he was thrown from a horse while helping the local milk lady, and the accident affected his sight and hearing. Only one other Donovan seems to have been able to resist the siren call of the Navy – younger sister Connie became a WAAF mechanic.
Paddy Donovan saw service in battleships in the 1930s, and the cruiser Norfolk during the Abyssinian crisis of 1939, and survived the loss of the fast minelayer Latona in 1941, bombed and sunk while attempting to run supplies into besieged Tobruk. In the latter part of 1942 the then Second Lieutenant Donovan joined the new Royal Navy destroyer Obedient as gunnery officer. One of the first of the Navy’s new class of escort destroyers, the ship was assigned to Arctic convoy protection, and Paddy needed to acclimatise himself quickly to the particular difficulties and dangers of serving in those far northern latitudes.
The waters of the Barents Sea need to be treated with utmost respect in peacetime, let alone in war. Sub-zero winds blast off the polar ice cap at up to hurricane strength, catching and freezing spray and rain, blowing it like shrapnel against a ship’s upper works to set as layer upon layer of ice. This ice must be regularly chipped or steam-hosed away if the weight is not to cause stability problems and the serious risk of foundering. Ships take waves 70 ft (21.3 m) high ‘green’ over their decks, while in the depths of winter temperatures might register 50 degrees Celsius of frost. Any crewman unwise enough to go on deck in these conditions without gloves would find the flesh of his hand instantly ‘welded’ to metal by frost, should he touch it. On 17 January 1942 the escort destroyer Matabele was torpedoed in these treacherous waters
and sank. A rescue vessel arrived on the scene in minutes but found only two survivors, the rest of the crew having frozen to death. To add to the difficulties, the warmer waters of the Gulf Stream enter the freezing Arctic, causing banks of thick fog to drift across the area, and the phenomenon known as ‘layering’ (different layers of warm and cold water), which was little understood at the time, but which seriously disrupted ASDIC[26] searches for submarines.
The polar ice edge fluctuates greatly with the changing seasons, and in winter it would come down far enough to force the convoys south of Bear Island, and consequently closer to German naval and air bases in northern Norway. Depending upon where the ice edge was situated, the arduous voyage from the UK to Russia would be from 1500 to 2000 miles (2760 to 3680 km). Winter would also see the freezing up of Archangel, leaving only Murmansk through which to discharge cargoes.
The Kola Inlet runs approximately north and south from the Barents Sea to Murmansk, and is the estuary for the River Tuloma (see map p. 23). On the western shore of the inlet some 5½ statute miles (8.85 km) from its mouth lies Polyarnoe, where destroyers and submarines were based, and where the C-in-C of the Russian Northern Fleet and the Senior British Naval Officer, North Russia, had their administrative offices. Across the inlet (8½ statute miles/13.7 km by water), lies Vaenga where the Royal Navy had established an auxiliary hospital with beds for seventy-four patients. Vaenga was connected by a single track railway with Murmansk, some 16 statute miles (25.7 km) to the south.
Murmansk lies along the eastern shore of the inlet, and since 1928 had been the subject of an ambitious expansion plan to develop what had been principally a fishing village into the Soviet Union’s main ice-free northern port. During the war years the town was subjected to savage and sustained bombing attacks from the nearby Luftwaffe bases in Finland and Norway.[27]
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