Kummetz had evidently heard of the message of 11.45 on the 31st despatched by Kapitänleutnant Herschelb of U354, and the interpretation of great success which had been put upon it by a German high command which, accordingly, had anticipated his confirmation of the destruction of the convoy with heady anticipation. While his explanation puts his point of view clearly, it is also apparent that he is becoming rattled and irritated by the impression that a witch-hunt is in progress higher up the chain of command concerning the unexpected lack of any positive results. He is also naturally concerned that if scapegoats are required, neither Kapitän zur See Stange (whom he loyally supports) nor himself, should be blamed for carrying out their instructions not to risk the heavy ships.
In a later report Kummetz stated candidly his opinion concerning the lack of results – ‘The operation’s objective could possibly have been achieved if the imposed commitments had been ignored. On the other hand this would always have involved high risks for the cruisers. A radio message, which I received whilst already at sea, placed particular emphasis on avoiding high risks.’[139]
Vice-Admiral Kummetz’s explanations were considered, logical and reasonable, but it is difficult to escape the conclusion drawn by Kapitän zur See Stange that this engagement had been a missed opportunity: ‘When our vessels leave the battle area it is with the uneasy feeling that, despite the overall situation, which seemed so favourable to begin with, we have not succeeded in getting close to the convoy, neither did we achieve any success at all.’[140]
—♦—
New Year’s Eve at Wolfschanze (Wolf’s Lair), Hitler’s headquarters in the forest close to Rastenburg, East Prussia, was turning out to be an unexpectedly jovial occasion. As 1942 drew to a close it appeared that military operations had taken a significant turn for the worse, particularly on the eastern front where General von Paulus’ Sixth Army stood in danger of being surrounded at Stalingrad. Nevertheless, as the Führer greeted his guests he bubbled with excitement at the news that an Arctic convoy had been destroyed – a message had been received from a U-boat observing the battle, and he expected details imminently. Instructions were given to issue a grand announcement to the media on New Year’s Day.
As the evening wore on Hitler became increasingly edgy and constantly quizzed Admiral Krancke for news. Krancke in turn contacted Berlin, who contacted Gruppe Nord, who contacted Kluber in Narvik, who could get no reply from Vice-Admiral Kummetz as he steadfastly maintained radio silence until the battle group was safely out of harm’s way. Explanations were forwarded that bad weather had delayed the battle group’s arrival, the telex link from Norway to Berlin had broken, etc., but by the morning of 1 January Hitler’s mood had turned to fury. With impeccable timing, it was at this point that his information bureau brought him a transcript of a BBC news broadcast which claimed that units of the Royal Navy, escorting a convoy in the Barents Sea, had put to flight a superior German force on New Year’s Eve – the convoy having escaped unscathed. Hitler boiled over, condemning the German navy for not fighting the action through to a finish (despite his own strictures against taking risks), and declaring that the defeat spelt the end for the German High Seas Fleet. Capital ships, he raged, were a waste of men and matériel and served no purpose other than to tie up other much needed forces for their defence. In a towering fury he ordered Berlin to contact the battle group immediately and get news of what had happened. Despite this, by 17.00 on the 1st there was still no word (the telephone and telex links still not having been reestablished), and Hitler again sent for Admiral Krancke. Raging at the unfortunate admiral that the failure to produce a report was an affront to his person as the Führer of the Reich, Hitler declared: ‘I have made the following decision, and order you forthwith to inform the Admiralty that it is my unalterable resolve. The heavy ships are a needless drain on men and materials. They will accordingly be paid off and reduced to scrap. Their guns will be mounted on land for coastal defence.’[141]
In the face of this onslaught Admiral Krancke courageously attempted to dissuade the Führer, but Hitler was not to be placated and issued instructions for Grand Admiral Raeder to report to him immediately in person. Staff at the Admiralty in Berlin warned Raeder that trouble was brewing, and made an excuse that he was unwell and would be unable to travel to Wolfschanze for a day or two. Thus granted a few days’ respite Raeder was able to prepare himself for the conference, but the time was also used by his old sparring partner, Reichsmarschall Goering, to poison the atmosphere further by complaining to Hitler that Luftwaffe squadrons were being ‘wasted’ guarding the big ships, and reinforcing the notion that they should be scrapped. It is sometimes difficult to believe that Goering and Raeder were on the same side. It is even more difficult to believe that Hitler put up with Goering’s bluster for as long as he did.
—♦—
The meeting between Grand Admiral Raeder and Hitler finally took place at Wolfschanze on the evening of 6 January 1943. Also present were Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of Staff Armed Forces High Command, and two stenographers. Without giving Raeder a chance to put his case, Hitler launched into a 1½-hour tirade against the German navy from its inception to the existing hostilities. Again ignoring the fact that it was his own reluctance to risk the capital ships which prevented them from being used more often, he complained that in the present situation ‘where all fighting power, all personnel, and all matériel must be brought into action, we cannot permit our large ships to ride idly at anchor for months’.[142] Forging on he repeated Goering’s belief that Luftwaffe squadrons were wasted protecting the big ships, and continued by displaying his total lack of understanding of naval warfare, declaring that ‘until now light naval forces have been doing most of the fighting. Whenever the larger ships put to sea, light forces have to accompany them. It is not the large ships which protect the small, but rather the reverse is true.’[143] Finally coming to the point Hitler reiterated his belief that the heavy ships should be paid off and scrapped, and instructed Raeder to prepare a memorandum covering the following points:
1. Should the three aircraft carriers which were planned, be retained? Should other ships be converted into aircraft carriers? Are Hipper and Prinz Eugen, because of their great speed, more suited than Lützow or Scheer, which have a more extensive operating radius? If the latter were lengthened, could they develop greater speed and could they be given a larger landing deck?
2. Where would the heavy guns of these ships best be mounted on land?
3. In which order should the ships be decommissioned? Probably Gneisenau would be first, since she will not be ready for active duty until the end of 1944. Next would probably be the ships which are now due for overhauling and repairs. Personnel of these ships will remain with the navy.
9. Can the submarine programme be extended and speeded up if the large ships are eliminated?[144]
Enduring the tirade in more or less silence, the aristocratic Raeder believed that this had been an attempt to humiliate him personally, and accordingly ‘considered it beneath my dignity to refute his statements’.[145] The Grand Admiral now requested a private talk with Hitler, and Keitel and the stenographers left. Raeder was a sound strategist who, in the years leading up to 1939, had warned Hitler of the particular problems to be faced on entering military conflict with a naval power such as Britain. Following the outbreak of war he further warned Hitler against the military adventure into Russia, at least until Britain had been defeated. Now, however, he felt that it was time for the Führer and himself to part company, and offered his resignation as C-in-C of the Kriegsmarine. He was, after all, he said, almost sixty-seven years old and there were younger admirals, now with the necessary war experience, to take his place.
Hitler immediately began to back-pedal, insisting that he had not intended to criticise the navy as a whole, only the big ships. Furthermore Germany was sustaining heavy losses in Russia, and the Führer believed there was much criticism of him for dismissing too many generals. It would be highly
embarrassing should Raeder now resign as well. Nevertheless, Raeder was adamant, but in order that no criticism should fall on Hitler personally, the admiral suggested that he be given an honorary title, indicating that he was still involved with the navy and that his decision to resign as C-in-C had been amicably agreed. Hitler reluctantly acceded to the request, and the date for Admiral Raeder’s stand down was set at 30 January 1943, the tenth anniversary of Hitler’s rise to power.[146] Hitler also requested the names of two officers who, in Raeder’s opinion, would be suitable successors. Raeder’s first choice was Admiral Rolf Karls, his second the C-in-C of the U-boat arm, Admiral Karl Doenitz. Hitler had always stressed the importance of the U-boat campaign, and so appointed Doenitz.
By 15 January Raeder, in conjunction with the naval general staff, had completed and handed in the lengthy memorandum required by Hitler, including what amounted to an ‘idiot’s guide’ to the necessity of retaining battleships and cruisers. The principle of the ‘Fleet in Being’ demanded that Britain keep substantial units of her fleet at Scapa Flow to cover Tirpitz and the other German capital ships, even if they did no more than swing at anchor in the Norwegian fjords. Raeder forcefully maintained that if, as a result of the Battle of the Barents Sea, the battleships and cruisers were scrapped, it would be the cheapest victory that the Royal Navy had ever won. Britain would interpret the scrapping of the ships as a sign of weakness, and of Germany’s complete ignorance of the immense importance of naval warfare. Britain, he maintained, whose entire warfare depended upon her dominance of the sea-lanes, would consider the war won if Germany destroyed its ships.[147] However his efforts were to no avail, and Hitler refused to change his mind.
His resignation becoming final, Raeder was given the title Admiral Inspector of the Navy but, as suggested by Raeder himself, this did not involve any further active role.
—♦—
To welcome the Kriegsmarine’s new Commander-in-Chief to his post, on around 30 January Hitler presented Admiral Doenitz with a memorandum outlining his intentions for the German fleet:
1. All construction and conversion of heavy ships is to cease with immediate effect.
2. Battleships, pocket battleships, heavy cruisers, and light cruisers to be paid off, except where they are required for training purposes.
3. The resultant dockyard capacity, workmen, seamen, and weapons (mainly anti-aircraft), rendered available to be applied to an intensification of U-boat repair and U-boat construction.[148]
Admiral Doenitz’s initial response was acceptance of this memorandum, particularly with regard to item 3, his specialist area.
As he was quickly to discover however, the crisis for the German navy went much deeper than the proposed scrapping of all its big ships. At this time serious consideration was being given to the idea that much, if not all, of the navy should be transferred to army command. Having just been appointed C-in-C of the navy Doenitz was naturally opposed to the notion, and at the Führer conference on sea power held at Wolfschanze on 8 February made a special plea for the U-boat branch, together with all ancillary surface vessels, to remain the province of the navy. Hitler promised to consider the proposal seriously, but indicated that he would need to have further discussions with Field Marshal Keitel before making a final decision.[149] At the same conference, Doenitz submitted his proposals for decommissioning the capital ships. The programme in essence maintained that Tirpitz, Lützow, and Nurnberg should remain operational in Norwegian waters until August 1943, plus Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen in the Baltic, following which they would be progressively decommissioned. Prinz Eugen, Scheer, Leipzig and Emden would have minimal repair and maintenance works carried out, to enable them to be used as training ships. Dates for decommissioning definitely proposed were:
Cruisers Admiral Hipper and Köln – 1 March 1943
Battleship Schleswig-Holstein – 1 April 1943
Battleship Schlesen – 1 May 1943
Battlecruiser Scharnhorst – 1 July 1943
Battleship Tirpitz – autumn 1943.[150]
This would release 250 officers, 92 of whom could transfer to the U-boat service, and 8000 petty officers and men, who would be dispersed to the U-boat service, coastal and flak batteries, and replacements for the remaining surface ships. It was estimated that 1300 dockyard workers would also become available for work on the smaller surface ships (destroyers etc.), and for U-boat repairs. Hitler approved the plan.
—♦—
Having assisted with the drawing up of plans for what amounted to the destruction of the German navy, Admiral Doenitz began to have second thoughts. A submarine specialist through and through, he had a somewhat myopic view of sea power, but he was nobody’s fool, and on becoming Commander-in-Chief began to see the bigger picture and appreciate the value of the ‘Fleet in Being’. He was also (unlike Raeder) a political animal perfectly prepared to play power politics at the Nazi court. At this he proved to be extremely adept, successfully fending of the army’s attempts to take control of the navy. He also determined to try to save some of the capital ships, and at the next conference on sea power, at Vinnitsa on 26 February 1942, broached the matter with Hitler, skilfully opening the discussion by using one of the Führer’s complaints to support his case. The Führer, Doenitz maintained, had correctly decided that Germany could not afford to have her big ships lying idle. As a result Hipper, Leipzig and Köln had been decommissioned, to be followed shortly by further ships. Doenitz went on to explain that he considered the Allies’ Russia convoys to be excellent targets for the big ships, and considered it his duty, in view of the desperate fighting on the eastern front (comparing the eastern front to the efforts of the navy was another Hitler hobby horse), to exploit the possibilities to their fullest extent. The admiral therefore proposed to strengthen the naval forces in Norway by transferring Scharnhorst from the Baltic, which, combined with Tirpitz, Lützow and the destroyers already there, would make a powerful task force. Hitler was not to be easily persuaded however, and retorted that he was strongly opposed to any further operations by the surface ships. Since the sinking of Graf Spee one defeat had followed another. Large ships, he maintained, were a thing of the past, and he would prefer to have the steel and nickel contained in them than sanction their use again.[151]
Doenitz shifted his ground while still attempting to use Hitler’s arguments against him, maintaining that the big ships were severely hampered by the restrictions imposed that they must not be damaged or sacrificed. Hitler declared that he had never issued such an order (which was correct – he had, nevertheless, made his feelings clear on the subject many times, which in Nazi Germany amounted to the same thing as an order). Hitler went on to state that if in contact with the enemy, ships must go into action, but in any event he no longer valued their effectiveness. Mounting his hobby horse, he bemoaned the sacrifices made by the men on the eastern front while the strength of the Russians was constantly increased by the convoys, the most recent of which comprising twenty-five ships (JW53), had just reached its destination. Doenitz seized on this to press his case, declaring that instead of decommissioning Tirpitz and Scharnhorst, he considered it his duty to send them into action whenever possible for as long as suitable targets could be found.[152]
Hitler reluctantly agreed to despatch Scharnhorst to Norway and asked how long it would be before a suitable target could be found. Doenitz replied that he thought it would be within the next three months, to which Hitler taunted, ‘Even if it should require six months, you will then return and be forced to admit that I was right.’[153]
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
That the Battle of the Barents Sea had been a significant victory for the Royal Navy was recognised by both sides. For the Kriegsmarine, Vice-Admiral Weichert later commented that their lack of success had been ‘due to poor visibility and the problems inherent in a night action, but primarily the Germans were paralysed by the stringency of their operational orders’.[154]
Vice-Admiral Kum
metz’s plan had been a good one and came close to being successful (had Force ‘R’ arrived any later, the problems for the defending destroyers would have been acute), but the German forces were indeed hamstrung by the crippling restrictions placed upon them, and also by the confusion of purpose, and perhaps consequent confusion of mind, which resulted from springing Operation Aurora on Kapitän zur See Stange and Lützow a matter of hours before engaging JW51B.
By contrast, Captain Sherbrooke, and subsequently Commander Kinloch, both had a clear grasp of their objective, which was in all cases the safety of the convoy. The tactics laid down by Captain Sherbrooke were aggressive and played upon the known caution displayed by commanders of German heavy ships when faced with torpedo attacks. The fate of the battleship Bismarck in 1941 undoubtedly underlined this caution. When in a position to make her escape to one of the French Atlantic ports, she suffered a hit to her rudder from a torpedo launched by a Swordfish aircraft. Unable to manoeuvre she was caught and sunk by units of the Home Fleet.
An essential element of Sherbrooke’s defence, and the one which as much as anything foiled Kummetz’s attack, was the refusal of the escort to be drawn away from the convoy. Despite facing a heavy cruiser and her consorts, Captain Sherbrooke split his own small force of four destroyers by despatching two back to the convoy as he could not pinpoint the whereabouts of the German destroyers, and feared that they might attack the merchantmen. At all times, therefore, and regardless of all difficulties, the safety of the convoy was the prime objective. Commander Kinloch displayed this same singleness of purpose on taking command from the wounded Sherbrooke, and as each attack by German forces was driven off, the British destroyers would fall back to cover the convoy. The contrast with the relative inaction of the German destroyers is stark, and mystified Commander Kinloch, who stated in his report: ‘The inactivity of the German destroyers is inexplicable. They made no attack on the convoy and in two engagements were following astern of their cruiser without taking any part.’[155]
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