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The Southampton class cruisers, (later known as Town class), were designed and built to counter the new cruisers of the Japanese navy, and much thought and debate went into the pros and cons of the 6 in (150 mm) gun against the larger 8 in (200 mm) option. The weight of the 6 in shell was, at 100 lb (45.3 kg), less than half that of the 8 in which tipped the scales at 250 lb (113.4 kg). To balance this, twelve 6 in could be mounted against eight 8 in, and a more rapid rate of fire achieved with the smaller gun, giving the 6 in cruiser a superiority in weight of broadside of nearly three to one – 7200 lb (3266 kg) per minute, against the 2500 lb (1481 kg) of its bigger-gunned rival.[184] Despite these advantages the smaller gun could be outranged, requiring the 6 in cruiser to close the enemy as rapidly as possible while having improved armour protection to withstand hits while it manoeuvred into a firing position. Inevitably, higher speed and heavier armour are impossible to equate on a restricted budget, therefore the Southamptons were provided with heavier armour and their speed held at 32 knots.[185] An engagement at night or in poor visibility (dependent upon the efficiency or otherwise of the protagonists’ radar equipment) was expected to favour the smaller-gunned ship. The Battle of the Barents Sea falls nicely into this scenario, as Sheffield and Jamaica were able to close on the larger-gunned Admiral Hipper and open fire from comparatively short range.
Sheffield had the distinction of being only the second Royal Navy warship to be equipped with the fledgling radar (or ‘radio location’ as it was initially known), being fitted with the Type 79 RDF in November 1938. The first vessel so equipped was the battleship Rodney in August of that year.
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Sheffield had a busy war, and a career which amply illustrates the dual cruiser roles of keeping open Britain’s supply routes, plus fleet duties. On 7 April 1940 she accompanied a Home Fleet battle group sent north for the abortive Norwegian campaign, and later that year was transferred to Admiral Sir James Somerville’s Force ‘H’ stationed at Gibraltar. Here she took part in a complicated series of operations designated Hats, Coat and Collar, which aimed at reinforcing Admiral Cunningham’s fleet in the eastern Mediterranean, while passing merchant ships through to supply Malta. As already noted (see Appendix I), Sheffield accompanied the Excess convoy on the western Mediterranean leg of its trip from Gibraltar to Malta and Greece in early January 1941.
In May 1941 Bismarck broke out into the Atlantic, and Force ‘H’, including the carrier Ark Royal, was ordered north from Gibraltar to strengthen the escort of a convoy of five troopships bound for the Middle East. Subsequently brought directly into the hunt, Admiral Somerville detached Sheffield to shadow Bismarck, and ordered Ark Royal to prepare and launch an air strike. Unfortunately the Fleet Air Arm pilots were not notified that Sheffield would be in the same area as their target, and attacked the British cruiser. Luckily for Sheffield the aircraft used torpedoes fitted with new magnetic detonators, which proved faulty. Of the eleven torpedoes launched, six exploded on impact with the water, and the cruiser managed to dodge the remainder. Ironically this potentially catastrophic case of mistaken identity may have been a blessing in disguise. The torpedo detonators were changed to the old contact type for Ark Royal’s next attack, which damaged Bismarck enough for a Home Fleet battle group to catch and sink her.
September 1941 saw Sheffield and Force ‘H’ participating in Operation Halberd, designed to escort another convoy through to Malta. This was carried out successfully, but the convoy suffered numerous air attacks en route, and a torpedo hit damaged the escort flagship, the battleship Nelson. The following month the cruiser returned to home waters for a brief spell before being transferred to Arctic convoy duty. On 4 March 1942 she hit a mine and was out of action until July. On completion of repairs convoy duty resumed, with the exception of a brief spell in December when she flew the flag of Rear-Admiral C.H.J. Harcourt, while supporting the Torch landings in North Africa.
Following the Battle of the Barents Sea she continued Arctic escort duties until February 1943, transferring to operations in the Bay of Biscay until August, and thereafter supporting the Salerno landings in the Mediterranean. By December Sheffield was back in the Arctic, and took part in the sinking of the Scharnhorst. In 1944 the cruiser supported raids against Tirpitz before being scheduled for a well-earned refit in Boston, Massachusetts. She returned to the UK for completion of the work, and was still under refit when the war ended.
This fine ship remained in service with the Royal Navy until September 1964, finally being disposed of for breaking up in 1967.
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In 1937 a second London Naval Treaty restricted cruisers to a maximum displacement of 8000 tons, which, for the Royal Navy meant that construction of the Southampton class could not be continued. A new design conforming to the smaller tonnage restriction was required, and the result was the Fiji class. Various sizes and configurations of main armament were considered, but finally twelve 6 in (150 mm) was adopted, as with the Southamptons.
HMS Jamaica spent most of her wartime career on Arctic convoy duty, participating in the Battle of the Barents Sea in December 1942, and the sinking of the Scharnhorst in December 1943. Prior to those actions, in company with Sheffield she supported the Torch landings in North Africa. In 1944 she interspersed convoy escort duties with supporting carrier operations against the Norwegian coast. After the war the cruiser spent time on both the East and West Indies stations, and was part of the 5th Cruiser Squadron in the Far East for the Korean War. Finally paid off, she arrived at Dalmuir on 20 December 1960 for scrapping.[186]
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After much discussion the Royal Navy finally accepted the necessity for two distinct types of destroyer, a larger, faster, more heavily armed type for fleet actions, and a smaller type for convoy escort, with the accent on anti-submarine and anti-aircraft armament. It was hoped that this would help to alleviate a chronic shortage in gun production and fire control equipment, which lagged behind the rate at which construction of destroyer hulls was possible.[187] The ‘O’ class were the first of the new escort destroyers, and to illustrate the dire shortage of guns, with the exception of Onslow, were equipped with 4 in (100 mm) main armament, some of which dated back to the First World War.
Since twin gun mountings required power units which would drastically increase top weight, hand-operated single gun turrets were installed, together with hand-operated torpedo tubes, although a powered hoist was fitted for ammunition. Despite these savings the class was still some 80 tons (81 tonnes) overweight (Onslow 124 tons – 126 tonnes).[188]
Spending much of their wartime careers on Arctic convoy duty, the class remained in service with the Royal Navy until the mid-1960s.
APPENDIX III
OUTLINE DETAILS OF THE MERCHANT SHIPS OF JW51B WITH NOTES ON THE MERCHANT MARINE
In 1938 (the last period for which pre-war figures are available), 192,372 seamen were employed in the British Merchant Marine, of which some 50,700 were foreign, mainly Indian and Chinese.[189] On the outbreak of the Second World War, Britain’s ‘Red Duster’ flew from 3000 deep-sea cargo ships and tankers plus 1000 coastal vessels, amounting to an impressive 21,000,000 gross tons (21,336,000 tonnes), the largest fleet in the world, comprising 33 per cent of total tonnage. On any one day during the war there would be an average of 2500 British vessels at sea to protect, the rapid rate at which they were lost and had to be replaced becoming apparent when the total sunk, 4700 ships (54 per cent of total world merchant ship losses), is compared to the pre-war total of ships in service.
During the war period some 185,000 seamen served on board British merchant ships, of which 40,000 were foreign, mainly Indian and Chinese although seamen were recruited from other countries, notably the West Indies and Aden. Figures vary, dependent upon which source is consulted, but a reasonably accurate figure for British and foreign merchant seamen who lost their lives as a direct result of enemy action would be 33,000, although it is estimated (but not provabl
e), that the casualty rate might be as high as 25 per cent were it to include those who were wounded, shipwrecked, or otherwise affected, and ‘lived permanently damaged lives, still in the shadow of death.’[190]
In the event of sinking, the chances of being picked up were, in the early years of the war, estimated at 3 to 2 against, although the odds improved as time went on thanks to a number of inventions and improvements in the area of life-saving equipment. Of these, three of the most important were:
• the lifejacket light, first supplied in September/October 1940, compulsory from 6 March 1941
• the manual lifeboat pump, first supplied in July 1941, compulsory from 22 July 1942
• protective clothing, first supplied September 1941, compulsory from 27 July 1942[191]
Convoy JW51B – Merchant Vessels
Delays would often occur between equipment becoming available and becoming compulsory, as time would be required for supplies to be manufactured in sufficient quantities.
During the early stages of the war, the average working week for a seaman aboard a British ship, before overtime, would be ten hours longer than the all-industry average, with shipboard conditions inferior to those of some comparable nations, notably Norway. Nevertheless the Government promptly instituted a war pensions scheme comparable to that of the Royal Navy, while the Ministry of War Transport, the trade unions and owners came together to improve conditions, notably in the area of mail (very important for crewmen), health, general comfort and conditions of life both in the UK and abroad.
Wages also improved dramatically, although while a single man with nothing to spend his money on during long periods at sea might have seen some benefit from these increases, a married man with a family in Britain to support would have to contend with a dramatic 83 per cent increase in the cost of living between 1939 and 1943. Nevertheless, in the first three and a half years of war a British able seaman’s pay almost trebled:
3 September 1939 – £9. 12s 6d per month.
1 January 1941 – £17. 12s 6d per month.
1 February 1943 – £24. 0s 6d per month.[192]
These amounts include a ‘war risk’ (danger money) payment of £3 rising to £10. In addition to these incremental improvements, paid leave and continuity of employment were introduced for the first time. Foreign seamen were paid less than their British counterparts, a source of understandable friction.
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Despite the terrible risks involved, there was never a serious shortage of crewmen during the war years, but the same cannot be said of ships for them to sail. By November 1939, the whole of the Belgian fleet had been made available to Britain plus half the Norwegian and Dutch fleets; however, as the German invasion of Europe spread an average of 26 per cent of the Norwegian, Dutch, and Belgian fleets were caught in their home ports and captured. Following the fall of France in June 1940, approximately ½ million tons of French shipping came into British hands, unfortunately matched almost exactly by tonnage of British ships caught in French ports at the same time. Danish shipowners proved to be generally pro-German, and ordered their ships at sea to put into neutral ports, but despite this a number of Danish ships found their way to the UK and operated under British flag, crewed by Danes, for the duration of the war. Greek ships later became an important addition to the fleet.
Formal possession of the ships of the British fleet remained unchanged for the war years, although the Government, through the agency of the Ministry of Shipping (incorporated into the Ministry of War Shipping in May 1941), had, by the summer of 1940, requisitioned all vessels and agreed terms with their owners.[193] This for the most part left crewing, maintenance, and the day-to day running of the ships to the owners, while all decisions as to cargoes and destinations were taken by the Ministry.
By the spring of 1941 a serious shortage of tonnage had manifested itself as a result of war losses. As a consequence, Britain’s annual imports dropped sharply from 42,000,000 tons (42,672,000 tonnes) to 28,500,000 tons (28,956,000 tonnes) – less than had been imported in the dark days of 1917. Britain’s minimum requirement for her civilian population alone amounted to 25,000,000 tons (25,400,000 tonnes) p.a. in addition to which it was estimated that 7–8 tons (7.1–8.1 tonnes) of supplies would be required to support every soldier in Europe when the time for an offensive came – double for the Pacific. To help alleviate the problem, the United States released quantities of old laid up tonnage to Britain on bareboat charter – in which the charterer, in this case the British government, in return for paying a correspondingly low charter rate to the owner, agrees to accept the lion’s share of the risks, and crews and operates the ship as the owner in all but name. The United States further assisted by requisitioning all French, Italian, and Yugoslav ships held in US ports and turning them over to Britain. In 1943 another tonnage crisis was eased when the United States agreed to divert ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic.[194]
That the Allies were able to keep the convoys going at all is due in no small part to the Second World War phenomenon the Liberty ship. This British-designed, 10,800 ton deadweight,[195] 11 knot, 3-cylinder steam-engined cargo ship was enthusiastically adopted by the United States Maritime Commission (USMC) which, however, altered the propulsion system from coal- to oil-fired, and to drastically cut building time, changed the hull design from all riveted to all-welded construction. The USMC also instituted a system of prefabrication whereby sections of ships would be constructed at sites all over the country and transported to the shipyards for final assembly. Placing orders in private and government-owned shipyards in the United States, the USMC built 5777 of these amazingly versatile ships between 1939 and 1945, with design configurations varying from the basic general cargo freighter to tankers, hospital ships, floating repair shops and tank transports (‘zipper ships’).
This phenomenal effort represents the most prodigious shipbuilding programme ever undertaken, accounting for a total of 56,300,000 deadweight tons (57,200,800 tonnes), at a cost of $13 billion, and constitutes one of the most significant contributions made by any nation to the eventual winning of the Second World War.[196]
The basic premise behind the Liberty ships was to build them faster than it would be possible for the Axis powers to sink them. It was said that they were ‘built by the mile, and chopped off by the yard’, and indeed one Liberty ship is recorded as having been launched 4 days and 15½ hours after her keel was laid. This rapid rate of build inevitably caused a few problems, particularly as inexperienced workers often manned shipyards during the war years. Liberties experienced a high percentage of defects, and 1 in 30 suffered major hull fractures.[197]
Britain placed orders for Liberty ships in US yards, and built similar-sized ships of various standard design types in British shipyards. Adoption of the faster welding method was slow in coming however, and most British-built ships were riveted, although a nod towards modern methods was made with the utilisation of a prefabrication system similar to that in the United States. A significant proportion of ships built in the UK were coal-fired, for the understandable reason that Britain had a considerable coal resource to draw upon. Canada took the opportunity to expand its shipbuilding capacity, and had considerable success in producing standard cargo ships, with designs which tended to follow the British types, but a construction method which favoured welding over riveting.[198] While it would have been impossible to meet the vast tonnage requirements without the massive industrial capacity of the United States, it is also true to say that the US alone could not have met the demands, and the substantial building and repair programmes put in hand by British and Canadian shipyards were vital contributions to ultimate victory.
It was calculated that if a Liberty ship made one loaded trip across the Atlantic she had done all that could be expected, and was unlikely to survive another. The rate at which they would be sunk by the enemy, or would in all probability fall apart due to the way in which they were constructed, would see to that. Despite these pessimistic pr
edictions, war-surplus Liberty ships were snapped up by commercial shipping companies at knock-down prices after the war, and many a fortune was made with them. Liberty ships were to be seen plying the trade routes of the world until the early 1970s, and such was the success of the type that as they came at last to the end of their colourful careers, shipyards around the world fell over themselves to produce designs for ‘Liberty replacement types’. The best-known UK version proved to be the Austin & Pickersgill SD14, which kept the same basic design but with a diesel engine, a deadweight increased to just over 14,000 tons (14,224 tonnes) and much improved cargo handling gear.
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Of the convoys to Russia, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound commented that they were ‘a most unsound operation, with the dice loaded against us in every direction’.[199] Despite this a total of 4,430,000 tons (4,500,880 tonnes) of essential equipment and foodstuffs were transported by this method, although ship losses were higher than on any other Allied convoy route – 7.8 per cent eastbound, 3.8 per cent westbound (in ballast).
A quarter of all Allied supplies to Russia were carried in the Arctic convoys, but the United States sent almost half its total aid to Russia across the Pacific to Vladivostock, carried in Russian ships which, as Russia was not at war with Japan, travelled largely unmolested.
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