With mounting press comment in London about how Australia was reacting to the expanding war, there was again unease within Whitehall about the tone of some of Canberra's telegrams.5 Churchill was focused on his Washington meetings, but he was advised that recent messages were 'both critical and querulous' and contained 'demands and allegations made not on the basis of ascertained facts but on unspecified information and prior assumptions'.6 The atmosphere in London had grown extremely tense as 'the old gang' of Chamberlain supporters began to sense the prime minister was becoming politically vulnerable.7 As his deputy warned him, and as Cranborne and the DO had also long asked, calls for closer cooperation with Australia and the rest of the Dominions could no longer sensibly be resisted.8 On Boxing Day 1941, Australia's leader told Roosevelt and Churchill that the authorities in Canberra would be happy to accept an American commander in the Pacific. The following day, in a special 'New Year' article contributed to a leading Melbourne newspaper, Curtin went even further, writing that 'Australia looks to America, free of pangs as to our traditional links and kinship with the United Kingdom'.9 This was not the first time an Australian leader had referred to the Dominions' right to look beyond London for foreign policy guidance; Menzies had stated back in April 1939 that, where the Pacific was concerned, his government needed its own diplomatic contacts.10 The following year he had reiterated this view when asking Roosevelt to intervene directly in the Pacific and secure a peaceful resolution with Japan.11 The DO had ensured that these appeals received little media attention back in Britain but Curtin's new statement could not be so easily handled.12
To one contemporary commentator, the dissolution of the British Commonwealth was at hand.13 Cranborne's immediate advice following this latest development remained the same as it had always been, the Dominions would have to be given a weightier political role.14 The question of an Empire War Cabinet had again been raised in the House of Commons shortly after the Japanese attack in the Far East but the government had gone no further in response other than to say that this remained 'under constant consideration'. Having instructed Attlee to inform the War Cabinet of just how 'deeply shocked' Curtin's 'insulting speech' had left him, Churchill was not, however, in any mood for compromise. Travelling with Churchill, Sir Ian Jacob noted that although his companion had never really understood Far Eastern problems, throughout the war the Australian government had taken 'a narrow, selfish and at times craven view of events', in stark contrast to New Zealand.15 Much of his displeasure may well have been down to the fact that Curtin's decision to make his views known publicly had generated considerable press interest in Britain, exactly what the DO had been trying to avoid.16 The arrival of a report from Cross did little to improve the situation, the British high commissioner was downbeat about the Australian war effort handicapped as it was by a 'lack of political leadership, a shoddy and irresponsible press and a number of trade union leaders reaping a dirty harvest'. Machtig thought it all 'a desperate picture'; Cranborne noted that the report had been delayed as it had come by sea and hoped that Japan's entry into the war during the interim might have had some positive effect.17 Nevertheless, the situation in Canberra clearly left him dejected, the government there could do little other than 'squabble, grumble and blame others, in particular us'. And his mood was made all the worse, as he told Churchill, by the British public's obvious shock at the recent Australian outburst. Indeed so negative had the reaction been that he had asked the Ministry of Information to discourage further press speculation.18
On the final day of 1941, Sir Earle Page talked once more with Cranborne. During the preceding three weeks his focus had remained improving Australia's position and he had enjoyed some success. Discussions with senior British political figures had yielded promises that all FO papers, irrespective of their subject matter, would be made available for him to inspect. Perhaps emboldened by this agreement, the Australian now shared his thoughts on how the Anglo-Dominion alliance should operate in future, specifically in the first instance Britain's relationship with his own country.19 It was his view that ministers from the Dominions should join the Defence Committee, the Ministry of Supply and a man 'of considerable standing' should be embedded within the FO where they could view papers and put forward opinions. Cranborne was also left in little doubt, not for the first time by a visiting Australian, that he was much too junior and was not a suitable person to be the secretary of state. Page's considered opinion was that somebody who was a member of both the War Cabinet and the Defence Committee should fill the position, which in future would have to be 'regarded as second only to the Prime Minister'. In the face of such frank advice Cranborne remained affable, seeing 'some force' in the arguments.20 He even circulated recommendations to the FO that, as a first step, his Whitehall colleagues should appoint a representative, with the rank of under-secretary, to act as a liaison with the DO. This would be helpful not just for the Dominions but, as he rather caustically pointed out, it would also aid a department which was still often not consulted at the earliest stages.
The Dominions secretary also correctly assumed that Page would waste little time in sending his revised proposals to Canberra. The idea that Bruce should be made the permanent accredited representative was rejected by Curtin but London was informed that an Australian politician would be sent and it was expected that he would have the right to be heard in the War Cabinet.21 This prompted Cranborne to write directly to Eden to suggest, yet again, that the existing system needed to be changed.22 Within the FO the reaction was decidedly unenthusiastic, Victor Cavendish Bentinck being most notable for the patronising tone in which he referred to the alliance partners; Cranborne's proposals would achieve little other than 'please the Dominions'.23 This senior official also appeared worried that there was insufficient knowledge of 'the mentality' of the Dominion governments to allow the liaison role to function properly. One of his colleagues did, however, recognize that a clear problem existed in so much as the DO was a 'channel for the discussion of policy, the finished article', but 'does not take much hand in the processing of the raw material, in the formulation of policy'.24 As Cranborne had passionately argued now for some months, the proposed solution was to find a method to allow the Dominion leaders to put forward amendments at a much earlier stage. It was also understood that the issue had now assumed 'big proportions' and, hence, would need to be discussed with Churchill on his return from the United States.
The prime minister was, however, already fully occupied at this stage dealing with another Australian complaint. During his Washington discussions he had agreed with Roosevelt's proposal that General Wavell be appointed supreme commander of the ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) command area.25 The authorities in Canberra seemed relatively content with this until they learned that the defence of Australia and Papua New Guinea was not to be included. Curtin and his colleagues were left angered by what was felt to be the ignoring of the Dominion's security. This was not repeated across the Tasman, however, where the reaction of the public to the worsening local situation was noted by the high commissioner as having been 'remarkably calm'.26 As Batterbee told the DO, with some obvious sense of satisfaction, the greater distance of New Zealand from the Japanese menace could account for some of the difference. There was also 'a clear conscience', the knowledge that the authorities in Wellington had a war record beyond reproach which left no requirement 'to cover up their shortcomings by blaming other people'. From Canberra there came more angry telegrams, the net outcome being Curtin insisting that the Dominion be included within the new command area. Churchill offered soothing words about how he recognized Australia's interests but privately he remained dismissive of any criticism of his handling of the relationship with the authorities in Canberra. While recuperating from a mild stroke in Florida, his mood had been downright belligerent, highly critical of people of 'bad stock'.27 He would not agree to any change and asked for time to reconsider the scheme's detail. Casey had been told by Canberra that this request was far fro
m ideal and would likely receive a 'very hostile' reaction if the military position worsened. The Australian representative in Washington nonetheless saw this as a good opportunity to again press London to accept greater Dominion representation.28
After his three-week absence, Churchill returned to Britain to more bad news. The garrison at Hong Kong had already long since surrendered. Successive chiefs of staff appreciations had outlined the inevitably of its loss in the event of any determined Japanese assault. Churchill had himself written to Ismay in January 1941 that there was 'not the slightest chance' that it could be held or even relieved—yet when the expected collapse came he still expressed surprise:
The worst thing that has happened is the collapse of the resistance of Hong Kong; although one knew it was a forlorn outpost, we expected that they would hold out on the fortified island for a good many weeks, possibly for several months, but now they seem on the verge of surrender after only a fortnight's struggle.29
While in Washington he had remained confident that Singapore would fare much better and be able to hold off a Japanese attack for as long as two months, but the information he received now suggested otherwise. He informed Curtin that, in his opinion, the loss of Malaya had been inevitable in light of the general war situation, but urged his counterpart not to become 'dismayed or get into recrimination', nor to doubt 'his loyalty to [both] Australia and New Zealand'.30 To his Cabinet he rejected the need for greater cooperation, arguing that it would not be possible until such time as the Australians had put to one side 'their Party feud and set up a National Government' and the sincerity of the prime minister's sensitivity towards his fellow Dominion leader was not difficult to spot.31 An obvious example was the Far Eastern Council which it had been agreed to establish, to 'focus and formulate views' in London before passing them on to Roosevelt. Canberra had not been informed of this decision in advance and heard two days after the authorities in Wellington. When official confirmation arrived it was not surprising therefore that this was critically received. Indeed the Advisory War Council quickly declared its unanimous disagreement with the proposal and instead requested that a Pacific Council be established in Washington.32
Cranborne's problems in Canberra were not restricted to the criticism coming from the Australian government. In a long and often venomous telegram sent to London, Cross had launched a sustained attack on the Australian leadership. Relations in the past had always been based on 'the assumption that the Commonwealth government shared the spirit of Imperial Partnership', but in recent weeks it had become obvious to him that this was no longer forthcoming. The former British minister believed that there was clear evidence showing 'abuse of the United Kingdom authorities'. He therefore urged the DO to help him gain better access to the Australian War Cabinet and to the messages it was sending to London as 'the time [had] come to collect all our weapons and to fight for British prestige'. The greatest alarm was reserved, however, for his final recommendation, that economic pressure be applied with a British refusal to undertake 'negotiations of a commercial or financial character'. The Dominions secretary was aghast, so much so that Cross was warned that to pursue such a line would not bring Australia closer but instead 'give further stimulus to their tendency to look to the United States'. Although he was sympathetic to his high commissioner's situation, Cranborne had already acknowledged privately that he had 'taken to lecturing Australian Ministers as if they were small and rather dirty boys'.33 Shortly after his arrival in Australia, Cross had written back to London that he was 'puzzled' by what he had found. In the intervening period he had endured a difficult time, particularly after the Labour Party had assumed power in Canberra. Much of the reason for this was an ill-advised public statement he had made in which he reminded his audience of Russia's communist heritage. In so doing even he would later recognize that he had tied 'a Tory label around [his] neck'. Duff Cooper had visited Canberra in December 1941 and been warned by no less a person than the governor-general that 'if you start wrong in Australia you can never get right again'; this was exactly what had happened to the high commissioner.34
Just four days after Churchill had returned to London following his Washington visit, Cranborne submitted two memoranda to the War Cabinet, both examining the issue of cooperation with the Dominions.35 In his first paper the warning was given that 'it would ... be a great and possibly disastrous mistake ... to underestimate the strength of the feeling arising in the Commonwealth [of Australia] on this question'. Making the danger worse in his view, there was also the potential that 'a rot which started in Australia might easily spread to other Dominions'. This was therefore a genuine crisis, 'an issue not merely of machinery, but even more of status', which could be averted only through wise statesmanship. Cranborne duly recommended, yet again, that if Australia wanted to attend the War Cabinet in London it should be granted this right, 'a gesture that would pay us a hundredfold'. The other Dominions should also be invited to attend although he thought they would probably decline such an offer.36 The caveat remained, however, that representatives would only be allowed to attend if they had authority to actually make decisions, a point upon which Churchill had been insistent.37 Even before the War Cabinet had seen these papers, King George VI had himself read both of them. The prime minister received warning that the British Empire's sovereign had been greatly 'alarmed at the feeling which appears to be growing in Australia'.38 In his almost immediate reply to the King's private secretary he now accepted that 'it would be foolish and vain to obstruct [Australian] wishes', offering an assurance that he had already heeded Curtin's requests.39 This news was welcomed at Buckingham Palace and it was made quite clear that the King would remain an interested observer of how the situation developed.40
A more generally sympathetic mood now spread throughout Whitehall. Even Cadogan, in trying to decide how to implement Page's earlier proposals, felt that it was time something should be done. With Eden's agreement, this would lead ultimately to the defunct DID gaining a renewed role.41 The only people who seemed less than pleased with the changes were the Dominion high commissioners. All of them doubted the merits of an Imperial War Cabinet and were even of the opinion that sending ministers to London was not practicable.42 Massey in particular wanted it stressed that Australia had assumed the driving role and 'that it was for other governments concerned to decide whether they wished to avail themselves of the facilities'.43 Curtin may still have wanted more but the proposals as they stood could already cause embarrassment for Mackenzie King in Ottawa. With Jordan still refusing to attend meetings with his counterparts because of his 'confirmed inferiority complex', Waterson concurred in his diary that 'it should not be made awkward for Governments not to accept the offer of Cabinet representation'.44 Privately he was more interested in the proposals as it appeared he saw another opportunity for enhancing his position, telling Smuts that there was 'no reason why the High Commissioner should not be nominated [as] accredited representative'.45 The South African leader's response was to send a reminder that, in his opinion, the Dominions' policy should simply be to offer Churchill 'wholehearted support in the immense dangers confronting us all'.46 There was still very little evidence of anything like this degree of support from Canberra and the proposed Far East Council, to be headed by the British government, had become a major source of irritation. New Zealand was also unhappy, Fraser advising that, although he was 'very sorry to worry' Churchill, his government could not accept any proposal which failed to give them 'direct and continuous' access to the United States.47 Only days before the government in Wellington had accepted that an American Admiral would be responsible for the conduct of naval operations in the waters surrounding New Zealand.48 Cranborne had been directly tasked to resolve the tension and he decided that Roosevelt had to be approached. The US leader was duly informed therefore that Australia and New Zealand both preferred a Pacific Council based in Washington.49 Relations had, however, taken a dramatic turn for the worse with a new telegram from Curtin. Menzies had as
sured the British public that no Australian leader would 'stand on any platform and attack Great Britain'.50 This new message carried with it the suggestion that an evacuation of Singapore would be seen by the Australian government as 'an inexcusable betrayal'.51 This explosive charge originated from a secret communication produced by the British prime minister which mooted the possible abandonment of Singapore. Intended for the three Chiefs of Staff it had inadvertently been shown to Page who had in turn passed it on to Curtin.52 Churchill's initial response was indignant, warning his Australian counterpart that he would 'make allowances for your anxiety and ... not allow such discourtesy to cloud my judgement or lessen my efforts on your behalf'.53 This note was eventually not sent, but its tone made clear the extent of the British leader's renewed anger. Others in Whitehall were equally upset with the recriminations. The Australian leader, a 'wretched second-rate man ... screaming for help', found himself castigated along with his countrymen who had 'suddenly woken up to the cold and hard fact that [Australia's] very existence as a white country depends not on herself but on protection from Great Britain'.54
Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War Page 15