Success at the third Battle at El Alamein in November 1942 appeared to save the day and represented what Churchill described as 'the end of the beginning'. The polemic is one of his most famous, delivered as part of a speech at the Mansion House and it was during this that he also told his audience he had 'not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire'. As his most eminent biographer has pointed out his next remark is seldom quoted, that if this were to take place 'someone else would have to be found' to carry it out, a declaration of his belief in Empire, 'not a political statement that the Empire would never be dissolved'.3 This sentiment was noteworthy as debate about the alliance's future was becoming increasingly fever-pitched. Even a cursory reading of the sessions in the House of Commons that same month, following the King's Address, gives a flavour of the arguments that were being put forward. The Empire's role in the war was widely praised but there was dismay at the growing practice of referring not to the 'British Empire' but to the 'British Commonwealth of Nations'. Sir Edward Campbell believed that 'it is a horrid term for the greatest Empire the world has ever known' and, despite being informed that the phrase had been first used over 40 years ago, the irate parliamentarian resolved that he would continue to use 'British Empire'. Flight-Lieutenant Raikes, by his own description a right-wing member of the House, was of a similar mind. He welcomed the continuing use of the term and believed that there had been 'a gasp of relief' from many countries upon learning that 'the British still believe in something which they are prepared to hold and fight for'. Mr Emmott, the Member from eastern Surrey, was also troubled and as he put it: 'Are the British not to be permitted to acknowledge their pride in the British Empire, their determination to defend it against those who would destroy it and their will to make all sacrifices for it?' He believed that the British public was actually mystified by 'a pestilent doctrine which teaches men to be apologists for the British Empire, to be ashamed of it, to explain it away as part of the old world'. As he concluded: 'Are we to deny, to disown that Empire which has given peace, justice, humane administration, and good government to countless human beings throughout the habitable globe? ... How odious, how shameful is this doctrine!'4
As this debate should have made clear, while there was no shortage of interest much of it remained hopelessly uninformed about how the Imperial alliance was changing. This was nothing new; the father of all the parliaments scattered around the Dominions had a pretty indifferent record when it came to debating about them. There were a number of parliamentarians who were keen to discuss Imperial matters but they were definitely in the minority. Edgar Granville had been born in Britain but had served in the AIF during the First World War and was one of the most vocal questioners of government policy relating to the Dominions. He served briefly as a captain in the Royal Artillery before returning to Westminster, first as a National Liberal but from 1942 until the war's end as an independent. Another leading protagonist was Emmanuel Shinwell. A leading member of the Labour Party, in May 1940 he refused a position in the Ministry for Food in the National Coalition Government but two years later became party chairman. In June 1941 both of these parliamentarians rounded upon Churchill for not having organized an Imperial War Cabinet.5 Two weeks later Granville was asking another question about the functioning of high commissioner meetings; the week after he was enquiring about methods of increasing the amount of information being supplied to the Dominions; six weeks later yet another question on the possibility of an Empire War Cabinet.6 Another in this category was Beverley Baxter, a Canadian-born journalist-turned-politician who held the suburban London seat of Wood Green for the Conservatives. In a May 1942 debate about the war situation he criticized Churchill and his parliamentary colleagues for their apparent lack of interest in the Empire. Many felt deeply about the subject but he wished that the prime minister, one who 'had done so much to bring the English-speaking people together', would appear more visibly interested and that in Britain as a whole there could be a far greater appreciation of what the Dominions were doing in the war.7
Inevitably the figure of Churchill loomed large over the debate. As he told a Party meeting on 9 October 1940, convened to discuss the question of Chamberlain's successor, he had always 'faithfully served two supreme causes—the maintenance of the enduring greatness of Britain and her Empire and the historic certainty of our Island life'.8 Indeed, an American correspondent in London wrote later that same year, Britain's wartime leader was undeniably 'the son of Jennie Jerome of New York City, American in his directness but otherwise British as bully beef' but while his 'blood is half American when it begins to boil, a chemistry of ancient loyalties makes it all British—exultant, proud, superior, unbeatable even in defeat'.9 Massey referred to him in often critical terms as the 'Headmaster' for this was how he sometimes appeared to deal with his errant pupils.10 Although a staunchly self-professed imperialist, his views continued to draw their basis from an era that was drawing to a close. Indeed to certain commentators in London, he was 'Eighteenth century in many respects' and even his undoubtedly closest Dominion confidante, Smuts, could only lament the degree to which Churchill remained 'obsessed with 1776'.11 Even the British leader's own trusted secretary thought that his boss was 'in the main oblivious to the growth of nationalism as a force in British imperial affairs'.12 As an exponent of Empire in nineteenth- rather than twentieth-century terms, he was determined that nothing should be surrendered.13 The Empire was 'an instrument that gave to Britain a world position that she would not otherwise have had'.14 Malcolm MacDonald, in his draft handwritten memoirs talking about Britain's wartime relations with Canada, detailed the 'certain difficulties' that arose 'now and then'. Sometimes this was because of the prime minister's 'old fashioned notions'. He was inclined to regard Canada and all the other Dominions as still a partly, if not wholly, dependent colony of Britain, whose Cabinet ministers should accept—and indeed obey—the British government's views on all problems at all times as 'the last word in wisdom'. He recognized their constitutional status but tended to view this as 'a matter of polite, and somewhat ridiculous theory rather than undeniable fact'.15 With this highly romanticized, but often conditional view of the Empire, he found it hard to view the Dominions as equals.
If Churchill loomed, Cranborne's was a much more munificent presence. He may no longer have been at the helm at the DO but he had only moved to the larger, sister CO department situated in the same building. From here he remained a key presence, a contender for the mantle of the Empire's most important wartime statesman. He saw the Commonwealth of Nations as a living organism in which the grown-up children were the self-governing Dominions and what pains there were could best be described as 'growing pains'. In July 1942 Lord Elibank had once again begun another debate on the question of the future unity of the British Empire. Together with Viscounts Bennett and Bledisloe, these grandees of the 'Imperial Idea' detailed what they considered the post-war world might hold. Cranborne was called upon as secretary of state for the colonies to respond for the government and employed a familial relationship to put across his argument. He told the Peers that during a family's early days, 'children are young and inexperienced, and not able to face problems themselves'. This meant that they had to be protected and educated but as they grew up they could 'begin to take their own line—to think for themselves'. Eventually they would become independent entities, independent personalities and, finally, self-supporting. 'They are no longer dependent upon their parents, but they remain members of the family still bound to each other by ties of affection, and still having a responsibility to help and protect each other.' He concluded his passionate account with the assertion that the Empire was 'neither dead nor even going into decline'. Instead, with sensible and sympathetic treatment, it would emerge 'wiser and more united than it has ever been in its long history'.16
His new position left him well placed to focus on what he considered to be the most critical areas of deficiency blighting the r
elationship. Cranborne had written to the high commissioner in Ottawa in early summer 1942 detailing his thinking on Imperial issues. He believed that relations between Britain and the Dominions needed to be closer and the job being undertaken by MacDonald and his counterparts in the other overseas capitals was 'invaluable'. The danger as he saw it was that there were 'centrifugal tendencies' and these increased the strain on future unity so much so he believed that its structure was on the point of collapse.17 He was also concerned about the way in which the Dominions thought of the Colonial Empire. Commenting on a report on the subject prepared by the DO he noted that it was an aspect of Imperial policy that had been long neglected. As he went on:
So long as the Dominions regard the Colonies as our private property they will take no interest in them—although, as a matter of fact, they are just as much involved as we ourselves. We must manage by hook or by crook to make it clear to them before the end of this war that the British Empire is not a number of very loosely connected units; it is an inter-dependent whole; and that the loss of or even unsatisfactory condition in any portion of it must affect not only the prosperity but the international influence of the whole. The Australians I feel, are particularly bad about this. They want all the advantages of the Imperial connection without any responsibilities. We must by some means manage to make them realise that this is not possible, and that it is not even to their own interests that they should divorce themselves from the affairs of the Empire as a whole.18
There seemed to be a growing view that the Colonial Empire was being overlooked and a wish to break down stereotypical images of what the English were about. A joke repeated in the Empire Review in January 1943 seemed to say as much: 'We all know the story of the six men wrecked on a desert island. Two Scotsmen, two Irishmen, and two Englishmen. The two Scotsmen immediately went over to a cave and formed a Caledonian society. The two Irishmen began to fight and the two Englishmen walked up and down the beach waiting for somebody to introduce them.' The writer's comment on this was that the rather 'snooty' impression was misplaced and it was actually shyness that was the problem. The article's message was that the future lay not with the Old World but with the New, those states that had been colonized by Britons.19 Throughout the 1930s Empire and colonization had been a largely marginalized issue in the British Labour Party; not until the war years would ideas of long-term colonial development became much more visible, ones in which the white dominions played a central role.20 Home Secretary Herbert Morrison told the House of Commons that he held out the twin prospects for the colonies of greater attention to their economic welfare and eventual self-government. He also thought though that it would be 'sheer nonsense—ignorant, dangerous nonsense—to talk about grants of full government to many of the dependent territories for some time to come. In these instances it would be like giving a child of ten a latchkey, a bank account and a shotgun.' According to the Economist it was clear that the government was 'building up an apologia for the Empire', one that represented 'not only the timely riposte of bludgeoning from abroad but also a new and welcome upsurge of popular interest in the responsibilities of Empire rule'.21
This was certainly a debate that was closely followed by the media. A long piece written by a Time correspondent in London in April 1942, in seeking to identify the current character of the British people, examined the role of Empire. It argued that it was something that had been taken for granted, the assumption being that it would always be there and the conclusion for the American readership was that 'England as a whole simply did not have any serious thought whatever about the Empire. England was unanimously non-imperialist—and unanimously unprepared for the break-up of her Empire.' It perhaps took an American to identify the problem:
The English people themselves are principally to blame for the weakness of their Empire. The English people blame their various rulers—including the Old School Tie. But the average Englishman has for a decade or two exhibited an almost total lack of interest -even a lack of ordinary curiosity—in great affairs of Empire. He and his countrymen had an Empire—and they were just plain not interested. That, perhaps, is the whole truth, as nearly as it can be stated in one sentence.22
A survey on the public's opinion conducted by the BBC's Listener Research Department reached similar conclusions. One of the findings of the January 1943 study was that there was widespread ignorance as to the differences between a Colony and a Dominion, hence the habitual use of the term 'the Colonies' to denote any part of the Empire other than Britain. There was, however, a much better understanding that the term 'British Commonwealth of Nations' covered the Dominions; 10 per cent, however, did not think this included the British Isles.23
The intensity of the debate could be seen in something as apparently innocent as the correct use of language. There was often little distinction drawn between 'Commonwealth' and 'Empire'; as was made clear in a post-war memorandum the two were considered 'strictly speaking interchangeable' and sometimes they were used together, sometimes separately. But the meanings could vary depending on the circumstances and those using them.24 Churchill was a leading advocate of the importance involved and had rounded on more than one member of the House of Commons for 'pedantic divisions about nomenclature'.25 During his second wartime visit to London in the spring of 1944, Mackenzie King had asked for some explanation as to what was meant by 'Commonwealth and Empire'. Cranborne told him that Churchill himself had coined the phrase and everybody had followed suit. 'The Commonwealth meant the five completely self-governing countries: Britain being one of the five. I said: "the Balfour Declaration". He said: "Yes". That Empire meant the Colonial Empire—Colonies and India.'26 There is of course the well-known anecdote about the British leader's address to a group of Americans among whom was Senator Arthur Vandenberg, a leading anti-imperialist. During this he made it clear that 'British Empire' or 'British Commonwealth of Nations' were merely titles, taunting the senator with a mischievous suggestion that he maintained 'trade labels to suit all tastes'.27
He was not alone in such opinions. Keith Hancock, although an Australian by birth, with his long historian background, was perhaps better qualified than any to comment on the nature of the Dominions. In his wartime mini-polemic, Argument of Empire, he put the case in his usual informed fashion. For him Dominion status meant 'sovereignty but not separation, independence but not interdependence'. There might be those who disagreed or found it odd but his view was that 'the Dominions are free to separate from the British Commonwealth if they choose' but the reality was that they did not choose to do so.28 He was also prepared to add a word—or two—on the correct use of language:
Some people have become ridiculously self-conscious even about words. If, for example, I use the old-fashioned term British Empire, there are progressive people who will write me down as a Blimp. If, on the other hand, I use the new-fashioned term British Commonwealth, there are plain blunt men who will think me hypocritical or high-falutin. I intend to use both forms of speech just as I please: indeed, I can't properly get along without using both, for each signifies an essential aspect of the living reality. British Empire connotes the historical tradition, which is alive and real: British Commonwealth connotes the progress and the programme, which are also alive and real. There are many people who mistake words for things. Some people use the same words to signify different things. The word 'Imperialism' is a good example. In one morning I once counted up ten different meanings given to it by ten different writers: to some of them it meant federation between Great Britain and the Dominions, to others it meant military expansion, to others it meant 'dominion over palm and pine', to others it meant the 'monopoly stage of capitalism', to others it meant the government of primitive peoples. Its connation was at one time political, at another time military, at another time economic, at another time racial. Words are good servants but bad masters.
There was also a considerable public debate about the future of the Commonwealth alliance and this reached its crescendo again
in 1943 as various politicians, some still influential, others less so, sought to promote the value of the imperial connection. It had begun the year before with an address by Attlee, in his role as Dominions secretary, to the Royal Empire Society. His speech provided a typically impressive array of facts and figures detailing how grand and important the role of the alliance partners had been in fighting the war so far, outlining 'a common battle with common ideals'. As he concluded, 'the British Commonwealth stands today as an example to the world of the unity of democratic nations who have learnt how to achieve unity and common action while retaining individual freedom'. The enthusiastic questioning that followed agreed with the theme, indeed expanded upon it, that the war had been fought effectively by an alliance that had adapted to the necessities it encountered.29 Barely a month later Duff Cooper—a late replacement for Sir Walter Monckton, a much more acknowledged imperialist—was the guest of the lunch-time meeting at the same venue, his task being to consider the make-up of the post-war world.30 He introduced to his audience a new idea of international relations: 'interdependence'. This involved a future based upon closer cooperation and there was no better example than the British Empire, 'a binding together of a vast community of peoples'. Richard Law followed a week later. A key FO figure, he had been considered in early 1940 as a potential Dominions secretary and would lead the committee examining American understanding—or lack of—of the Empire. His theme was 'The British Commonwealth as a World Power' and his aim was to consider how this 'unique' organization would fit into the proposed post-war international system. Here was a model for a global organization, the only one that was already worldwide, allowing it to 'form a bridge of understanding and influence between one continent and another'. In his vision it would take a central position with each of the members taking a key role in their particular region. Once more this provoked an outburst of mutual self-congratulation. Geoffrey Whiskard, who had been an 'eventful' high commissioner in Australia until 1940, thought that the British had used their genius to evolve 'a new relationship between completely free and independent nations'; previously, independent states had existed only with the fear of war between one another.31
Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War Page 17