While the FO was upset that the draft reply had been produced without it having been consulted, the agreement itself was generally viewed much more favourably.25 It was felt the process could have been handled in a better manner, but the practical result was helpful from the point of view of enhancing the world position of the Commonwealth.26 The two governments were in a position to be able to say things that would be 'much less convincing' if they had come from London. It demonstrated to Washington that Australia and New Zealand were independent-minded states and 'not mere appendages of Great Britain'. It also was felt it should serve notice that some of the comments being made by American commanders in the Anzac area had been poorly received.27 Indeed, the concerns about the manner of the publication aside, the conclusion within the FO was that the Pact had done more good than harm and had made clear to the United States certain points which British diplomats could never have made.28 This was, of course, just as the Antipodean politicians had claimed. A more detailed analysis was provided by the DID who viewed parts of the agreement as being likely to lead to delay and confusion and being much more helpful to Australia than New Zealand. The proposed consultative machinery would be dominated by Canberra's more experienced officials who would see to it that their view became heard as the common Anzac view. The hope was that Carl Berendsen, the New Zealand high commissioner in Canberra, who was noted for being extremely tough and capable and 'who dislikes and despises the Australians', would be able to ensure that this was not the case. The conclusion was that the agreement would have to be accepted in good grace and monitored to see what, if any, positive lessons could be learnt for the future.29
Elsewhere, among the other Dominions, only Canada offered an opinion about the agreement, focusing on its perceived anti-Americanism. From London, Canada House thought the discussions in Canberra had been rashly handled—it was doubted that the British government had not been consulted beforehand -while the outcome was bound to be offensive to American opinion. Only the year before, the Australians had professed, very publicly, their wish for closer integration of the Commonwealth and yet, with this decision, they had broken from the long-established principles of inter-Imperial consultation. As it was Curtin who had 'raised his voice more than most' it was odd that he now appeared 'a trifle inconsistent'.30 Pearson, who had moved to Washington to become the Canadian Counsellor, was alone in thinking it a good thing, an indication of progress in the evolving Commonwealth relationship, and was perhaps of a similar mind to the FO; to him it demonstrated an increased independence of mind, something that would prove significant in the discussions about the post-war world that were yet to come.31 It was reported from Ottawa that Le Devoir, the leading French-language newspaper published in Montreal, had described the Pact as a new form of foreign policy. It highlighted the degree to which this marked the declining British imperial role; Australia still wished though to retain its position in the alliance so long as this did 'not place her again in the tragic position of 1941 and 1942'.32 An editorial in the Sydney Morning Herald described the agreement as 'a remarkable achievement' while recognizing that both the Tasman Dominions still relied upon the United States and Britain for their security and had to be 'wary of appearing too importunate, or too ambitious'. Later assessments talked of the agreement being 'ambitious' but a realistic conclusion that Britain could no longer defend itself and its distant imperial outposts. Menzies and the opposition were bitterly critical of the Pact, saying that it set a 'new standard of crudity in international approach' and stressing that it would not be binding on future governments. Indeed, in parliament, he went so far as to say that all the bases needed to dominate the Pacific and ensure security should be given to the United States. In New Zealand there was, initially, a reserved public response but with some more general 'mild sarcastic criticism' of those proposed actions that affected Britain and the other great powers.33 It proved, however, to be of only limited interest to the press and in a few days ceased to be front-page news.
An immediate impact of the agreement was that Fraser now believed that he could no longer discuss related questions freely with the British government without first discussing them with Curtin.34 He was, at the same time, also evidently uncomfortable with this and the manner in which the agreement had been reached; he therefore chose to circumvent any possible restrictions by talking informally to Batterbee, who was then free to pass the views exchanged back to London. Indeed he seemed to go out of his way in the days that followed to speak in a 'most frank and friendly nature', stressing how pleased he was with the British response and how important it would be for Britain to remain in the Pacific. He even hoped that British forces might yet be deployed to New Zealand.35 This was the method used to send to London the full text, accompanied by Fraser's response and his assessment of what it meant, of the message sent to the US charge d'Affaires in Wellington from Cordell Hull which was generally critical of the proposed measures. Indeed both leaders either side of the Tasman were contacted by the American secretary of state and told that neither Washington nor London thought the stage had been reached where formal discussions should be held about possible post-war regional developments. This could spawn a rash of such conferences in the process, inhibiting efforts to achieve a general system of world security.36 The British high commissioner sensed Fraser's relief at the way in which the Americans had responded as this, theoretically, made Australian pressure all the more difficult to maintain. He was also perhaps a little pleased that the Americans had immediately reacted as he had warned that they would.37 The New Zealand leader also worked hard to ensure that Evatt's initial proposed response to Washington was not sent as he thought it would be likely to cause offence.38
The idea of pursuing the proposed Regional Commission continued to be badly received both in London and Washington well into the spring. In the South Pacific also it was reported that senior American naval officers interpreted the Pact as an attempt to exclude the United States from the region; as a result forces from the Dominions were not used in operations against the Marshall and Caroline Islands to prevent any subsequent claim for a say in what should happen to them post-war.39 There was some barely disguised glee within the FO at Evatt's vitriolic response to Hull's polite admonishment, it being noted that the Australian 'did not mince his words' but had instead 'violently attacked' some of Roosevelt's 'ill-considered theories and rash remarks'.40 During Curtin's visit to Washington on his way to the prime minister's gathering in London he met with Cordell Hull and an 'informant' had passed on to the British Embassy the outcome of the conversation. Curtin, who had initially begun by saying he did not think there to be 'much harm' in the agreement, was 'all at sea' about the intensely negative reaction he encountered. His host had left him in no doubt that the Canberra meeting and the decisions taken there, particularly calling for a Pacific conference, had not been appreciated.41 A meeting with the president produced similar results; as a result of this Roosevelt had concluded that responsibility for recent Australian initiatives lay squarely with Evatt and Curtin seemed content 'to wash his hands of it'. This overtly hostile response helped guarantee that there would be no conference about regional security prior to the Dominion leaders meeting in London.42 At the same time Cranborne's efforts, both with the summary and the subsequent manner in which he had sent detailed responses and messages to Canberra and Wellington, were also welcomed within Whitehall as having helped ensure that 'this tiresome incident appears after all to have turned out well for us'. Pointing to the Cairo communiqué as providing some sort of justification had proven to be an especially misguided gambit; as one member of the FO commented, this had actually been 'sprung' on the British attendees by the Americans 'at short notice after prior consultation with the Chinese' and was not designed as a slight against the Dominions.43 Another member of the FO noted in April 1944, 'how indignant the Australians would be if the UK behaved as they have done. I don't think any harm has been done and they—or at least Mr Curtin—may now be a little a
shamed.'44 The reality was that the Pact would have little more than 'a token effect', an attempt at a naked land grab, in the old imperial style.45
Success or otherwise, the two Dominions had agreed that they would establish a secretariat to provide for a more permanent means of continuous consultation and planning. They would also subsequently hold two annual conferences, a development seen at the time in London as having been 'unfortunate'.46 The discussions held in Wellington in November 1944 were the first to take place under this agreement and they caused further difficulties within Whitehall and a fair degree of additional embarrassment.47 The main problem lay with declarations that were made connected to the question of future colonial administration. As has been seen, the role of the Colonial Empire had been a particular area of concern for the DO. Paul Emrys-Evans's memorandum had been based upon the Dominions' own views which they themselves had submitted to Whitehall.48 Having reviewed these there was some concern that they had not fully considered the part they might be expected to play in the proposed post-war policy. Developments during the pre-war years had seen the relationship between the Dominions become gradually looser. In so doing, their interest in the Colonial Empire, one which they should have thought of 'as a joint heritage' laying upon them 'a common obligation', had reduced to the point where it was not certain if it existed at all. The mandated territories they had received at the end of the First World War—all except Canada—had not absorbed their energies nor proven a particularly successful venture. South Africa alone had maintained an existing policy, but here racial prejudice meant that there could only be anticipated a 'small measure of cooperation'. The war, the author felt, had changed the situation and it was likely to be the case that the various members of the Commonwealth would have greater interest in the post-war position; the time had arrived 'to ask our partners to share some of the burdens as well as to enjoy the advantages of the British connection'. Indeed, it would be necessary for the British government to construct a new Imperial Policy, one in which the Dominions would be expected to play their part.
This message had apparently been taken fully onboard by at least some of the Dominions. During the Wellington discussions it was stated firmly that there should be set up an international body to which Colonial powers should undertake to make reports on the administration of the territories they controlled. This would be empowered to visit these territories, such supervision being binding on trustee states, and publish their completed reports, all as part of the 'spirit of trusteeship for dependent peoples'. Seen within the context of the proposed United Nations organization, both governments were willing to support any such proposal as it might affect both colonies and mandated territories. In addition, and as had already been revealed at Canberra at the beginning of the year, they also wished to promote a regional commission, involving in addition Britain, the United States and France, to consider specifically the South Seas area. Here they hoped it would be possible 'to pool their experience and collaborate in furthering the welfare of dependent peoples'.49 The response was instant and terse; as it was commented in London, 'they have issued without consultation with us or with the other Commonwealth Governments a declaration of policy on matters affecting us all'.50 This judgement was based on the understanding spelt out at the 1923 Imperial Conference: 'a Government contemplating any negotiation should consider its effects upon the other Governments and keep them informed'.51 Bruce even wrote to Curtin advising him that this had put 'the cat among the pigeons' and caused great annoyance.52 He warned of an 'electric atmosphere of tension' as a result of the lack of consultation before the embarrassing statements were announced and suggested the proposals should be 'quietly dropped'.53
The violent reaction was particularly unfortunate in light of the efforts that had been made in Wellington to avoid any repetition of the offence that had arisen at Canberra. They had endeavoured to keep Batterbee advised of developments, despite the irritation this caused the Australians, and the high commissioner had been led to believe that there would be nothing of any great significance discussed; indeed he doubted that Fraser really wanted it to take place at all.54 Cranborne had still been suspicious about the invitation for Batterbee to attend only a formal meeting at the conference's end, without having heard any of what had been discussed beforehand. This he deemed to be 'an odd way of avoiding the impression that they took place behind closed doors'. There was also some recognition among New Zealand officials that talking about the future of the Pacific without inviting the British representative to attend would probably make London believe that the Antipodean Dominions were 'behaving a little queerly'.55 Nonetheless the Dominions secretary concluded that the authorities in Wellington would manage a meeting much better than had been the case in Canberra and he thought Fraser was trying to do the right thing.56 This was indeed probably the case as Batterbee certainly enjoyed a better relationship with his government than Cross across the Tasman.
With his direct assurances that 'nothing except of the most anodyne character would appear in the published statements' Batterbee was shocked when a copy of the speech to be released to the press was handed to him at the last moment.57 Evatt had insisted that a big statement be made and Fraser had been unable to resist. The high commissioner's best efforts to have the offending statement removed from the end-of-conference published statement proved to no avail; the responsibility for this lay with the Australian delegation and Batterbee thought it 'pretty monstrous'.58 Worse, the New Zealand authorities initially tried to claim that they had consulted with him beforehand about the nature of the statement and he was anxious to ensure that the DO did not think this was actually the case.59 There was in fact a great deal of sympathy across Whitehall for the way in which their colleague in distant Wellington had been treated.60 The instigator was recognized by all involved as having been Evatt; Cranborne thought it 'a bad story', particularly as far as the Australian politician was concerned.61 The high commissioner had written back to London immediately after the incident with a detailed account of the Australian's behaviour and an assessment of why he had followed this course; while having 'the profoundest admiration for Mr Churchill' he apparently believed that the government in London was inclined 'to overlook the independent nationhood of the Dominions'.62 He seemed particularly aggrieved that Australia had not been represented in the discussions about the armistice terms to be imposed upon Germany. If the same were the case when considering the terms for Japan there would be 'deep resentment'. Despite such criticisms, Evatt was keen to stress that the Tasman Dominions would be prepared to 'to act as a unit' in certain cases and wished to work with Britain in all matters relating to the Pacific. He recognized, though, that South Africa and Canada continued to approach the issue of the future relationship from a different viewpoint and there remained much discussion to be had about how the British Commonwealth might function in the post-war world.
An official response was sent by the DO and the words 'surprise', 'concern' and 'regret' were all mentioned. London felt that the Wellington conference was espousing a form of international control where colonies were concerned and the British authorities would now likely have to issue their own statement by way of response. In so doing this would inevitably highlight the difference in outlook which existed within the coalition. Both Dominions, in turn, produced long defences not just of their actions but also of their respective attitudes and approaches towards Colonial matters, to an extent which should have caused concern in London about future international discussions which might include the matter. Evatt, as was his want, went further, complaining about the tone of the telegram sent from London which he claimed 'recalled Colonial Office despatches of the distant past'. Cranborne was more than content to defend the manner in which his department had dealt with the spat. As he told the Minister for External Affairs in Canberra, there had been numerous 'very frank telegrams' received from the Australian government during his time as secretary of state and he had appreciated these as 'frankness is the nece
ssary basis of close and cordial collaboration'. On this most recent occasion, however, the unilateral statement on colonial policy had caused embarrassment in London. Not only had the British view been known in Canberra beforehand, and apparently ignored, there had been no prior warning or attempt to find common ground. For Cranborne to have not indicated the depth of dismay that this had caused in Whitehall would 'not have been fair to you nor to us'; indeed he thought the exchange had done some good and, even, cleared the air. Evatt did not agree and responded once again, this time petulantly pointing to occasions where the British government had embarrassed him, adding discussions about Polish boundaries to his now traditional complaints about the Cairo Conference, although it was not entirely clear how either had directly involved Australia. The Dominions secretary recognized these had taken place but they were a result of 'the emergencies of war' which sometimes required the making of rapid decisions. Where the future settlement of policy was concerned there was always time available for consultation with those countries that would be involved: this had not been forthcoming with the Wellington declaration.63 By way of conclusion he thanked both Dominions for their views and told them that British post-war Colonial policy had not yet been formulated. Batterbee was happy to report to London that he and Evatt had actually kept on good terms with one another, parting in 'the most friendly fashion', and the Australian seemed sincere in looking forward to next visiting London.64
Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War Page 20